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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the relevance of 
republican political theory to the current debates surrounding 
issues of global justice and democracy. I argue that a 
republican concern with domination contributes to these 
debates by making a clearer link between political participation 
and individuals’ capacity to protect their interests. The thesis 
synthesises two major approaches in political theory that draw 
on the republican tradition in political thought. It argues that 
Philip Pettit’s republicanism provides an appropriate link 
between participation and the prevention of domination. The 
thesis uses several rival approaches to the problem of global 
justice (drawn from Dryzek, Nagel, Held and Cohen and Sabel) 
to demonstrate that the uneven distribution of state capacities 
at the global level puts people at risk of domination. However, 
the rival approaches do not go far enough in explaining the role 
of democracy and political participation in preventing 
domination. The thesis develops a more robust theory of 
domination based on an account of basic interests. It argues 
that participation is valuable because it is the most effective 
way to ensure people can protect their basic interests. 
However, participation itself should be designed so it does not 
impose excessive costs on individuals. Throughout the thesis, 
the arguments are illustrated by reference to contemporary 
problems with developing and implementing international 
labour standards. In the concluding chapters, the theoretical 
discussion of domination is applied to develop practical 
suggestions that a major institution -  the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) - could implement in order to improve the 
situation of people subject to domination.
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Introduction
There are many critical terms from our everyday moral and political 
vocabulary that might reasonably be applied to the global political order 
as it exists today. People might call it unfair, unjust, exploitative, unequal, 
undemocratic, oppressive and so on. Some of the familiar figures about 
the distribution of wealth and income might reinforce the use of some of 
these terms. The claim that around 85 per cent of the world’s income 
goes to the richest 20 per cent of the world’s population while 6 per cent 
goes to the poorest 60 per cent (Hurrell, 2008, p. 11) is generally taken 
as a good demonstration of its inequality, and for many of its unfairness 
and injustice. My primary aim in this thesis is to ask whether domination 
is a term that can be applied to the global political order, and if so 
whether doing so tells us anything very useful about how to deal with 
some of the problems we find. Answering this question requires us to 
start with a rough idea of what we mean by domination, and I do so by 
looking at the term as it is used in contemporary republican political 
theory. Broadly speaking, for contemporary republicans, domination is an 
injustice that relates to the capacity to act without regard for the interests 
of those affected by ones actions (Pettit, 1997, p. 22ff, Shapiro, 2003, p. 
4). For the two main republican thinkers who form the focus of this thesis, 
a concern with domination already takes us some way towards a concern 
with political institutions. Both Philip Pettit and Ian Shapiro argue that, 
since domination results from misuse of the power to interfere with 
people’s interests, the remedy for domination is to design political 
institutions so that people with such power are in some way made to track 
the interests of those they affect. For both thinkers, this involves some 
form of democracy. The basic argument here is that democracy is a way 
of making those able to exercise power explain to those over whom it is 
exercised how it serves the latter’s interests. The task of explaining how 
this works will be left until later in the thesis. For now, three points are 
worth noting. First, republican political theory draws a much closer link 
between democracy and justice than many other branches of political
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science, political philosophy and political theory1. Domination is the 
primary injustice with which they concern themselves, and democracy, or 
democratic participation, is the primary institutional remedy for that 
injustice. Second, we need an account of the domains in which 
domination is possible, the way democracy works to alleviate it, and the 
way interests are affected when domination occurs. Third, if domination 
can be shown to be a significant problem at the global level, we would 
seem to have good reason to be concerned about the possibility of 
democratic means of alleviating it. This raises two questions that Charles 
Beitz distinguishes in a brief discussion of the prospect of developing a 
theory of global democracy as an extension of contemporary analytic 
cosmopolitanism:
The problem is simultaneously philosophical and institutional. The 
philosophical aspect is to distinguish the various kinds of reasons 
that explain why democratic forms are desirable at the domestic 
level and to judge whether and how these reasons are affected 
when the subject changes to governance beyond the state. The 
institutional aspect is to imagine what the range of realistically 
achievable alternative political arrangements is like at the global 
level, and to understand how they would likely operate in view of 
the incentives their procedures would establish (Beitz, 2005, p. 
26).
After setting out the republican conception of domination and explaining 
the focus on this aspect of republican theory, this thesis addresses 
Beitz’s problems. It does so in two main parts. In the first, mainly critical 
part, it sets out the answers that have been given to the philosophical and 
institutional questions by examining a set of four representative 
approaches, which are considered in four chapters. First, it identifies a 
global civil society approach in the work of John Dryzek, who places 
emphasis on democratic participation outside of and often in opposition to
1 For example, Brian Barry concluded “that there is nothing inherent in 
democracy that necessarily makes it just. Democracy is a procedure for 
formally capturing the views of citizens and translating them into 
outcomes. That procedure has only tangential connections to the 
outcomes being just” (Dowding, Goodin and Pateman, 2004, p. 5).
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the state. Dryzek scales up a domestic version of this argument to the 
global level. However, I argue that in doing so, Dryzek effectively 
demonstrates one of the ways in which domination can occur at the 
global level. Because some people do not have a state as a background 
source of protection, they are more directly vulnerable to civil society 
actions. Dryzek’s approach thus provides broad answers to both parts of 
Beitz’s questions. It identifies a desirable feature of domestic democracy 
and claims it can be scaled up institutionally to the global level. However, 
I am critical of these claims.
The second of the four chapters examines a statist argument that 
Thomas Nagel has recently reasserted. Although Nagel’s argument is not 
explicitly focused on democracy, criticism and reconstruction of helps to 
show how a specific form of democratic equality is relevant to controlling 
the power of the state. The examination of Nagel thus gives us an answer 
to part of Beitz’s first, philosophical question, namely why “democratic 
forms are desirable at the domestic level”. Nagel also gives a broad 
answer to the second question, which is that institutions at the global 
level derive their legitimacy from the states that set them up. This 
argument is subjected to criticism on the basis that Nagel tries to carry 
over the legitimacy of internally democratic states to a global order in 
which not all states fulfil their responsibilities to their citizens.
The third of the four chapters looks at David Held’s cosmopolitan 
democracy, which again provides distinct answers to Beitz’s two 
questions. It argues that domestic democracy succeeds to some extent in 
doing justice to a cosmopolitan concern with individual autonomy, global 
integration and interaction require democratic institutions at the global 
level. I argue that Held’s analogy between the domestic and the global 
levels is incomplete, and suggest that the discussion of Nagel provides us 
with the resources to complete it. Once this is done, though, Held’s 
institutional proposals can be questioned.
Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel provide a distinctive approach in that 
instead of proceeding from the domestic level, they take what they see as 
a version of democracy already at work in an international association. 
They argue that deliberative polyarchy in the EU works to enhance the
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legitimacy of EU decision making and can be expanded to the global 
level. However, this argument is subject to a criticism based on the 
disanalogy between the EU in which all states are domestically 
democratic, and the global level at which they are not.
The next three chapters of the thesis turn to the more constructive task of 
showing how republican domination can be used in an answer to Beitz’s 
two questions. The first of these three chapters deals mainly with the first 
of Beitz’s questions. It provides a fuller theoretical account of domination 
and explains how institutions might be designed to alleviate it. Although I 
argue that domestic democracy at the state level is the main institutional 
means for reducing or controlling domination, I also hold that 
cosmopolitan concern with individuals requires that we try to identify 
transitional means to reduce or control domination even where states are 
not internally democratic.
The second of the three chapters addresses Beitz’s second question 
more directly. It uses the International Labour Organization as an 
example, and explains how that specific institution can act to alleviate or 
mitigate the kind of domination identified. The third of the constructive 
chapters addresses some further criticisms, puts the arguments made 
into the context of the alternative proposals looked at earlier in the thesis, 
and identifies some possible avenues for further research. Finally, the 
conclusion offers an overview of the main arguments made through the 
thesis, summarises the key points, and raises some issues for further 
consideration.
Before proceeding to the main arguments, it is also worth addressing the 
issue of the empirical status of the proposals made in the thesis. I chose 
to address a specific issue in some detail in part because doing so allows 
for the development of a more consistent set of illustrative examples. 
However, I also hope to show that the use of specific examples can be 
used as the basis of a response to the charge that cosmopolitan political 
theories are utopian2. First, I do not make any empirical predictions about 
the likelihood that any of the practical proposals I develop will actually be
2 For discussions of the utopianism of earlier liberal forms of international 
political theory, see Brown (2005) and Dunne (2001).
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realised3. The role of the more empirical parts of the thesis is to try to 
identify feasible changes that could be made to existing institutions and 
practices in order to address the problems identified. If these changes are 
feasible and likely to be effective but they are not realised, this would still 
stand as an effective criticism of the moral status of contemporary 
political practices in this area. The point is to try to reinforce the moral 
criticism on the basis that there are available alternatives to current 
practices4.
Second, one of my main worries about thinkers like Held and Caney’s 
advocacy of strong cosmopolitan institutions is that they do not address 
the issue of whether or how democracy can be used to prevent arbitrary 
rule by such institutions5. The plausibility of my argument thus depends 
on whether my alternative proposals can be shown to be less demanding 
on international institutions, while still working to prevent domination. The 
International Labour Organisation is a useful test case for this kind of 
argument precisely because many of its activities are concerned with
3 Compare the comments Molly Cochran makes on the apparent 
similarities between the normative concerns of the cosmopolitan 
democrats she discusses and the concerns of functionalists and neo­
functionalists in international relations theory. Cochran at times appears 
to make two separate suggestions. First, that the study of empirical 
research in international relations can be used to generate practical 
proposals that are grounded in normative concerns (which is an approach 
endorsed in this thesis). Second, that the existence of normative 
concerns is itself the basis for sociological explanations of change in 
world politics. This second possibility is not addressed in this thesis (see 
Cochran, 2002, p. 540).
4 A somewhat similar approach is found in some of the work of Thomas 
Pogge, who emphasises the relatively low costs of redistribution of wealth 
to deal with global poverty: “Because our responsibility is negative and 
because so much harm can be prevented at so little cost to ourselves, the 
reduction of severe global poverty should be our foremost moral priority” 
(Pogge, 2001, p. 22). For critical remarks on Pogge, see Freeman (2006, 
2007). This is not to endorse Pogge’s own practical proposals. It is also 
not to say that the justification of moral principles depends on whether 
they can be realised at low cost to those responsible for realising them.
5 Held provides some discussion of the role of democracy in preventing 
arbitrary rule in his book Models of Democracy (2006, 3rd edition). 
However, his discussion of cosmopolitan democracy in that book is 
mainly focused on the institutional changes necessary to realise 
cosmopolitan democracy rather than on the role of such changes in 
preventing arbitrary rule at the global level (see Held, 2006, p. 290ff).
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building local level capacities rather than concentrating power at the 
supra-national level. I provide some suggestions for testing these claims 
in the concluding chapters of the thesis.
I will begin in the next chapter by providing a broad overview of 
republicanism and explaining why I have focused on Pettit and Shapiro’s 
versions of republican political theory in particular.
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One. Republicanism, Cosmopolitanism and Global 
Justice: An Overview
Outline of the Chapter
I) Introduction
II) Four key republican concepts
III) Two versions of cosmopolitanism
IV) Republicanism and contemporary political theory
V) Choice of Rival Theories
VI) Overview of Labour Standards
VII) Conclusion and Summary
I) Introduction
What contribution can republican political theory make to contemporary 
debates about global democratic justice? At the most general level, my 
argument in this thesis is that there are four main contributions 
republicanism can make. These are drawn from the distinct forms of neo­
republicanism elaborated in the work of Philip Pettit and Ian Shapiro. The 
most important of these is domination. I shall argue that a more robust 
and detailed conception of domination can make some of the problems 
faced by an institutional approach to global democratic justice more 
tractable. There are two further contributions to be drawn from Pettit’s 
republicanism. The first is the distinction between dominium and 
imperium. The second is Pettit’s more recent elaboration of a two- 
dimensional model of democracy. However, these components of Pettit’s 
theory need modification. In particular, Pettit’s conception of domination 
relies on a conception of interests that is not very clearly specified. I shall 
argue that Ian Shapiro’s conception of basic interests is the most useful 
starting point for a more robust account of interests. In the body of the 
thesis, I shall argue in the first four main chapters that different 
approaches to global democratic justice are each lacking in certain 
respects. In the three chapters following them, I shall make a case for a 
conception of domination that helps us to address the problems raised 
earlier. If asked to define the approach I take here, I would describe it as
12
morally grounded institutional design. The moral priority I defend is the 
prevention or minimization of domination. I shall argue in the final three 
chapters that providing a more robust account of domination as a moral 
problem helps point to some ways in which that problem can be 
addressed through institutional design. Before moving on to that task, I 
want in this chapter to do several things to set the general argument in 
the context of contemporary debates about global justice and democracy. 
There are five main points. First, I will outline Pettit’s key terms, 
domination, imperium and dominium and two-dimensional democracy, 
and Shapiro’s account of basic interests. Second, I will set out the main 
general approaches to global justice and democracy and my major 
concerns with them. Third, I will look at some of the potential ways in 
which republicanism might be applied to the problems identified. Fourth, I 
will explain my choice of the rival theories of global justice I will criticise. 
Fifth, I will explain my choice of the global labour standards issue as a 
specific case for the application of the theory developed here.
II) Domination, Dominium and Imperium; Two-Dimensional 
Democracy and Basic Interests
My basic concern is that the current structure of international political 
institutions leaves great scope for actions that disregard the interests of 
vulnerable people. I argue that the various institutional proposals for 
reform of such institutions fail to address this problem adequately. A 
modified republican conception of domination can be applied to at least 
some of these problems and generates institutional proposals to deal with 
them although the limited contextualism I advocated above may itself limit 
the scope of these applications beyond a specific set of cases.
Pettit defines his conception of domination with the following three-step 
formula: someone dominates or subjugates another, to the extent that,
1) They have the capacity to interfere
2) On an arbitrary basis
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3) In certain choices that the other is in a position to make (Pettit, 
1997, p. 52).
It has been noted that the term “arbitrary” carries a lot of the normative 
weight in this definition6. For example, Henry Richardson states,
Pettit’s central achievement has been to articulate a normative 
theory that provides an apt basis for [a] range of institutions and 
virtues [whose point] is to foster a central aspect of human 
freedom, namely, freedom from domination, from being subject to 
the arbitrary will of another (Richardson, 2006, p. 176)7.
This comment also emphasises the link between moral concerns on the 
one hand and formal constitutional issues on the other8. Pettit packs a lot 
into the basic term, “arbitrary”. The best place to begin the unpacking is 
with Pettit’s own reference to interests. Expanding on the notion of 
arbitrariness, Pettit argues,
[An] act of interference will be non-arbitrary to the extent that it is 
forced to track the interests and ideas of the person suffering the 
interference. Or, if not forced to track all the interests and ideas of 
the person involved...at least forced to track the relevant ones 
(Pettit, 1997, p. 55).
Not much more is said in this context about what Pettit means by 
interests. However, I shall argue that a more robust conception of
6 Although the term “interference” also usually carries pejorative meaning, 
Pettit emphasises that interference need not always be subject to moral 
criticism: “although interference always involves the attempt to worsen an 
agent’s situation, it need not always involve a wrongful act: coercion 
remains coercion, even if it is morally impeccable” (Pettit, 1997, p. 54).
7 Bohman claims that in an earlier work, Richardson criticised Pettit for 
giving a non-normative definition of domination (Bohman, 2008, p. 198). If 
this is so, Richardson appears to have changed his mind in the more 
recent work cited above.
8 As Richardson points out, the normative definition of domination 
distances Pettit from historical republicanism, which tended to exhibit 
what we might call a sort of institutional fetishism:
Historically, republican theory tended to lack an explicit (or, 
anyway, non-esoteric) normative basis, and instead consisted 
mainly of an insistence on various constitutional mechanisms 
designed to establish the rule of law, disperse power, and provide 
opportunities for contesting governmental decisions (Richardson, 
2006, p. 176).
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interests is necessary for at least two reasons. First, a more detailed 
understanding of interests promises to shed light on the mechanisms by 
which domination can work. Pettit suggests at several points that 
domination can occur when control of particular resources allows people 
to drive a hard bargain. He gives the example of “the pharmacist who 
agrees to sell an urgently required medicine but not for the standard 
fee...only on extortionate terms” (Pettit, 1997, p. 54). In this case, it 
appears that one interest (the need for the medicine) is being arbitrarily 
traded off against another (broadly, the interest in being charged a fair 
price, and perhaps more specifically, the financial well-being of the 
pharmacist’s client). This suggests that more flesh can be put on Pettit’s 
accounts of how agents can have the capacity to act in arbitrary ways. 
Second, a more detailed account of interests may help make clearer the 
distinction between relevant and irrelevant interests. Compare Pettit’s 
pharmacist example with the case of a jeweller who charges an 
extortionate price for some exclusive, collectable trinket. We would not 
usually think any relevant interests are at stake here. The jeweller might 
be acting in a broadly exploitative manner but we would not normally look 
with much sympathy on an obsessive collector who coughs up the cash 
for the bauble. This suggests we do need a more robust way of 
distinguishing between relevant or irrelevant interests. I can only offer a 
promissory note at this stage, but in the final chapters of the thesis I shall 
defend Ian Shapiro’s definition of basic interests in terms of “the obvious 
essentials that they need to develop into and survive as independent 
moral agents in the world as it is likely to exist for their lifetimes” (Shapiro, 
2003, p. 45). I shall defend this view on the grounds that the capacities 
needed for independent moral agency contribute to people’s ability to live 
a decent or successful life. The rough definition thus needs considerable 
unpacking and modification to serve our purposes. However, it is valuable 
in that it draws attention to a general ethical concern with the substantive 
resources people need in order to achieve some sort of decent or 
satisfying life, and how that concern can be related to a republican 
concern with domination.
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There are two further reasons for the appeal of Pettit’s republican 
approach to the problem of domination. The first can be drawn from his 
distinction between dominium and imperium. These terms mark a rough 
distinction between, respectively, private and public forms of domination. 
The former are kinds of domination that occur between ordinary people in 
their everyday interactions, individually and collectively (Pettit, 1997, p. 
130)9. The latter are cases of domination by the state. This distinction has 
made Pettit’s republicanism attractive from a range of theoretical 
perspectives -  most significantly feminism and multiculturalism10. In the 
context of global justice, the distinction is relevant precisely because of 
the comparative lack of powerful state-like institutions. One of my 
arguments is that the lack of such institutions makes the risk of dominium 
much greater. Furthermore, if the institutional structures necessary to 
prevent dominium are different from those necessary to prevent 
imperium, it will be unwise to simply try to replicate the latter structures in 
order to prevent dominium.
A second further source of appeal is Pettit’s distinction between electoral 
and contestatory democracy -  he calls this a two dimensional model of 
democracy. Pettit has made this aspect of his political theory more 
explicit and systematic in a series of papers published since 
Republicanism (1999, 2000, 2005). Nevertheless, the basic distinction 
relates to the prevention of domination in the following way. Pettit argues 
that laws and political decisions will not dominate people “so far as they 
are forced to track the perceived interests of those on whom they are 
imposed and do not represent an arbitrary form of interference” (Pettit, 
1999, p. 170). Two-dimensional democracy is intended to put institutional
9 It might be asked whether one corporate entity can dominate another. It 
is almost certainly the case that this can happen. However, from the point 
of view of the broadly cosmopolitan perspective taken here, these cases 
are only of derivative interest: that is, if they result in domination of 
individuals.
10 See especially Iris Marion Young, whose book Inclusion and 
Democracy (2000) brings together a range of feminist and socialist 
concerns about democracy. Cecile Laborde (2001, 2006) has provided a 
republican perspective on contemporary issues raised by multiculturalism 
and secularism in France.
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flesh on the bones of this account of non-dominating government. The 
aim is thus to show how democratic participation is linked to a general 
good -  non-domination -  that a wide range of people can endorse as 
contributing to a reasonably successful and decent life11. The first, 
electoral, dimension is designed to provide minimal assurance that 
governments will take account of perceived interests: “Under a popular, 
periodic electoral system, whatever its other features, those in 
government will be unlikely to be re-elected if they display indifference to 
common, perceived interests” (Pettit, 1999, p. 171). However, since 
people will also have different interests in any diverse society, it is always 
possible that some people will end up worse off -  being subject to 
interference in the sense noted in the definition above. As Pettit puts it, “if 
the common interest is to be advanced, therefore, the decision making 
procedure has to allow for some people to be treated less well than 
others” (Pettit, 1999, p. 179). This will not represent arbitrary or 
dominating interference if the “decision is made just on the basis of what 
course of action would promote the shared goal” (Pettit, 1999, p. 179). 
Contestatory democracy is thus designed to ensure that people can 
protect their interests against the arbitrary pursuit of collective goals.
I have three remarks that are relevant to how I will develop the question 
of how international institutions might be designed and might act to 
mitigate or reduce domination.
First, Pettit sometimes argues that this two dimensional model is 
specifically intended to prevent domination by government institutions. 
This leads to a strong emphasis on the common good:
Not only ought government to be oriented toward the satisfaction 
of people’s common, recognizable interests; those are the only 
factors that it ought to take its ultimate guidance from. Government 
ought to countenance no other master (Pettit, 1999, p. 107).
11 As Pettit puts it, non-domination is a primary good in the sense that it 
“is something that a person has instrumental reasons to want, no matter 
what else they want” (Pettit, 1997, p. 90). I would stress that the 
conception of interests outlined here connects non-domination to the 
capacities people require in order to live a decent or successful life.
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This suggests that Pettit’s two-dimensional democracy is primarily 
oriented towards preventing imperium -  domination by the state or 
government. He does not say much about the mechanisms necessary to 
prevent dominium -  domination by private individuals or by non-state 
collective entities12. Yet presumably such an account must play its part in 
any elaboration of republican institutions. Any account of the mechanisms 
needed to prevent dominium will need to be aware of the distinctions 
between the way imperium and dominium work.
Second, when applying a concern with preventing domination to issues of 
global justice, it is important to note two issues. If there are severe 
inequalities in the world, it is much more likely that particular policy 
decisions will affect some groups much more severely than others. This 
indicates that the contestatory dimension of Pettit’s model will play a 
more significant role at the global level. Furthermore, in the absence of a 
world government, and in a world in which many states are weak or 
incapable, the likelihood of dominium is much greater. These points 
suggest that our attention should be on the elements of contestatory 
democracy most likely to protect those who have urgent interests at 
stake.
Third, as various critics of Pettit have pointed out13, too much 
contestation is itself likely to make action to prevent domination difficult. If 
the grounds for contestation are too vaguely defined, we are likely to get 
bogged down in continuous contestations, which would result in a similar 
outcome to giving everyone veto powers over decisions that affect them 
negatively -  precisely the outcome Pettit wants to avoid14. Shapiro’s 
basic response to this problem seems to me correct: uUniess we limit 
rights of delay to those whose basic interests are threatened, we privilege
12 Perhaps a case could be made for a collective or common interest in 
preventing dominium, but Pettit does not seem make this case in his 
discussions of two-dimensional democracy.
13 See Shapiro, 2003, Ferejohn, 2000, 2001, and Van Parijs, 1999.
14 “If people had an individual power of veto then every...initiative could 
be stymied...as persons tried to push the relative costs of the initiative 
elsewhere” (Pettit, 2000, p. 1118).
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the status quo, making it impossible for government to prevent 
domination” (Shapiro, 2003, p. 48, emphasis added).
I have outlined the features of a republican approach to domination that 
make it relevant to questions of global justice. First, there is the concern 
that the current structure of international institutions and international 
society leaves individuals vulnerable to domination. Second, there is the 
distinction between dominium and imperium, which is relevant to a 
situation in which government institutions are weak or absent. Third, there 
is the focus on the contestatory dimension of democracy, which focuses 
attention on the need for participatory institutions that are sensitive to the 
fact that people often have different interests at stake in particular 
decisions.
It is also worth summarising the connection between Pettit’s theory of 
domination and Shapiro’s account of basic interests. My argument is that 
Pettit’s claim that non-domination requires that agents be forced to track 
the relevant interests of affected people is incomplete as it stands. In 
order to complete the account, we need a clearer understanding of 
relevant interests. My claim is that Shapiro’s account of basic interests -  
defined as the resources needed for independent moral agency - is suited 
for this task when it is put in the context of a contribution to the 
responsible pursuit of a decent or successful life15. A further point Shapiro 
makes is that control of basic interests is itself a potential source of 
domination, in the sense that control over the basic resources people 
need to survive can be used to influence their ability to make choices. 
Distribution of resources thus becomes important, because “one’s access 
to goods and services affects one’s relative power and vulnerability to the 
power of others” (Shapiro, 1999, p. 232). On this view, it is not enough 
that institutions simply hand out resources. The way those resources are
15 It should be stressed that Shapiro does not claim that his account of 
basic interests is completely neutral with regard to conceptions of the 
good. Rather, his aim is to provide an account of how democratic justice 
enables people to pursue interests that contribute to their happiness and 
fulfilment in a responsible manner: “Whereas the idea of adequate pursuit 
of interests refers to the freedoms and resources that people need to live 
their lives, that of responsible pursuit of interests directs attention to what 
they may reasonably require of one another” (Shapiro, 1999, p. 88).
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handed out is also important, since control of resources is a potential 
source of domination. The upshot of this is that my argument attempts to 
connect the concern (drawn from Pettit) with institutions that are designed 
to track interests with a concern (drawn from Shapiro) that people should 
be able to pursue a decent or successful life in a responsible manner.
Ill) Two Versions of Cosmopolitanism
The approach taken in this thesis is cosmopolitan in the very broad sense 
that it attempts to elaborate appropriate standards of political morality that 
are not confined within the borders of states, and claims that these 
standards apply to all people16. However, in order to justify taking a 
distinctively republican approach to cosmopolitan morality, it is worth 
beginning by setting out some basic worries about two important forms of 
contemporary cosmopolitanism. I shall call the first version analytical 
cosmopolitanism. The name is less than perfect, but it aims to capture 
two strands in the broadly liberal tradition that proceeds from the criticism 
of Rawls’s attempt to limit principles of distributive justice to liberal states 
in A Theory of Justice17. These two strands are the moral claim that 
human individuals are the objects of moral concern and the more political 
claim that humans are owed some sort of equality in the distribution of
16 This is admittedly a very thin conception of cosmopolitanism. 
Significantly, a version of it might be seen in the work of David Miller, who 
argues that there are universal moral principles that apply across state 
borders but that these are weaker than substantive equality. See, for 
example Miller, 2002a. Brian Barry gives a more general definition of 
cosmopolitanism that appears frequently in the literature. 
Cosmopolitanism holds that “individual human beings have (ultimate) 
value; that each human being has equal moral value; and that the first 
two clauses apply to all human beings” (Barry, 1999, pp. 35-6).
17 Two of the most important texts here are Beitz (1979) and Pogge 
(1989). Both of these thinkers have since modified their positions 
somewhat. Compare Beitz (2001) and Pogge (2002). More recent 
cosmopolitan theories that take a broadly liberal approach include Caney 
(2004), Moellendorf (2002), and Tan (2000). Rawls’s reply to Beitz and 
Pogge can be found in Rawls (1999).
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resources. A second approach might be called critical cosmopolitanism18. 
This approach shares the moral universalism of Habermas’s approach 
but places more emphasis on the need for participatory and democratic 
processes at the global level.
i) Analytical Cosmopolitanism
The first strand in the analytical or anglophone literature on 
cosmopolitanism is a claim about the moral status of individuals. Brian 
Barry and Thomas Pogge have set out a basic three-part formulation of 
this position in similar ways:
1) Human beings are ultimate units of moral concern. Families, 
tribes, nations, cultures and so on can become units of moral 
concern only indirectly. 2) The status as an ultimate unit of moral 
concern extends to all human beings equally. 3) Human beings 
should be treated as ultimate units of moral concern by everyone 
(Pogge, 1992, pp. 48-9. See also Barry’s version in note 11 
above).
Philosophers on both sides have also conceded that the basic principles 
set out in the argument are relatively weak claims that most people would
18 I am wary about using this term, since none of the authors referred to 
here actually use it. It is intended to signal the connection to critical theory 
in the Habermasian tradition. Habermas’s own work in this area includes 
(1997, 2001, 2006). Some of other the main texts include Forst (2001, 
2002), Brunkhorst (2002), Fraser (2005a, 2005b), and Gould (2004). Iris 
Young’s (2000) and Seyla Benhabib’s (2002, 2006) work are interesting 
cases because they accept some of the arguments about changing 
contexts and institutional structures of justice but attempt to make more 
room for existing cultural attachments than some of the other critical 
theorists referred to. Some commentators have argued that Habermas 
himself makes more room for these types of commitment than is usually 
acknowledged (see Laborde, 2002). As we shall see below, John Dryzek 
is more radical. He rejects the apparent reconciliation between Habermas 
and Rawls that Gutman discusses (2003).
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endorse19. They are moral principles that do not make any strong 
institutional claims, as Beitz acknowledges:
Cosmopolitanism need not make any assumptions at all about the 
best political structure for international affairs; whether there 
should be an overarching global political institution...is properly 
understood as a problem for normative political science rather than 
as a problem for political philosophy itself (Beitz, 1998, p. 831 )20.
I have two main concerns about this approach. First, as David Miller has 
pointed out, and as several cosmopolitan philosophers themselves 
concede, the basic moral principles provide us with limited guidance in 
terms of actions.
David Miller has argued that in order for moral cosmopolitanism to be 
more effective in providing action-guiding proposals, a substantive 
account of what it means to treat people as targets of ultimate, general 
and equal moral concern is needed21. In more recent work on global 
justice, Beitz appears to concede this point:
Concentrating on the substantive reasons for concern about 
global inequality reduces the temptation to error by directing 
attention to policy measures that specifically address these 
concerns -  for example, relief of poverty, improvement of nutrition,
19 For discussions of disagreement over such principles that focus on 
issues of cultural relativism, see Beitz (2001, pp. 115-6), Caney (2004, 
ch2 and ch3) and Miller (2008, ch7).
20 See also Barry, 1999, p. 36: “Because it is defined in terms of a moral 
stance rather than (as with statism and nationalism) an institutional 
nostrum, there is a good deal of room for dispute about the institutions 
that would be best adapted to bringing about a cosmopolitan vision of a 
just world”.
21 Caney also notes the need to provide a substantive account of human- 
well being. In response to the argument that such accounts are 
controversial, Caney makes two points. First, Caney argues that a 
substantive account requires “a more ecumenical view that genuinely 
encompasses the perspectives of all [and] enjoins us to be ever vigilant in 
our ascription of human interests” (Caney, 2004, p, 76). Second, “one 
instructive way of minimizing the likelihood of foisting a partial vision of 
human interests on all human beings is to protect each person’s human 
interest in freedom of belief and expression” (Caney, 2004, p. 76).
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empowerment of local communities and so forth (Beitz, 2001, p. 
121 )22.
The account of basic interests drawn from Shapiro is intended to address 
this issue, since it attempts to provide a substantive account of what it 
means to treat people as targets of moral concern.
The second concern brings us to the issue of redistributivist 
cosmopolitanism. My worry here is not so much about the principles of 
equality that redistributivists advocate, as with the possible institutional 
arrangements that might result when putting those principles into 
practice. As Andrew Hurrell puts this point,
[If] serious efforts to reduce global poverty do come about, then 
the potential power of external actors will grow and the dangers for 
democratic politics and political autonomy and for legitimate 
difference will come into starker relief (Hurrell, 2001, p. 47).
Hurrell’s concern is thus a worry about the possibility that cosmopolitan 
institutions might concentrate and misuse power. Now a standard 
cosmopolitan response to this claim would draw on the distinction 
between moral and political cosmopolitanism and argue that this is not an 
issue for cosmopolitan morality -  in Beitz’s terms, Hurrell’s worry is a 
worry for normative political science. I believe that the republican account 
of domination provides a useful response to this cosmopolitan argument.
If domination has an impact on people’s ability to fulfil or act on their basic 
interests, and this account of basic interests is connected to our 
understanding of what it means substantively to treat people as targets of 
(cosmopolitan) moral concern, then a concern with domination is relevant 
to a more substantive account of cosmopolitan morality. Pettit argues that 
domination results when institutions fail to track people’s basic interests. 
As result, a concern with arrangements that ensure that institutions do 
track such interests is central to Pettit’s republicanism23. My argument
22 See also Beitz (2005). Miller’s argument will be discussed in more 
detail in the chapter on Held, below.
23 For a different argument that connects political principles of equality to 
a moral concern with individuals, see Held. Held argues that a proper 
concern with individual autonomy leads to principles of political 
participation on an equal basis (see Held, 2004, 2005).
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here is that part of the substantive concern with the moral status of 
individuals should involve attention to the kinds of policies that can force 
institutions to track the interests of affected people. That is, attention to 
preventing domination as a form of arbitrary rule. The aim is to move from 
a substantive concern with basic interests and their role in a decent life to 
policy proposals that can reduce domination by helping to ensure that 
decisions track the interests people have at stake in particular decisions. 
Equality may play a role in some cases24, but such a role is subordinate 
to the concern with preventing domination.
ii) Critical Cosmopolitanism
Critical cosmopolitanism is an approach that gains much of its momentum 
from critical theory and from Habermas’s version of deliberative 
democracy in particular. It is more recent and perhaps more diverse and 
less firmly established than redistributive cosmopolitanism -  indeed the 
name I have given it is not one its advocates themselves use. Although 
the approaches are complex, subtle and often ambitious in trying to bring 
together a range of political concerns, they do share an important central 
focus on participation25. Nancy Fraser makes this point clearly:
In my view, the most general meaning of justice is parity of 
participation. According to this radical democratic interpretation of 
the principle of equal moral worth, justice requires social 
arrangements that permit all to participate as peers in social life. 
Overcoming injustice means dismantling institutionalized obstacles 
that prevent some people from participating on a par with others, 
as full partners in social interaction (Fraser, 2005b, p. 73)26.
24 For example, it may explain the particular conception of equality that is 
at play in electoral democracy.
25 The emphasis on participation certainly serves to distinguish the critical 
approach from the analytical approach.
It is also worth noting that, in this statement of her position, Fraser 
bases her claim about participation on a claim about equal moral worth.
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Developing a point made in her earlier work27, Fraser suggests that 
political theorists need to address the question of the how of political 
decisions about justice as well as the what, where the former is 
understood in terms of the capacity to participate in social interaction28. 
My concern about this approach is that -  at least as it is expressed in 
Fraser’s discussion of global justice -  it sets up quite a sharp opposition 
between the what and the how of justice without providing a clear account 
of how to reconcile the two29. For example, a major problem for this 
approach is the following question:
Merely showing that poor people or ethnic minorities do not 
participate is not enough, on its own, to demonstrate injustice or a 
lack of democracy. There might be a number of interrelated 
reasons why citizens decide to take no part in political affairs which 
are democratically innocuous (Dowding, Goodin and Pateman, 
2004, p. 7).
The republican approach to domination outlined above does provide 
clearer guidance on this issue. My basic argument here is that the 
concern with domination provides a link between arbitrariness, interests 
and contestation. The contestatory aspect of Pettit’s republican inspired 
version of democracy in particular emphasises the importance of 
participatory procedures that are designed to ensure that decisions are 
forced to track the (relevant) interests of those concerned. As Laborde 
and Maynor put this point in their discussion of contemporary 
republicanism,
27 See, for example, (1995, 1997).
28 Fraser suggests that changes in the structure of global politics have 
also changed the question of who can claim to be included. This is a 
common concern with redistributivist cosmopolitans, as well as those who 
defend the view that questions of justice are still confined to states.
29 Compare also Forst, who proposes a distinction between minimal and 
maximal justice. “Minimal justice calls for a basic structure of justification, 
maximal justice for a fuliy justified basic structure” (Forst, 2001, p. 181). 
Minimal justice includes the capacity to participate in political discourse, 
which includes a substantive “threshold of political and social equality” 
(Forst, 2001, p. 182). However, Forst does not specify what would 
happen if the discourses produce outcomes that conflict with maximal 
justice.
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[The] tight conceptual fit between freedom and forms of political 
rule has strengthened the republican normative commitment to the 
political institutionalization of non-domination (Laborde and 
Maynor, 2008, p. 9).
Although my own view is that basic interests are more important as a 
component of a basic conception of domination, the point that 
republicanism establishes a closer conception between participation and 
other political values is nevertheless relevant.
As a final point, it is worth concluding this brief discussion of critical 
approaches to cosmopolitanism by addressing one of the more radical 
democratic arguments. Dowding, Goodin and Pateman sum up the basic 
argument quite neatly:
For more radical theorists, democracy -  extending beyond the 
electoral process -  is intrinsically valuable because...of the effects 
of participation on individual citizens, including the development of 
a public spirit or sense of justice (Dowding, Goodin and Pateman, 
2004, p. 6).
A basic response to this claim runs as follows. A view in which 
democratic participation is seen as making it possible for people to 
pursue values and goods that are extrinsic to participation will also make 
room for those who find intrinsic value in participation. Those who find 
participation inherently valuable will have at least some opportunity to 
participate. The converse is less likely to be true: if a strong intrinsic view 
of participation is allowed too much influence, the demands of 
participation and active citizenship may make it increasingly difficult for 
people to pursue other things they value. For this reason, Shapiro argues 
that participation is best understood as what he calls a consumption 
good: “people should be free -  but not forced -  to engage in it” (Shapiro, 
2003, p. 43)30. This argument is brief, but it does suggest that it is
30 See also Miller, who argues (in the context of a discussion of domestic 
democracy) that participation at local levels could be combined with 
competitive elections at national level. For Miller, this would have the 
advantage that “people would enjoy the benefits of participation in a 
forum...which is small enough to make participation meaningful” (Miller, 
1983, p. 154). Miller’s attempt to reconcile participatory and competitive
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possible to reconcile a view in which participation is seen as intrinsically 
valuable with a pluralist view of the values and projects people may want 
to pursue.
This rough outline of two of the main contemporary approaches to global 
justice suggests that they do share one problem. Put crudely, although 
they focus respectively on distribution of resources and participation, it is 
not clear that they provide an adequate answer to the normative question 
of why it is that these issues of central focus are targets of moral 
criticism31. I have suggested that the republican theory of domination 
points us in the direction of a clearer answer to the normative question: 
roughly, inequality and lack of participation are subject to normative 
criticism if they result in arbitrary curtailments of persons’ ability to 
vindicate their interests. An account of domination thus promises to 
provide a way of stabilising the commitments to redistribution and 
participation that are different foci of the two approaches. I argue that it 
does so by reference to basic interests32. Furthermore, the reference to 
contestation suggests a close link between the prevention of domination 
and the need for political structures that are designed to track people’s 
interests.
IV) Republicanism and Contemporary Political Theory
Having set out my worries about two of the main approaches to 
cosmopolitan justice and explained how a focus on domination might 
begin to address those worries, I now want to narrow the focus to
democracy suggests that both have advantages that can only be realised 
in certain conditions, as well as indicating that the intrinsic value of 
participation does not necessarily outweigh the value of competition.
I am using “normative” in the broad philosophical sense of attempts to 
make judgements about the goodness or badness of states of affairs. 
This contrasts with the sociological understanding of norms as structures 
that regulate social activity.
32 Pettit would probably argue that it does so by reference to a republican 
conception of freedom as non-domination. However, as I noted above, 
Pettit’s account of domination in Republicanism does rely quite heavily on 
a reference to interests as the object of arbitrary interference.
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republicanism itself and to explain why I have chosen to direct most of my 
attention to domination. Within political theory, republicanism is a broad 
term that has attracted a range of political philosophers33. It is not 
possible here to cover all the different contributions that republicanism 
has made to political theory34. It is possible to identify five main areas that 
are relevant to the discussion of global justice, however. First is the 
question of the role of historicist approaches to republicanism. Second is 
the issue of the relationship between republicanism and 
communitarianism. Third is the question of republicanism and citizenship. 
Fourth is the recent attempt to begin to address the possibility of 
republican cosmopolitanism. Fifth, there is the issue of republicanism and 
constitutional theory.
i) Republicanism and the History of Political Thought
The most significant and detailed examinations of republican themes 
have come from the history of political thought, and from the attempt to 
recover neglected republican ideas from the works of Early Modern 
political writers35. My main preoccupation is with how this excavation of 
the republican tradition has been put to use in addressing contemporary 
political issues, particularly in the work of Philip Pettit. As a result, this 
thesis will not address the historical debates surrounding the emergence 
and progress of republican ideas, and will take Pettit’s work in particular
33 To some extent, republicanism has been seen as a “progressive, but 
non-Marxist, political doctrine” (Lovett, 2006). It has thus attracted a 
range of theorists who want to provide a progressive alternative to 
liberalism. For a more critical view of the idea of republicanism as an 
alternative to liberalism, see Gaus (2003).
34 Laborde and Maynor (2008) is a useful starting point, though.
35 The most significant exponents of this approach are Quentin Skinner 
(1978, 1997), and J.G. A. Pocock (1995), whose interpretative approach 
forms a distinct and influential school in the history of political thought. 
Other historically informed republican work includes Viroli (1992), Elkin 
(1987), Pagden (1987), Weintraub (1988), Rahe (1992), Bock (1990), and 
Baron (1966). Probably the most significant discussions of republican 
ideas in international relations theory are Onuf (1998), with a historical 
focus and Deudney (2008), with a focus on security theory.
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as a statement of republican ideas that are most relevant to 
contemporary issues.
Despite this, there are two significant points I want to draw from the 
historicist approach to republicanism. The first is simply that the 
republican focus on history encourages us to focus on republican ideas 
that have actually been realised in practice in the past and on ideas that 
continue to be practiced. This approach justifies, for example, Philip 
Pettit’s assertion that his two-dimensional model of democracy “is fairly 
true to established ways of conceiving of democracy; it does not 
represent a new-fangled idea” (Pettit, 1999, p. 105). As a broad point, this 
feature of republicanism provides something of an antidote to the more 
utopian tendencies of contemporary discussions of global justice.
The second point is Pettit’s distinction between neo-Roman and Athenian 
traditions of political thought. This distinction also takes the form of a 
contrast between populism and communitarianism on the one hand and 
republicanism on the other in Pettit’s work36. Pettit draws a sharp contrast 
between an Athenian approach in which political participation is viewed 
as an intrinsic value, and a neo-Roman approach in which political 
participation is instrumental to the protection of freedom as non­
domination, and should be restricted through various constitutional 
safeguards to prevent problems such as majority tyranny37. The main 
attraction of the neo-Roman approach is that it is more compatible with 
pluralism. Pettit’s rejection of the populist or Athenian tradition is (rather 
unusually) harsh. He rejects this tradition, which
[Hails] the democratic participation of the people as one of the highest 
forms of good and that often waxes lyrical, in communitarian vein, 
about the desirability of the close, homogeneous society that popular 
participation is often taken to presuppose (Pettit, 1997, p. 8).
36 Compare also Rawls’s distinction between Civic Humanism and 
Classical Republicanism, which some authors have taken as an 
opportunity to develop a somewhat republican interpretation of Rawls 
(Rawls, 2001, Audard, 2007).
It should be stressed that the Athenian and neo-Roman models are 
ideal types. There is much discussion in particular about whether 
Athenian democracy was as participatory and discursive as its 
enthusiasts claim (see Pettit, 1997, for references).
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This position seems hard to defend in a situation of cultural and political 
pluralism. Pettit’s claim is that non-domination as a political ideal is 
compatible with pluralism, and that democratic participation is valuable 
and important as a way of promoting non-domination (Pettit, 1997, p. 8). 
The task of the final chapters of the thesis is to show how non-domination 
can be defended in these terms.
A further reason to find interest in neo-Roman republicanism is its focus 
on constitutionalism. As Pettit and other suggest, a concern with 
constitutions stretches back to Cicero’s discussion of the Roman practice 
of sharing power between different interest groups or social classes in 
Roman society (Pettit, 1997, p. 5). The issue of constitutionalism raises a 
number of large questions, however, and I shall return to it later in this 
chapter.
ii) Republicanism and Communitarianism
As we have seen, in Republicanism, Pettit is quite explicit about 
distancing himself from the Athenian version of the republican tradition. 
Communitarian authors have been much more enthusiastic in their 
attitude to this tradition, and above all in relation to its emphasis on 
themes such as public participation and civic virtue38. Since I do not have 
the space here to address all the subtleties and complexity of a possible 
argument between the Athenian and Roman traditions, I will try to do 
something less ambitious. I want to argue that the theory of domination 
outlined above and developed in detail below is still relevant from the 
perspective of one prominent recent communitarian version of 
republicanism. This version is found in various works by David Miller, and 
is particularly salient because Miller has developed some of his
38 Pettit links the Athenian republican tradition to Hannah Arendt (1958, 
1973). He also refers to Viroli (1992). Communitarians who have explicitly 
expressed sympathy to republican ideas include Miller, 2000, Sandel
(1996) and Taylor (1995). Kymlicka also emphasises communitarian 
values in the context of promoting democratic debate, although not in an 
explicitly republican context (Kymlicka, 1999, 2001).
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arguments in the context of global justice. I will start by setting out a 
rough outline of Miller’s basic argument, which has four main steps.
1) Weak cosmopolitanism. We should be concerned about the well 
being of people everywhere.
2) National self-determination makes an important contribution to 
people’s well being.
3) National self-determination means states will pursue policies that 
are likely to lead to unequal outcomes, particularly in the 
distribution of wealth. Attempts to restore equality will conflict with 
self-determination.
4) Therefore, national self determination conflicts with cosmopolitan 
or global egalitarianism.
In order to reconcile the apparent conflict between global justice and 
national self determination that this argument generates, Miller appeals to 
a more complex list of priorities of global justice. These are: respect for 
human rights, prevention of exploitation, political self-determination for 
peoples and redress of historic injustice. There are three key points that I 
want to stress about this argument. First, Miller defines human rights in 
terms of claims to resources necessary for people to fulfil a basic need to 
live a minimally decent life39. Second, the second step above is justified 
by reference to a range of republican arguments40, so it is appropriate to 
see Miller’s appeal to national self determination as a broadly republican 
claim. Third, it is important to stress Miller’s concern with exploitation. In 
an early article on global justice, Miller gives a rough outline of an 
exploitative situation:
One [example] is a case where an international corporation sets up 
an operation in a developing country which would be seen as 
hazardous or in some other way unacceptable in an industrialized 
society, and which would therefore be outlawed or a least strictly
39 See Miller, 2008a, chapter 7.
40 In particular, Miller argues that republican civic virtue is a human value 
that can only be sustained in bounded, self-determining political 
communities (see Miller, 1995, 2000, 2008b).
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regulated by the government...Why do we see such a situation as 
potentially exploitative of the foreign workers and the communities 
they belong to?...[Given] the levels of unemployment prevalent in 
many poor countries, those who sign up with the corporation are 
likely to be desperate to earn wages, and therefore willing to take 
on these jobs despite the health and other risks they pose (Miller, 
1999, p. 206).
Although Miller is sceptical about providing a more general account of 
exploitation, I would argue that the outline of domination provided above 
resembles this kind of case and does point the way to a more general 
theory41. The fact that workers rely on the employer for basic needs puts 
the employer in a position to act without regard to their safety, because 
he can threaten to fire workers who complain. This is an example of lack 
of access to basic goods or services making one vulnerable to the power 
of others, as Shapiro might put it. Miller’s example of exploitation thus 
bears a significant resemblance to the version of domination based on 
basic interests that is defended here. When person A has basic needs at 
stake, it is possible for person B who controls access to resources to act 
in ways that undermine the interests of A.
My point here is that we do not need to adjudicate between the Athenian 
and the Roman versions of republicanism in order to discuss the kind of 
situation Miller identifies above. We do not need to try to show directly 
that the communitarian or neo-Roman version of republicanism is 
incorrect or incoherent in order to see that the workers in this situation are 
being treated wrongly. Rather, both versions share a common concern 
with a kind of injustice that is more basic. Miller describes this as 
exploitation. For Pettit or Shapiro, it would be viewed as an example of 
domination.
41 One problem for Miller is that exploitation is often criticised on 
egalitarian grounds because some are left worse off than others in 
relative terms. This criticism is clearly not available to Miller in his 
discussion of global justice. For a discussion of egalitarian critiques of 
exploitation, see Roemer (1995).
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iii) Republicanism and citizenship
Is there anything about a distinctively republican conception of citizenship 
that can be carried over to contemporary concerns about 
cosmopolitanism and global justice?42 Two of the most explicit critics of 
contemporary or neo-republicanism have argued that the most obviously 
distinctive features of classical or historical republicanism are something 
of an embarrassment to the neo-republicans. Robert Goodin focuses on 
the republican emphasis on status and relative standing. Goodin argues 
that a distinct and exclusive focus on status can undermine or conflict 
with morality, and lead to petty conflicts:
Internalizing concerns with one’s image differs importantly from 
internalizing morality as such...particularly when the guardians of 
the image themselves internalize a code of image based honour, 
rather than a substantive code of morality as such...Republics 
grounded in this sort of honour are quintessential^ duelling 
societies (Goodin, 2003, p. 64).
Goodin and Hanasz identify another even more morally troubling aspect 
of the republican tradition: its emphasis on militaristic and martial virtues. 
As Hanasz puts it, “Machiavelli brutally declared that human lives could 
be sacrificed when the common interest was at stake” (Hanasz, 2006, p. 
286). Perhaps republicans are right to be embarrassed by these aspects 
of their tradition, and to turn away from them where possible. There are 
good republican reasons for this, though. Put simply, these versions of 
citizenship are a problem for republicans if they themselves result in 
domination. For the cosmopolitan version of republicanism defended 
here, the pursuit of status or martial virtue would itself be subject to 
contestation by other people on the grounds that it conflicts with their 
basic interests. Nevertheless, Goodin and Hanasz’s criticisms should 
press republicans to think more thoroughly about citizenship, and
42 For more general theories of cosmopolitan citizenship, see the essays 
collected in Hutchings and Danreuther (1999).
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perhaps to reflect more carefully on what exactly it is that republican 
citizenship is supposed to promote43.
One possible response by republicans is to focus on more general civic 
virtues such as active citizenship, vigilance in the face of excessive state 
power, and responsible pursuit of moral values. The problem with this 
move is that it makes the gap between republicanism and other civic- 
minded political theories infinitesimally small. We can illustrate this by 
comparing David Miller’s version of republican citizenship with Brian 
Barry’s civic nationalism44. Miller emphasises the importance of active 
and responsible national citizenship, and its importance for any feasible 
trans-national citizenship:
[Such] possibilities for transnational citizenship as may exist 
depend upon first strengthening citizenship and inculcating civic 
virtue within national boundaries, and then hoping that these 
qualities may carry across to wider constituencies (Miller, 2000, p. 
95).
Miller does not say much about how this might actually work, but it would 
presumably be uncomfortable with the kinds of status-oriented and 
militaristic republicanism mentioned above. It also seems to rule out 
strong forms of ethnic nationalism: Miller is more explicit in distancing 
himself from these45. However, if we reject ethnic nationalism, it is very
43 Again, my own argument here is that a focus on a more robust 
conception of domination provides a better moral and practical structure 
to republican political thought.
44 See also Rawls’s response to republicanism. Rawls makes common 
cause with republicanism by stressing that active political participation by 
virtuous citizens is necessary to sustain the democratic liberties that form 
a central part of his version of liberalism:
Between classical republicanism...and the liberalism represented 
by Constant and Berlin, there is no fundamental opposition...[The] 
question is [just] to what degree citizens’ engaging in politics is 
needed for the safety of basic liberties...[This] is a matter of 
political sociology and institutional design...Classical 
republicanism...is fully compatible with political liberalism, and with 
justice as fairness as a form thereof (Rawls, 2001, p. 144).
45 He expresses a preference for the French model of citizenship in which 
any resident of France can become a citizen if they “absorb sufficient 
doses of French national culture” over the German model, in which ethnic 
descent determines claims to full citizenship (Miller, 2000, p 88).
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hard to see what distinguishes Miller’s republican citizenship from Barry’s 
civic nationalism. Barry outlines civic nationalism in the following way:
It is useless to imagine that particularistic loyalties can be 
attenuated unless there is some wider focus of loyalty that can be 
charged with some emotional force. We do need nation states. But 
this does not mean the state as the property of a pre-existing 
ethnocultural nation (Barry, 1999, p. 55).
Barry emphasises that some form of emotional or affective attachment to 
the nation state may be needed to sustain liberal institutions, but that this 
is compatible with cosmopolitan morality. The only obvious difference is 
that Miller sometimes advocates a shared collective purpose or destiny 
as a source of civic virtue. As Barry notes, there are two reasons to be 
suspicious of this. First, Miller is not actually very explicit about what this 
might be in particular cases (Barry, 1999, p. 58). Second, and more 
importantly, a strong sense of national destiny can work against 
democracy, “For it offers the constant temptation to use it as a way of 
short-circuiting debate about the country’s future and delegitimating the 
views of those who reject it” (Barry, 1999, p. 59)46. The obvious task for 
defenders of Pettit’s version of republicanism is finding a form of civic 
identity that is strong enough to sustain institutions capable of preventing 
domination, without sliding into communitarian excesses in which strong 
conceptions of national destiny override healthy democratic debate47. 
Whether this requires any strong sort of national identity is an open 
question. My view is that it depends on the kind of institutions that are 
required to prevent domination, and the answer to that institutional 
question becomes clearer when we have a better idea of the kind of
46 Hanasz directs a similar criticism at republicanism, arguing that 
(communitarian) republicanism requires a degree of unquestioning loyalty 
to the republic that conflicts with democratic debate and contestation. I 
am unconvinced by Hanasz’s version of the argument because he 
conflates communitarianism with republicanism too easily, ignoring 
Pettit’s distinctions between Athenian and Roman versions of 
republicanism. See Hanasz, 2006, p. 298-9).
47 Pettit’s own argument is that broad norms of civility should accompany 
republican institutions. He does not claim that either national identity or 
the kinds of republican civic virtue criticised by Hanasz and Goodin are 
necessary for this.
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domination we want to prevent. None of this is to suggest that we should 
reject the kinds of moderate civic and republican nationalism Miller and 
Barry advocate at the outset. It is to suggest that republicanism should 
put them in the context of institutions designed to prevent domination: 
how does civic virtue encourage people to take account of the affected 
interests of other people? More specifically, these institutions help 
prevent domination if they enable people to contest decisions that 
represent arbitrary forms of interference. Arbitrary interference is 
interference that is done without regard to basic interests, defined roughly 
as the resources needed to develop into an independent moral agent. 
The cosmopolitan concern is that people should be able to pursue their 
own interests in ways that are compatible with other people being able to 
pursue theirs. As Shapiro puts the point, a theory that aims at preventing 
domination, “aims at enabling people to live by their values, but always in 
ways that permit opposition and take due account of the affected interests 
of others” (Shapiro, 1999, p. 232).
To stress the point being made here: republicans (including cosmopolitan 
republicans) may have reason to be interested in broad questions of 
citizenship, civic virtue and nationality, to the extent these are relevant to 
the prevention of domination. However, cosmopolitans (including 
cosmopolitan republicans) have little reason to be interested in narrow 
conceptions of specifically republican civic virtue if these conceptions 
conflict with preventing domination.
iv) Cosmopolitan republicanism
To date, the most thorough attempt to work out a cosmopolitan version of 
republicanism can be found in the work of James Bohman48. Bohman has 
argued for the extension of various forms of deliberative democracy to the 
global or cosmopolitan level as part of a cosmopolitan republican project. 
This project is distinguished from other forms of cosmopolitan democracy 
in two important respects. First, Bohman strongly emphasises the
48 See also Laborde (2009, forthcoming) and White (2003).
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importance of the unevenness of global integration and its effects on 
different people. Second, Bohman links deliberation to a specific 
normative or moral concern with preventing domination. Although these 
two basic points seem compelling, I am not at all convinced that Bohman 
succeeds in working through their implications.
a) Cosmopolitan Republicanism and Globalisation
The first move Bohman makes is to stress the uneven character of 
globalization and its effects. As he puts it,
[Even] if globalization enlarges the ways in which we live together 
in political space and time, it does not follow that all share the 
same fate within it...it is experienced in different ways by different 
peoples or political communities, with markedly different impacts at 
different locations (Bohman, 2004, p. 339).
To the extent that this argument cautions us against crudely scaling up 
domestic institutions and rules to solve global problems, it is a point well 
worth making. However, given this emphasis on differential effects and 
unevenness, I find it very odd that Bohman does not then turn his 
attention to the problems faced by those made worst off by globalisation. 
The main concrete example Bohman chooses as a case of the kind of 
deliberative politics he has in mind is the European Union. He describes 
EU decision-making processes in the following way:
[The] European union has developed a quite different form of 
institutional inquiry in its new decentralized form of decision­
making via committees, where the implementation of legislative 
acts is assisted by hundreds of committees from member states. 
Much more dispersed than the broader authority invested in 
experts in the World Bank or the IMF, the European Union’s 
‘comitology’ is broadly subject to the epistemic norms of experts 
and their transnational epistemic communities. Such committees 
work by argumentation where each member seeks to change the 
standpoints and interests of others in the committee, while being 
open to reciprocal influence (Bohman, 2004, p. 348-9).
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Despite the detail of Bohman’s account, I fail to see how any of this 
addresses the problem of the uneven character of globalization and its 
effects. Bohman does not demonstrate how this process of deliberation 
serves to bring out the voices of those most seriously affected by 
decisions. Indeed the suggestion that committee members should have 
their standpoints and interests changed does not seem to me to offer 
sufficient guarantees to those whose interests may be most severely 
affected by particular decisions. Perhaps Bohman wants to show that the 
kinds of deliberative processes he describes are sufficient to bring out 
severely affected interests, but he does not offer anything in the way of 
either evidence or argument to demonstrate this. At most he has 
established that the EU deliberates more than the IMF, without showing 
whether or how this helps the worst off. Although he starts off with a 
plausible concern about the uneven effects of globalization, Bohman 
seems to get distracted somewhere along the way from the real ethical 
issue at stake in these uneven effects. As Charles Beitz puts it (in a 
slightly different context), we would do well “to concentrate attention on 
the situation of those who are worse off and to emphasise the respects in 
which their circumstances interfere with their living what might reasonably 
be described as decent and satisfying lives” (Beitz, 2001, p. 120). This 
issue is missing from the account of cosmopolitan republicanism that 
Bohman gives.
b) Cosmopolitan Republicanism and Domination
The real distinctiveness and appeal of Bohman’s cosmopolitan 
republicanism lies in his attempt to show that a republican concern with 
non-domination can usefully be applied to problems of global justice. 
However, one reason for Bohman’s apparent distraction from the 
substantive issues at stake is that his own account of domination is very 
vague. In one of his papers on the subject, he takes up the criticism that 
republicanism as formulated by Pettit is not sufficiently normative. He 
stresses that the way to give it normative content is to show why Pettit’s 
concern with arbitrary interference matters from a moral perspective. This
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argument seems broadly along the right lines, but Bohman’s attempts to 
fill out the moral character of a concern with non-domination are not 
particularly satisfying. At one point, Bohman defines domination in terms 
of the arbitrary exercise of normative powers, and claims that
[The] most basic normative power of citizenship is the positive and 
creative power to interpret, shape and reform those very normative 
powers possessed by agents who seek to impose obligations and 
duties on others without allowing themselves to be addressed by 
others (Bohman, 2008, p. 199).
The problem is that Bohman’s own proposal for mitigating or reducing 
domination seems very weak. He argues that the most fundamental 
democratic power is the capacity to “initiate new deliberation” (Bohman, 
2008, p. 207, author’s emphasis). Bohman argues that this is important 
from a democratic perspective because without the power to initiate 
deliberation, citizens will “be merely consulted, and thus unable to 
introduce new points of view and new relevant interests and opinions” 
(Bohman, 2008, p. 207). This objection misses Pettit’s point in several 
ways49, but the most relevant one here is that Bohman entirely neglects 
Pettit’s emphasis on the importance of being able to ensure that 
decisions actually track the interests of those affected by them. As Pettit 
stressed even in his earlier work, “an act of interference will be non- 
arbitrary to the extent that it is forced to track the interests and ideas of 
the person suffering the interference” (Pettit, 1997, p. 55). Pettit’s account 
of how contestation might prevent domination faces objections50. 
However, Bohman’s proposal lacks any equivalent account of how the 
capacity to initiate deliberation alone can result in decisions that are 
forced to track the interests of those subject to interference. Although I 
can only speculate here, I think Bohman’s account of domination is
49 The other important way in which Bohman’s objection misses Pettit’s 
point is in its mis-intepretation of Pettit’s two-dimensional model of 
democracy. Part of this two-dimensional model places emphasis on the 
importance of electoral processes in generating a range of policies that 
are open to discussion and debate. See Pettit, 1999 and 2000. See also 
Pettit (2005) for an attempt to provide an analogue to this electoral 
process at the global level.
See especially Van Parijs, 1999.
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flawed because it connects a general concern with choice and voluntary 
relationships to institutional proposals for deliberation. At one point, 
Bohman does make this quite explicit. He argues that globalization 
makes it possible that we can find ourselves in different kinds of arbitrary 
relationships:
If social actions are indefinite in this way, then we cannot choose 
those with whom we must co-operate, and in the absence of such 
a choice the existing scheme of co-operation must be open for 
negotiation and deliberation (Bohman, 2004, p. 340).
I am not convinced that the lack of choice in our relationships is the main 
issue of ethical concern here. Rather, as Pettit’s conception of domination 
suggests, the issue is the concern that decisions might fail to track the 
interests of those subject to interference. I do think we need a more 
robust account of interests and their relationship to domination than Pettit 
gives: as we saw above, Shapiro’s account of basic interests provides us 
with the resources to do this. However, this account is not to be found in 
Bohman’s version of cosmopolitan republicanism.
v) Republicanism and constitutionalism
As noted at the end of the discussion of historicist republicanism above, 
republicanism places a central emphasis on the role of constitutional 
restraints. More broadly, republicanism has had some influence in 
constitutional and legal theory51. Looked at from the other direction, there 
has been increasing discussion of the possibility of constitutionalizing 
international politics and the global order52. These latter projects explore
51 The most prominent examples of this are Michelman (1988) and 
Sunstein (1988,1993).
52 The most prominent advocate of this approach is Habermas (1997, 
2006). Habermas draws much of his argument about the possibility of a 
global constitutional order from the experience of EU integration. This 
raises issues about whether it is appropriate to generalise this 
experience. Other approaches include Held (1995) and Falk (2000), both 
of whom advocate legal structures designed to promote democracy. For a
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the possibility of constructing formal constitutional structures at the global 
level. However, as Richard Bellamy has stressed in a recent article, 
republicanism has been more ambiguous than other political theories 
about what exactly constitutionalism means. In particular, it is ambiguous 
about whether a constitution has to mean a formal document, or whether 
it can also embody more general rules and principles about the sharing of 
power:
The prevailing understanding of a constitution is as an entrenched 
written document that sets out the fundamental law of a polity and is 
upheld by a constitutional court...Historically, though, republicans 
have regarded a constitution as a particular form of government that 
embodies certain ways of sharing and balancing power (Bellamy,
2008, p. 160)53.
This republican distinction between more and less formal understandings 
of constitutionalism is relevant for this thesis in two respects54. First, it 
directs our attention to the basic moral norms we want constitutional 
structures to protect. As we have seen, for Pettit and other neo­
republicans, non-domination is the basic moral concern. This concern 
with non-domination does at least mitigate the criticism that some forms 
of republicanism amount to a sort of constitutional fetishism in which
discussion of the related issue of the conflict between democracy and 
international law, see Benhabib (2005).
53 The same distinction appears in Miller’s article in the same volume. 
Predictably enough, Miller stresses the importance of active citizenship 
and a common identity in sustaining a republican conception of the 
common good. He asks: “Can there be active citizens without a political 
community held together by a common sense of belonging?” (Miller, 
2008, p. 155). My reply to this is, roughly, that in the absence of a 
common sense of belonging, we need to think though more carefully the 
moral standards we want constitutional structures to protect.
54 A version of the distinction also appears in Pettit’s Republicanism, 
although the focus is still on legal structures:
We find constitutionalism in place wherever there are legally 
established ways of constraining the will of the powerful even if the 
constraints are not recorded in a formal constitution (Pettit, 1997, 
p. 173).
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power is shuffled about through constitutional means without really 
thinking about why this is being done55.
Secondly, the distinction broadens the scope of republican interest from 
formal, legal structures to more general policy proposals that might help 
restructure power relationships in ways that mitigate or reduce 
domination. This is important, not least because the possibility of a formal 
global constitution remains something of a distant prospect, regardless of 
how attractive it might be as a long term aim. As a recent book by Andrew 
Hurrell suggests, the second, less formal, of Bellamy’s conceptions of 
constitutionalism seems the most relevant one in the context of 
international politics. Hurrell’s book, subtitled “Power, Values and the 
Constitution of International Society”, explicitly refers to a set of three less 
formal conceptions of the idea of a constitution56:
[First], constitution in the sense of the broad institutional practices, 
norms and conventions of behaviour which, taken together, define 
how a polity has been constituted; second, constitution in the 
sense of the processes by which a polity is constituted and through 
which change takes place; and third, constitution in the sense of 
the vitality, strength, or healthiness of the polity (Hurrell, 2008, p. 
20).
It is worth stressing the absence of any reference to formal, entrenched 
constitutions here. As Hurrell also notes, discussions of constitutionalism 
tend to be immodest undertakings. The concern with sharing of power 
opens a connection to a literature on power that we cannot begin to 
address adequately here. Instead, I want to try to direct our attention to 
the (hopefully more modest) project of trying to understand how
55 Richardson stresses this point about Pettit’s republicanism: “the 
purported exercise of a normative power- the power to modify the rights 
and duties of others -  is essential to the idea of domination” (Bohman, 
2008, p. 198).
56 Hurrell’s title also explicitly situates his work in the English School of 
International Relations, although he rejects Hedley Bull’s claim that a “thin 
pluralist international society of states provides the best available means 
of upholding world order” (Hurrell, 2008, p. 12). Hurrell instead advocates 
greater attention to the links between moral and political 
cosmopolitanism. This strikes me as an attractive approach.
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domination works in the context of a specific example, and of the kind of 
policy proposals that might be used to mitigate or reduce it. It seems to 
me a mistake to move too quickly to formal, constitutional mechanisms 
when other, less intrusive, proposals might be available in the specific 
context.
I have looked at five broad ways in which republicanism might be applied 
to cosmopolitan concerns about global justice. I first argued that 
historicist republicanism is not directly relevant to a thesis of this type. 
However, historicism is useful in reminding us of the possibility that 
republican ideas can come to have practical influence. It is also useful in 
emphasising a distinction between Athenian and Roman schools of 
republican thought. Second, I looked at the distinction between 
communitarian and neo-Roman republicanism. Here, I argued that one of 
the most important contemporary accounts of communitarian 
republicanism in fact involves an appeal to a very similar moral concern 
that applies at the global level. Miller’s concern with exploitation is very 
similar to the version of domination I work with here, although Pettit and 
Shapiro’s work provide the basis for a more robust account of domination. 
Third, I looked at the relevance of republican concerns about civic virtue 
to issues of cosmopolitan or trans-national citizenship. I argued that 
cosmopolitan republicans have good reason to be concerned about 
general issues of civic virtue and citizenship, since these are relevant to 
the question of the kind of institutions that can prevent domination. 
However, the distinctively republican versions of civic virtue and 
citizenship are seen as something of an embarrassment to contemporary 
republicans. Any discussion of citizenship by contemporary republicans is 
thus likely to have to share common ground with more general 
discussions of this issue, focusing on virtues such as responsibility and 
active participation.
Fourth, I looked at the most detailed contemporary attempt to apply 
republicanism to cosmopolitan concerns about domination. Bohman’s 
suggestion that domination is a moral or normative standard that can be 
applied in issues of global justice is a promising one. His argument that
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deliberative democracy is relevant to preventing domination is also 
interesting. However, I argued that Bohman does not offer a sufficiently 
robust account of how domination works, or why it is of ethical concern. 
This affects his institutional proposals, which are excessively vague. 
Nevertheless, his account does press us to think about how and why a 
republican concern with domination is important. In brief summary, my 
own view is that we need to connect Pettit’s concern with interests more 
directly to a general ethical concern with the conditions that enable 
people to live decent or satisfying lives. Doing this has the added 
potential of making a concern with domination of more general ethical 
appeal.
Finally, I have looked at the broad issue of constitutionalism. 
Republicanism has made a significant contribution to constitutional 
theory, and one obvious avenue would be to try to apply this contribution 
to the possibility of some sort of formal global constitution. I have rejected 
this avenue, partly because the possibility of a global constitution seems 
a rather distant prospect57. More specifically, I believe that closer 
attention to the issue of how domination works in practice can suggest 
policy proposals that are less drastic and demanding than writing a formal 
global constitution. I aim to illustrate this argument using the example of 
international labour standards.
V) Choice of rival theories
My other main tasks in this chapter are to explain my choice of targets for 
criticism and my choice of an illustrative example. The overall aim of the 
thesis is to show that there is something missing from the accounts of 
legitimacy found in established approaches to global democratic justice. 
The different approaches fail, in various ways, to take account of the fact 
that different basic interests are at stake in many decisions. Some people
57 Of course, an effective global constitution might also require a 
concentration of political power that is itself unattractive from the 
perspective of limiting or mitigating domination.
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are dependent on particular relationships and institutional arrangements 
to provide for their basic interests, while others are not. This difference 
can result in domination, understood as arbitrary reduction an in 
individual’s capacity to vindicate her basic interests58. The deliberative or 
participatory element of my argument comes in through emphasis on the 
importance of structures in which decision makers have incentives or 
pressures to show that their decisions do not result in domination59.
There are four general approaches to global democratic justice that I 
want to criticise. I choose specific authors as typical examples of these 
approaches. This is in part in order to provide a tractable discussion but 
also in part because each author brings something specific to the debate 
that is of particular relevance to my argument here. The four approaches 
are global civil society, represented in John Dryzek’s work; statism, 
represented in Thomas Nagel’s work; cosmopolitan democracy, 
represented in David Held’s work; and global deliberative polyarchy, 
represented in Cohen and Sabel’s work. I will provide a brief justification 
for these choices.
i) Dryzek
John Dryzek has made one of the most consistent attempts to apply 
deliberative democracy to issues of global politics60. Dryzek develops a 
specifically discursive model of deliberative democracy61. This project is 
intended to preserve the more radical aspects of Habermas’s approach to 
deliberative democracy in the face of Habermas’s own recent attempts to
58 Pettit’s account of domination will thus be modified by the addition of a 
conception of basic interests and an account of how having basic 
interests at stake can result in domination. This account Is developed with 
reference to Shapiro’s work on democratic justice.
59 As Shapiro puts it, “By strengthening the hand of the weaker party, 
government can increase the likelihood that insiders will deploy their 
wisdom to search for the deliberative solutions that may be waiting to be 
discovered” (Shapiro, 2003, p. 49).
60 Dryzek, 1999, 2006.
61 See Dryzek, 1990,1996, 2000.
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reconcile his theory with more mainstream approaches to liberalism and 
democracy62. Broadly speaking, Dryzek continues to emphasise a 
participatory, bottom-up deliberative approach that he contrasts with 
constitutional, formal state based democratic structures63. The attempt to 
separate deliberative democracy from the coercive structures of the state 
links Dryzek’s approach to contemporary theoretical and empirical work 
on global civil society64. We can see this contrast in Michael Walzer’s 
basic definition of civil society: “The words ‘civil society’ name the space 
of uncoerced human association, and also the set of relational networks -  
formed for the sake of family, faith, interest, and ideology -  that fill this 
space” (Walzer, 1997, p. 7). For progressive intellectuals and activists, 
global civil society has become closely associated with protest 
movements and politicised non-governmental organisations: global civil 
society has come to have an explicitly political meaning65.
There are two important parts of Dryzek’s work that I will focus on. The 
first is his claim that the lack of state structures at the global level is an 
opportunity for the unconstrained, uncoerced deliberation he favours. 
Dryzek fails to address the inequalities of resources and deliberate 
repression that many groups face, however. He sometimes seems to hold 
that political protests will form naturally or spontaneously around 
important issues. However, it is far from clear that these protests will 
involve those with the most urgent interests at stake. One of the most
62 See, for example, Cochran, 2002 on Dryzek’s distinction of his own 
position from Habermas. The changes in Habermas’s approach can be
seen by comparing Habermas, 1986, 1996. For a discussion of 
Habermas’s reconciliation with contemporary Rawlsian liberalism, see 
Gutmann, 2003. Iris Young’s book Inclusion and Democracy is a different 
attempt to develop deliberative democracy. Young’s is much less 
suspicious of state action than Dryzek’s, and Young explicitly relates her 
work to Pettit’s republicanism.
64 The literature in this area includes Kaldor (2003), Keane (2003), 
Chandler (2004), Aaronson (2001), and the global civil society yearbooks 
edited by Albrow, Glasius and others. Brown (2001) provides a more 
sceptical discussion.
65 This understanding is, unsurprisingly, disputed. See Wolf: “[Civil] 
society is a name for all social activity that lies outside the state. It should 
not be appropriated by a limited subset of pressure groups” (Wolf, 2004, 
p. 7).
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basic criticisms of global civil society is that activists from wealthy western 
countries are vastly overrepresented and that those on whose behalf they 
claim to speak have little or no voice.
The second point relates to Dryzek’s apparent enthusiasm for 
unconstrained forms of political action. Dryzek does not seem to address 
the problem that lack of constraint can involve lack of responsibility. He 
does not provide any account of the normative constraints on civil society 
action, yet, in a situation where ordinary state structures are absent, such 
an account seems to be precisely what is needed.
Dryzek thus raises one of the most important issues for global civil 
society: how to provide an account of political responsibility appropriate 
for situations in which different affected groups have different interests at 
stake.
ii) Nagel
In contrast to global civil society, statism is one of the most firmly 
established approaches to international order and politics66. Thomas
66 One of the classic essays on statism is Kant’s “Perpetual Peace” 
(1989/1795). Kant’s basic claim there is that states are the only feasible 
law-governed relationship between people, but that this does not exclude 
moral duties that apply between non-citizens. Kant’s difficulty is in 
describing an institutional framework that can make the moral duties 
stable. The concession to morality distinguishes statism from realism. 
The relationship between Kant’s moral philosophy and his political 
philosophy is too complex to address here. Kant is a central reference 
point for cosmopolitans as well as statists, and the difference seems to 
depend on whether or not Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is read as 
providing a general method for addressing ethical issues such as issues 
of justice. Cosmopolitans argue that this is the correct way to understand 
the First Critique, (see Hoffe, 2006 and O’Neill, 2003 for discussion of 
these issues). More recent examples of statist approaches in the 
international relations literature include Bull (1977) and Nardin (1983), 
Frost (1996) and Jackson (2000). Philosophical discussions include Blake
(2001), and Sangiovanni (2007). For a cosmopolitan critique of some of 
these statist arguments, see Caney (2004, 2008). The focus on law 
governed relationships also helps distinguish statism from communitarian 
approaches like Miller’s (1995, 2008) and Walzer’s (1983). The latter
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Nagel has attempted a consistent philosophical restatement of the statist 
position in the context of contemporary egalitarian justice (2005). The 
other major candidate as a contemporary example of statism is Rawls’s 
Law of Peoples. To some extent, both of these works might be seen as 
attempts to restate Kant’s basic position in contemporary terms. 
However, Rawls’s argument is complicated because he introduces the 
idea of a public political culture as a source for political values. This has 
led some commentators to complain of a communitarian shift in Rawls’s 
approach67. As a result, it is not entirely clear that Rawls upholds a purely 
or consistently statist approach. In contrast, Nagel places central 
emphasis on the role of equality in relation to the coercive legal structures 
of the state. Roughly speaking, Nagel denies that public political culture is 
the main source of standards of justice for states. Rather, the nature of 
what states do in imposing coercive laws on their citizens imposes 
requirements of justice. Since Nagel does appear to include democracy 
as part of his conception of equality, this makes his distinctively statist 
approach relevant to our concerns here. In focusing on legal, coercive 
structures, Nagel does provide a seemingly clear criterion for 
distinguishing between states that generate demands of justice and non­
state structures that are bound by less stringent moral norms.
There are two main issues about this approach that I will address. First, 
Nagel is rather quick to assume that all states are well functioning. This 
sometimes leads him to suggest that states provide a background against
emphasise the importance of affective cultural ties and common purposes 
in addition to (or perhaps in extreme cases in place of) law-governed 
relationships. A recent attempt to accommodate and reconcile the growth 
of international and global institutions with statism is Hurrell (2008). 
Hurrell’s basic approach accepts Bull’s focus on states and international 
society but shows the additional role of non-state actors, particularly in 
areas such as the environment.
67 See, for example, Tan, 2004. It is worth noting that some defenders of 
Rawls’s Law of Peoples have argued that Rawls attempts to construct the 
morality of the law of peoples out of International public political culture 
(Wenar, 2006). This raises the question of why Rawls did not choose a 
more individualistic, cosmopolitan international public culture as his 
starting point. Roughly, the most philosophically compelling answer is that 
states remain the most plausible institutional structures for the protection 
of certain basic rights of individuals.
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which other interactions and transactions can be seen as fair and 
voluntary. However, there is plenty of reason to dispute this basic 
assumption: there are many states that are not remotely well- 
functioning68. This is an empirical argument, so it might be claimed that it 
does not touch the more normative point Nagel is trying to make. In 
response, we could argue that if Nagel relies too heavily on an ideal of 
well functioning states, he will fail to identify many of the more pressing 
moral concerns that appear when states are in fact weak and incapable. 
Second, Nagel’s conception of equality is considerably more opaque and 
complex than it first appears. He bundles together conceptions of 
distributive justice, procedural fairness and democracy in his conception 
of equality in a way that makes it very hard to discern the precise 
connection between coercive laws and equality. This bundle requires 
considerable unravelling before it becomes clear why equality matters. 
Furthermore, the specific notion of equality that is relevant to the issue of 
democracy is quite limited in its scope.
Nevertheless, Nagel’s article does prompt us to think more carefully 
about what equality is for in relation to states. Reflection on this issue 
presses us to come up with a more specific account of the role of equality 
in allowing individuals to limit the power of the state. It also presses us to 
think more clearly than Nagel does about the possible moral 
responsibilities that fall on non-state actors. Another, independent, reason 
for focusing on Nagel’s article is that he presses the question of how we 
might get from a statist world order to a more globally just, perhaps 
cosmopolitan order. Nagel is sceptical about the possibility of doing so in 
an orderly, just or legitimate fashion: he thus poses a significant 
independent challenge to cosmopolitans.
68 Jackson (1991) is an influential introduction to these issues.
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iii) Held
Nagel’s criticisms of the possibility of global justice are directed at 
cosmopolitanism in general. However, within the group of thinkers who 
describe themselves as cosmopolitans, there is room to distinguish 
between moral and institutional cosmopolitanism. The former group 
includes thinkers like Charles Beitz and Brian Barry who emphasise that 
moral cosmopolitanism is a position with few direct political or institutional 
implications69. I want to leave this group aside, partly for the reasons 
outlined above70. A broader reason for not choosing to focus on this 
group is that my main concern in this project is with the moral implications 
of following particular versions of institutional structures. By avoiding the 
question of which particular structures are required by their preferred 
moral view, the moral cosmopolitans seem to rule themselves out of 
consideration. The institutional cosmopolitans include thinkers like Simon 
Caney and David Held, who are much more explicit about the kinds of 
institutional structure cosmopolitanism requires. Broadly speaking, they 
advocate strengthening institutions that can promote cosmopolitan 
principles of justice at the sub- and supra- state levels. Although Caney 
proposes a similar multi-layered scheme of cosmopolitan institutions to
69 Thomas Pogge is one of the cosmopolitan political philosophers who 
formulated a version of the cosmopolitan moral claim about the equal, 
general and ultimate moral status of individuals. However, Pogge has 
done a great deal of work in devising specific institutional proposals that 
he often connects to minimal negative moral duties, so it is inappropriate 
to categorise him solely as a moral cosmopolitanism (see, for example, 
Pogge, 2001). Beitz provides further discussion of these issues in the 
afterword to Political Theory and International Relations. His remarks are 
not entirely clear, but he seems to be saying that humans are the units of 
ultimate moral concern but that it is only the existence of a global basic 
structure that generates demands of justice as an expression of that 
moral concern. In the absence of such structures, concerns of justice 
would not be appropriate as expressions of moral concern (see Beitz, 
1999, pp. 198ff).
70 David Miller emphasises this point: “Cosmopolitanism...comes in two 
very different forms. Its weak ethical version -  formulated in terms of a 
principle of equal moral worth or equal concern -  can be accepted by 
almost anybody barring a few racists or other bigots” (Miller, 2002, p. 84).
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Held, he is much less specific than Held about the role of democracy and 
participation. As a result, Held’s cosmopolitan democracy seems like the 
most appropriate target.
I have a number of concerns about Held’s approach. The first set of 
concerns relate to the way Held moves from a commitment to basic 
cosmopolitan principles about the status of individuals as targets of 
ultimate, general and equal moral concern to political and institutional 
principles relating to a cosmopolitan democratic order. This move 
depends on provision of substantive principles about what it means to 
treat people as targets of moral concern. Filling out these principles leads 
us to question Held’s move to strong cosmopolitan institutions as an 
ultimate aim.
A second worry about Held is his application of equality to a world in 
which people are likely to have very different interests at stake. Held does 
not make clear or explicit why it is appropriate to treat people equally in 
these cases.
A third concern relates to Nagel’s question of how we get from here to 
there. Some cosmopolitans try to dodge this question by suggesting that 
it is an issue for normative political science and institutional design. This 
answer is inadequate. If it is likely that pursuit of moral principles will 
impose significant and serious burdens on particular groups, we either 
need to rethink the moral principles themselves or (perhaps preferably) 
think harder about more responsible and less onerous ways of putting 
such principles in practice. It is hard to see how anyone could deny that 
this is itself a task with independent moral significance, even if it is not a 
part of meta-ethical thinking about the meaning of equality. Furthermore, 
it again presses us to think about appropriate principles for cases where 
people do have different interests at stake. It is also worth noting that it is 
quite hard for a thinker like Held to dodge the question in this way, since 
he is more specific about the institutional structures his approach 
requires.
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iv) Cohen and Sabel
The potential difficulties with pursuing an institutionally robust 
cosmopolitan democratic order may lead us to look for a less ambitious 
approach as a target. Alternatively, the pursuit of such an order might 
lead us to think more carefully about how we proceed towards a 
cosmopolitan target on the basis of the institutions we actually have. One 
approach that does seem more focused on existing institutions is Cohen 
and Sabel’s deliberative polyarchy model. The label “deliberative 
polyarchy” gives this approach a rather obscure, esoteric appearance. 
Cohen and Sahel's use of this label is presumably a reference to Dahl’s 
polyarchy, which is a more concrete, minimally legitimate term for 
electoral institutions that fall short of a more demanding ideal of 
democracy71. However, it is important to stress that Cohen and Sabel do 
not (unlike Dahl) make any room for electoral institutions in their 
approach. Rather, they suggest that deliberation among qualified groups 
is sufficient to produce politically and morally legitimate policy decisions. 
Cohen and Sabel take the decision making structures of the European 
Union as a basic model for their approach, suggesting a greater degree 
of institutional density than Dryzek’s deliberative model72. Nevertheless,
71 See Dahl, 1989, for a description of the basic institutions of polyarchy. 
Dahl himself is sceptical about the possibility of transnational or global 
democracy. He prefers the term “bureaucratic bargaining” to describe the 
kinds of processes Cohen and Sabel identify.
72 The literature on the democratic accountability and legitimacy of the 
European Union is an enormous and ever growing part of the general 
debates around the EU. Overviews of EU integration include Moravcsik 
(1998), Rosamond (2000), and Chryssochoou (2001). Haas (1958) is a 
seminal work. Discussions of the EU’s democratic legitimacy include 
Greven (2000), Schmitter, (2000), Bellamy and Castiglione (2000) and 
Moravcsik (2002, 2008). By comparison, Cohen and Sabel are quite 
unusual in attempting to generalise the EU experience to the international 
level. Cosmopolitans such as Pogge (1992), Held (1995) and Bohman 
(2008) make approving gestures towards the EU but tend to keep their 
distance. Perhaps this is a result of the problems faced by Ernst Haas’s 
attempts to generalise the experience of EU integration to international 
experience. Critics point out that Haas’s model (drawn from the EU 
experience) has not been exported to other processes of integration, and 
has not even been applied consistently within the EU see Brown, 2005, p.
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the approach is less institutionally ambitious than Held’s 
cosmopolitanism. For example, Cohen and Sabel give little attention to 
the problem of the level of resources needed to sustain a highly 
participatory, multi-layered cosmopolitan democratic order.
I have three central and closely related worries about Cohen and Sabel’s 
approach. First, their definition of what it means to have relevant 
knowledge or experience to make particular decisions is very flexible. At 
one extreme, it could lead to a form of technocracy, if only people with 
specific technical knowledge are counted as experts. At the other 
extreme, the range of people with at least some relevant knowledge could 
be considered to be very broad. More importantly, we should not just 
include different voices because doing so generates epistemically or 
technically acceptable policy decisions. Rather, the point is that particular 
people will have to bear the burdens of those policies, and have some 
reasonable claim to ask how far the policies respect their legitimate 
interests.
This brings us to the second objection. Cohen and Sabel do not provide a 
clear account of how their approach generates incentives to consider the 
interests of those people affected by particular decisions. Conventional 
electoral democracy can be defended on the basis that it does generate 
an incentive for those in political power to consider a wide range of 
interests, but Cohen and Sabel do not include any equivalent 
mechanisms in their deliberative polyarchy model.
The third objection relates to Cohen and Sabel’s attempt to generalise 
from the EU experience. Membership in the EU is conditional on states 
achieving a degree of internal competence and democratic legitimacy. 
This requirement protects rights to participation and contestation by
124). Moravcsik (2004) may be relevant. Slaughter (2004) describes a 
structure of government networks that bears some resemblance to Cohen 
and Sahel's deliberative polyarchy, although with little direct reference to 
deliberative democracy. Similarly, Kuper (2004) defends a version of 
global democracy that is explicitly separated from both deliberative and 
electoral structures. Cohen and Sabel rely quite heavily on the work of 
Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart (2005). Martin Shapiro (2005) offers a 
sceptical view of the attractions of expanding the EU experience to the 
global level which does refer to deliberative democracy.
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citizens. These rights can be used against the state itself, but also against 
international institutions and non-state actors. The situation outside the 
EU is often different. Many states do not protect even the most basic 
freedoms of association or political participation, and their citizens thus 
lack the basic capacity to contest decisions that affect them.
The main value of Cohen and Sabel’s approach is that it presses us to 
think more carefully about how to proceed on the basis of the institutions 
we actually have. They suggest that the EU is an appropriate model for a 
version of global deliberative democracy, but they neglect the dis-analogy 
between the EU and the broader global order. In particular, their 
approach raises the question of what to do when basic rights to protest, 
participation and contestation are not well protected.
VI) The Labour Standards Issue
My final task is to explain my choice of labour standards as an example 
that I use to illustrate and apply the arguments about domination and 
possible ways to mitigate it. A concern with the possibility of domination in 
employer-employee relationships occupies a prominent place in Pettit’s 
discussion of areas where republican theory can be applied. This is 
unsurprising: Pettit’s republicanism is centrally -  but not exclusively - 
concerned with the way social relationships can affect the well being of 
individuals73. Interestingly, Pettit’s discussion of the dominating effects of 
employer-employee relationship gives strong emphasis to the role of 
status:
The image of workers as wage slaves casts them as dependent on
the grace and mercy of their employer, and as required to court
73 This is a general republican concern that stretches back at least as far 
as Rousseau, who gives prominent place to a concern with relationships 
of dependency on “men” rather than “things”. See, for example, 
Rousseau (1968/1762). Other issues of republican concern include 
environmentalism, feminism and multiculturalism. See especially Pettit
(1997), p. 135ff.
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paths of caution and deference in dealing, individually or 
collectively, with their bosses (Pettit, 1997, p. 141).
This seems mistaken to me, mainly because it draws Pettit into the kinds 
of republicanism that Goodin and Hanasz criticise. An excessive or 
exclusive focus on status can make republicanism seem parochial and 
limited to a particular cultural context. More important is the issue of how 
control of resources puts employers in a position where they can 
arbitrarily interfere with workers’ interests. Shapiro makes the basic point 
well:
Anyone in a position to threaten a person’s basic interests 
evidently has great power over him. An employer who can fire an 
employee in a world where there is no unemployment 
compensation has power of this kind (Shapiro, 2003, p. 45)74.
In a situation where it is claimed that “only 20 per cent of the world’s 
population has adequate social security coverage and more than half lack 
any coverage at all” (ILO, 2008), it should be clear that vulnerability to the 
kind of domination Shapiro refers to is a problem of global scope. My 
broad argument is that a proper analysis of how domination can work in 
particular cases points us in the direction of more effective ways of 
mitigating or reducing it. These potential solutions extend beyond basic 
state provision of social security, but are linked together by a general 
concern with providing resources so that workers are not dependent on a 
single source in order to provide for their basic interests. I examine the 
ILO as an appropriate institution to address some of the problems of 
domination that emerge from employment relationships in the global 
economy. An overview of the history, institutional structure and 
enforcement powers of the ILO can be found in appendix one.
74 To be fair to Pettit, he does acknowledge a similar point, expressing a 
concern that “individual contracts of employment are wrested from 
workers under the spectre of destitution, and that they put the employer in 
a position of domination relative to employees” (Pettit, 1997, p. 142). My 
complaint is that it is unfortunate that this more basic concern is tangled 
up with concerns about status that are perhaps more difficult to 
generalise.
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A brief overview of the literature on global labour standards is also in 
order. One of the most influential works in bringing the issue of global 
labour standards into public debate was Naomi Klein’s. No Logo: Taking 
Aim at the Brand Butties (1999). This is a self-consciously biographical 
and even polemical work, which the author herself has defended as an 
account of an emerging movement rather than a coherent manifesto for 
change75. Although critics of Klein’s work complain that it adds nothing 
substantial to the debate about policy responses to the problems workers 
in developing countries face, it is nevertheless significant that the work 
has generated so many direct and often critical responses76.
Despite their criticisms of Klein and of the anti-globalization protest 
movement in general, analysts of the effects of globalization on workers 
do acknowledge the plausibility of one of the central claims made by 
critics of globalization. This is the prediction of a race to the bottom in 
labour standards: employers will be able to use the availability of 
locations with lower labour standards as a bargaining tool to threaten 
developed nations to lower standards and prevent developing nations 
from raising them77. The plausibility of this thesis has led to it being seen
75 The criticism that Klein’s work is not a coherent manifesto is developed 
in detail by Heath and Potter (2004), who criticize the emphasis on 
counter-cultural movements in Klein’s work. Heath and Potter suggest 
that the suspicion of institutional solutions among counter-cultural 
movements is itself an obstacle to developing effective solutions to the 
problems Klein identifies. For a claim that transnational social structures 
make it possible for civil society groups to influence labour and business 
practices, see Braithwaite and Drahos (2000).
For a strong statement, see Wolf: “Analytically, her book No Logo adds 
nothing to the debate about globalization. Psychologically, however, it is 
brilliant. Klein succeeded in connecting the sense of personal inadequacy 
and guilt of the affluent western young to the plight of the world’s poof 
(Wolf, 2004, p. 227).
See also The Economist:
http://www.economist.com/aqenda/displavstorv.cfm7storv id=E1 GTDQ 
RN&CFID=45578785&CFTOKEN=58456869 and
http://www.economist.com/business/displavstorv.cfm7storv id=E1 TQNJ 
QNJ accessed 6th March, 2009.
77 One of the other major criticisms critics of globalization make is that 
competition leads to lowering of wages. This is of course a separate and 
equally complicated issue. Two responses to the basic claim are as
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as conventional wisdom. Empirical studies of labour standards have 
found that there is little support for conventional “race to the bottom” 
wisdom, however78. For example, David Kucera looked at the effect of de 
facto enforcement of core ILO labour standards on foreign direct 
investment and concluded
[This] study finds no solid evidence in support of the ‘conventional 
wisdom.’ If anything, the balance of evidence leans in the opposite 
direction, with all evidence of statistical significance suggesting 
that FDI tends to be greater in countries with stronger worker rights 
(Kucera, 2001, p. 2)79.
There are two points that are worth remarking on from Kucera’s study. 
First, Kucera uses the ILO’s list of fundamental principles and rights at 
work -  a list that does not include rights to social security or 
unemployment insurance (Kucera, 2001, p. 1). It would be interesting to 
know if strong rights in other areas such as freedom of association are 
correlated with provision of social security. If so, this would suggest a link 
between worker participation and protection of workers in this area80. A 
further empirical question is whether provision of social security is itself
follows. First, Wolf argues that moving low-skilled employment to poorer 
countries is more of a benefit to both developed and developing 
countries, creating opportunities in both cases (Wolf, 2004, p. 240). 
Second, both Bhagwati and Wolf question whether moving to countries 
with low wages is always attractive: other economic considerations may 
prevent this. Kymlicka (1999) makes a similar point in response to Held.
See also Held, 2004, ch1. Held acknowledges that there has not been 
a global race to the bottom on labour standards or wages.
79 Kucera cites similar evidence from Rodrik (1996) and the OECD 
(2000), but points out that these studies were not definitive, and that 
alternative measures of labour standards to the ones used are needed 
(Kucera, 2001, p. 1). Kucera also warns, “A ‘race to the bottom’ does not 
depend on investors being truly attracted to countries with lower labour 
standards. Perception, true or false, will suffice” (Kucera, 2001, p. 1).
80 Rodrik (1999) found that democracies do pay higher wages, and 
suggests that “democracies allow more efficient bargains by removing the 
impediments that authoritarian regimes install so as to repress wages” 
(Rodrik, 1999, p. 25). Whether bargaining over social security provision is 
easier or more efficient in democracies seems open to question.
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associated with higher labour standards, or indeed whether more open, 
diverse economies are associated with higher standards81.
A second point relates to the question of enforcement. Kucera rightly 
focuses on the de facto practice of labour rights, rather than the existence 
of standards or legislation that are not necessarily enforced in practice82. 
This raises the large question of enforcement of labour standards. There 
are empirical problems with gathering evidence in this area. A summary 
of some of the different approaches to gathering evidence of violations of 
labour standards and trade union rights can be found in appendix two. 
Ensuring the enforcement of labour standards is unsurprisingly much 
more difficult than writing legislation and getting countries to ratify it. Not 
long after the appearance of No Logo, Fung, O’Rourke and Sabel 
published the volume Can We Put an End to Sweatshops? They argued 
for an approach they call “ratcheting labour standards”, in which the 
central focus is on publicity and social pressure, rather than on robust, 
even coercive legislation. The aim is “to use monitoring and public 
disclosure of working conditions to create official, social, and financial 
incentives for firms to monitor and improve their own factories and those 
of their suppliers (Fung, O’Rourke and Sabel, 2001, p. 4). This approach 
partly builds on the interests in deliberative democracy of Fung and 
Sabel. However, the emphasis on social pressure and public disclosure 
received a rather sceptical response, both from respondents in the 
original volume83 and from subsequent commentators84. More recent
81 A recent paper from the ILO has restated the importance of social 
security provision in the context of the global financial crisis. See Ernst 
and Escudero (2008).
82 Some studies have focused on ratification of the ILO’s core labour 
standards and claimed that countries with higher levels of ratification 
have a greater share of US investment. As Bhagwati points out, though, 
these studies miss the point somewhat, since “ratifications are not a good 
guide to what protections exist for workers in reality” (Bhagwati, 2004, p. 
130). See also Young, who notes: “The primary problem with labour 
regulation in much of the world...including in the United States, is lack of 
enforcement rather than lack of standards” (Young, 2006, p. 109n.18).
83 See, for example, Basu (2001) and Moberg (2001).
84 For example Compa (2003) and Spooner (2004). Fung has maintained 
his focus on deliberative democracy as a source of labour standards
(2002). O’Rourke has withdrawn somewhat, suggesting corporate codes
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responses have seen renewed emphasis on effective unions at the state 
level. This can be seen in both enthusiasts and critics of free trade. 
Compare Wolf and Compa:
Trades unions can limit the ability of employers to exploit their 
bargaining power over the workforce, protect individuals against 
bullying and other forms of exploitation and insist on elementary 
standards of safety and health (Wolf, 2004 p, 186).
To advance workers’ rights in the global economy requires strong 
regulation and enforcement at both the national and the 
international level. Domestic labour law is key. So is an expanded 
role for the ILO, as well as new linkages of labour rights to trade 
agreements. Trade sanctions against abusive countries and firms 
are an important tool. Workers’ rights also rely on strong trade 
unions that can organise, bargain and strike effectively (Compa, 
2004, p. 215)85.
A strong reason for renewed emphasis on local level enforcement and 
monitoring of labour standards is the worry that both strong international 
enforcement and the ratcheting labour standards approach fail to give 
adequate voice to workers themselves. As Elliott and Freeman point out, 
monitoring by outside agencies can be expensive and inefficient in 
comparison to more direct involvement of workers86. On the other hand, 
“antisweatshop campaigns to date have made little headway in 
empowering workers themselves” (Elliott and Freeman, 2003, p. 70).
and informal monitoring are only part of a range of solutions to the 
problem of enforcing standards (2003).
It is important not to gloss over the significant differences between 
these approaches: Wolf would reject Compa’s emphasis on trade 
sanctions as a tool, and place limits on the extension of union powers into 
areas beyond the basic ones he sets out.
86 In support of this, they cite Reebok’s director of human rights 
programmes, Doug Cahn:
We have inspections of factories, both announced and 
unannounced. But you just don’t have the assurance that things 
will be the same the next day...The best monitors are the workers 
themselves (Elliott and Freeman, 2003, p. 72).
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There is a persistent concern that campaigns of this type do more to 
empower western consumers than workers.
More broadly, Kucera’s evidence suggests that the enforcement and 
monitoring of labour standards is patchy and inconsistent rather than 
being pushed to the bottom. If countries with effective labour standards 
are not directly threatened by globalization and economic liberalization, 
this suggests that our emphasis and concern should be with those groups 
for whom monitoring and enforcement are not effective. This includes the 
poorest workers in developing countries, and workers in authoritarian 
states where there is no respect for fundamental rights such as freedom 
of association.
There are two points to draw from this overview. First, the possibility of a 
race to the bottom in global standards is less troubling than the uneven 
and patchy enforcement of existing standards, and the possibility that 
uniform standards would be insensitive to legitimate local variations. 
Second, we can distinguish three general approaches to the problem.
i) Informal approaches. These approaches rely on social 
pressure and devices such as threats to reputation. A 
curious feature of these approaches is that advocates 
include both radicals like Klein and enthusiasts for 
globalization.
ii) Strong international labour standards. This approach 
has been criticised by both opponents and enthusiasts 
of globalization, mainly on the grounds that it is 
insufficiently sensitive to local variations in levels of 
development.
iii) Strong local labour standards. This approach finds some 
support among enthusiasts for globalization, perhaps 
mainly because they argue that the threat globalization 
poses to the state is exaggerated. It also finds support 
among trade union activists who are suspicious of 
informal approaches that threaten to crowd out unions.
These three approaches are advocated in different combinations and with 
differences in strength of emphasis. For example, Bhagwati seems to
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advocate a combination of informal approaches and local labour 
standards, but with limits on the strength of unions (see Bhagwati, 2004, 
p. 246). On the other hand, Compa advocates a combination of very 
strong international and local standards (see Compa, 2004, p. 215). As 
Elliott and Freeman point out, the main concern here is whether workers 
in developing countries have an adequate voice in the proposed 
combinations. This again presses us to think about how to identify those 
with the most urgent interests at stake.
This last observation brings together the example discussed in this last 
section and the more general concern with contemporary republicanism. 
In the case of global labour standards, the unevenness of globalization 
and the institutional responses to its downsides lead to situations in which 
different people can have different interests at stake. Pettit and Shapiro’s 
emphasis on domination -  and their attempts to relate non-domination to 
different forms of democratic participation and enfranchisement -  seem to 
me to be more sensitive than any of the main alternative approaches to 
this problem. Defending this claim, and showing how the analysis of 
domination can be used to point the way to plausible policy responses in 
the area chosen for close examination, will be the two main tasks of this 
thesis.
VII) Conclusion and Summary
In this chapter, I have set out my reasons for focusing on specific aspects 
of contemporary republican political theory. I provided an outline of 
Pettit’s theory of domination and indicated why I believe it needs to be 
supplemented with an account of basic interests drawn from Shapiro. 
Following that, I set out my concerns about two contemporary versions of 
cosmopolitanism: redistributivist and critical. I then looked at possible 
alternative aspects of republican political theory and suggested why these
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have not formed central issues for this thesis. The aspects I identified 
were: historicist republicanism, communitarian republicanism,
republicanism and citizenship, cosmopolitan republicanism, and 
republicanism and constitutionalism. Having set out my criticisms, I 
outlined my reasons for choosing alternative understandings of global 
justice as targets for criticism. Finally, I set out my reasons for using 
global labour standards as an example for the application of my 
arguments.
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Two. Dryzek’s Global Discursive Politics: Global 
Civil Society Without a State?
Outline of the Chapter
I) Introduction
II) Three Criticisms of Global Discursive Democracy
III) Dryzek and the Eclipse of the State
IV) Democratic and Moral Functions of the State
V) Conclusion and Summary
I) Introduction
John Dryzek has developed an explicit and detailed defence of the role of 
informal civil society actors in global politics. Broadly speaking, Dryzek 
rejects the increasing emphasis on formal, state-based political authority 
in Habermas’s more recent work. Instead, he focuses on discursive 
democracy as operating through communication and social learning in 
order to act in a “non-authoritative fashion” (Dryzek, 2006, p. 24). For 
Dryzek, the relative lack of formal political institutions at the international 
and trans-national level is an advantage because it leaves more space for 
discursive democracy to operate. In order to examine his work, it is 
important to set out a couple of the underlying themes of his approach. 
First, Dryzek does not set out explicitly his objection to state power and 
the role of discursive democracy in responding to such power in his work 
on global politics. As a result, it is necessary to try to reconstruct his basic 
opposition to the state and the role of discursive democracy. At bottom, 
Dryzek’s concern seems to be that formal structures of state power 
constrain and limit the possibility for open-ended discursive processes 
that provide opportunities for critical self-reflection (see Dryzek, 2006, p. 
25). On this interpretation, Dryzek’s opposition to the state is that its 
formal structures constrain and limit the opportunity for genuinely open 
and non-coercive processes of communicative action based on critical 
self-reflection.
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Second, in his earlier work, Dryzek appeared willing to accept some
division of labour between different forms of political agency. He
distinguishes between the state on the one hand and the public sphere or
civil society on the other. Traditionally, political activism has been aimed
at getting the state to do various things: a group that achieves this is
included by the state. However, Dryzek argues that inclusion within the
state only results in democratic gains when goods that the state does - or
can - provide are at stake: “such gain can only be secured when the
defining interest of the entering group can be connected to an existing or
emerging state imperative” (Dryzek, 1996, p. 476). There are some things
states are willing and able to do: when states do them, the people
demanding those things are included. When states do not do them, they
exclude people; in these cases, civil society may take over to provide the
goods in question or continue to pressure the state. This position implies
that there is some kind of division of labour between what we can
reasonably expect states to do, and what civil society or the public sphere
can do. Dryzek clearly favours civil society because he believes that it is
“relatively unconstrained” (Dryzek, 1996, p. 482): the open-ended nature
of political discussion is taken as a sign that coercion is less pervasive in
civil society than in the state. On this view, “exclusionary” states are in
some ways more democratic because they give more room to civil society
and the public sphere. As Cochran notes, Dryzek’s preference for civil
society over the state becomes more and more pronounced.
Furthermore, he sees the comparative absence of coercive institutions at
the international level as a sign that global politics is more likely to be
discursive, and as more attractive for precisely that reason:
Transnational discursive democracy does not have to be 
integrated with any particular set of formal institutions...Democracy 
is about communication as well as voting, about social learning as 
well as decision making, and it is the communicative aspects that 
for the moment can most straightforwardly be pursued in the 
international system (Dryzek, 2006, p. 25).
A third point is that Dryzek seems to see the public sphere as comprising 
all forms of political activity that go on outside the state. He does not draw 
many sharp distinctions beyond that: the public sphere includes both
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NGOs and informal types of public mass action. However, it does seem 
possible to draw a rough distinction between different types of activity in 
the public sphere. NGOs are institutionalised: they have sources of 
funding, and can both make protests through various forms of direct 
action (Dryzek’s example is Greenpeace’s Brent Spar protest) and in 
some cases act to provide goods themselves (as when charities provide 
food aid during famines). Other parts of the public sphere or civil society 
are less formal than this, working through indirect forms of mass action or 
social influence such as boycotts87.
Dryzek’s criterion for who should participate in discursive democratic 
activity is voluntariness: “civil society consists of voluntary political 
association oriented by a relationship to the state but not seeking any 
share in state power” (Dryzek, 1996, p. 481 )88. It is also important to 
stress that civil society operates through various informal types of social 
pressure. Dryzek argues that it does not lack power to influence or 
change behaviour. However, the capacity to influence comes from social 
pressures rather than the direct exercise of coercive power89. As a rough 
definition, then, discursive democracy might be described as “use of non­
state based forms of political influence by groups who voluntarily identify 
themselves as having an interest at stake in a particular issue”. As
87 This distinction is sharper than the one drawn in some definitions of 
civil society:
Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action 
around shared interests, purposes and values. In theory, its 
institutional forms are distinct from those of the state, family and 
market, though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil 
society, family and market are often complex, blurred and 
negotiated (LSE, Centre for Civil Society, accessed May 02, 2008, 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/what_is_civil_society.htm)
I draw attention to the differences within civil society and the different 
forms of collective action that are possible there, rather than on the 
boundaries between civil society and other arenas.
88 Dryzek later describes civil society actors as “self-selecting” (1996, p.
t 8 2 ) ’Dryzek claims that there are four ways such influence can work. First, 
by changing the terms of (official) political discourse. Second, by 
legitimating non-state forms of collective action such as sit-ins. Third, by 
constructing distinct policy-oriented forums. Fourth, by creating fear of 
political instability that prompts governments to respond (Dryzek, 1996, p. 
481).
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Cochran points out, Dryzek argues that participation should in general be 
as broad as possible: democratization progresses when franchise
90increases .
II) Three criticisms of global discursive democracy
My first criticism of this approach targets the claim that criteria for 
deciding who has an urgent claim to participate in particular decisions 
should be based on self-selection or voluntary choice. Cochran identifies 
this as a potential strength or advantage of Dryzek’s approach, pointing 
out that it allows for democratization from the bottom up:
We must consider the possibility that the obligation to realize 
democratic autonomy may only be appropriate at sites or around 
issues where a problematic situation is identified by those affected, 
when say an international public sphere has been formed by 
interested individuals. This could be viewed as an alternative form 
of democratic autonomy, one that does not depend on rights 
guarantees, but works of its own accord to create access to 
international public deliberation and decision-making where it may 
not exist and only where it is required (Cochran, 2002, p. 521-2).
The main worry about this claim is the problem of how to identify groups 
that actually do require some form of democratic participation in decisions 
that affect them. Taking the formation of public spheres or discursive fora 
around a particular issue as a sign that the people who form them are the 
only people with interests at stake is not always satisfactory. The 
sweatshops and labour relations example provides an illustration of some 
of the problems that might appear here. The most basic problem is that in 
many cases, people with very large interests at stake do not and even 
cannot protest about their working conditions. This is because they may
90 Increases in franchise should not come at the expense of the scope 
(the range of issues subject to democracy) or authenticity (the quality in 
terms of actual engaged participation) of democratic participation (see 
Cochran, 2002, p. 524).
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be subject to sanctions from their employers. Another variation on this 
problem is that informal mass action may focus on one highly visible 
aspect of a particular problem to the exclusion of other areas of concern: 
Campaigns to harness consumer demand for labour standards are 
inherently limited because they target production of brand-name 
good in export markets rather than conditions in the agricultural 
and informal sectors in Less Developed Countries, where workers 
are worse off (Elliott and Freeman, 2004, p. 129)91.
In these cases, the fact that ethically oriented consumers have become 
aware of the problem of sweatshop labour has led to various forms of 
informal protest and social pressure of the type Dryzek advocates. 
However, the public spheres that have formed around these issues do 
not seem to have succeeded in identifying and helping all the groups with 
interests at stake in the labour standards issue: commentators complain 
that “Consumer activism and corporate responses to it are still too 
narrowly focused on brand-sensitive firms” (Fung, O’Rourke and Sabel, 
2001, p. 18). I do not wish to dismiss public activism of this type92. The 
growth of the anti-sweatshop movement has put the issue of labour 
standards on the political agenda and may, in Dryzek’s terms, have had 
some effect in changing the terms of the political discourse. However, I 
do not think it has succeeded in identifying all the groups that have 
significant or urgent interests at stake in this issue.
A second part of this objection is that while informal, self-selected groups 
may be quite effective at publicising particular issues, they may be less 
effective at generating solutions to the problems. Dara O’Rourke refers to 
this problem when he discusses a student-based sweatshop monitoring 
organisation, the Worker Rights Consortium. The main criticism of the 
consortium is that it represents “a ‘gotcha’ model of monitoring, more 
focused on identifying problems and embarrassing firms than on 
resolving problems” (O’Rourke, 2003, p. 18). Various commentators have
91 See also O’Rourke, 2003, p. 22.
92 For more generally sceptical comments about activism against 
globalisation, see especially Wolf, 2004, p. 6.
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argued that workers themselves are often best placed to come up with 
practical solutions to the problems they face in the workplace:
Workers themselves have the strongest interest in combating 
sweatshop conditions...According to some researchers, employer- 
sponsored monitoring systems that aim to reform sweatshop 
conditions but fail to involve workers in a meaningful way are often 
ineffective or actually harm workers (Young, 2006, p. 125).
This suggests that, in many cases, some people will be better placed to 
come up with practical solutions than others. However, this raises the 
general question of deciding which voices to include or exclude from 
particular decisions. In general, looking at the problems with the claim 
that discursive democracy should be based on voluntary or self-selecting 
groups prompts us to ask why some groups do not participate or raise 
issues. In some situations, it may be that other costs conflict with their 
willingness and ability to do so. This is different from saying that they are 
simply not committed to democracy: it may be that they would take 
advantage of democratic and participatory opportunities if the costs of 
doing so were less onerous.
A second objection to Dryzek’s argument targets his claim that civil 
society is a more attractive site for democratization because it is 
“relatively unconstrained” and the elements of coercion found in the state 
are less pervasive there. Dryzek sometimes appears to suggests that the 
lack of formal, electoral processes of accountability at the global level 
may actually be an advantage for discursive democracy because it leaves 
more room for discursive democratic innovation93:
In applying [discursive democracy] to international politics, 
influence can be exercised over international governmental 
organizations, the content of treaties and diplomatic negotiations,
93 This is slightly different from his earlier argument, that there are just 
fewer formal institutions at the global level than at the domestic level of 
the state: The earlier argument claimed that the lack of such institutions 
was a “golden opportunity” for discursive democracy (Dryzek, 1999, p. 
35).
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and the actions of states and corporations within the system 
(Dryzek, 2006, p. 27).
My main objection to this is that it is not at all clear that absence of 
constraint is the same as absence of domination. The fact that particular 
groups can exert influence or even informal power at the global level can 
in some cases be more of a problem than an opportunity. Basu gives a 
clear example of the sort of problem that can occur when there are limited 
constraints on the capacity to exercise informal sanctions:
Once consumers in a rich country are given the moral 
responsibility to enforce standards and they are told that in 
Ethiopia workers are paid ninety cents for a day’s work, it is easy 
for the consumers to believe that this is not a living wage and 
begin a boycott of Ethiopian goods, unmindful of the fact that such 
a boycott could cause unemployment and drive the incomes of 
many workers down to zero (Basu, 2001, p. 62).
Similarly, focus on high profile and visible forms of abuse of workers may 
simply push those same workers into less visible but equally abusive and 
dangerous industries, as Basu points out with regard to efforts by rich 
countries to boycott imported goods made with child labour94.
In these cases, the problem is that it is possible for civil society groups to 
act without establishing whether their actions have -  or might have -  
damaging effects on the more basic interests of the sweatshop or child 
labourers they are trying to help. This suggests that the problems with 
civil society are not always just cases of obvious abuses of power for 
morally reprehensible ends. Even well intentioned actions can impose 
unintended costs on those the action is intended to help.
We can find a version of this criticism in Iris Young’s work when she 
states, “unbridled freedom of expression and association leads to gross 
unfairness in an economic system where some interests and opinions 
have greater access to resources than others” (Young, 2000, p. 147). 
This basic argument has much intuitive plausibility. It may be true to
94 See Basu, 1999, p. 1115-6.
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some extent that the lack of formal constraints on civil society actors at 
the global level makes it easier for civil society to exert various forms of 
social pressure. However, the absence of formal constraints does not 
mean that inequalities of power and capacity to influence are also absent. 
It is important to be careful here, though: inequalities by themselves may 
not always be the problem. The fact that a particular view is held by 
people who lack the resources to publicise it is not by itself a reason to 
give those people the chance to make their view public. Similarly, the fact 
that a view is held by a minority is also not by itself a reason to give that 
minority disproportionate power, for example by giving them a veto over 
public policies95.
Again, I do not think we should be too hasty in dismissing the role of civil 
society groups in these cases. They have managed to put some of the 
issues surrounding sweatshops and abuse of workers on the political 
agenda. However, many of the commentators on the sweatshops issue 
seem to converge on the view that informal civil society action is best 
viewed as a supplement or accompaniment to more formal systems of 
monitoring and enforcement. O’Rourke is particularly emphatic about this: 
[With] increased transparency, improved technical capacities and 
new mechanisms of accountability to workers and consumers, 
non-governmental monitoring could complement existing state 
regulatory systems (O’Rourke, 2003, p. 25).
There are couple of things that are worth noting here though. First, 
O’Rourke’s proposal that non-governmental monitoring could 
complement government action is far from being unconstrained: he 
alludes to a range of possible restrictions and rules that might be used to 
ensure that monitoring is transparent and accountable. Second, while 
O’Rourke stresses that monitoring should not be seen as a long term 
alternative to official, formal monitoring and enforcement, he also does 
not seem to see it as an attractive short term second best. Unconstrained
95 Philippe Van Parijs criticises Phillip Pettit for suggesting that minorities 
should be given veto powers to protect their interests. Van Parijs’s 
general argument is that vetos may allow certain minorities to preserve 
the status quo and interfere with programmes designed to promote justice 
(Van Parijs, 1999).
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monitoring is not seen as a solution for a situation in which there is no 
background of more general political freedom or freedom of association, 
for example. I want to return to this point below.
My third objection to Dryzek’s discursive global democracy is that it 
seems very vulnerable to a criticism that David Miller directs at theories of 
global civil society, and at Robert Falk’s claim that people might become 
“citizen pilgrims” in a global polity. There are two strands to Miller’s 
argument, one of which I find compelling, the other less so. In criticizing 
Falk, Miller says of the citizen pilgrim that,
There is no determinate community with which she identifies 
politically, and no one, except perhaps other members of her 
group, with whom she stands in relations of reciprocity (Miller, 
2000, p. 96).
The first part of the argument is that a particular community with 
historical, cultural and affective cultural bonds is necessary to sustain 
social justice. This is the basic argument we find in Miller’s work on 
nationality (see Miller, 1995). I want to leave this argument aside for the 
moment. The second argument is that ongoing relationships of reciprocity 
require more than just motivation to take a moral stance on political 
issues: they often also require willingness to compromise on certain 
issues. As Miller stresses, this may require us to change or alter our 
priorities -  including our moral priorities - in some cases:
This involves, for instance, taking a long-term view of the 
community’s interests rather than a short-term one. It involves 
recognizing when trade-offs have to be made between different 
objectives and trying to achieve a consistent balance so that, for 
instance, you do not find yourself simultaneously voting for tax cuts 
and for an expanded public health service (Miller, 2000, p. 85).
I think Dryzek’s proposals about global discursive democracy are 
particularly vulnerable to the second part of Miller’s criticism, namely that 
members of an emerging global polity have little reason or opportunity to 
recognise the need for trade-offs between different priorities. Dryzek’s 
general claim that civil society actors can act in an unconstrained, self-
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selecting fashion only seems to reinforce Miller’s argument: without 
ongoing relations of reciprocity or cooperation, different actors have little 
incentive or opportunity to moderate their claims in the face of other moral 
priorities. For Dryzek, unconstrained civil society is sometimes seen as a 
way to escape from these demands for compromise and trade-offs. In 
civil society,
Discourse need not be suppressed in the interests of strategic 
advantage; goals and interests need not be compromised or 
subordinated to the pursuit of office or access; embarrassing 
troublemakers need not be repressed; the indeterminacy of 
outcome inherent in democracy need not be subordinated to state 
policy (Dryzek, 1996, p. 482).
For Miller, these claims might seem like an attempt to use civil society to 
escape from the demands of political responsibility altogether.
Oddly enough, Dryzek’s own discussion of a specific example serves to 
emphasise the problem. He uses the example of the Greenpeace protest 
against the disposal of the Brent Spar oil platform. Dryzek argues that 
Greenpeace was freer than its opponents to “act in a reflexive fashion in 
pursuit of the environmental values the organization cherishes” (Dryzek, 
2006, p. 123). The outcome of the protest was that Shell changed its 
proposal to sink the platform at sea, opting instead to dismantle the 
platform on land. This option turned out to be about as environmentally 
damaging as the original proposal. Nevertheless, Dryzek presents this as 
a victory for Greenpeace because the organization was able to “reinforce 
the idea that deep ocean marine environments should be off limits to 
dumping” (Dryzek, 2006, p. 123). However, it also turns out that the affair 
did great damage to Greenpeace’s reputation because it later emerged 
that it had exaggerated the amount of oil that was left on the platform 
(Grant and Keohane, 2004, p. 20). It might be the case that 
Greenpeace’s apparent unwillingness to negotiate formally with Shell led 
to an outcome that was not any better for the environment than dumping.
It also seems that unwillingness to submit to more formal processes of 
environmental evaluation led to an outcome that ultimately damaged 
Greenpeace’s reputation and credibility.
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Similar concerns appear from the literature on sweatshops and labour 
relations. As Lance Compa points out, some protestors against 
sweatshops “see their role as keeping the heat on corporations through 
public exposure and denunciation rather than through negotiation for 
better codes of conduct, since any negotiation requires some measure of 
compromise with the hated corporate adversary” (Compa, 2003, p. 214). 
This can conflict sharply with the practices of unions, for whom collective 
bargaining will always require some measure of accommodation and 
compromise with employers and governments. The problem, as we have 
seen, is that an uncompromising moral stance on this issue may leave 
many workers in an even worse position if blanket boycotts or bans on 
certain practices cause factories to close and leave people unemployed. 
Here again, the moral priorities of the anti-sweatshop protestors conflict 
with other moral concerns. Milr would presumably argue that these 
different groups have little reason to accept trade-offs on their different 
priorities, and some may thus continue to make irresponsible and 
impractical demands at the expense of any real progress on the issue. 
For Miller, this type of compromise is only possible against the 
background of ongoing association and interaction we find within 
bounded national communities. We thus seem to have two extremes: at 
one end, Dryzek’s reflexive, discursive space in which groups form 
voluntarily around issues. At the other, Miller’s communities, which are 
bound together by ongoing relationships of reciprocity, as well as 
identities based on common culture, history and shared experience.
I think Cochran is right to suggest that this division is too sharp. She 
holds out
[The] hope that shared problems, which are not limited to 
demarcated political realms, can lead to persons learning of the 
value of social cooperation and the creation of community through 
repeated interaction in relation to those problems (Cochran, 2002, 
p. 538).
This seems like a promising alternative to the sharp division between 
Dryzek and Miller’s visions. There do seem to be circumstances in which 
people stand in a more robust and demanding moral relationship that
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requires compromise and trade-offs between different priorities. These 
situations do not seem to be confined within the boundaries of the nation 
state. Nevertheless, I think we need a more thorough account of why 
such situations might raise moral demands on the participants, as well as 
a more sociological account of how they might work to generate a sense 
of community.
I have raised three objections to Dryzek’s claims about discursive 
democracy and its role in global politics. The first objection is that self­
selection or voluntary participation may not be the best criterion for 
deciding whether particular groups have a very urgent interest at stake in 
a particular issue. Both Dryzek and -  to some extent -  Cochran seem to 
suggest that the fact that pressure groups or grass roots protests form 
around particular issues is a sign that the people involved have an urgent 
interest at stake. This claim seems very doubtful in a world in which 
different groups have very different levels of capacity to take part in civil 
society. As the sweatshop example makes clear, some workers are 
vulnerable to reprisals from their employers if they protest or blow the 
whistle on abusive working practices. These workers have to weigh up 
the costs of protesting against the costs of losing their jobs and 
livelihoods. Nevertheless, it is these workers who have the most direct 
interests at stake. The example suggests that we need to be wary of 
claiming that protests will naturally emerge around particular issues on 
the one hand, and also of the claim that, because nobody has protested 
about an issue, there is no demand for democratic participation.
The second criticism suggested that absence of constraints is not the 
same as absence of domination. The claim that global protest 
movements are not constrained by ordinary democratic rules and 
processes does not necessarily mean that they cannot inflict arbitrary 
outcomes on other people. A frequent complaint against the apparently 
effective anti-sweatshop boycotts is that they can leave workers worse off 
by closing factories. In this case, social sanctions and informal protests 
may be less attractive precisely because they can act outside the 
boundaries and constraints of ordinary political processes.
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Finally, I suggested that Dryzek’s argument is vulnerable to Miller’s point 
about responsibility. Dividing issues up so that people can protest and 
exert political influence in an unconstrained way may lead people to act in 
a less responsible way. Again, moral outrage at sweatshop conditions 
often needs to be tempered by the awareness that these kinds of jobs 
may be the only source of income for some people.
The general source of these problems is Dryzek’s apparent lack of 
attention to the possibility that people can stand in institutional 
relationships outside the state. In some cases, these relationships might 
constrain political action and make it difficult for people to use that action 
to protect their interests. In other cases, the fact that certain people stand 
in a particular kind of relationship may mean those outside the 
relationship need to take more care when wielding political influence. So, 
there is a danger in anti-sweatshop protestors using their influence over 
multi-national corporations without regard to the complex set of interests 
of workers, and of the need to weigh those interests against each other in 
some circumstances.
Ill) Dryzek and the eclipse of the state
Dryzek’s discussion of globalization and the state starts with some fairly 
familiar points about globalization. He goes on to draw some interesting 
and distinctive conclusions about the way globalization might represent 
an opportunity rather than a threat for the discursive type of democracy 
he favours. There are two issues with this approach that I want to raise. 
First, it is not entirely clear why Dryzek thinks the potential eclipse of the 
state under conditions of globalization is a good thing. He is obviously 
critical of and even hostile towards the state as a political agent, but it is 
not always clear what the basis of his criticism is. Second, his criticism 
does not contain any account of the moral function states might serve, 
and the role conventional democracy might play in that moral function. I 
will develop the first point in this section and the second one in the next 
section.
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As he acknowledges, Dryzek’s description of globalization is a familiar 
one:
[The] organizations being undermined are states, whose territorial 
boundaries are eroded by increasing flows of trade, investment, 
finance, people, communications, ideas and cultures, which cannot 
easily be controlled by national governments (Dryzek, 2006, p. 
298)98.
However, in contrast to Held, Dryzek does not see this capacity of 
globalization as a threat to democracy. Instead, he suggests that the 
absence of formal, state based democratic structures is an opportunity for 
discursive democracy because it creates more room for democratic 
movements to act reflexively. Reflexivity is understood by Dryzek as 
“sensitivity to the degree to which actions themselves create the contexts 
for action” (Dryzek, 2006, p. 86). Although we now have a range of 
political institutions and actors at the global level, these institutions are 
not subject to direct control by formal democratic processes. For Dryzek, 
this means that they are more open to influence and social pressure by 
grass-roots, bottom up action such as protest movements and consumer 
boycotts. These actors are themselves more able to act reflexively, 
according to Dryzek. Whereas states and corporations are constrained by 
imperatives such as security and profit motives, civil society actors are 
able to reshape and adapt their motives more easily:
[This] uneven distribution of the capacity to act reflexively, biased it 
seems in favour of civil society actors who are disadvantaged 
when it comes to more conventional sources of political power, has 
important implications for the wellsprings of transnational 
democracy. If transnational democracy requires decentralized 
power in the hands of reflexive actors, then civil society actors 
should be central (Dryzek, 2006, p. 123).
96 Dryzek draws this account of globalization from Beck (1999) and
Giddens (2000). For more sceptical interpretations of the claim that
globalization is undermining the state, see Evans (1997), Kymlicka 
(1999), Wendt (1999), Wolf (2004) and Bhagwati (2004).
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On this view, globalization is seen as an opportunity for discursive 
democracy because the absence of formal structures of democracy 
leaves more room for civil society to act reflexively.
Cochran notes Dryzek’s emphasis on the possibility that the state can 
undermine civil society through co-option and collusion. However, she 
expresses doubt about whether this is really likely. As she puts it, 
“[Dryzek’s] primary concern is that oppositional civil society, the great 
motor of democratic change, can be significantly compromised through 
collusion with the state, but is this likely to happen in one fell swoop?” 
(Cochran, 2002, p. 535). I agree with this doubt, and think the criticism 
can be deepened by developing it in two directions.
First, it is not at all clear what it is about state power that Dryzek objects 
to. As we have seen, he clearly sees the potential undermining of the 
state by globalization as an advantage for civil society, but he does not 
explain what is so objectionable about the state in the first place. Dryzek’s 
brief definition of a state is a good place to start in working out (somewhat 
speculatively) what his argument might be. The state “may be defined as 
the set of individuals and organizations legally authorised to make binding 
decisions for a society” (Dryzek, 1996, p. 475). On this view, the 
distinctive capacity states possess might be understood as their capacity 
to make decisions that apply (in principle) to all members of a society. 
One distinctive tool that states aspire to possess is a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of coercion. However, a focus on coercion alone seems 
too limited. Rather, an important and distinctive tool that governments can 
use is uniform regulations that apply across whole territories. These 
regulations are usually coercive, but perhaps do not always have to be 
so. As Young points out, the uniformity of state regulation is sometimes 
just as troubling for critics of state power as its coercive character:
Activities to meet needs and provide social services that come 
under the bureaucratic rationality of the state, moreover, 
disorganise the democratic communicative potential of family and 
community, replacing them with normalizing, dominating, and
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pacifying regimes to which clients must submit or do without help 
(Young, 2000, p. 183).
However, it is important to ask whether regulations that stretch across 
entire territories are always seen as sources of oppression and 
conformity, or whether civil society groups actively pursue such regulation 
in any cases.
The sweatshop case provides a useful counterexample to Dryzek’s 
claims. In particular, there is the frequently stated worry that bans on 
sweatshop and child labour in one area will push workers into more 
dangerous employment in other areas. As Basu points out, the political 
and moral challenge is to identify which practices are always 
unacceptable, and enforce bans on them:
There seems to be some agreement that some minimal 
restrictions, such as children being prevented from working in 
hazardous conditions or under bonded labour conditions, are worth 
enforcing legally (Basu, 1999, p. 1115).
Similarly, Basu stresses that it is important to consider which kinds of 
blanket legislation are most effective. With regard to prohibition of child 
labour, “if a ban is deemed desirable, a good way to implement it is by 
making schooling compulsory. This is because a child’s presence in 
school is easier to monitor than a child’s abstention from work” (Basu, 
1999, p. 1115). In both cases, the important point is that these bans 
should operate across whole societies in order to ensure that all potential 
victims are protected. This suggests that there are at least some cases 
where the distinctive capacity of the state to impose rules that apply to 
whole societies can be beneficial in protecting very vulnerable people. 
Although civil society groups have had some effect in bringing sweatshop 
conditions to public attention, many commentators have worried that one 
possible outcome of this focus on civil society action and informal 
sanctions is that it may undermine more traditional institutions for 
protection of workers rights: namely, trade unions. Trade unions require 
state legislation in order to act against corporations: some unions thus 
ask “will a rush to corporate codes of conduct undermine effective labour 
law enforcement by governmental authorities and undermine workers’
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power in trade unions?" (Compa, 2003, p. 211). Because unions operate 
very close to the boundary between state and civil society, they seem 
precisely the sorts of institution that Dryzek would object to, since they 
seem at greater risk of co-option because of their proximity to the state. 
However, as we have just seen, unions and the workers they aim to 
protect often need some form of state legislation, because this is the best 
way to ensure that all members of vulnerable groups such as child 
labourers are actually protected. Furthermore, while Dryzek worries about 
co-option of civil-society groups by the state, he seems to ignore the 
possibility that civil society groups may also be vulnerable to co-option by 
corporations. As O’Rourke points out, there is concern that NGOs are 
also vulnerable: “Some critics warn that companies are controlling these 
processes, co-opting NGOs by changing them from watchdogs to 
‘partners’ and undermining strong local laws and unions” (O’Rourke, 
2003, p. 22). Even if NGO monitoring is attractive, it may be better if it is 
used to expose violations of national, government legislation. This may 
be preferable to imposition of unclear standards by NGOs. Compa cites 
another relevant (but anecdotal) example, in which an NGO 
representative took part in negotiations with a firm. In this case, factory 
managers bombarded the trusted local NGO representative with 
“arguments that trade unionists are used to hearing and refuting, but 
which were new and plausible to him” (Compa, 2003, p. 214). The upshot 
was that “He emerged from a meeting with management agreeing that 
workers had to increase productivity and work more diligently before 
wages could be improved and before supervisors could ease their 
discipline” (Compa, 2003, p. 214). The contrast between trade unions and 
other NGOs is that unions are more used to using local labour legislation 
in negotiations with corporations. In principle, they are also more directly 
accountable to workers than other NGOs -  although this may vary in 
practice. In these cases, proximity to government may be an advantage 
for unions, because legislation gives them a tool to use against firms.
The upshot is that all these cases undermine Dryzek’s opposition to the 
use of state power -  an opposition that is rooted in the idea that formal 
political mechanisms suppress and distort the reflexivity of open ended
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discursive political processes. The arguments outlined suggest that civil 
society groups -and particularly unions - need states in order for their 
protests to become effective. Different states might (in principle) make 
legislation that is sensitive to local conditions and try to ensure that it is 
applied across the whole society. Unions have a role to play in ensuring 
that such legislation is put in place and used once it is in place. As Young 
points out, civil society activists at the global level have begun to 
recognise the value of strengthening state level legislation along with the 
capacities of unions: “Most analysts conclude that NGO activity should 
work to support unionization and to pressure for greater government 
protection of workers’ rights to form or choose unions” (Young, 2006, p. 
129)97. This contrasts sharply with Dryzek’s approach, in which civil 
society should be kept separate from the state, and is even seen as 
plausible substitute for state action98.
A second way to develop Cochran’s criticism of Dryzek’s argument is to 
ask whether there really is much evidence for the claim that states tend to 
co-opt or undermine civil society activity. The sociologist Peter Evans 
argues that evidence suggests that precisely the opposite is true. Citing 
evidence from studies by Robert Putnam and several others, Evans 
argues that it is more accurate to view the relationship between civil 
society and the state as a symbiotic one: “just as modem markets depend 
on economic decisions being made in a predictable institutional 
framework, likewise civic engagement flourishes more easily among
97 This contrasts somewhat with her emphasis in Inclusion and 
Democracy on cosmopolitan regulation. Young appears to conclude that 
state action is more appropriate in this case.
98 Young’s argument here also seems to undermine a further point that 
Dryzek makes:
Irrespective of what interest groups seek, states must meet certain 
imperatives. Unfortunately for advocates of state-sponsored group 
representation such as Cohen and Rogers and Young, promoting 
the organization of disadvantaged groups is not one of those 
imperatives and I can imagine no scenario under which it becomes 
one (Dryzek, 1996, p. 478).
Young’s example suggests that this is almost a case of wilful myopia on 
Dryzek’s part. Pressure from NGOs does seem to be one conceivable 
scenario under which states might feel compelled to adopt better labour 
legislation. The scenario is not beyond imagination.
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private citizens and organised groups when they have a competent public 
sector as an interlocutor” (Evans, 1997, p. 79). This is not to deny that the 
state and other public institutions could be threatened under conditions of 
globalisation. Evans argues that this might come about because of the 
ideological commitments of powerful global actors: “Bent on maximising 
its room for manoeuvre, trans-national capital could easily become an 
accomplice in the destruction of the infrastructure of public institutions on 
which its profits depend” (Evans, 1997, p. 72). The point, though, is that 
the retreat of these institutions would weaken civil society. This is 
because “a move toward less capable and involved states will make it 
more difficult for civic associations to achieve their goals and will thereby 
diminish incentives for civic engagement” (Evans, 1997, p. 81). This 
directly contradicts Dryzek’s claims that civil society is most likely to 
flourish in areas that are not usually reached by state activity, and that an 
exclusionary state is more likely to be accompanied by a flourishing and 
active civil society". The example of trade unions that I cited above can 
be used to illustrate and reinforce this point. Trade unions actually require 
a competent and active state because they use state labour legislation to 
hold firms to account for abuses of their workers. Broadly in line with 
Evans’s analysis, this suggests that unions need the state in order to 
carry out many of their aims. Evans’s view is also broadly in line with the 
approach that Nancy Fraser takes, and which Cochran cites with some 
approval. On this view, the concern with the possibility that civil society 
might be co-opted is seen as less pressing:
[More] important is the concern that publics become ‘strong’ in the 
sense that Nancy Fraser (1992) has outlined (i.e. the need to
99 By “exclusionary” state, Dryzek means a state that does not attempt to 
represent civil society interest groups in political processes. Perhaps in 
order to make clear the distinction between left- and right- wing 
approaches to civil society, Dryzek distinguishes between actively 
exclusionary states and passively exclusionary states. The former 
actively try to repress and destroy civil society associations, as with 
Thatcher’s attacks on the union movement. The latter simply leave 
minimal constitutional protections of civil society in place (see Dryzek, 
1996).
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make radical change real through access to parliamentary decision 
making) (Cochran, 2002, p. 535).
We thus have two ways to reinforce Cochran’s argument against Dryzek. 
First, Cochran suggests that Dryzek is overly concerned about the 
possibility of states co-opting civil society groups. However, this concern 
can seem unmotivated if we do not have a clear idea of what is distinctive 
about state power. I have tried to suggest an answer to this question by 
emphasising states’ capacity to use laws that (in principle) apply to all the 
members of a particular society. The sweatshop example then revealed 
why this capacity can be useful in some circumstances -  although it is 
important to note that it is not clear how far we can generalise from this 
particular example. Second, there is reason to challenge Dryzek’s claim 
that a strong or capable state will necessarily undermine civil society 
activities. Evans argues that a capable and active state can mobilise and 
motivate civil society by providing incentives to press the state to act to 
help particular groups. The sweatshop example illustrates this point by 
showing that trade unions need an active state to achieve many of their 
aims100.
As I stressed in the outline of Dryzek’s work above, it is important to note 
the way his emphasis changes from a possible division of labour between 
the state and civil society, towards a preference for an unconstrained 
realm of civil society action in his more recent work. I think this change in 
emphasis is regrettable because there is a large -  and in my view fairly 
obvious -  blind spot in the latter approach. Dryzek suggests that the 
absence of strong, centralised, state-like political institutions in the
100 A further point Dryzek might make is that an active state might 
undermine the distinctive claim that politics is an intrinsically valuable 
activity, precisely by encouraging people to think in terms of strategic and 
instrumental advantage. Jon Elster argues that there is no necessary 
contradiction between an activity being instrumental and being 
intrinsically valuable: chess is an activity that has the instrumental aim of 
winning the game, but is also intrinsically valuable. A game chess that 
could never be won would lose its intrinsic value. Similarly, political 
deliberation that never resulted in a positive outcome would not be 
politics at all. It might be a form of conversation or argument with its own 
intrinsic value but it would be wrong to call it politics, according to Elster 
(see Elster, 1997).
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international system is a “golden opportunity” for discursive democracy 
(Dryzek, 1999, p. 35). This is because decentralised institutions are more 
open to the influence of discursive democratic processes. As Dryzek puts 
it,
[Decentralisation] is not a sufficient condition for democratic 
control, but it is a necessary one. The lack of centralised authority 
in transnational governance is at least one less impediment to 
democratization (Dryzek, 2006, p. 108).
The problem here is that, in comparison to domestically democratic 
states, some of the other minimal necessary conditions for meaningful 
civil society association are also missing101. Dryzek claims that, “[Beyond] 
laws protecting the basic citizenship rights of expression and association, 
one should not expect much in the way of positive state action to promote 
the well-being of civil society” (Dryzek, 1996, p. 484). Whatever we think 
of this claim about states promoting civil society, it is clear that there are 
many states that do not even provide these minimal rights of free speech 
and association. Given the importance of free speech and association for 
the formation of unions, this is especially pressing for those who 
campaign for improvements in labour standards. As a result, Elliott and 
Freeman in particular stress that pressure towards freedom of expression 
and association within states that do not yet accept or practice those 
standards is a long term goal. They stress that it is important not to 
denigrate the achievements of civil society, NGOs and unions. However, 
such achievements remain a second best when compared to achieving
101 More generally, the fact that one of several necessary conditions for 
democracy is met should not lead us to undue optimism. To illustrate, 
consider left-communitarians like Miller and Walzer. They might argue 
that a strong sense of communal, cultural and even national identity is 
necessary to sustain various forms of democracy and social justice. 
However, if these strong identities are present but protections for 
minorities and individual rights are not present, the strong identities may 
work against democracy and social justice. So, for example, some strong 
religious affiliations may condone the oppression of women. I do not wish 
to endorse Miller and Walzer’s arguments about social justice here. 
Rather, I am trying to make the more general point that the existence of 
one necessary condition for democracy might work against 
democratization when other necessary conditions are absent.
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freedom of expression and association that are seen as preconditions for 
genuine bottom-up determination and enforcement of labour standards by 
the people most directly affected by their violation102.
The attractive aspect of Dryzek’s arguments about discursive democracy 
is that they encourage us to think in more practical terms than some 
cosmopolitan thinkers. Because institutions of global governance are 
complex, “it is more practical to think of the democratization of particular 
mechanisms that do exist rather than their subordination to some grand 
institution-building logic. It is in complex situations that such grand logic is 
likely to go astray (or become coercive)” (Dryzek, 2006, p. 161). This 
approach contrasts quite sharply with the approach of more obviously 
cosmopolitan thinkers like Held and Fraser. For Fraser,
[Transnational] movements are counterpowers. Their efficacy 
requires the existence of institutionalized sovereign powers that 
can be constrained to act in the general interest. Failing major 
institutional renovation, neither transnational social movements nor 
public sphere can assume the emancipatory democratizing 
functions that are the whole point of public-sphere theory (Fraser, 
2005a, p. 7).
Dryzek’s worry about the possible consequences of grand institution- 
building schemes does seem to the point here. Increasing the power of 
large scale institutions is potentially troubling in the absence of even the 
most basic freedoms of speech and association for some of the poorest 
and most vulnerable people103. However, I think he goes too far in seeing
102 Similarly, Bhagwati points out that many trade unions in poor countries 
are still campaigning for the most basic rights necessary to operate 
effectively:
Many unions from other poor countries support the AFL-CIO 
efforts because they want solidarity from the organized unions in 
the United States in their struggle to win civil and political rights, 
including the right to organize (Bhagwati, 2004, p. 246).
103 Andrew Hurrell makes this point with regard to cosmopolitan 
redistributionists such as Pogge, Beitz, or Caney: “if serious efforts to 
reduce global poverty do come about, then the potential power of external 
actors will grow, and the dangers for democratic politics and political 
autonomy and for legitimate difference will come into starker relief’ 
(Hurrell, 2001, p. 47).
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global discursive politics as a realistic and attractive long term alternative 
to genuine change in the direction of greater freedoms of association and 
expression for the worst off. At its worst, his approach seems vulnerable 
to precisely the criticism that has been levelled at NGOs who aspire to 
greater participation in WTO decision making. As Narlikar points out, it is 
possible to contrast representatives of democratic governments in the 
WTO with NGOs:
In the case of democracies, these representatives bear some 
accountability to their peoples, no matter how far removed they are 
from the electorate in practice. By contrast, not even the best of 
NGOs are democratically elected or bear any form of legal 
accountability to the society that they claim to represent (Narlikar, 
2005, p. 136).
On this view, the long term aim might be to encourage the domestic 
democratisation of the members of the WTO. The use of NGOs to act as 
a source of additional democratic legitimacy seems to be seen as a rather 
poor substitute. This contrasts with Dryzek, who sees the use of NGOs 
and other civil society movements as a realistic long term substitute for 
more structured democratic participation even at the domestic level.
My own view is that we need to think more carefully about the possible 
role of NGOs, civil society actors and democratic states in the short term. 
What I want to avoid is a situation where citizens of non-democratic 
states are entirely cut off because their governments are non-democratic. 
Dryzek’s view holds out the possibility of some forms of democratic action 
cutting across the boundaries of non-democratic states, but I think this is 
something of a false promise if this is not directed towards the ultimate 
aim of providing the citizens of those states with their own democratic 
institutions. My position is much closer to the views expressed by 
Carothers and Slaughter, who both seem to take civil society and 
democratically inclined government officials as potential sources of 
democratisation within non-democratic societies. Again, this contrasts 
with the possibility of civil society actors in democratic societies acting for
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or on behalf of citizens of non-democratic states104. It also requires us to 
think about what kind of democratic and moral demands might fall on 
these groups and individuals, and how they might express their 
democratic aspirations in the absence of familiar electoral institutions.
IV) Democracy and the moral function of the state
To conclude this discussion, it is worth pausing to reflect again on 
Dryzek’s attitude to the state. It can sometimes seem that Dryzek repeats 
a basic mistake of liberal political theory. As Shapiro puts it, “the 
characteristic liberal mistake is to focus on the forms of tyranny 
performed by and through government as the only - certainly the principal 
- kind of tyranny that should worry political theorists” (Shapiro, 1999, p. 
31). The obvious initial response is to emphasise that “Government can 
be an instrument for mitigating domination as well as a source of its 
generation” (Shapiro, 1999, p. 32). As I argued above, the distinctive way 
that governments do this is by imposing legal rules that (in principle) 
apply to all members of a political community. This capacity can be used 
to mitigate domination, for example by preventing unscrupulous 
employers from allowing children to work in dangerous industries such as 
glass making. It can also be used to share burdens widely across 
societies, so that there is less chance that one particular group is 
dependent on another for basic resources. The problem is how to use 
democracy to keep this power within reasonable limits. Institutional
104 A further point is that Dryzek sometimes expresses nostalgia for the 
type of opposition that took place in totalitarian states. For example, the 
democratisation of Eastern European countries after 1989 left “[Little] or 
nothing in terms of oppositional public spheres. The gain was a liberal 
democratic state, the loss was of discursive democratic vitality” (Dryzek, 
1996, p. 485). This only seems very troubling if we think that the loss of 
oppositional public spheres was total or permanent. It would be 
somewhat eccentric for campaigners to continue campaigning for an end 
to Soviet communism after the end of Soviet communism, but they might 
move on to other issues. The other alternative - that we might sustain 
totalitarian states in order to indirectly encourage the vitality of 
oppositional public spheres - just seems too repellent to contemplate.
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relationships carry a combination of benefits and risks, and the problem is 
how to keep the risks under control. My worry about Dryzek is that he 
sometimes exaggerates the lack of institutional structures and institutional 
relationships at the global level. On the one hand, it is not clear that a 
lack of institutional structure necessarily is a good thing, since as we have 
seen, it is possible for people to impose moral priorities such as 
elimination of child labour without consideration of the broader needs of 
children. On the other hand, it is also not clear that the absence of formal 
democratic structures at the transnational level will make the institutional 
structures we do have more amenable to the types of unconstrained 
democratic control that Dryzek advocates. The problem is rather that they 
are different from those we find at the level of the state and will need 
different forms of democratic control. Dryzek sees the apparent absence 
of institutional structures at the global level as a golden opportunity for 
discursive democracy. My own view is that the absence of familiar 
democratic structures requires us to look carefully at the distinctive 
institutional relationships that can appear when different states have 
uneven levels of democratic capacity, and think about the kinds of 
democratic requirements these institutional relationships raise. So, for 
example, what are the democratic moral requirements on a trans-national 
corporation that employs citizens of a poor country with no independent 
trade unions, weak welfare provision, and no democratic political 
processes?
Dryzek argues that mainstream, conventional democratic theory has 
tended to focus on the connection between democracy and state power. 
He cites Dahl as an example: “Advocates of the democratic process have 
always meant it to be applied to the state” (Dahl, 1989, p. 37)105. Since it 
is one of the central aims of this thesis to argue that there are institutional 
relationships outside the state that raise moral demands for some form of 
democratic participation, I am inclined to agree with Dryzek’s rejection of 
this claim. However, I do not think Dryzek provides a clear or systematic
105 Since Dahl is discussing democracy in the context of an anarchist 
challenge to the possibility of legitimate coercion, Dryzek may be quoting 
him out of context here.
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account of the moral position that underlies his argument about 
democracy. The basis of his moral claims seems to be that the 
unconstrained political participation that is possible outside the influence 
of the state is preferable to the more structured forms of participation that 
we find in decision making by democratic states. To some extent, we 
have already seen some reasons to be suspicious of this claim. The 
discussion of the sweatshop example shows how civil society actors in 
the anti-sweatshop movement are sometimes in a position to impose 
moral priorities on poor and vulnerable people without reference to, or 
consideration of, the full range of needs those people have. When - in an 
attempt to close sweatshops - they impose boycotts that threaten to leave 
workers destitute, we have a case of this kind of imposition and it is 
necessary to acknowledge that it is morally troubling. Dryzek may reply 
that these actions are not morally troubling because they are not 
coercive, but the example only serves to emphasise that this objection is 
not convincing. To be sure, the anti-sweatshop protestors are not using 
state coercion against the owners or operators of the sweatshops. 
However, they are using a sanction -  the threat that they will withdraw 
their business -  against the owners in order to get them to comply. This is 
still coercion, on any conventional understanding106. It also impacts 
indirectly on the workers if the effect is to close the factories that are the 
sources of their livelihood. Dryzek suggests that civil society "consists of 
voluntary political association oriented by a relationship to the state, but 
not seeking any share of state power; that is, association is self-limiting” 
(Dryzek, 1996, p. 481). Limited to what, though? In his discussion of the 
ways that civil society can make its power effective, Dryzek does seem to 
include forms of action that count as coercive. This includes the threat of 
political instability, for example, and possibly the use of mass action such 
as boycotts. His discussion of the Greenpeace action against Shell’s 
plans for Brent Spar might also be counted as a form of coercion, since 
Greenpeace could use the threat of adverse publicity against Shell. The 
problem is that Dryzek’s account of what counts as civil society action is
106 See Hart, (1961), for example.
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broad enough to include some forms of coercion. However, if his 
objection to state action is that it is specifically coercive, he is in danger of 
contradicting himself. More generally, I do not think Dryzek gives any 
clear or convincing account of the moral demands that fall on states; 
again, because of this his suspicion of state action can seem rather 
unmotivated. I think we need an account of the moral demands that fall 
on the state; I will give a brief outline of what this account might look like, 
in part to distinguish my own position from the one Dryzek offers.
I want to emphasise four basic features of the moral position that informs 
my account of the state.
i) Our moral duty to all other people is expressed in terms of a duty to 
provide everyone with the basic resources necessary to live what counts 
as a successful or flourishing life. Several authors make similar claims107. 
However, there are predictable controversies about both the content and 
the institutional implications of these claims. I cannot address these 
controversies here: my aim at the moment is the more modest one of 
showing how a moral claim like this fits with the idea that the state is a 
moral agent -  precisely the account that I think is missing from and 
distorts Dryzek’s understanding of the state.
ii) The state is a moral agent in the sense that it is one institutional 
structure that allows for the provision of at least some of the necessary 
basic resources. I agree with Bob Goodin’s claim (Goodin, 1995) that the 
state is a moral agent, but am somewhat dubious about his claim that the 
existence of such a collective moral agency lets individuals off the moral 
hook. I would argue instead that the duty to promote individual flourishing 
requires institutions. More specifically, it requires institutions that enable 
people to fulfil parts of their moral duty without undermining either their
107 See especially Raz, (1995) and Fabre (2003). Raz’s formulation is, 
“every person should have access to an adequate range of options to 
enable him to have a successful life" (Raz, 1995). Raz argues that his 
view of these matters has both conservative and radical implications. The 
conservative implication is that it does not matter morally that not 
everyone has access to the same options, whether comparing within or 
across societies. The radical implication is that some options may have to 
be changed if all people are to have access to them (Raz’s example is 
gay marriage).
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capacity to live a successful life or their more general capacity for moral 
agency108. The state is one such institution. However, I think it changes 
people’s moral responsibilities rather than exculpating them. For 
example, once we have a state, we have a moral responsibility to 
strengthen and sustain its capacity to provide a successful life for all 
citizens. This responsibility will hopefully be less onerous than the 
responsibility to provide a flourishing life that might hold in the absence of 
a state. However, part of the reduction of that burden might be in the 
service of enabling people to fulfil more immediate moral demands, such 
as duties to family and friends.
iii) The state’s capacity to fulfil the duty to provide a successful or 
flourishing life requires the concentration of power. This may be 
necessary to prevent people defecting on their duties in ways that 
undermine the state. However, the concentration of power can also take 
forms that pose threats to both people’s moral agency and to their 
capacity to live a successful life. As a result, restraints on the state’s 
capacity to exercise its power are needed.
iv) Democracy is often presented as one of the key ways in which this 
power is restrained. There are obvious and large controversies about how 
-  and even whether -  this works in practice. However, democracy is most 
often defended in terms of its tendency to do better than other forms of 
government when it comes to protecting the rights and even the well 
being of democratic citizens.
These four points are rather vague and abstract. I hope they do not 
sound trite. My purpose in providing this outline is to try to make a link 
between a moral understanding of the role of the state and an argument 
about the moral function of democracy. This account is absent in 
Dryzek’s work and I think this is why his suspicious attitude to the state 
often seems unmotivated. Without an account of this sort, it is not clear
108 The sweatshop example can be used to illustrate this: a parent may 
have a moral duty to provide for her family, and be in a situation where a 
job in an illegal sweatshop is the only way to fulfil this part of her moral 
duty to them. However, a job like this with long hours and poor conditions 
may undermine both her ability to live a more generally successful life, 
and to express other forms of meaningful moral agency.
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why the state is the target of so much criticism. Furthermore, I think the 
outline above pushes us to think more carefully about the different moral 
functions democracy might play. The argument implies that there may be 
other ways to fulfil these moral functions, and that we might compare their 
effectiveness with the effectiveness of the state. Perhaps most 
importantly, the argument emphasises that although the state provides a 
specifically institutional relationship that is designed to promote a set of 
moral ends, the nature of the relationship itself poses a potential threat to 
those joined together by the state. Again, democracy as it exists within 
states can generally be understood as an attempt to reduce or eliminate 
that potential threat. Dryzek’s question is whether there are forms of 
participatory and activist politics that can flourish in a global situation 
where an overarching global state is absent, but where there are vast 
differences in the distribution and types of power available to different 
actors. Although he acknowledges that civil society is not inevitably a 
force for good, he does not address the question of whether democracy 
might be necessary to restrain some of the political actors he discusses. I 
think this is the central difference between the approach I advocate and 
Dryzek’s approach. To some extent, Dryzek focuses on the possibility 
that seemingly small-scale and powerless civil society actors -  often 
treated with condescension in the literature on globalization -  can actually 
wield more capacity for change than is acknowledged. This question 
seems to be pursued to the exclusion of the question of whether or how 
such power can be exercised responsibly. This is why I am inclined to 
find Dryzek’s approach unattractive. Furthermore, because he makes a 
virtue out of the flexibility and lack of constraints on the civil society actors 
he favours, it is not open to him to respond by saying that his account is 
just incomplete, and that further details about possible constraints are 
forthcoming. The problem thus seems to be a deep one. The flexibility 
that Dryzek favours is not always morally attractive, but it lies at the heart 
of his distinctive approach to global democracy.
Applying this broad moral approach to the sweatshop issue, it is 
important to note that the specific actions required to even begin 
attempting to fulfil the basic moral demand will often come into conflict in
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practice. As Young points out, developing countries often face a dilemma 
between providing decent working standards and encouraging 
development.
There is no excuse for national and state governments in the 
United States not to enforce labour standards in the apparel 
industry, or any other industry, and the record here is rather poor. 
Some governments in less developed countries, however, can say 
with some justification that they are under severe constraints that 
prevent them from improving working conditions... These 
governments will say that they desperately need investment and 
jobs, and that to get them they must compete with other poor 
states to promote a ‘favourable’ investment climate (Young, 2006,
p. 118).
Now, we saw in the introduction that this kind of conflict is not necessarily 
the real issue. Kucera (2001, 2004a) and others have argued that in 
many cases, higher labour standards do not prevent companies from 
investing in countries. The problem for many developing countries is 
more the perception that this is the case, and the pressure this perception 
exerts on them to lower their standards. In any case, the problem remains 
that the governments themselves feel under some pressure not to 
enforce or implement effective standards, and that this pressure may 
come in part from the desire to attract jobs that offer some of their citizens 
an improved standard of living. However, the moral significance of the 
other actors involved in these cases is not that they are relatively free 
from these constraints and the apparently painful trade offs that often 
have to be made. Rather, it is that the constraints on the state in this case 
mean that it is not able to lighten the moral obligations that apply. For 
corporations, the fact that the state is not able or willing to enforce labour 
standards means that they have more direct obligations to ensure that 
some such standards are met. For individual consumers, the possibility 
that companies are using sweatshop labour and states are unwilling or 
unable to prevent this generates a more direct obligation to press for 
higher labour standards. Dryzek might argue that the fact that western 
consumers are not constrained by the same moral conflicts facing
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developing country governments allows them to be more 
uncompromising in their moral demands. I think this would pick out the 
wrong kind of flexibility. The relevant kind of flexibility in this case is that 
wealthier western consumers can adapt their demands for goods at little 
personal cost. As Young points out,
Middle-class clothing consumers in the developed world...benefit 
from the large selection and affordable prices that the industry 
offers them. Persons who benefit relatively from structural 
injustices have special moral responsibilities...because they are 
able to adapt to changed circumstances without suffering serious 
deprivation (Young, 2006, p. 128).
Because the state is an ongoing, institutional association, it generates a 
demand for political responsibility understood as a need to balance 
different moral demands when they come into conflict. However, as 
Young points out, it is wrong to suggest that the absence of the state 
somehow absolves people of responsibilities of justice, or of the need to 
consider how different moral priorities might conflict. As she points out by 
referring to Locke’s social contract theory, civil society does not imply an 
absence of structural or moral constraints:
[The] need and desire for political institutions arises because 
socially connected persons with multiple and sometimes conflicting 
institutional commitments recognize their relationships are liable to 
conflict...The moral status of political institutions arises from the 
obligations of justice generated by social connection: such 
institutions are instruments through which these obligations can be 
discharged (Young, 2006, p. 105).
My worry about Dryzek’s approach is that he misses the point that the 
obligation to weigh different and possibly conflicting interests falls more 
heavily on individuals and non-state institutions when state institutions 
are weak or absent. When states are unwilling or unable to enforce 
labour standards, the moral obligation to ensure they are met falls in part 
on corporations, in part on consumers, and in part on workers 
themselves, and requires these actors to weigh this obligation against 
other commitments. So, for example, western consumers considering
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boycotting products with the aim of closing sweatshops are required to 
weigh this aim against the need to protect the livelihoods of poorer 
citizens of developing countries.
V) Conclusion and Summary
Dryzek’s argument about global discursive democracy is distinctive 
because it takes up the claim that a lack of conventional democratic 
political structures is an opportunity for a different form of democracy. 
One way to summarise this position is to see Dryzek as taking an 
argument about the function of civil society in Soviet and post-Soviet 
states and applying it to the global level. As Michael Walzer points out, 
this approach can be found in the work of anti-Soviet dissidents like 
George Konrad. Konrad “urged his fellow dissidents to reject the very 
idea of seizing or sharing power and to devote their energies to religious, 
cultural, economic and professional associations” (Walzer, 1990, p. 21). 
Walzer rejects this idea in part because civil society “left to itself, 
generates radically unequal power relationships, which only state power 
can challenge” (Walzer, 1990, p. 23). So, Walzer’s objection to civil 
society that is not in some way constrained by the state is that it may 
itself produce some forms of domination109.
The arguments in this chapter can be seen as an attempt to deepen this 
criticism and apply it to the specific problems of a seemingly global 
political movement against sweatshops. The first three criticisms of 
Dryzek’s argument looked at problems with his claim that global 
discursive democracy is attractive because it is unconstrained. The 
voluntariness argument is unconvincing because we cannot simply take 
people’s actual participation in anti-sweatshop protests at face value. 
There are people with more urgent interests at stake who face constraints 
on their capacity and willingness to take part in monitoring or protesting 
about working conditions. Furthermore, it can be argued that those 
people are in many cases best placed to comment on working conditions
109 See Brown (1999) for criticism of the idea of global civil society.
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and even to propose solutions to the problems they face. Similarly, the 
claim that protest movements are attractive because they can act in a 
unconstrained way is unattractive. Often, this lack of constraint may lead 
to people with greater power imposing moral priorities on less powerful 
people without regard to a broader range of considerations. Interestingly, 
the sweatshop case shows that this can happen even when the more 
powerful people have quite good intentions. It is possible to impose moral 
priorities such as opposition to sweatshop labour through the kinds of 
informal mass action Dryzek favours. However, we have seen how this 
can actually make some poor and vulnerable people worse off, and I think 
this should be seen as more morally troubling than Dryzek acknowledges. 
Finally, Dryzek’s argument is vulnerable to Miller’s point that some forms 
of global civil society action work against the traditional demand for 
political responsibility that - for Miller in particular - is only found in nation­
states. If global discursive democracy is unconstrained and people can 
join and leave movements at will, there is no demand for them to weigh 
different and conflicting priorities against each other. I agree with the 
general point about responsibility, but I hope to show that relationships 
that generate these kinds of responsibility are not confined within the 
state. To give a brief illustration, sweatshop workers themselves are in a 
relationship in which their job provides them with basic means for survival 
and possibly a higher standard of living than they could otherwise expect. 
This is an ongoing relationship. If they press for better working conditions, 
they may have to weigh this against other considerations such as 
competitive advantage against other firms. It is worth stressing that this is 
not an attractive trade off to make. However, the point is that the workers 
are not simply in a position where they can act without regard to a range 
of important considerations. This contrasts quite starkly with the position 
of Western consumers who can often make choices about which goods to 
buy without much personal cost.
The point I want to take forward from this is that it is worth looking for 
ongoing institutional relationships that can provide some of the minimal 
conditions for political responsibility that Miller stresses. I do not see why 
we must limit these relationships within the boundaries of the state.
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In the second and third parts of the chapter, I developed two points about 
the role of the state in Dryzek’s argument. In the second part, I suggested 
that it is not clear exactly why Dryzek objected to the use of state power. 
In general, I think he is too focused on the use of state power as a source 
of domination but neglects its role in preventing or mitigating it. 
Furthermore, I argued that one of the distinctive things states can do is to 
make regulations that (in principle) apply across whole territories. This 
may be troubling if the rules states make are insensitive to legitimate 
differences between people. However, the sweatshop case shows how 
these types of rules can also be useful in some circumstances. For 
example, setting minimum standards that apply across all industries in a 
territory may prevent child workers in highly visible industries such as 
clothing manufacture from being driven into less visible industries such as 
agriculture or production of raw materials.
Finally, I attempted to give a brief outline of the moral function states 
might serve. Although a fuller account will be given in the more 
constructive chapters of this thesis, I think this is important at this stage 
because this type of account is missing from Dryzek’s argument and this 
can make his suspicion of the state seem rather unmotivated. The basic 
argument I gave is that the state is one of the institutional structures 
through which a moral obligation that is owed to all people can be 
discharged. If the state did not exist, the obligation might fall more directly 
on individuals, making it more onerous. There are a couple of points to 
stress about this. First, the absence of a state does not make the 
obligation void; if anything, where the state is absent, the obligation may 
become more demanding. Second, even where the state does exist, its 
existence does not nullify the individual moral obligation. Rather, the 
obligation becomes an indirect one: people are required to sustain the 
state, on the assumption that this is generally the best way for them to 
ensure the obligation is fulfilled. Third, the state can itself pose a threat to 
people’s ability to lead successful lives, and this threat means state 
power should be limited in some ways. I suggested that democracy plays 
an important role here.
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We thus have three main points I want to take forward for further 
discussion. First, the possibility that there may be institutional 
relationships outside the state that generate something like the political 
responsibility that Miller stresses. Second, the point that states can 
mitigate domination, and that one of the distinctive ways they do this is by 
making rules that apply in principle to all citizens. Third, that states are 
one of the institutional means by which moral responsibilities can be 
discharged, but that these very institutional structures pose a potential 
risk to people and that this risk might be limited through democracy.
As a final point, I want to add a comment on Cochran’s point about 
bottom-up democratisation. Cochran stresses the contrast between the 
grand, cosmopolitan institution-building approach that we find in Held, 
and the bottom-up, civil society based approach we find in Dryzek. I 
generally find the bottom-up process attractive, in particular because I am 
concerned about the effects that cosmopolitan institution building might 
have on localised individuals and groups. However, I am not convinced 
that the unconstrained, rather unstructured approach that Dryzek 
stresses really qualifies as bottom-up at all. One of the charges levelled 
at protestors such as the anti-globalisation movement is that they are 
rather irresponsible and privileged members of wealthy societies. Wolf 
gives a very sharp statement of this point: “They fall rather in the category 
of spoiled children” (Wolf, 2004, p. 10). This can seem like rather a cheap 
shot, but perhaps it has a more serious point behind it. When sweatshop 
workers live in countries with limited rights to free speech and 
association, or face pressure from employers, it is very hard for them to 
make their voices heard. As a result, it seems inappropriate to claim that 
protest movements are really bottom-up at all. The rules that provide 
even a minimal degree of credibility to the claim that political protests in 
western countries represent those with the most urgent interests at stake 
are missing. This presses us to think about how we might identify those 
who have genuine and urgent interests at stake, as well as asking how 
and why they could be included in decisions that affect them.
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I) Introduction
My aim in this chapter is to respond to statist arguments that attempt to 
confine principles of justice within the boundaries of the state. My main 
target is Thomas Nagel, who argues that a combination of coercion and 
collective authorisation by fellow citizens provides the source for claims to 
egalitarian justice. Although I look at other statist arguments in section I 
below, Nagel is my main target for several reasons. First, his argument 
about coercion and collective authorisation forces us to think about 
exactly what it is that states do. In particular, it emphasises that states are 
institutional structures that provide for the basic needs of their citizens. I 
address this issue in sections II and III. Second, his argument for 
egalitarian justice within the state bundles together a range of different 
egalitarian concerns. I will argue that pulling apart these concerns and 
looking at them in the context of the role of states helps us understand 
that Nagel’s argument for equality in relation to states relates to the role 
of democratic political equality in preventing arbitrary use of state power, 
rather than any of the other egalitarian concerns. I address this in section 
IV. The main point of these first sections is thus to try to explain the 
connection between basic needs, the state, equality and democracy. In 
section V, VI and VII, I turn to a different argument from the statists. This 
is the claim that the legitimacy of international institutions is derived from 
the states that set them up. I argue that this claim is of limited moral and
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empirical relevance when many states are unwilling or unable to provide 
basic goods for their citizens. I argue that Nagel’s account needs to be 
modified in a more cosmopolitan direction. Once this is done, it becomes 
clearer that moral principles for dealing with institutional relationships 
outside the state are needed.
II) Arguments for Statism: Co-operation and Coercion
In recent years, a number of arguments attempting to confine the scope 
of egalitarian justice - and particularly egalitarian distributive justice - 
within the boundaries of states have appeared. These arguments have 
partly been motivated by the debates around John Rawls’s replies to his 
cosmopolitan critics in his Law of Peoples. Several of the defenders of 
statism have explicitly defended different components of Rawls’s 
argument, although not all statists claim to defend Rawls’s argument as a 
whole110. In this section, I want to set out the basic arguments that have 
been used to defend statism and the responses to them. In the next 
sections, I will look in more detail at two specific statist arguments.
Simon Caney picks out two statist arguments for detailed criticism. The 
first can be called the co-operation argument. The second can be called 
the coercion argument. Although Caney does not pretend that these are 
the only statist arguments111, I believe it is worth focusing on these 
particular arguments because it is only by bringing versions of them 
together that we can come to a proper understanding of the specific role 
of equality in relation to the state.
110 As I noted in my introduction, Rawls himself does not fit easily into the 
statist category. This is partly because of his emphasis on deriving 
principles of justice from ideas embedded in the political culture of 
political societies. Brian Barry caricatures Rawls’s later position sharply 
when he describes it as “a rather muddled version of Michael Walzer’s 
anti-enlightenment particularism” (Barry, 2001, p. 331 n27). Fora detailed 
cosmopolitan critique of the Law of Peoples, see Beitz (2000). Freeman 
(2006) is probably the most consistent attempt to defend all of Rawls’s 
arguments in the Law of Peoples.
111 See Caney (2008, p. 489fl) for a longer list of possible statist 
arguments.
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The argument from co-operation draws on the liberal idea of the state as 
a scheme of social and political co-operation and argues that principles of 
justice only apply to states. Samuel Freeman provides a detailed 
elaboration of the argument in his recent defences of Rawls112. It is 
argued that sovereign states are the only schemes of social and political 
co-operation that raise demands of justice, because states are the only 
actors that provide the basic structure that makes social and political co­
operation possible (Freeman, 2007). The problem with this argument is 
that, as Simon Caney argues, none of the four explanations Freeman 
gives as to why states are special or unique sites of justice are 
persuasive.
Freeman’s first argument is that justice simply applies to the distinct 
economic and legal structures of the state. The claim is that economic 
and legal structures are the only relevant basic institutions. However, as 
Caney stresses, Freeman does not explain why this claim defeats other 
accounts, such as the common cosmopolitan argument that relationships 
of co-operative interdependence raise demands of justice113.
Second, Freeman claims that applying principles of justice to the basic 
institutions of the state is the only way to realise pure procedural justice. 
However, this argument again does not explain why basic institutions at 
the state level are the only appropriate sites for procedural justice. 
International institutions could also be appropriate sites for procedural 
justice.
Third, Freeman claims that principles of justice are intended as a guide 
for political actors within existing schemes of legislation. This is 
unpersuasive because it is not clear why political actors should only be 
concerned to apply those principles to domestic affairs (Caney, 2008, p. 
495).
Finally, Freeman claims that political actors are needed to apply 
principles of justice, and states are the only political actors capable of 
doing so. Caney’s response is that this gets things the wrong way round.
112 See Freeman (2006, 2007).
113 Examples of the latter view include Beitz (1999a), Pogge (2002), and 
Young (2000).
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Normatively, we do not tailor our principles of justice to existing agents. 
Rather, we reform existing agencies if this is needed in order to 
implement principles of justice (Caney, 2008, p. 496).
These four responses to Freeman’s argument can be summarised by 
stressing that he has not shown what it is about states as distinct actors 
that makes principles of justice uniquely applicable to them114.
The second approach Caney picks out is the coercion argument. Peter 
Blake defends this approach. Blake starts with a liberal claim that 
autonomy is valuable. He argues that this means that any coercive 
political system needs special justification, because coercion restricts 
autonomy. A commitment to justification of coercion requires a 
commitment to relative principles of distributive justice. Blake claims the 
global order is not coercive in the same way states are, and that, as a 
result, egalitarian or relative principles of distributive justice do not apply 
at the global level.
Caney provides a number of detailed arguments against Blake’s claim, 
but the following is perhaps the most simple and effective response:
Suppose we concede that (state) coercion requires justification. It 
is far from clear why a commitment to justification entails a 
commitment to egalitarianism. This again depends on what 
‘justification’ requires. On one view, justification requires giving the 
philosophical reasoning for one’s view. However, on this view 
‘justification’ is compatible with libertarianism so long as the state 
provides an account of the reasons supporting it. Blake’s 
vindication of (domestic) egalitarianism thus requires an argument 
showing why (state) coercion requires a more substantive pro­
egalitarian kind of justification than this other kind of justification 
(Caney, 2008, p. 505).
114 As a further point, Freeman also claims that all political decisions and 
actions at the global level are derivative of states as the primary actors. 
Since this argument is pretty much identical to Nagel’s derivative 
legitimacy argument, I shall leave it for consideration as part of the 
discussion of Nagel below.
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The basic point here is again that Blake owes us an account of why state 
coercion leads to a commitment to egalitarian distributive justice. Caney 
argues that a commitment to justification alone is not enough. It is not 
clear what is so special about coercion that it requires a specifically 
egalitarian justification.
I have moved rather quickly through the co-operation and coercion 
arguments that Freeman and Blake advance, and the replies Caney 
provides. I have only tried to do enough to show that the arguments are 
incomplete as they stand. I have not tried to go into more detail here 
because I believe the statist argument needs more careful reconstruction. 
Once it is reconstructed in an appropriate way, I hope it will become clear 
that the kind of equality that is distinctively appropriate at the state level is 
of a different kind than the distributive equality that statists concern 
themselves with.
Ill) Nagel: Coercion, Collective Authorisation and Global 
Justice
In his provocative article, “The Problem of Global Justice”, Thomas Nagel 
follows a rule from John Rawls which states, “The correct regulative 
principle for a thing depends on the nature of that thing” (Rawls, 1999, p. 
25). Nagel calls this a “political” approach to the question of where 
demands of egalitarian justice come from. On this view, the specific 
nature of the relationships in which we stand generates specific moral 
demands. However, there is a crucial difference in the way they use this 
rule to generate principles of egalitarian justice from the existence of 
separate political societies. For Rawls, the “thing” at stake is a political 
society with a liberal background culture: even in his early work, he 
stresses that his aim is to make explicit and systematic principles that are 
implicit in the political culture of a democratic society115. Nagel rejects this
115 Cohen stresses this point. He notes that Rawls’s explicit aim is to 
describe principles of justice “for a democratic society”, where democracy 
implies a political culture in which citizens are seen as free and equal. 
See Cohen (2003, p. 86 and 95-6).
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emphasis on political culture116. For him, the “thing” in question is a state. 
The demands of egalitarian justice follow from the existence of a state 
and from a distinctive capacity that states wield (or at least aspire to 
wield) over their citizens. More specifically, for Nagel, the complex 
combination of coercion and collective authorisation that states wield over 
their citizens generates a demand for egalitarian justice. This is because 
states’ use of this capacity involves or implicates the will of their citizens, 
and for Nagel, this involvement or implication of will requires special 
justification. To quote his basic statement of his position,
A sovereign state is not just a co-operative enterprise for mutual 
advantage. The societal rules determining its basic structure are 
coercively imposed: it is not a voluntary association. I submit that it 
is this complex fact - that we are both putative joint authors of the 
coercively imposed system, and subject to its norms, i.e., 
expected to accept their authority even when the collective 
decision diverges from our personal preference - that creates the 
special presumption against any arbitrary inequalities in our 
treatment by the system (Nagel, 2005, pp. 128-9).
Nagel denies that the same demand applies to relationships outside the 
complex of coercion and collective authorisation: there is no justice 
outside the state. This does not mean that there are no moral demands 
outside the state. In the terms of contemporary international relations, he 
is no realist: indeed, he might be seen as a cosmopolitan in an older, 
Kantian sense. However, Nagel argues that the only moral demands that
116 With regard to Rawls’s claim that theocratic societies that lack 
electoral processes might be seen as legitimate as long as they respect 
basic human rights, Nagel states “This seems to me a mistake. The 
political conception of justice need not be based on a strong 
personification of peoples” (Nagel, 2005, p. 135).
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apply outside the state are minimal humanitarian ones that would hold 
even if we were not in any institutional relationship at all117.
Nagel does not deny that people do in fact stand in institutional relations 
besides those between fellow citizens of a state. He even concedes that 
they may be necessary to fulfil basic humanitarian demands. However, 
he denies that these sub- and supra- state institutions raise demands of 
justice. This is because they are closer in character to voluntary 
associations, being established through bargaining by mutually self- 
interested parties. He states, “There is a difference between voluntary 
association, however strongly motivated, and coercively imposed 
collective authority” (Nagel, 2005, p. 140). This constitutes a challenge to 
those institutional cosmopolitans who hold that increasing trans-national 
cooperation means that we have institutional connections between 
people that generate egalitarian demands of justice on a global level118. 
For Nagel, the absence of a world state means that these institutions lack 
the distinctive characteristic that raises demands of egalitarian justice: 
they are not coercively imposed and collectively authorised.
One instinctive response to this argument is to question Nagel’s sharp 
distinction between coercive and voluntary schemes. Various 
commentators have expressed this intuitive doubt119. As Andrew Hurrell 
puts it,
[Nagel’s] view of justice places too much weight on the difference 
between coercive and non-coercive situations; and, more 
importantly, underplays the extent of changes that have in fact 
taken place in the density of international institutions, in the extent 
to which they do in fact exercise power and can be said to be co­
authored (Hurrell, 2007, p. 310).
117 “This moral minimum does not depend on the existence of any 
institutional connection between ourselves and other persons” (Nagel, 
2005, p. 131).
118 For discussions and defences of institutional cosmopolitanism see, for 
example, Beitz (1979), Buchanan, 2000 and Wenar, 2001.
119 See also David Miller. Miller states that although Nagel is right to see 
the nation-state as “a privileged context for justice”, he is “wrong to 
reduce that privilege to the fact of coercion” (Miller, 2008, p. 278).
Hurrell’s response raises the possibility of a sliding scale of different 
densities of interaction and power: some interactions are more “dense” 
than others, and raise more stringent demands of justice than others. 
However, it is precisely this “sliding scale” approach that Nagel singles 
out for sceptical attention towards the end of his paper. Leaving aside 
practical concerns, he asks if this approach makes moral sense: “Is there 
a plausible position covering this case that is intermediate between the 
political and the cosmopolitan conceptions?” (Nagel, 2005, p. 142). This 
immediate response is thus incomplete. However, I want to point out two 
more effective responses to Nagel’s argument. The first is simply that 
Nagel is vulnerable to the same criticism that Caney levelled at Blake. 
Nagel does argue that coercive legal systems require special justification, 
but he does not give any detailed explanation of why this justification has 
to be specifically egalitarian120.
A second response to Nagel is found in Arash Abizadeh’s article on 
global justice. Abizedah claims that Nagel’s argument is normatively 
perverse. He formulates Nagel’s argument in the following way:
If x requires concern by the state for the relative deprivation of an 
individual, then x is ongoing state coercion against that individual 
regulated by a system of law earned out in her name, i.e., actively 
engaging her will (Abizedah, 2007, p. 351).
The problem with this argument is that it
[Implies] that a state can exempt itself from the demands of justice 
simply by ensuring that the coercion to which it subjects persons is 
pure coercion without any pretence of accountability, i.e., by 
denying to those whom it coerces any standing as putative authors 
of the system of coercion (Abizedah, 2007, p. 351).
120 Caney claims “Nagel simply assumes that justice can only apply within 
the kind of coercive framework that is constituted by the modern state 
and gives us no argument for this assumption” (Caney, 2008, p. 498). I 
do not think this is right: I believe Nagel makes the same move from 
legally authorised coercion to a commitment to justification that Blake 
makes, but that this then makes Nagel vulnerable to Caney’s criticism of 
Blake.
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The perversity of Nagel’s argument results from his combination of 
coercion with collective authorisation. Nagel’s argument requires coercion 
and collective authorisation as necessary conditions for the normative 
demands to come into effect. However, this argument generates the 
perverse consequence that any state or other scheme of social 
interaction can avoid the demands of justice simply if those imposing it 
deny that it is authorised by those on whom it is imposed121. They can 
avoid demands of justice by denying that one of the necessary conditions 
is met.
In what follows, I look at these two arguments in turn. I first turn to the 
question of why states generate specific demands of equality. It is worth 
stressing from the outset that Nagel bundles a range of different 
conceptions of equality together in his statist conception of justice. He 
includes not only distributive equality but also democratic equality. My 
task will be to try to explain the rationale for democratic equality. I shall 
not look at distributive justice here122. I then turn to the normative 
perversity issue. I believe Abidezah’s argument needs some modification, 
but that when suitably qualified, it still demonstrates that Nagel’s 
argument yields normatively perverse outcomes when applied to two 
issues: the way states treat non-citizens and the way international 
institutions treat individuals.
IV) Basic Goods, Coercion and Voluntariness
121 Abidezah notes that the same argument can be found in A.J. Julius’s 
paper, “Nagel’s Atlas" (2006).
122 Much of the recent literature on global justice has revolved around the 
issue of why states raise demands of distributive equality, departing from 
John Rawls’s denial that his principle of distributive justice applies at the 
global level. Freeman argues that Rawls believed that the difference 
principle is only appropriate when institutions that guarantee the 
protection of the basic liberties are in place. Shapiro points out that few 
people have noticed that Rawls required democratic institutions as part of 
the structure of basic liberties. There is an interesting question about 
whether Rawls believed the application of the difference principle was 
contingent on whether it would be affirmed by democratic decision 
making processes. For discussion of some of the relevant issues, see 
Cohen (2003).
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One of the puzzling things about Nagel’s argument in “The Problem of 
Global Justice” is that he begins by emphasising the importance of a 
coercive, collectively authorised system for the co-ordination of actions 
that promote justice, but never explains what these institutions are co­
ordinating. These institutions are needed to assure people that their 
conduct is part of a reliable and effective system of collective action:
The only way to provide that assurance is through some form of 
law, with centralized authority to determine the rules and a 
centralized monopoly of the power of enforcement (Nagel, 2005, p. 
116)123.
However, Nagel never addresses the issue of whether the nature of the 
goods, benefits and burdens the state works to provide is itself relevant to 
questions of justice.
Nagel also seems to run together the claim that the state is coercively 
imposed with the claim that it is not voluntary: “The societal rules 
determining its basic structure are coercively imposed: it is not a 
voluntary association” (Nagel, 2005, p. 128). This may seem 
uncontroversial, but as Andrea Sangiovanni points out in his discussion of 
Nagel in relation to the issue of coercion, there are in fact at least three 
senses in which the state might be seen as non-voluntary. Sangiovanni 
uses a though experiment in which the coercive institutions of a state are 
destroyed by a terrorist attack: the police and military are rendered 
incapable of coercively enforcing the states’ laws. He then asks us to 
suppose that the state is nevertheless able to continue to co-ordinate the 
provision of various goods and services. However, at a certain point a 
group of wealthy gentlemen decide that, because the system of laws and
123 Nagel denies that any such system of legally co-ordinated action 
exists at the global level. This empirical claim is highly doubtful, though. 
Andrew Hurrell observes, for example, that
[There] have been an ascending scaled of multilateral actions on 
the part of both the UN and regional bodies: from non-recognition 
to the application of sanctions, to conflict resolution and political 
reconstruction, to peacekeeping/ peacemaking with a strong 
humanitarian component and a heavier emphasis on military force 
and coercion, to military intervention to restore an overthrown 
government (Hurrell, 2008, pp. 63-4).
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co-ordinated action is no longer coercively imposed, it no longer meets 
the full set of conditions for demands of justice to apply. Sangiovanni 
suggests that the gentlemen are wrong. What makes the state system 
non-voluntary is not just its coercive enforcement, but the fact that most 
of those involved depend on it for an important set of basic goods that 
they need to fulfil the most basic human needs:
For all but the most well off, attempting to secede from or opt out 
of the legal system would be excessively burdensome; in leaving 
the association, they would lose access to those basic goods and 
services required to develop and act on a plan of life (Sangiovanni, 
2007, p. 12, author’s emphasis).
Sangiovanni’s argument thus yields an important distinction between two 
senses of the claim that the state is non-voluntary and the claim that it is 
coercively imposed. The state is non-voluntary because most people 
depend on its system of co-ordinated co-operation for the provision of 
basic goods. This is distinct from the fact the state is imposed by a 
system of coercive laws. We can supplement this account by adding that 
the fact that some people are able to afford to exit the relationship at little 
or no personal cost while others are not able to do so creates a 
relationship of dependency.
A third understanding of the claim that the state is not a voluntary 
association can be found in Sangiovanni’s affirmation of the basic 
cosmopolitan claim about the equal, general and ultimate moral status of 
individuals. Although Sangiovanni is not explicit about this point, he 
seems to hold that affirming this cosmopolitan claim means that the 
provision of basic goods is not a matter of choice. The wealthy gentlemen 
are not entitled to deny that they have any responsibility to ensure that 
the state is still able to provide basic goods for all its citizens.
A few other observations about Sangiovanni’s discussion of Nagel are in 
order before we proceed. First, Sangiovanni claims that Nagel actually 
makes the distinction between non-voluntariness and coercion drawn 
above in “The Problem of Global Justice". I think this is too generous to 
Nagel: Nagel tends to run the two ideas together and does not address 
the possibility that states raise demands of justice because people
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depend on the goods they provide124. Second, having provided a clearer 
set of distinctions than Nagel between three different senses in which the 
state might be understood as being non-voluntary - it is coercively 
imposed; most people depend on it for basic goods; it helps ensure a 
provision of basic goods that is owed to everyone - Sangiovanni then 
abandons further discussion of the claim that the state raises demands of 
justice because it is not a voluntary association. Instead, he turns to a 
discussion of reciprocity in the provision of basic goods as an idea of 
fairness that is distinct to the state. Although I believe this is a mistake, it 
is not possible to set out a full response to Sangiovanni’s reciprocity 
argument here125. Third, having established through his thought 
experiment that coercion is not the only sense in which the state is non­
voluntary, Sangiovanni then abandons any further consideration of the 
possibility that coercion might be connected to the specific demands of 
justice states raise.
Sangiovanni’s argument improves on Nagel’s in several important ways. 
It distinguishes three senses in which states can be understood as being
124 Sangiovanni’s thought experiment is directed at Michael Blake’s 
version of an argument from coercion to distributive equality.
125 There are three broad objections to Sangiovanni’s argument. First, 
trying to distinguish co-operation from a full system of social rules puts 
Sangiovanni in a dilemma. Emphasising simple co-operation makes it 
hard to distinguish the kind of interaction that goes on at the level of the 
state from the kind of c-operation that goes on between employees of a 
multi-national corporation. Why does the MNC not then owe egalitarian 
justice to its workers? On the other hand, emphasising a full system of 
social rules threatens to privilege the status quo by assuming the state is 
the only feasible form such a system can take (for this part of the 
objection, see Caney, 2008, p. 496). A second objection is that 
Sangiovanni still does not explain why the system of rules and social 
norms involved in sustaining the state raise specifically egalitarian 
demands of justice. Other candidates include co-operation, 
interdependence and interaction, but Sangiovanni does not address 
these (this objection relates to a discussion between Charles Beitz and 
Brian Barry about whether interaction or mutually advantageous co­
operation raise demands of justice. See Beitz, 1979 and Barry, 1991. See 
also Caney, 2004, 2008). A third objection is that I believe Sangiovanni’s 
argument about reciprocity is more plausible as a normative claim about 
how to co-ordinate the social provision of basic goods in a fair and stable 
way than as a claim about how existing states actually do constitute 
reciprocal systems that raise demands of egalitarian justice.
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non-voluntary. They impose coercive laws; most people are dependent 
on them for basic goods; they are an institutional way of fulfilling a moral 
demand that people have access to basic goods. Nevertheless, I believe 
Sangiovanni is mistaken in abandoning Nagel’s attempt to draw a 
connection between the coercive role of the state and the demand for 
equality as a consideration of justice. In the next section, I attempt to link 
Sangiovanni’s concern with the role of the state in the provision of basic 
goods with Nagel’s concern with the connection between coercion and 
equality.
V) Dependency, the State and Democracy.
In this section, I want to argue that we can move from an argument about 
relationships of dependency, via an argument about the role of the state, 
to an argument for a specific form of equality. However, this equality is 
not the distributive equality that is the central concern of the theorists of 
statism I have looked at so far. My aim here is not to either vindicate or 
defeat distributive egalitarianism. Rather, my aim is to defend a specific 
form of political equality that I believe can plausibly be restricted within 
the boundaries of a state.
The first step in the argument is to acknowledge the basic cosmopolitan 
principles that Barry, Pogge and others have set out -  that individuals’ 
morally legitimate interests are of ultimate, general and equal concern. 
This creates a demand for institutions that are appropriately attentive to 
those interests.
The second step in this argument is to turn back to Sangiovanni’s 
reciprocity argument. Sangiovanni does acknowledge that there are 
circumstances in which some people have better exit options from 
reciprocal relationships than others. His argument suggests that this is 
most obviously the case when some people are dependent on basic 
goods they need to formulate and act on a plan of life. If other participants 
are not dependent in the same way, they can impose significant and 
morally relevant costs on their fellows.
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The state can do a couple of things to prevent this, though. This is the 
third step. On the one hand, states can redistribute resources so that the 
dependency relationships are more balanced. This could involve making 
some people more dependent on their fellows. Although this might seem 
odd, the basic idea underlying it is partly expressed in Rousseau’s 
demand that “no citizen shall be rich enough to buy another and none so 
poor as to be forced to sell himself (Rousseau, 1986, p. 96). 
Furthermore, it could be argued that increasing interdependence might 
strengthen social solidarity and reinforce the standing of some groups as 
valued members of society126.
A second option is to impose rules on those who are wealthy enough to 
leave the state, either to ensure that they continue to contribute or to 
ensure they only leave on terms that protect the interests of those who 
are dependent on them. These two basic options would be designed to 
ensure that those who are dependent on their relationships with others for 
basic goods are in a more secure, reciprocal relationship.
Both of the two options just outlined would require states to concentrate 
and increase their coercive power. The fourth step in the argument 
acknowledges this worry - the possibility that states might use their 
coercive power in arbitrary ways. This possibility of arbitrary rule would 
make it difficult for citizens to formulate and act on a plan of life. A 
concern with the morally legitimate interests of individuals requires that 
states be prevented from exercising coercive power in arbitrary ways.
The fifth step in the argument claims that a conventional, competitive 
form of electoral democracy plays an important part in preventing 
arbitrary rule. It is here that we introduce broadly republican arguments 
about the role of democracy in preventing arbitrary rule127. A competitive 
electoral system depends on a simple form of political equality: each adult 
citizen has a single vote that has the same weight as the votes of other 
citizens, and votes for one of several competing political parties. It works
126 For an argument broadly along these lines, see Anderson (1999).
127 These arguments are mainly drawn from Pettit (1999, 2000) and 
Bellamy (2008), although they are also indebted to Miller (1983) and 
Shapiro (2003).
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to prevent arbitrary rule in two ways. First, a competitive system gives the 
competing parties an incentive to show that the policies of their rivals are 
not in the interests of any citizens. This is perhaps the most effective way 
to prevent their competitors from gaining power. Second, a competitive 
system also works to protect the interests of minorities. Pettit describes 
this mechanism as follows:
In elections where parties compete with each other, the fact that a 
policy adopted by one party is inimical to the interests of some 
minority - if indeed it is a fact - gives rival parties a reason to draw 
attention to that fact and to lessen thereby the support that the 
offending party receives. Those parties may persuade some 
supporters who do not belong to the relevant majority to change 
their allegiance, they may shame majority supporters into changing 
their allegiance, or they may shame the party itself into changing 
its policy (Pettit, 2000, p. 117).
Pettit himself has doubts about the effectiveness of this mechanism. 
However, Bellamy responds to these doubts by making two main points. 
First, “Within most democracies, the number of minorities incapable of 
allying with others to seek a degree of political influence is very small” 
(Bellamy, 2008, p. 183). Second, relying on measures such as judicial 
review to protect minorities still depends on some degree of majority 
support:
Only democracy can galvanize popular support around a measure 
by reassuring citizens of its fairness by balancing it against other 
considerations and indicating that a degree of reciprocity underlies 
measures that may be costly for them (Bellamy, 2008, p. 185).
The sixth and final step in the argument is that there are outer limits to the 
effectiveness of this competitive form of democracy. I will look at these 
arguments in more detail in the next chapter in my discussion of Held’s 
cosmopolitan democracy. For the moment, the following concerns can be 
noted. First, ethnic, religious and linguistic differences can make it difficult
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for democracy to operate effectively128. Second, economic factors may 
undermine the effectiveness of electoral competition. Third, demographic 
problems may undermine the effectiveness of the mechanism Pettit 
describes: the larger a population, the less likely it will be that a given 
minority will be needed as an ally to tip the balance between particular 
parties. These considerations suggest that we need to be cautious at best 
about the possibility of an effective version of electoral competition on a 
global scale. In particular, there is serious cause for concern about 
whether the mechanisms in domestic electoral democracy that - 
according to Pettit and Bellamy - work to protect minorities could also 
work on a much larger scale.
The argument set out here moves from a requirement that all people 
have access to institutions that allow them to secure their morally 
legitimate interests to a claim about the scope of democratic institutions. 
It suggests that the main reason for limiting the scope of equality to the 
state level depends on an argument about democratic equality. The 
democratic mechanisms that serve to protect people from arbitrary rule 
by the state involve a specific form of political equality. However, this form 
of equality is only likely to be effective on a fairly limited scale. There are 
reasons to doubt its effectiveness at the global level129.
In the previous three sections, I have examined several statist arguments 
about the scope of justice. The contemporary statists I have been 
examining all attempt to restrict the scope of justice to within the 
boundaries of the state. For most of them, the central concern is with 
distributive justice. It may seem odd, then, to focus on this literature as a 
source of arguments about democracy. I hope the discussion of Nagel
128 For discussions of democracy in ethnically divided societies see, for 
example, Lijphart (1984) and Barry (1975). For some discussions of the 
problems of democracy under conditions of economic inequality see 
Young (2000) and Miller (2000).
129 One further point is that, because the electoral system is itself 
defended in terms of its role in realising a basic cosmopolitan concern 
with protecting individuals’ morally legitimate interests, it should not 
become so intrusive as to prevent people from acting on those interests 
at all.
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and Sangiovanni shows why a democratic form of equality is relevant to 
the debates on statism, and follows from a concern about how states 
work to provide what Sangiovanni calls basic goods. Briefly, the fact that 
states fulfil a specific duty to provide basic goods through mechanisms 
that concentrate power and share burdens requires political structures to 
restrict the possibility of arbitrary use of political power. I argued that 
competitive electoral democracy provides a mechanism that does this. 
There are a couple of further remarks to add to this summary. First, I 
have not tried to refute or defend distributive egalitarianism at either the 
global or statist level. My argument has been that the specific power of 
the state requires a specific form of democratic equality in order to 
prevent arbitrary rule. This tells against Nagel’s version of the statist 
argument precisely because Nagel bundles together a range of different 
conceptions of equality:
It is only from [the state] and from our fellow members through its 
institutions that we can claim a right to democracy, equal 
citizenship, non-discrimination, equality of opportunity, and the 
amelioration through public policy of unfairness in the distribution 
of social and economic goods (Nagel, 2005, p. 127).
This only serves to confuse matters. My argument has been that we need 
to think more carefully about than Nagel does about which forms of 
equality are relevant to the distinct institutional relationship the state puts 
people into.
Second, I suggested briefly in the fifth and sixth steps of my argument 
above that there are outer limits to the scale of democratic institutions 
that can work to protect both citizens as a group and minorities. If this 
argument can be reinforced, we may have an indirect argument against 
strong forms of cosmopolitan institutionalism. The objection would not be 
directly against the relevance of cosmopolitan versions of distributive 
justice or other forms of egalitarianism, but rather an argument against 
cosmopolitan institutions on the ground that democracy would not work to 
prevent them acting in arbitrary ways. I want to return to this argument in 
the next chapter.
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VI) Derivative Legitimacy
A second line of argument that emerges from the literature on statism can 
be called the derivative legitimacy argument. This line -  somewhat 
neglected in the literature -  attempts to address the problem that there is 
a now a huge range of institutions and organizations that cut across the 
boundaries of states130. These institutions pose a problem for statists, not 
least because some cosmopolitans argue that economic co-operation for 
mutual advantage is a source of claims of justice, and many international 
institutions are set up precisely to facilitate and encourage such co­
operation. The statist response is to question the significance of these 
institutions in comparison with the state:
[For] the moment they lack something that according to the 
political conception is crucial for the application and 
implementation of standards of justice. They are not collectively 
enacted and coercively imposed in the name of all the individuals 
whose lives they affect. International institutions act not in the 
name of individuals, but in the name of the states or state 
instruments and agencies that have created them. Hence the 
responsibility of those institutions toward individuals is filtered 
through the states that represent and bear primary responsibility 
for those individuals (Nagel, 2005, p. 138)131.
130 Nagel draws his own evidence about the extent of global political 
integration and interaction from Anne-Marie Slaughter’s book A New 
World Order (2004). It is worth noting that Slaughter sometimes presents 
a prescriptive version of her account of global networks: “[A] world of 
government networks would be a more effective and potentially more just 
world order than either what we have today or a world government in 
which a set of global institutions perched above nation states enforced 
global rules” (Slaughter, 2004, p. 7). This would presumably require that 
networks be made more accountable to individual states than at present.
131 See also Freeman: “Global political, legal and economic arrangements 
are secondary institutions and practices: they are largely the product of 
agreements among peoples and are supervenient upon the multiplicity of 
basic social institutions constituting the basic structure of many different 
societies...Consequently the only feasible global basic structure that can 
exist is secondary and supervenient" (Freeman, 2006, p. 246).
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On this view, associations at the supra-state level are the product of fair 
bargaining among representatives who are acting to promote the 
interests of the people they represent. Their legitimacy is derived from the 
fact that states set them up and maintain them through self-interested 
bargaining. As a result, they can be seen as voluntary and for Nagel are 
not bound by norms more demanding than a minimal humanitarianism 
that would apply even in the absence of any institutional connection. 
Before proceeding, I want to explain my use of the term “derivative 
legitimacy”. Legitimacy is a slippery concept132, but in this case it refers to 
the suggestion that private transactions can be seen as beyond the reach 
of state intervention as long as states provide a legal framework that 
ensures that those transactions are carried out on a fair basis133. The 
transactions themselves are not the subject of considerations of justice, 
as long as state institutions act to provide a fair background. However, 
Nagel is ambiguous about whether states actually have to provide such a 
background domestically in order for their participation in international 
institutions and co-operation to apply.
The arguments in the next sections have three main purposes. First, to 
establish the charge that Nagel’s argument is normatively perverse. 
Second, to identify a version of a statist argument that is not vulnerable to 
that charge. Third, to demonstrate that we need further principles to deal 
with problems that occur in a statist order, and that Nagel does not have 
the resources to provide those principles.
132 Andrew Hurrell provides a useful analysis of five different meanings of 
legitimacy, distinguishing process and procedure, substantive values, 
effectiveness, specialist knowledge and reason giving (Hurrell, 2008, p. 
80ff). The conception at work here is somewhat different from all these, in 
that it depends on the idea of a provision of a fair background against 
which other transactions are beyond the reach of intervention to promote 
justice.
133 See, for example, Sangiovanni: “the only reason that secondary 
associations within states are considered voluntary is because of the
background system of entitlements and protections provided by the state” 
(Sanggiovanni, 2007, p. 12).
VII) Normative Perversity?
Abidezah argues that normatively perverse outcomes follow from Nagel’s 
claim that coercive enforcement and collective authorisation are two 
necessary conditions for demands of justice to apply. In this section, I 
want to connect this claim to the derivative legitimacy argument set out 
above. Before doing so, it is worth noting a modification that needs to be 
made to Abidezah’s basic charge. Abidezah claims that Nagel’s argument 
is perverse because it leaves room for tyrants and authoritarians to 
escape the demands of justice in a very simple way: they only have to 
deny that their imposition of their will on their citizens is collectively 
authorised in order to remove one of the necessary conditions for 
demands of justice to apply. As Abidezah puts it, “This seems to suggest, 
for example, that colonial rule is exempt from the demands of justice 
precisely because it does not claim to act in the name of the colonized” 
(Abidezah, 2007, p. 352)134. This is a strong charge, but I believe that 
even a more generous reading of Nagel’s argument results in normatively 
perverse outcomes. As Sangiovanni notes, a more plausible reading of 
Nagel’s collective authorisation condition is that it applies to the system of 
rules a state puts in place and not to the attitude of the rulers imposing 
the system. On this view, it is not relevant that the rulers claim to be 
imposing a particular system. What matters is the way the system 
actually works: “Speaking of the state’s ‘claim’ to speak in our name and 
so on is simply shorthand for saying that the state is a norm-generative 
system of social rules which expects our compliance with it” 
(Sangiovanni, 2007, p. 16). This defuses the charge of normative 
perversity when it is applied to the domestic arrangements of existing 
states. As long as they meet some set of conditions (whatever those may 
be) to count as a system of norm-generative social rules, states raise 
demands of justice, the attitudes of their rulers notwithstanding135.
135 It is not clear from either Nagel or Sangiovanni’s arguments precisely 
where the relevant threshold lies. Nagel simply refers to “a special 
involvement of agency or the will” (p. 128) necessary to life in a society,
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Presumably, Nagel thinks all existing states meet the conditions that raise 
demands of justice and thus owe justice to their citizens. Nevertheless, as 
I shall argue, Nagel’s formulation of the grounds of justice still results in 
normatively perverse outcomes in the case of dealings with those who 
are not bound together by collectively authorised, coercively imposed 
systems of rules. The perverse outcomes relate to various different 
relationships, such as the relationship between states and citizens of 
other states, and the relationship between states and stateless persons. 
However, for our purposes here, the main problem for Nagel’s account is 
with dealings between international institutions and states that are either 
internally illegitimate or internally weak136.
There are two possible interpretations of Nagel’s derivative legitimacy 
argument. The first applies claims about derivative legitimacy to a world 
in which certain background moral demands on states are met. Call this 
strong derivative legitimacy. The second interpretation applies them to a 
world in which they are not met. Call this weak derivative legitimacy. 
Strong derivative legitimacy would require that states meet certain 
minimum domestic requirements of fairness or justice in the treatment of
while Sangiovanni refers to the actions needed to “support and maintain 
the state’s capacity to provide the basic goods necessary to protect us 
from physical attack and maintain and reproduce a stable system of 
property rights and entitlements” (Sangiovanni, 2007, p. 20).
136 With regard to the relationship between colonizing states and the 
citizens of the states they colonize, Nagel’s argument is perverse 
because it implies that the best way for the colonizers to avoid demands 
of justice is to ensure that the system they set up is not a legal one that 
requires normative compliance. The more coercive the system, the less it 
raises demands of justice. This argument depends on the nature of the 
system and not just the attitude of the rulers. With regard to the 
relationship between states and stateless persons, a state can deny that 
it owes considerations of justice to groups such as refugees simply by 
refusing them citizenship. This denies them full membership in the 
coercively enforced system of rules, membership that, if granted, would 
raise demands of justice. Simply coercing groups such as refugees by 
barring their entry or forcing them to leave does not raise demands of 
justice. Nagel actually seems to endorse something similar to this point 
when he states, “Immigration policies are simply enforced against the 
nationals of other states” (Nagel, 2005, pp. 128-9). However, he does 
have foreign nationals in mind here; he does not address the problem of 
stateless persons.
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their own citizens before their participation in international institutions can 
be seen as legitimate. On this view, the fact citizens of state A do not owe 
considerations of justice to the citizens of state B is the result of the fact 
that the citizens of B are already in a relationship that, for example, 
provides adequately for their basic needs. This could be compatible with 
the weak cosmopolitan principles Sangiovanni affirms. It would also 
address the normative perversity problem to some extent, since states 
would not be able to impose just any demands on their citizens. However, 
the textual evidence does not suggest Nagel endorses this strong version 
of derivative legitimacy. Although he makes some concessions to the 
possibility that states might pursue domestic justice as a result of their co­
operation in international institutions137, he generally argues that the 
domestic arrangements of states are of little direct concern to their 
fellows: “liberal states are not obliged either to tolerate non-liberal states 
or to try to transform them, because duties of justice are essentially duties 
to our fellow citizens” (Nagel, 2005, p. 135)138.
A second interpretation of Nagel’s view would apply derivative legitimacy 
on the basis that only states owe considerations of justice to their
137 See, for example, the following:
[State] institutions are responsible to their own citizens and may 
have a significant role to play in the support of social justice for 
those citizens...the aim of [global and regional networks] is to find 
ways in which the member states, or state-parts, can co-operate to 
better advance their separate aims, which will presumably include 
the advancement of domestic social justice in some form (Nagel, 
2005, p. 140).
138 Furthermore, a strong version of derivative legitimacy would impose 
limits on the kinds of agreements and transactions states could impose 
on one another. The limits on the agreements states could make would 
be set by whether those agreements are compatible with all states being 
able to sustain fair or at least minimally decent domestic institutions, yet 
Nagel imposes no such limits. Contracts and agreements between states 
are free bargains “and need not be underwritten by any kind of 
socioeconomic justice” (Nagel, 2005, p. 141). Compare Rawls (1999), 
who contrary to some of his cosmopolitan critics, does impose limits on 
the contracts peoples can make in the co-operative organizations they set 
up: “Should these co-operative organizations have unjustified distributive 
effects between peoples, these would have to be corrected” (Rawls, 
1999, p. 43). However, as Wenar (2001) points out, Rawls does not 
address the issue of the effects of such contracts on the individual 
citizens of peoples.
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citizens, and that it is no concern of other states or institutions whether 
states actually meet the demands those considerations impose. In this 
case, presumably, the mere fact that government agencies are involved 
in the bargaining process would be enough to secure a connection to a 
state and thus secure some claim to derivative legitimacy. The internal 
character of the state would not be relevant. As noted above, he textual 
evidence suggests that Nagel does endorse something like this 
argument. He argues both that the internal, domestic justice of states is of 
no direct concern to other states and that there are no constraints on the 
bargains or contracts states can make with other states. In both cases, 
the rationale for this is that there is no system of collectively authorised, 
coercively imposed rules between the states or between their citizens. 
Now, we can dispute the empirical truth of Nagel’s claim on the basis of 
the existence of institutions like the UN and the EU. The deeper 
normative point, though, is that Nagel’s claim about the absence of 
institutions that link people together in a relationship that raises demands 
of justice results in normatively perverse outcomes with regard to the way 
international institutions treat those affected by their policies.
VIII) Two Examples
In this section, I want to consider two cases that raise problems for 
Nagel’s argument. These cases lead us to question the relevance of 
Nagel’s claim that the global order and the interactions that go on within it 
are legitimate in virtue of the fact that states are in some way the source 
of the legitimacy of such interaction.
a) Undemocratic States
Nagel’s argument is based on the claim that the legitimacy of trans- and 
supra- national political agents is derived from their connection to 
domestic political authorities. However, the evidence suggests that he
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holds to the weak version of the derivative legitimacy thesis. On this view, 
the domestic justice of states is of no direct concern to other states or 
international institutions because justice is only owed by states to their 
own citizens. Democratic state A can interact with undemocratic state B 
because B’s failure to meet this standard for internal justice is of no direct 
concern to A139. This argument results in two kinds of normatively 
perverse outcome, which I shall illustrate using the labour standards 
example. First, a multi-national corporation that sets up an operation in an 
undemocratic country would be free to impose whatever conditions it likes 
on the workers it employs140. This is because any claims of justice that do 
exist are owed by the state to its citizens: again, they are of no concern to 
the MNC. As long as the MNC does not impose a full set of rules and 
expectations comparable to those imposed by states, it does not owe its 
employees any considerations of justice or fairness beyond Nagel’s non- 
institutional humanitarian minimum.
Second, similar points would apply to an international organization like 
the ILO. The ILO has some limited coercive powers (although it rarely if 
ever invokes them, and few people realise it has them at all) and makes 
binding rules. However, Nagel’s argument again implies that as long as 
those rules do not meet the threshold to count as the full system of 
societal rules a state imposes, the ILO would not owe considerations of 
justice to those affected by its decisions. Rather than owing assistance to
139 Nagel does at one point qualify this claim by arguing, “there are good 
reasons, not deriving from global socioeconomic justice, to be concerned 
about economic relations with states that are internally egregiously 
unjust” (Nagel, 2005, p. 143). However, he does not give any rationale for 
this qualification.
140 Several non-democratic countries do attempt to attract foreign 
businesses by using Export Processing Zones (EPZs), which offer 
incentives such as lower taxes and - in some cases -  restrictions such as 
limits on the right to form or join trade unions. Non-democratic countries 
with EPZs include Bangladesh, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, 
Malaysia, Thailand and China (Boyenge, 2006). Of course, some 
developing countries may have reasons to use EPZs and not all EPZs 
impose harsh restrictions on workers. However, the normative point is 
that Nagel would permit them to do so since neither they nor the MNCs 
that operate in them are institutional arrangements that raise demands of 
justice.
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the members of non-democratic states, the ILO could evade any 
responsibility for them by ensuring that its rules fall below whatever 
threshold Nagel has in mind.
Before proceeding, I want to make three more points with regard to the 
problem of non-democratic states. First, the problem is a large one. 
Freedom House’s Freedom in the World ranks countries according to 
their political rights and civil liberties. Its survey for 2008 classed 60 
countries as Partly Free and 43 as Not Free. Perhaps more important are 
the numbers of people living in countries that are Partly Free (1, 185, 300,
000) or Not Free (2, 391, 400,000)141. Perhaps of most direct interest to 
our discussion here, countries with low ratings for civil liberties are often 
given those scores because of evidence of repression and harassment of 
trade unions, prevention of industrial action, and intimidation of workers 
who organise protests and demonstrations. The criteria Freedom House 
uses are not doubt controversial, but they do give us an idea of the scale 
of the problem.
Second, Nagel’s claim that human rights are based on some sort of 
minimal morality that applies to non-institutional relationships limits his 
normative resources when it comes to these kinds of cases. The 
employees of an MNC in a non-democratic country or workers who 
depend on the ILO to take up their case do seem to be in some sort of 
morally significant relationship, but if it does not reach the threshold for 
statehood Nagel sets, it does not raise demands beyond Nagel’s moral 
minimum.
Third, Nagel’s argument about derivative legitimacy is focused on the way 
governments act in their dealings with international institutions: “the aim 
of such institutions is to find ways in which the member states, or state- 
parts, can co-operate to better advance their separate aims” (Nagel, 
2005, p. 140). However, if these states are not domestically democratic 
and if they actively abuse the rights of their citizens, it is hard to see how 
the ILO can advance the interests of the groups it is supposed to
141 Data from Freedom House, Freedom in the World (2008). 
http://www.freedomhouse.ora/template.cfm?paae=130&vear=2008. 
Accessed 03 June 2009.
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represent - workers in particular - if it only interacts with the states’ 
undemocratic governments. Since these people are denied freedom of 
association and the right to participate openly in trade unions, it is hard to 
see how they could influence the ILO to act in their interests via their 
governments alone142. These problems suggest that the ILO should - as 
far as possible - do more to interact directly with workers in undemocratic 
countries. It could have more power to gather evidence of violations of 
freedom of association independently of government agencies, for 
example. However, this only reinforces the need for principles to identify 
those who have urgent needs at stake in institutional relationships such 
as the relationship between employers and employees. Again, because 
Nagel’s minimal humanitarian morality is not based on institutional 
connections, he does not have the normative resources to give an 
account of such principles.
b) Weak and failing states
Nagel’s vision of the way states interact with international institutions 
involves an image of states engaging in bargaining and arriving at 
voluntary agreements to cooperate. I shall leave aside the rather heroic 
assumption that all states actually have sufficient capacities to influence 
such bargaining in order to best protect their interests143. Instead, I will 
focus on a different point. Nagel’s argument presents a rather limited and 
incomplete account of what international institutions actually do. In 
particular, he leaves the way that they interact with weak and failed states 
out of the picture. As Grant and Keohane point out, one of the roles of
142 Of course, the ILO does not just work with governments. It is a 
tripartite organization that includes representatives of unions and 
employers as well as governments. However, there are problems with its 
inclusion of unions from non-democratic countries, such as the case of 
the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU). For discussion of 
some of the issues, see Elliott and Freeman (2003, ch. 5) and Spooner 
(2004). Furthermore, Nagel does not address the issue of international 
organizations that do not deal directly with states.
143 Amrita Narlikar discusses this point in relation to the WTO (2005).
124
international institutions is to step in to act as a surrogate when existing 
state institutions have failed:
Weak and dependent states may be subject to fiscal and 
supervisory accountability, often through international 
organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank, or in cases of 
state breakdown (as in parts of the former Yugoslavia), the United 
Nations (Grant and Keohane, 2004, p. 22).
Suffice to say that this is rather different from the image of bargaining 
between states interested in furthering their self-interested aims. If the 
institutions of the existing state have broken down, it seems appropriate 
to say - as, for example, Cohen and Sabel do - that the international 
institution that steps in has entered into a direct rule-making relationship 
with the state’s citizens, and that this rule-making relationship raises 
normative demands144. Now Nagel might reply that if the international 
institution is making coercive laws that apply to the (failed) state’s 
citizens, then it is bound by the same moral demands as a state would 
be. He might argue that the situation is analogous with his comments on 
imposed or imperial regimes: they are bound to treat the people they 
impose on as equals. In practice this will probably mean restoring 
separate democratic institutions and political independence. As Cohen 
and Sabel point also point out, though, it does not seem right to restrict 
this demand to legal, coercive impositions by states. Contrary to Cohen
144 Cohen and Sabel give the example of the IMF stepping in to save the 
economy of a country on the brink of economic chaos (Cohen and Sabel, 
2006a, p. 167). They claim that the involvement of will necessary to 
sustain rule governed relationships raises normative demands more 
stringent than minimal humanitarianism, but less stringent than full 
justice. I am unconvinced by this for two reasons. First, I believe 
something more demanding than the involvement of will necessary to 
sustain a co-operative relationship is at play in the kinds of situation 
described. Second, Cohen and Sabel define the normative demands that 
such relationships impose in terms of giving due consideration to the 
“good” of those bound by the rules being made (Cohen and Sabel, 
2006a, p. 173). Cohen and Sabel’s use of the term “good” is too vaguely 
specified to be of much help in making sense of their normative demands.
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and Sabel’s argument, though, I am not convinced that it is just the fact 
that the international institution is imposing rules on the failed state’s 
citizens that imposes the moral demands. After all, tennis clubs and 
knitting circles presumably have some rules, but do not raise demands of 
justice. The IMF or World Bank impose rules that potentially affect the 
capacity of citizens of poor states to provide for their basic needs. This 
factor seems important in generating more stringent normative 
requirements. Sangiovanni points out that an important moral function of 
states is to provide a background of secure basic goods, against which 
further interactions (from membership of tennis clubs to mutually 
beneficial economic transactions) can be seen as voluntary. However, 
when the state is weak or breaks down, the background of basic goods 
itself is at stake. This applies in the case of adjustment assistance 
programmes: one way to respond to the negative consequences of trade 
liberalization is to strengthen local provision of welfare support. This is 
quite possible in wealthy countries, as both Wolf and Baghwati point out. 
However, this is not the case in countries with limited resources or weak 
infrastructure:
Poor countries typically can ill afford adjustment programmes...So 
we need to think of institutional programmes of adjustment 
assistance that can be domestically implemented but financed 
externally. The obvious candidate for this task is the World Bank, 
which should put its money where its pro-globalization mouth is 
(Bhagwati, 2004, p. 235).
In this case, it is the World Bank itself that is ultimately responsible for 
providing for the basic needs of those adversely affected by its policies, 
and indeed for building the infrastructure required to provide for those 
needs. As a result, it is surely directly answerable to those who rely on 
it145.
145 Elliott and Freeman make a similar point in their recommendations to 
anti-sweatshop activists:
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To reinforce the point, consider a slightly different example. Imagine a 
state where some natural disaster has left the government unable to 
provide basic goods for its citizens. NGOs intervene to provide the goods. 
The process of rebuilding the state’s capacities is a long one. As a result, 
the NGOs are responsible for provision over a long period. The NGOs do 
not rely on coercion of the local people to generate the goods they 
provide. However, the people living in the country are nevertheless highly 
dependent on the NGOs for provision of basic (or even subsistence) 
goods. It is obviously absurd to suggest that the people’s relationship to 
the NGO is voluntary - their dependence makes it different from that. The 
situation is a humanitarian one in the ordinary sense. However, Nagel’s 
conception of humanitarianism seems too thin. His conception relies on 
the idea of duties we owe to people in the absence of any institutional 
relationship. However, the relationship between the people in my 
example and the NGO does seem to be institutional in some sense: there 
is an ongoing relationship of dependency between the people and the 
organisation. It certainly does not seem to be the same as the thin, non- 
institutional humanitarian relationship that imposes the duty to help 
someone if they fall into a pond, for example. What might Nagel say if a 
religiously motivated NGO in an Islamic country made its aid provision 
conditional on the recipients converting to Christianity?
When a state has a functioning set of internal democratic institutions and 
international agreements are limited in ways that preserve and protect 
those institutions, it might make sense to say that its participation in some 
international institutions can be seen as voluntary. However, this is not 
the only function international institutions (and NGOs) serve. They also 
serve to provide support when state institutions collapse. Not all such 
support is provided in a legally structured, coercive way. However, this 
raises the question of what sort of voice the citizens of failed states have 
in their interactions with international institutions. If the international
Activists should demand that the World Bank and regional 
development banks should require social audits on projects they 
fund, using a combination of suitably trained domestic 
nongovernmental organizations or trade unions, as well as 
accredited auditors (Elliott and Freeman, 2003, p. 132).
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institution does not use coercive laws, Nagel would deny that it raises 
demands of justice. However, it seems highly unsatisfactory to claim that 
the relationship is a voluntary one. There is often an ongoing institutional 
relationship in these cases, and one that involves the provision of 
important basic goods. If this is so, we need a convincing account of the 
moral claims that the people in these relationships might make. By 
definition, Nagel’s complex of coercion and collective authorisation 
cannot provide such an account.
These examples raise a problem for Nagel’s account. If he wants to 
argue that the legitimacy of international institutions is derived from the 
legitimacy of states that are already internally legitimate according to the 
standards of strong derivative legitimacy, then his arguments are clearly 
empirically false, as the examples above indicate. Many states would 
have to move much further in the direction of internal democracy before 
we could claim that the requirements of strong derivative legitimacy were 
fulfilled. On the other hand, if he wants to argue that the demands on the 
internal legitimacy of other states are less stringent, then he is vulnerable 
to the charge that his argument is normatively perverse. The 
governments of undemocratic and failing states often fail to represent the 
interests of their citizens adequately, yet Nagel’s argument gives other 
states room to evade responsibility for those citizens and even permits 
them to impose arrangements that amount to pure coercion on them. The 
latter arrangements are permitted because only states raise demands of 
justice, and the way to avoid those demands is to avoid imposing the full 
set of legal and social norms that are necessary conditions for demands 
of justice to apply. These points do not, of course, directly affect the 
normative validity of the strong derivative legitimacy claim. It may still be 
the case that the strong version of the argument provides standards for 
forms of global and international interaction that do not generate 
normatively perverse outcomes. It may also be the case that a global and 
international order of this kind happens to be practically feasible and 
allows all individuals to protect their morally legitimate interests. In this 
case, Nagel’s strong derivative legitimacy argument would be compatible
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with a weak form of cosmopolitanism. However, this suggests that 
citizens of weak, failing and non-democratic states have a claim to the 
institutional conditions for internal, domestic legitimacy as a basic 
requirement of morality. It also suggests that they have a claim to 
institutions and policies that would enable them to make a transition 
towards these institutions.
IX) Coercion, Dependence and Basic Goods
Up to now, I have looked at two versions of Nagel’s derivative legitimacy 
argument, a weak one and a strong one. These arguments can be related 
to two more general arguments about the role of the state in promoting 
justice. They both make a strong claim about the role of the state. The 
two arguments can be formulated and related to the derivative legitimacy 
arguments as follows:
SS1: Only states raise demands of justice and these demands only apply 
between citizens of the same state.
This version of the argument relates to the weak version of derivative 
legitimacy, since it claims that neither the legitimacy or justice of other 
states nor the absence of state structures for other individuals is of 
concern to fellow citizens of the same state. Its weakness is that it is 
vulnerable to the normative perversity criticism, since states can exempt 
themselves from demands of justice by not getting into coercive, 
collectively authorised relationships with other citizens. As a result, we 
have a good reason to reject this formulation of Nagel’s argument.
SS2: States are the only institutions that can effectively promote justice. 
This relates more closely to the strong version of derivative legitimacy, 
since, if true, it suggests that the fair background against which other 
interactions are legitimate can only be secured by making all states 
internally capable of promoting justice. Two further points are worth 
stressing. First, this argument is not as obviously vulnerable to the 
normative perversity criticism as SS1, since it does not limit the demands 
of justice to states that already meet conditions of coercive enforcement
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and collective authorization. It suggests instead that any attempt to 
promote justice will depend on the capabilities of states. It is thus 
compatible with the weak cosmopolitan premises Sangiovanni endorses, 
since it claims that states are necessary to fulfil the basic moral concern 
expressed in those premises. Second, this argument is a feasibility claim 
and not a direct claim about the content of principles of justice146. For 
Nagel, the feasibility claim would be that coercive, centralised institutions 
imposing laws that apply to all citizens are the only really effective way to 
promote justice. It also suggests that the transition towards such 
institutions cannot itself be just, since the institutional conditions for a just 
transition - a coercive, collectively authorised legal system - are 
themselves missing.
The argument that Nagel’s focus on the state as the only source of 
demands of justice results in normatively perverse outcomes should 
motivate us to reject that focus. However, rather than try to rebut Nagel 
completely here, I want to suggest two starting points for a response to 
his argument. First, the connection between basic goods and 
dependency drawn from the discussion of Sangiovanni above seems a 
good place to start in understanding what is at stake when people stand 
in morally significant institutional relationships. If employees of a sweat 
shop are largely or wholly dependent on their employer for various basic 
goods, we can argue that this is a morally significant institutional 
relationship, even if we do not go so far as to claim that it directly raises 
demands of egalitarian justice. There seems little point in trying to claim 
that this kind of relationship is voluntary in the way a citizen of a wealthy 
democratic state’s membership of a tennis club is. However, such 
relationships may be necessary in cases where the state is unable or 
unwilling to do more to provide basic goods. The institutions and services 
provided by a centralised, coercive state may - for various reasons -  be 
in some cases the best or most efficient way of providing certain basic
146 Nagel himself does sometimes formulate his argument for statism in 
terms of feasibility. His feasibility argument is that only a coercive, 
centralised state can provide the necessary assurance that other people 
will conform to rather than undermine the patterns of conduct needed to 
promote justice. See Nagel, 2005, p. 116.
goods, but there may be other ways that are at least minimally 
acceptable. If this is so, we need to find ways of ensuring that these 
relationships are not abused. The possibility that people might be 
dependent on the relationships for basic goods seems the best place to 
start when trying to understand and mitigate their vulnerable status. 
Nagel’s account of justice suggests that the principles of justice are 
defined solely in terms of the institutional relationship in which people 
stand, specifically that of fellow citizens. In contrast, this account argues 
that basic goods can be provided through a number of different 
relationships. Even if the state is the most stable and even the most just 
institutional way of providing these goods, the possible weakness and 
injustice of states indicates a need to look for alternatives, even if only as 
part of the transition to more stable state provision of basic goods.
Second, where states are not willing or able to do more to protect their 
own citizens and promote justice, the transition may require institutions 
that possess a degree of independence from states. One example of the 
reason for this can be found in the literature on labour standards:
[Countries] such as India have some of the most progressive, and 
expensive, legislation on the books concerning even minimum 
wages, but with no real intention to enforce it precisely because 
the cost of such mandates would be forbidding (Bhagwati, 2004, p. 
174).
Perhaps this just gives us a case for separating monitoring or even 
enforcement from the government to some extent. One tentative 
suggestion might be to give trade unions a greater role in writing and 
even enforcing the standards, but to make them raise their own funds in 
order to do this. Done carefully, this might create legislation that is 
cheaper to enforce, more sensitive to local needs, and possibly make the 
unions more accountable to their members. In any case, the suggestion 
is intended as a response to the point that some poor states may have an 
incentive to create strong labour laws as a form of window dressing, with
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no intention to put the laws into practice147. In this case, it may make 
sense to shift the burden of legislation and enforcement onto more 
directly accountable agencies such as trade unions when the state does 
not itself provide the good (in this case, decent and effective labour 
standards) in question. There are two more general points to this 
example. The first is to suggest that there may be ways of providing basic 
goods even when states themselves are not willing or able to do so. The 
second is that the legitimacy of the institutions providing the goods is 
itself a moral concern, since the recipients of the goods are likely to be 
dependent on the institution.
We now have general answers to the three main aims of this discussion 
of derivative legitimacy and the charge of normative perversity. First, 
Nagel’s argument leads to normatively perverse outcomes when applied 
to the dealings states have with non-citizens, and also to normatively 
perverse outcomes when applied to international institutions. Second, a 
modified version of the statist argument would hold that all persons are 
entitled to membership in a state that actually provides basic goods. This 
is compatible with weak cosmopolitanism. Third, Nagel’s minimal 
humanitarian morality is not suited to addressing the moral problems that 
arise from institutional relationships for the provision of basic goods that 
are possible when states are weak or internally unjust.
X) Conclusion and Summary
This chapter looked at two separate aspects of a recent argument that 
attempts to confine principles of justice within the state. Nagel’s argument 
is a strong form of statism: it denies that any considerations of justice 
apply outside the state. The chapter was structured by responses to two 
separate criticisms of the statist argument. The first was Caney’s charge
147 Bhagwati makes this point with regard to India: “[Countries] such as 
India have some of the most progressive and expensive legislation on the 
books concerning even minimum wages, but with no intention to enforce 
it because the cost of such mandates would be forbidding” (Bhagwati, 
2004, p. 174).
132
that it is not clear why states raise demands of egalitarian justice. I 
argued that we can derive a demand for a form of democratic equality 
from the function of the state in providing basic goods, although this does 
leave open the question of why states raise demands of distributive 
equality. The second objection was Abidezah’s charge of normative 
perversity. I modified this charge in a way that is more generous to Nagel, 
but suggested he is still vulnerable to the modified version of the 
normative perversity charge. Examining this charge of normative 
perversity in the context of the derivative legitimacy argument pushed us 
to do two things. First, to try to come up with a more normatively 
adequate defence of statism, and second to try to come up with more 
normatively adequate principles for international institutions.
The upshot of the discussion of democratic equality was that democratic 
processes are an appropriate way to prevent arbitrary uses of the state’s 
coercive powers. I will turn more directly to the question of whether the 
same mechanism can work outside the state in the next chapter. The 
upshot of the discussion of normative perversity was that Nagel’s 
argument permits states and international institutions to avoid 
institutionally demanding responsibilities by avoiding taking on the full set 
of state-like traits that would raise demands of justice. A less perverse 
version of the statist argument would hold that, while states may be the 
best institutional arrangements for providing basic goods that all 
individuals everywhere have a right to, we also need principles that can 
deal with cases where states are unwilling or unable to meet their 
responsibilities to provide those goods. These principles would need to 
be sensitive to the problems raised by different the forms of institutional 
relationship through which people provide for basic goods when the state 
is not able or willing to do so. Nagel’s argument only focuses on the state 
as one such institutional relationship. His failure to attend to the role of 
basic goods in that relationship - and his failure to address the possibility 
of other relationships in which basic goods might be at stake - exposes 
the inadequacy of his statist argument.
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Four. Held: Cosmopolitanism, Globalization and 
Democracy
Outline of the chapter
I) Introduction
II) Held’s cosmopolitanism
III) Moral and political cosmopolitanism
IV) Democracy and the sovereign state
V) Democracy beyond the state
I) Introduction
Beginning in the early 1990’s, David Held has elaborated a distinctly 
democratic version of cosmopolitanism. Held argued that democracy has 
become established as the “the world’s most popular form of government’’ 
(Mandelbaum, 2007). It has become the most common standard for 
judging the legitimacy of existing states. However, the expansion of the 
globalization of international law, international regimes, military 
institutions, culture and economics has undermined democracy within 
states because citizens are now subject to influences that transcend state 
boundaries yet are rarely subject to any direct democratic influence (Held, 
1995, pp 100-30). Held argues that the appropriate response to this is to 
set up a cosmopolitan democratic order in which cosmopolitan law works 
to uphold democratic principles of accountability at different levels of 
decision making. My aim in this chapter is to ask how far Held’s demand 
for strong cosmopolitan democratic institutions is justified. I start in 
section II by setting out some recent modifications Held has made to his 
basic argument. I then examine Held’s description of the way democracy 
emerged as a principle of political legitimacy for the modern state. 
Following that, I ask whether a less demanding version of global order 
could be defended on Held’s cosmopolitan grounds. Finally, I ask
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whether Held’s principles are relevant to pursuing this less demanding 
version.
II) Held's Cosmopolitanism
In recent years, two different forms of cosmopolitan political theory have 
evolved almost in parallel to each other. On the one hand, cosmopolitan 
democrats have argued for strengthening of democratic forms of 
participation at the global level, mainly in response to globalization148. On 
the other, moral cosmopolitans have defended a conception of individual 
humans as objects of ultimate, general and equal moral concern149.
In a series of recent publications (Held, 2003, 2004, 2005), Held has 
restated and reaffirmed the moral and political principles that form the 
basis for his cosmopolitan approach. Held outlines the following eight 
principles:
1: equal worth and dignity: humankind belongs to a single moral realm in 
which each person is equally worthy of respect and consideration.
2: active agency; active agency connotes the capacity of human beings to 
reason self-consciously, to be self-reflective and self-determining.
3: personal responsibility and accountability: actors have to be aware of, 
and accountable for, the consequences of actions, direct or indirect, 
intended or unintended, which may radically restrict or delimit the choices 
of others.
4: consent: interlocking lives, projects and communities require forms of 
public reasoning, deliberation and decision making that take account of 
each person’s equal standing in such processes.
5: collective decision-making about public matters through voting 
procedures:
148 Some of the main texts in this tradition include Held (1995), Linklater 
(1998), Archibugi (1998), Kuper (2004) and Gould (2004).
Selecting from a large and growing number of works in this area, 
Pogge (2002), Barry (1999), Beitz (1999), Tan (2004) and Moellendorf 
(2004).
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while a legitimate public decision is one that results from consent, this 
needs to be linked with voting at the decisive stage of collective decision 
making and with the processes and mechanisms of majority rule.
6: inclusiveness and subsidiarity: those significantly affected by public 
decisions, issues, or processes, should, ceteris paribus, have an equal 
opportunity, directly or indirectly through elected representatives, to 
influence and shape them.
7: avoidance of serious harm: if the requirements specified by the 
principle of avoidance of serious harm are to be met, public policy ought 
to be focused, in the first instance, that is, on the eradication of serious 
harm inflicted on people “against their will” and “without their consent” 
(Barry, 1998, p. 207, 231).
8: sustainability: all social and economic development must be consistent 
with the stewardship of the world’s core resources.
(Principles one to eight quoted from Held, 2004, p. 171ff, 2005, p. 12ff). 
Held emphasises that these principles are universal in scope: “These are 
principles that can be universally shared, and can form the basis for the 
protection of each person’s equal interest in the determination of the 
institutions which govern their lives” (Held, 2005, p. 171). This brings Held 
much closer to contemporary cosmopolitans like Pogge and Barry, since 
he now clearly affirms something like the claim that individual human 
beings are of ultimate, equal and general moral concern150. It also 
suggests that Held thinks that these fundamental principles are not 
themselves matters of democratic affirmation or choice: rather, they 
provide the rationale for democracy. In this section, I want to examine 
how Held’s clear affirmation of this set of principles clears some 
ambiguities in his account of cosmopolitanism, but how it also raises 
some further difficulties for his account. I emphasise that I am not 
claiming that Held ever endorsed the conclusions that some of his critics
150 For the original formulations of these claims, see Barry (1999) and 
Pogge (2002). Held states the principle in the following way: “Humankind 
belongs to a single moral realm in which each person is equally worthy of 
respect and consideration” (Held, 2003, p. 470).
level at him. Rather, my point is that his eight cosmopolitan principles 
make clear how he would answer the criticisms.
a) In his earlier work, Held sometimes defended substantive redistribution 
in a way that gave the impression that political participation is the 
foundational or primary good that democracy should promote. For 
example: "The domain of welfare denotes the organization of those 
capacities that people require in order to ensure that they are 'competent 
to take part in both economic and political life'" (Held, 1995, p. 178). 
Held’s more recent endorsement of his first four principles about the 
status of individuals as moral agents capable of pursuing projects and 
interests in a responsible manner changes this emphasis and clarifies his 
argument to some extent. Democracy is now seen as an expression of, or 
consequence of, these more basic principles about moral agency and the 
status of individuals as objects of moral concern.
b) One ambiguity that some of Held’s critics have exploited is that he 
appears at some points to claim that promoting and protecting democracy 
is only of concern to states that already are democratic151.
Held does not offer normative arguments for why democracy 
should spread. He believes that participation in this cosmopolitan 
framework comes down to a decision on the part of each actor to 
uphold democracy and its principle of autonomy globally - either 
you do or you don't, since by definition, democracy has to be freely 
chosen (Cochran, 2002, pp. 520-1).
This interpretation suggests that Held would restrict cosmopolitan 
principles to those states and communities that choose to recognise the 
equal moral worth of individuals. Held’s cosmopolitan principles would 
then run firmly aground when confronted with non-democratic societies. 
His later, stronger affirmation of universal principles of equal moral worth 
provides a response to this criticism, since it suggests that the normative
151 This ambiguity is found, for example, when Held states that 
cosmopolitan democratic law requires the establishment of a “community 
of all democratic communities” (Held, 1999, p. 106). It is not entirely clear 
in this context whether Held then means to restrict cosmopolitan 
democratic law to those communities that already accept democracy.
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argument for the spread of democracy is the basic commitment to the 
equal moral worth and dignity of individuals.
c) Held’s affirmation of universal principles of moral worth and dignity 
commits him to giving an account of how to realise his cosmopolitan 
principles in ways that are compatible with the moral worth and dignity of 
individuals. This follows from the universalist nature of Held’s argument, 
since there is no morally relevant difference between those individuals 
who might have to work to realise a cosmopolitan democratic order and 
those who live under it once it is in place. A couple of points should be 
stressed about this argument. First, I am not trying to claim that the 
processes by which a cosmopolitan democratic order might be realised 
themselves have to meet the standards of a fully just or democratic 
cosmopolitan order. Rather, I am making the same claim that Abidezah 
makes in the following passage:
If justice can be realized to greater and lesser degrees, and if the 
necessary instrument for its realization is not available, all that 
follows is that other, second-best means must be deployed for at 
least a partial realization of justice (Abidezah, 2007, p. 340).
Second, I am not criticizing Held for failing to give an account of how to 
realise his cosmopolitan democratic order. I am only arguing that his 
commitment to universal principles of equal moral worth and dignity and 
his commitment to a principle of avoidance of serious harm do commit 
him to giving such an account. This is a necessary extension of Held’s 
project152.
d) Held’s endorsement of substantive principles such as equal moral 
worth and dignity, personal responsibility and accountability, avoidance of 
serious harm, and sustainability, commit him to a concern with the 
outcomes of democratic procedures as well as to the extension of 
procedures themselves. Barry stresses that this is a consequence of the 
affirmation of the basic cosmopolitan commitment to ultimate, equal and
152 Held does provide outlines of various short term steps towards the 
realization of cosmopolitan democracy or global social democracy, 
although he does not give a detailed explanation of how they are 
compatible with his guiding ethical principles. See, for example, Held 
(2003, pp. 475-6, 2004, p. 164).
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general moral concern with individuals: “the value of any political 
structure (including a world state) is entirely derivative from whatever it 
contributes to the advancement of human rights, human well-being and 
the like” (Barry, 1999, p. 37). This presumably also applies to democratic 
decision-making procedures153. Held at least partially concedes this 
commitment to a concern with substantive outcomes when he points out 
that his fifth principle, a commitment to decision making through voting 
procedures -  needs some qualification:
Minorities clearly need to be protected in this process. The rights 
and obligations entailed by principles 4 and 5 have to be 
compatible with the protection of each person’s equal interest in 
principles 1, 2 and 3 -  an interest in each person’s recognition as a 
being of equal moral worth, with an equal capacity to act on and 
account for their actions (Held, 2005, p. 27n4).
e) Although Held’s eight principles have more determinate content than 
Barry and Pogge’s three-part cosmopolitan principles, it can be argued 
that Held’s principles are nevertheless subject to a concern that emerges 
from the following point:
Moral cosmopolitanism, in its most general formulation, says 
simply that human beings are all subject to the same set of moral 
laws: we must treat others in accordance with those laws no 
matter where in the universe they live; they likewise must treat us 
in the same way. Political cosmopolitanism says this can be 
achieved only if everyone is ultimately subject to the same 
authority with the power to enforce those laws. The first of these 
positions does not entail the second, and indeed many would deny 
that moral cosmopolitanism has any specific political implications 
(Miller, 2008, p. 24).
Although Held does not make the leap to world government (and Miller 
concedes that few political cosmopolitans actually do), it can be argued 
that his eight principles do include both moral and political principles. The
153 Barry appears to be making this point when he states “Nobody but a 
moral imbecile would really be prepared to deliver himself over body and 
soul to the majority principle” (Barry, 1991, p. 38).
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first and the seventh principles are fairly obvious examples of moral 
principles, whereas the fifth and sixth are principles with implications for 
the scope of political institutions. They state, respectively, that majority 
voting is an appropriate procedure for collective decision making and that 
people should have an equal opportunity to shape public decisions that 
significantly affect them. However, if Miller’s argument is correct, then 
Held cannot claim to have derived the political principles from the moral 
ones. I will return to this issue in my discussion below154.
I have outlined five consequences that follow from Held’s endorsement of 
a version of moral cosmopolitanism. First, Held accepts a set of moral 
principles that he formulates in a way that suggests that political 
participation is not the foundational good -  rather, individuals are the 
targets of moral concern and democracy is an expression of this concern. 
Second, I argued that his endorsement helps settle the concern about 
what to do about non-democratic societies. Third, I argued that Held is 
more clearly committed to giving an account of how to progress towards a 
cosmopolitan order. Fourth, I argued that Held is committed to some sort 
of concern with outcomes as well as procedures. Finally, I argued that 
Held is vulnerable to the criticism that principles of moral 
cosmopolitanism do not entail any strong conclusions about the political 
institutions that are needed to realise cosmopolitan morality. In the next 
section, I want to look more closely at Held’s connection between moral 
and political principles.
Ill) Moral and Political Cosmopolitanism
Although Held’s eight cosmopolitan principles include universal moral 
principles that bring him closer to contemporary moral cosmopolitans, he 
stands apart from them in his affirmation of further principles that do have 
more direct political implications. As I have noted, his fifth and sixth
154 As a further point, it is worth noting that neither Miller nor 
Sangviovanni deny the basic cosmopolitan principles. Sangiovanni 
begins his article by affirming them, while Miller says that everyone 
except “extreme racists” can affirm them (Miller, 2008, p. 27).
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principles are the most obvious example of this. If Held is claiming that 
the political principles are derived from the moral principles, he is 
vulnerable to the following charge that David Miller directs at other 
contemporary cosmopolitans:
Cosmopolitanism...as its defenders present it, is a thesis about 
value...It says that the fate of human beings everywhere should in 
some sense count equally with us. Global principles of equality, on 
the other hand, are principles intended to govern the design of our 
institutions. They require that we should establish institutions that 
provide people everywhere with equal amounts of some 
good...they specify how we should behave as voters and so forth. 
Claims about value and claims about how agents should act are 
distinct, and there can be no entailment from one to the other 
(Miller, 2004, p. 66. Emphasis added)155.
On this argument, Held cannot claim to have derived his political 
principles from his moral ones, since the claim about moral value is 
primarily a claim about the scope of our moral duties and not a claim 
about their content. As it stands, this is a rather odd argument. Miller 
himself seems to acknowledge that it implies that the cosmopolitan moral 
claim is redundant, since it provides no guidance at all for action (Miller, 
2004, p. 66). However, this makes it difficult for Miller to then help himself 
to his own set of institutional proposals, which, he claims, are compatible 
with the minimal cosmopolitan commitment156. I would argue that a more
155 A couple of qualifications are in order here. First, Miller does at some 
points argue that the minimal cosmopolitan premises do rule out certain 
types of conduct. He argues, for example, that it rules out state A 
dumping hazardous nuclear waste on state B’s territory simply because A 
declares that the interests of B’s citizens are of no concern to them 
(Miller, 2008, p. 29). Second, Held could argue that a basic commitment 
to moral equality requires that all people are given some kind of 
participation rights, even if only as a symbolic affirmation of their equal 
status (for some discussions of the symbolic role of democracy in 
egalitarian societies, see Dworkin, 1987 and Wolff, 2000). Of course, 
Held clearly wants democratic participation to have more substantive 
content than this.
156 These are as follows: “[Respect] for human rights worldwide, 
measures to prevent the international exploitation of political communities 
and smaller groups, and adequate opportunities for political self­
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plausible version of this argument is that we cannot move from the 
minimal cosmopolitan claim about the scope of moral equality to the 
institutional claim without giving some sort of substantive account of what 
we actually owe to people. Indeed, this is implied in Miller’s own 
argument. He argues that if a child from a distant town goes missing, and 
he has some information that can help find the child, he is under some 
obligation to provide the information. This suggests that his commitment 
to the moral worth of the child is expressed through his obligation to 
provide the information. Miller actually admits that what is really needed is 
a “substantive premise about what we owe to other human beings as 
such” (Miller, 2004, p. 67)157.
To illustrate this point with regard to a general example from the labour 
standards literature, consider the following case. Discussing the 
possibility of a total global ban on child labour, Kaushik Basu makes the 
following point:
There are circumstances where even if such a total ban were 
feasible and costless to implement, it ought not to be implemented.
To understand this, one ought to understand that there are worse 
things that can happen to children than having to work. In very 
poor regions, the alternative to work may be to suffer acute hunger 
or starvation (Basu, 1999, p 1111).
The point here is that in order to treat the child labourers appropriately as 
targets of moral concern, we need a broader account of the way child 
labour affects them. In particular, we need to ask which of their interests 
is at stake.
How does this apply to Held? Held is not very explicit about substantive 
content in either of his recent formulations of his eight principles, but he 
does at one point refer back to the idea that the boundaries of decision 
making are set by having significant interests at stake. In his formulation 
of his sixth principle, he refers to the idea that interests or needs can be
determination of all peoples. One might want to add to this the redress of 
historic injustice” (Miller, 2004, p. 78).
157 In his most recent book, Miller provides his own account of this 
substantive premise by giving an account of basic needs that are owed to 
all people. See Miller (2008, ch 7).
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used to determine who is affected by particular decisions. A brief account 
of his conception of needs is given in chapter 6 of Global Covenant 
Similarly, Held’s seventh principle expresses concern with substantive 
provision of basic welfare. Held’s account is thus more detailed than the 
basic three part cosmopolitan moral premise, and does commit him to
more substantive concerns about welfare and interests. It is not
necessary to provide a detailed examination of these accounts at this
point. All that is necessary is to ask whether Held has done enough to
rebut Miller’s challenge by providing (however implicitly or indirectly) a 
substantive account of what is owed to all people as a matter of moral 
concern. I will argue in the next section that Held has not done so. His 
account of needs provides the necessary substantive link from the 
cosmopolitan claim about the scope of morality to political principles. 
However, in the next section, I want to ask whether Held’s commitment to 
moral cosmopolitanism, coupled with his substantive account of needs, is 
enough to justify his political claims about cosmopolitan democracy. 
Before proceeding to my argument, one further point can be made. 
Perhaps Held is not claiming that there is any relationship of derivation 
between his principles. Instead of claiming that all eight principles are 
moral principles that are derived from each other, maybe Held has simply 
provided a list that includes both moral and political principles. Perhaps 
he is simply arguing that accepting the moral cosmopolitan claim and 
then accepting some empirical facts about the effects of globalization 
leads us to the political principles. In this case, the political principles are 
distinct from the moral principles: they are simply principles that follow if 
we accept the empirical claims, and the account of them serves a 
different purpose from the account of the moral principles. I would argue 
that this move still requires us to give a substantive account of the way 
globalization impacts on people’s ability to fulfil their needs. It still requires 
us to establish that cosmopolitan democratic institutions are both needed 
and able to fulfil the substantive needs that give content to the basic 
moral cosmopolitan claim. If this is so, it would still be possible to 
challenge Held’s claim about the need for strong cosmopolitan 
democratic institutions.
IV) Democracy and the Sovereign State
In this section, I will examine Held’s argument about the emergence of 
democracy from the absolutist sovereign state. I will argue that Held’s 
argument does not include an account of the role of democracy in taming 
potential abuses of power by the state. Once such an account is given, 
the limits of conventional forms of democracy can be shown. The section 
is divided into four. In the first part, I outline Held’s description of the 
evolution of the sovereign state and refer to an explanation of how 
competitive electoral democracy works to prevent abuses of power by the 
state. In the second part, I explain the limits of competitive electoral 
democracy. In the third, I set out the implications of this argument for 
international and supra-national institutions. Finally, I set out the 
implications for Held’s version of cosmopolitan democracy,
a) Held’s first step is to argue that the consolidation of power by absolutist 
rulers in sixteenth century Europe provided a context in which state 
sovereignty as an organising principle for political units could emerge:
Absolutism helped set in motion a process of state-making which 
began to reduce the social, economic, and cultural variation within 
states and expand the variation among them, i.e., it helped to forge 
political communities with a clearer and growing sense of identity -  
national identity (Held, 1999, p. 87).
The increasing distinctions between different territorial communities 
consolidated the idea of sovereignty as a principle (if not always a 
practice) of international law. States have exclusive control over their own 
territories and accept only minimal principles of international law 
governing relations between states. Significantly, states have no right to 
intervene on behalf of citizens of other states when the rights or interests 
of the latter are at stake.
The establishment of an absolutist principle of sovereignty effectively 
meant that citizens were at the mercy of their rulers. Held sees this as 
one source of the struggle to establish the rule of law and accountability
over those in political power. The process of creating unified political 
communities provided an impetus
[To] the development of a discourse about the nature of modern 
political community, about the meaning of membership in it, and 
about proper form and limits of political power (Held, 1999, p. 89).
The outcome of these debates was the establishment of representative 
democracy as the main source of the moral legitimacy of sovereign 
states. Representative democracy established
[A] cluster of rules and institutions permitting the broadest 
participation of citizens in the election of representatives who alone 
can make political decisions, that is, decisions affecting the whole 
community (Held, 1999, p. 90).
It is also important to stress that the participation of citizens itself reflects 
the establishment of a broadly liberal democratic principle of autonomy, 
understood as the freedom and equality of individual citizens (Held, 1993, 
p. 18, 1995, p. 147). Held thus makes a close link between the idea of 
citizens as free and equal and the claim that people should have an equal 
opportunity to shape political processes and decisions that affect them in 
significant ways (Held, 2003, p. 470-1).
Held’s arguments about the emergence of democracy as a principle of 
political legitimacy emphasise the importance of the idea of the sovereign 
state as a discrete political unit with a claim to non-interference from other 
states. Held argues that globalization significantly undermines the 
assumption that all political decisions can be taken in units of this kind: 
National boundaries have traditionally demarcated the basis on 
which individuals are included and excluded from participation in 
decisions affecting their lives; but if many socio-economic 
processes, and the outcomes of decisions about them, stretch 
beyond national frontiers, then the implications of this are serious, 
not only for the categories of consent and legitimacy but for all the 
key ideas of democracy (Held, 1999, p. 105).
The basic argument here is that the emergence of a range of trans­
national actors and forces makes it increasingly difficult to restrict political 
decisions to territorial states under the control of a single democratic
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government. Globalization thus threatens the democratic institutions that, 
for Held, emerged to make individual autonomy possible.
There are thus three main steps in Held’s argument. First comes the 
establishment of the sovereign state. Then comes the emergence of 
democracy as a procedure for accountable decision making within the 
boundaries of the state. Finally, globalization emerges as a challenge to 
both the nation state and democracy within the state.
One puzzling thing about this argument is the second step. Although Held 
does refer to electoral democracy in his work on globalization (Held, 
1999, pp. 89, 91), his argument does not explain in any detail whether or 
how it works to prevent arbitrary rule. This is perhaps not so important in 
Held’s earlier historical account, since all he needs to do there is to 
establish that globalization is eroding democracy. However, the role of 
democracy in preventing arbitrary rule becomes much more significant in 
Held’s account of moral cosmopolitanism. This is in part because Held’s 
moral account places much more emphasis on individual autonomy and 
agency (as is acknowledged in his second principle). As Held himself 
stresses, while the state may provide the background conditions for the 
exercise of individual choice and collective projects, its power also needs 
to be restrained:
Governments are entrusted with the capacities of the state to the 
extent that they uphold the rule of law. The equal treatment of all 
before the law, and the protection of subjects from the arbitrary 
use of political authority and coercive power, are sine qua non 
(Held, 1995, p. 145).
I argued in the previous chapter on Nagel that republicans have given an 
account that helps to explain how democracy works to minimise or 
prevent arbitrary rule (Pettit, 1999, 2000, Bellamy, 2008)158. More
158 Pettit distinguishes electoral from contestatory democracy, and argues 
that the latter is necessary to prevent arbitrary interference in the lives of 
individuals and minorities. His argument is thus an extension of traditional 
concerns about the tyranny of the majority. For Bellamy, competitive 
electoral processes themselves help to prevent domination of minorities. 
Arguably, Bellamy could be interpreted as arguing that a contestatory 
element is internal to electoral competition.
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specifically, properly functioning competitive electoral democracy 
institutionalises a system in which competing parties have incentives both 
to rule out uses of power that are not in the interests of any citizens and 
to avoid abuses of power that target minorities. To restate the argument, 
the first part works because competing parties have a strong interest in 
showing that their rivals’ proposals are not in fact in the interests of any 
citizens159. The second part works because competing parties in a 
majoritarian system will need to find support from specific minorities in 
order to build a winning majority, as Bellamy argues:
Because an electoral majority is built from minorities and is prone 
to cycling conditions, a ruling group will do well not to rely on a 
minimal winning coalition and to exclude other groups completely - 
thereby reducing the possibility of such cycles. In this respect, 
majority rule protects minorities. Either a currently excluded 
minority has a good chance of being part of a future winning 
coalition, or - for that very reason - is likely not to be excluded by 
any winning coalition keen to retain its long term power (Bellamy, 
2008, p. 182)160.
These arguments give us a clearer idea about how competitive electoral 
democracy based on a simple form of political equality -  one person, one 
vote, with universal franchise for adult citizens -  works to restrain the 
arbitrary use of power by states161. In the next part, I will argue that these
159 A version of this argument can be found in Amartya Sen’s explanation 
of how democracy works to prevent famines:
The open and oppositional politics of a democratic country tends to 
force any government in office to take timely and effective steps to 
prevent famines, in a way that did not happen in the case of 
famines under non-democratic arrangements (Sen, 1999, p. 188).
160 Bellamy also cites McGann (2004) as further support for this argument 
about how majority rule in a competitive system works to protect 
minorities.
161 The argument could be reinforced by arguing that electoral democracy 
also gives expression to the equal status of citizens by granting them an 
equal vote, or by arguing that electoral democracy contributes to citizens’ 
sense of civic pride and responsibility. For arguments to this effect, see 
Bellamy (2008), Dworkin (1987) and Wolff (1998).
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arguments also limit the applicability of electoral competition beyond the 
state162.
b) Held’s own arguments about autonomy and the capacity to pursue 
projects commit him to some sort of substantive concern with outcomes. 
Held also commits himself to the view that majority voting should not 
result in arbitrary rule over minorities (Held, 2004, p. 172n3). Democracy 
is valued if it can be shown to protect or advance these substantive 
values. However, there are practical problems with possible global or 
trans-national forms of majority competition that make it less likely that 
they will work to protect different interests in the same way as democracy 
at the state level. I have two basic worries about relying on majority 
competition as a way to protect minorities at the global level. The first is a 
concern about scale. The second is a concern about the effectiveness of 
minorities in forming alliances. I will look at the worry about scale first. 
Bellamy makes a basic argument for the effectiveness of majoritarian 
competition in protecting minorities. His claim is that the instability of 
coalitions means that minorities always have some chance of being in a 
position to tip the balance for particular coalition, allowing it to form a
162 Held does discuss competitive and pluralist models of democracy in 
his important and wide ranging work Models of Democracy (2006, 3rd 
edition). However, I have two main concerns about the discussion there. 
First, his approach focuses on Schumpeter’s competitive elitism and on 
pluralism as different mechanisms through which competition might 
secure protection of individual and group rights and interests. However, 
his discussion of Schumpeter does not address in detail the possibility of 
a more normative, electorally based version of Schumpeter’s competitive 
model (although Held does refer to Miller’s 1983 article which does 
outline such a model). Bellamy and Pettit’s discussions of electoral 
democratic processes might be seen as normative defences of 
competition. Similarly, Held identifies classical and neo-pluralism as 
approaches that focus on competition between active interest groups 
rather than electoral competition as the most important mechanism for 
protecting diverse interests (see Held, 2006, p. 170). My second main 
concern is that, although Held emphasises the importance of electoral 
competition in his normative model of domestic democracy (2006, p. 
282), he does not connect domestic competitive electoral mechanisms to 
his proposals for cosmopolitan democracy (see, for example, 2006, p. 
308-9). The argument in this chapter claims both that the republican 
arguments identified in Bellamy and Pettit help to explain how electoral 
competition works to protect minority interests and attempts to make a 
link between domestic and cosmopolitan forms of democracy.
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winning majority. This gives parties an incentive not to exclude particular 
minorities. However, my worry about this is that the larger the scale of the 
voting system, the less likely it will be that small minorities in particular 
will actually be in a position to tip the balance163.
My second concern expresses a worry that it will be much harder for 
minorities to form alliances and coalitions under conditions of linguistic 
diversity. It will presumably be much harder for different groups to 
communicate their different interests and reconcile them in the interests 
of achieving an effective majority. This point is partly expressed in 
Kymlicka’s response to Held (although Kymlicka is not focusing explicitly 
on electoral competition here): “Put simply, democratic politics is politics 
in the vernacular. The average citizen only feels comfortable debating 
political issues in their own tongue” (Kymlicka, 1999, p. 121)164. Under 
conditions of linguistic diversity, it becomes harder for minorities to form 
coalitions and thus the mechanisms of electoral democracy that protect 
minorities from majority domination are weaker. These two arguments 
suggest that -  if we want a form of democracy that actually works to 
protect minority interests -  we need to be cautious about extending 
electoral competition across linguistic boundaries or expanding the scale 
of electoral competition165.
163 For a more general discussion about the scale of effective democratic 
institutions see Diamond (1999), chapter 4. Diamond observes that in 
1998, 75 per cent of states with populations of less than one million were 
democratic, compared to 60 per cent of states with larger populations. 
Furthermore, two-thirds of states with populations of less than one million 
were rated as “free” according to Freedom House’s more demanding 
criteria, compared to one-third of larger states (Diamond, 1999, p. 117).
164 The problems of linguistic diversity as an obstacle to democracy are 
widely debated. See, for example, Mansour (1993), Van Parijs (2007) and 
Carothers (2007).
165 There is a further, closely related objection to democratic institutions 
that cut across national boundaries. This is the claim that a sense of 
national identity is itself necessary for democracy and institutions of social 
justice to function at all. David Miller has developed this argument in 
detail (1995, 2000). Brian Barry accepts that this is a plausible claim 
about effective liberal institutions (including democracy) but argues that 
this is nevertheless compatible with cosmopolitanism: “It is quite true that 
fellow nationals...have obligations to each other that they do not have to 
people in the rest of the world. But this in no way contradicts the
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This argument thus holds that there are limits to the scale of democratic 
institutions that can effectively work to protect the substantive interests 
that Held himself endorses in his list of eight principles. Electoral 
competition of the type specified here is a democratic mechanism that 
protects minority interests, but its scale is restricted by concerns about 
the effectiveness of coalition forming in large scale or linguistically diverse 
societies.
c) The argument above has two implications for the design of institutions. 
First, the concerns about scale and linguistic diversity do not necessarily 
rule out federal electoral systems within large diverse states. Diamond, 
for example, emphasises the importance (but also the limitations) of 
federal democracy for large states (see Diamond, 1999, p. 149ff).
More importantly for our argument here, though, is the point that if 
democracy is strengthened and institutionalised at local levels, this 
creates similar incentives for representatives to pursue the interests of 
those they represent at the trans- and supra-national levels. This point is 
made in Pettit’s article on national and international democracy, with 
reference to international institutions:
The fact that national governments have to sign up to these 
institutions, and that they have every reason to explore the good 
that can thereby be achieved, means that the search for mutually 
beneficial ventures can flourish without the benefit of competition 
for office...national governments have an interest in establishing 
the terms of reference under which the body operates, and in 
maintaining the maximum level of scrutability to ensure compliance 
with those terms (Pettit, 2005 pp. 16-17)166.
universalistic tenets of cosmopolitanism...universal morality consists 
largely in general prescriptions that, in the actual circumstances of 
everyday life, generate specific obligations” (Barry, 1999, p. 59).
166 For similar arguments, see Kymlicka and Slaughter. Kymlicka states:
It seems to me that there is no necessary reason why international 
institutions should be directly accountable (or accessible to) 
individual citizens. To be sure, if international institutions are 
increasingly powerful, they must be held accountable. But why can 
we not hold them accountable indirectly, by debating at the
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It is important to note that Pettit’s argument here assumes that the 
national governments themselves are democratic in some sense. For this 
reason, it cannot be taken simply as a defence of the status quo. 
Nevertheless, Pettit’s argument suggests that if national governments are 
constituted in such a way that they are forced to track the interests of 
their own citizens, this will carry over into their interactions with 
international institutions. Furthermore, if we assume that all governments 
are constituted in this way, each government will work to protect the 
interests of its own citizens167. On this argument, although there are limits 
to the scale of domestic democratic institutions, once those institutions 
are in place, the elected representatives themselves have incentives to 
protect the interests of those they represent, both domestically and at the 
international and supra-national level.
Two further remarks need to be added here, though. First, one response 
is that this argument neglects the differences in bargaining power and 
influence among states. The fact that poorer democratic states are often 
unable to afford well-informed and effective delegations to international 
institutions is well documented168. This suggests that they will often be 
unable to protect the interests of those whose interests they represent, 
even if they have some electoral incentive to do so. While this is a 
compelling argument, I do not see why it directly undermines the
national level how we want our national governments to act in 
intergovernmental contexts? (Kymlicka, 1999, p. 123).
Slaughter argues for the central role of networks that are accountable to 
governments: “government networks can provide the spine of...broader 
networks in ways that make it easier to distinguish politically accountable 
actors from ‘experts and enthusiasts’” (Slaughter, 2004, p. 240, emphasis 
added).
167 For an argument that makes the opposite assumption to Pettit, see 
Caney. Caney argues,
Democratic states may show some consideration to foreigners, but 
it is difficult to accept that this statist institutional structure is the 
most likely to deliver cosmopolitan outcomes. Consider the 
incentives facing democratically elected officials in a world of 
states. Their incentive is to win elections and to do so to cater for 
the wishes and beliefs of their own citizens (Caney, 2004, p. 169). 
This assumes that the representatives of other states are not doing the 
same, and that they cannot exercise similar influence.
168 See, for example, Held (2004, chapter 6) and Narlikar (2005).
151
importance of delegates being accountable to domestic constituencies. 
The argument suggests instead that we might need to find ways to 
strengthen the influence of representatives or delegates from poorer 
democratic states.
Second, it is questionable whether the outcomes that result from 
interaction among separate, internally democratic states should 
themselves be called democratic, not least since they are not the direct 
product of electoral competition based on universal franchise169. Dahl, for 
example, argues that international organizations should be referred to as 
bureaucratic bargaining systems (Dahl, 1999, p. 33). This does not 
undermine the point that these systems might be shown to be the most 
effective plausible way to protect people’s interests, though. Indeed, 
Held’s commitment to substantive values such as autonomy and 
protection of minorities suggests that these systems would be judged 
against their ability to protect those values, rather than just against their 
democratic credentials.
d) Held includes a demand for strengthened inter- and supra-state 
institutions in his outline of cosmopolitan democracy. This demand has 
been a consistent part of his advocacy of cosmopolitan democracy 
(compare Held, 1993, 1995, 2003, 2004, 2005). The arguments set out 
here suggest that we have reason to question the extent of these 
demands. I argued that there are worries about the effectiveness of 
conventional democratic competition in protecting the interests and rights 
of citizens at the inter- and supra- state level. Furthermore, I argued 
(following Pettit and others) that reinforced domestic democracy can itself 
serve to protect the interests of individuals in inter- and supra-national 
institutions. The difficulties involved in directly democratising international 
institutions, and the availability of feasible alternatives, suggests that we 
should recast Held’s demand for stronger, ultimately democratic 
cosmopolitan institutions. This argument thus leads us to question the
169 This is in opposition to Pettit, who claims that because international 
institutions give expression to the second, contestatory dimension of his 
two-dimensional model, they can properly be called democratic. See 
Pettit, 2005.
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way Held moves from his moral arguments about individuals having equal 
status as targets of moral concern to his more obviously political 
demands for strong cosmopolitan democratic institutions.
One further point can be added here. It was particularly central to Held’s 
earlier arguments about globalization and democracy that the various 
forms of globalization were acting to undermine the ability of democratic 
states to determine their own fates170. While Held has maintained 
versions of this argument in his more recent work (see 2006, p. 296-7, for 
example), there has also been a growing literature that emphasises the 
importance of strong and effective state structures in benefiting from and 
protecting the interests of citizens from the effects of globalization. For 
example, Martin Wolf argues, “the ability of a society to take advantage of 
the opportunities offered by international economic integration depends 
on the quality of public goods such as protection of property rights, 
personal security, a non-corrupt civil service, and education” (Wolf, 2004, 
p. 276)171. However, these arguments suggest that the most appropriate 
response to the problems Held identifies with globalization will often be to 
strengthen the capacities of weaker and poorer states both in terms of 
democracy and in terms of their ability to cope with globalization. The 
argument that - while democracy is a way to control the power that states 
concentrate in order to provide their citizens with basic goods - it has 
limited effective scope, reinforces this argument. This is because states 
remain the institutions most likely to carry out the provision of such goods 
without resorting to the use of arbitrary power.
170 See, for example, his 1999 essay: “the autonomy of democratically 
elected governments has been, and is increasingly, constrained by 
sources of unelected and unrepresentative economic power” (Held, 1999, 
p. 98).
171 Other advocates of the view that states are needed to ensure citizens 
can benefit from globalization include Evans (1997), Rodrik (2000) and 
Weiss (1997). Some opponents of specifically neo-liberal globalization 
suggest that states have adopted policies of state intervention and 
protectionism in some areas in order to develop (see especially Wade, 
2003). For arguments that states present obstacles to cosmopolitan 
democracy, see Wendt (1999) and Shapiro (2003). Young argues that 
there has been some convergence on the view that states are important 
in the protection of workers’ rights in the literature on sweatshops and 
labour standards (Young, 2006, p. 129).
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These arguments suggest that we need to recast Held’s own argument 
about cosmopolitan democracy. Held does not always distinguish clearly 
enough between problems that are the result of lack of domestic 
democracy and problems that are the result of a lack of cosmopolitan 
democratic institutions. If the main cause for concern is lack of effective, 
democratic domestic state institutions in some states, we need to think 
about ways of strengthening those institutions. This is different from 
focusing on the construction of a strong set of cosmopolitan institutions 
that might subsequently be democratised. However, what the citizens of 
such states lack is precisely the domestic democratic structures that allow 
for provision of basic goods while minimising the risk of arbitrary power. 
Put another way, the citizens of these states are especially vulnerable in 
comparison to citizens of effective, democratic states. I would argue that 
Held’s focus on avoidance of serious harm (his seventh principle) takes 
on a particularly important role here. This is because constructing 
democratic state institutions in non-democratic societies is likely to impact 
heavily on people who have limited abilities to protect themselves from 
arbitrary uses of power in constructing those institutions. I develop this 
argument in the next section of this chapter.
I had two main aims in this section. The first was to question the way 
Held moves from his endorsement of the cosmopolitan moral claim about 
individuals as ultimate, general and equal objects of moral concern, to his 
political and institutional claims about cosmopolitan democracy. I argued 
that the move from the moral arguments to the political and institutional 
ones required a further commitment to substantive principles about what 
is owed to individuals. Although Held does make some commitment to 
such substantive principles, I suggested that once in place, these 
principles undermine Held’s case for strong cosmopolitan institutions. The 
substantive principles require that democratic institutions actually be 
effective in doing things like protecting minorities from arbitrary rule, as a 
matter of moral concern. I argued that domestically democratic states can 
do this, and that they can also protect the interests of their citizens at the 
trans- and supra-national level without requiring strong cosmopolitan
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institutions. This is not to deny that inter- and supra-national institutions 
are necessary or to deny that they are in need of reform. It is to argue 
that the best way to pursue that reform is through domestic 
democratization.
My second aim was to question Held’s cosmopolitan democracy as a 
long term aim. Again, the main argument is that domestic democratization 
is an effective way of protecting individual interests, and thus meets the 
requirements of cosmopolitan morality. Furthermore, the moral and 
political issue is weak and non-democratic states that fail to promote and 
protect domestic democracy. This requires greater attention to the 
specific interests of the citizens of those states, and in particular attention 
to Held’s seventh principle, which demands avoidance of serious harm. I 
develop this point further in what follows.
V) Democracy Beyond the State
The previous argument suggested that the institutions of electoral, 
competitive democracy found at the level of the state are not necessarily 
likely to be appropriate or effective at the global level. Held might respond 
that this only requires greater imagination in the design and 
implementation of democratic principles beyond the state. In particular, it 
may require greater attention to the forms of political participation that are 
found in civil society. In Held’s earlier work, this point was expressed in 
terms of “double democratization”,
[The] interdependent transformation of both state and civil 
society...if democratic life involves no more than a periodic vote, 
citizens’ activities will be largely confined to the ‘private’ realm of 
civil society and the scope of their actions will depend largely on 
the resources they can command (Held, 1993, p. 25).
More recently, Held has focused on non-state actors in the context of 
global citizenship. Held does acknowledge some of the problems with 
reliance on civil society and NGOs as democratic institutions under 
conditions of inequality:
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[To] avoid citizens of developed countries being unfairly 
represented twice in global politics (once through their 
governments and once through their NGOs) special attention and 
support needs to be given to enhance the role of NGOs from 
developing countries (Held, 2004, p. 112).
This point about the importance of developing country NGOs seems 
exactly right to me. However, I would argue that the point can be 
deepened by considering more carefully the difference between non-state 
actors against a background where state institutions are effective and 
democratic, and non-state actors against a background where state 
institutions do not meet such standards. This gives a clearer rationale for 
Held’s own distinction between NGOs and other organizations in 
developed and developing countries. I draw out this distinction by drawing 
one analogy and one dis-analogy between developed and developing 
country organizations. I then look at the implications for Held’s own 
approach to participation.
a) A Domestic Analogy
At the domestic level, there is a number of broad similarities between 
non-governmental organizations in democratic and non-democratic 
countries. These similarities can be illustrated by looking at the example 
of trade unions172. The first similarity is the importance of organizations 
that have a degree of independence from the state. As various 
commentators have noted,
In the countries of the former Soviet Union [state controlled unions] 
collapsed with the regime, but they continue to thrive in surviving
172 Admittedly, trade unions are a borderline case when it comes to 
examining NGOs. On the one hand they are usually non-governmental 
(unless strongly controlled by the state). On the other, they are often 
internally democratic in ways that many NGOs are not. See Spooner 
(2004) for a discussion of the distinction between unions and NGOs. The 
problems of interaction between NGOs and trade unions have been quite 
widely discussed. See, for example, Brown and Gearhart (2004), 
Lipschutz (2004), Compa (2004) and O’Rourke (2003).
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one-party communist states, for instance the All-China Federation 
of Trade Unions (ACTFU) in China. Other examples can be found 
in Vietnam, Laos, Cuba and North Korea. In other countries that 
may not be communist but display certain authoritarian tendencies, 
such as Indonesia, Syria, Iraq and Iran, union federations are 
tightly controlled by the state as well (Spooner, 2004, p. 24).
As Elliott and Freeman point out, the Chinese case demonstrates some 
of the basic problems with state controlled unions. China has a wide 
range of labour problems including unpaid back wages and violations of 
basic labour standards (Elliott and Freeman, 2003, pp. 78-9). The 
existence of the government controlled ACFTU, which is “an old- 
fashioned ‘transmission belt’ union movement, which follows the dictates 
of party leaders and local officials...ACFTU cadres and officials are 
generally sympathetic to workers’ concerns, but they side with 
management and the state whenever workers have a serious problem” 
(Elliott and Freeman, 2003, p. 79). The Chinese government also 
opposes the formation of worker controlled unions, and has intervened to 
prevent the expansion of some of these organizations. As Elliott and 
Freeman note, “Because the most effective way to deal with low labour 
standards is to give workers the ability to defend their own interests, 
China has put itself in a box on this issue” (Elliott and Freeman, 2003, p. 
79)173.
It is also possible to argue for a greater degree of independence from 
government influence over unions even in democratic developing 
countries, though. Bhagwati makes a series of somewhat cynical- 
sounding comments on labour regulation in India. He suggests that 
generous sounding labour laws are put in place to please the labour 
lobby, but with little or no intention to put them into practice:
[Countries] such as India have some of the most progressive, and 
expensive, legislation on the books concerning even minimum
173 A parallel worry is the more recent concern with company funded and 
supported sweatshop monitoring. O’Rourke notes that “Some critics warn 
that companies are controlling these processes, co-opting NGOs by 
changing them from watchdogs to ‘partners’” (O’Rourke, 2003, p. 22).
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wages, but with no real intention to enforce it precisely because 
the cost of such mandates would be forbidding (Bhagwati, 2004, p. 
174).
Bhagwati uses cases like this to argue against strong domestic laws. 
However, the example seems to suggest that what is needed is 
independent authorities capable of assessing whether and how to apply 
laws in particular cases. Independent, worker-controlled unions seem like 
good candidates in this case, not least because their members are likely 
to have the most relevant knowledge of the effects of violations of the 
law174.
Independence from the state is not enough, though175. As various 
sources indicate, the effectiveness of unions also often depends on the 
effectiveness of state institutions. This point holds across the divide 
between developing and developed countries. As Elliott and Freeman 
point out, the problem in China is not so much lack of labour laws as 
such, but lack of enforcement:
Chinese labour laws are comparable to those in advanced 
countries, save for the country’s treatment of freedom of 
association. If enforced, the laws would guarantee decent working 
conditions for most workers. But private sector employers,
174 A further case for independent unions in democratic developing 
countries could be made on the basis of use of export processing zones 
(EPZs) in many developing countries, including democratic ones. EPZs 
are areas of countries in which normal legislative standards are lowered 
in order to attract foreign investment and business. This includes lower 
taxation but it also often includes lower labour standards as well. The fact 
that developing country governments have an incentive to offer lower 
standards in these zones can be used to make a case for independent 
assessment of standards in EPZs, possibly by trade unions with a degree 
of independence from the state.
175 Diamond makes a similar, more general point about civil society: “the 
single most important factor in the consolidation of democracy is not civil 
society but institutionalization...[civil society] must be reinforced by a 
political system that works to deliver the political goods of democracy 
and, eventually, the economic and social goods people expect as well” 
(Diamond, 1999, p. 259). See also Evans (1998).
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including foreign investors, regularly flout labour laws (Elliott and 
Freeman, 2003, p. 79)176.
To some extent, a similar argument can be made with respect to the 
United States. The decline in union membership -  to a level where less 
than 8 per cent of the private workforce is unionized -  is partly attributed 
to labour laws that impede organization, but also partly due to failures to 
enforce the labour code by the federal government177.
A further point about NGOs, including trade unions, is the increasing 
acknowledgement of the demand to include them in decision making 
processes at the global level. Elliott and Freeman make this point with 
regard to anti-sweatshop activists, making the following recommendation: 
Activists should demand that the World Bank and regional 
development banks should require social audits on projects they 
fund, using a combination of suitably trained domestic 
nongovernmental organizations or trade unions, as well as 
accredited auditors (Elliott and Freeman, 2003, p. 132, emphasis 
added)178.
Despite some misgivings about the nature of many NGOs, and about the 
often overwhelming influence of wealthy, Western countries over their
176 One reason for the lack of effectiveness is corruption. Elliott and 
Freeman point out “The businesses that violate labour rights range from 
foreign owned firms to Chinese private enterprises. Many have links to 
local or national party or government leaders and most pay taxes to local 
government” (Elliott and Freeman, 2003, p. 80).
These points are drawn from Freedom House’s 2008 Freedom in the 
World Survey:
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?paae=22&vear=2008&countr 
v=7515 (accessed April 21, 2009).
178 The more general point appears in Held’s work. He includes INGOs in 
his proposals for a global assembly. Andrew Hurrell makes a similar 
demand:
If rich states and international institutions are to develop effective 
policies on economic development, environmental protection, 
human rights or the fight against drugs, then they need to engage 
with a wide range of states and to interact, not just with central 
governments, but with a much wider range of domestic political, 
economic and social actors (Hurrell, 2001, p. 52).
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funding and operations, there is increasing acceptance of the demand to 
include them in trans- and supra-national decision making179.
The three points outlined here indicate some similarities between NGOs 
in democratic and non-democratic and developed and developing 
countries. There are reasons for ensuring that they have a degree of 
independence from states. There are also reasons to think many NGOs 
rely on effective state institutions to ensure they can realise their 
demands. Finally, there are demands to include NGOs in institutions and 
procedures of global governance. Given these similarities, on what basis 
does Held draw his distinction between developed and developing 
country NGOs?
b) A Disanalogy
Held argues that it would be potentially unfair for developed country 
NGOs to be represented in authoritative global political institutions 
without some sort of attention to the role of developing country NGOs. In 
part this is due to the possibility of developed countries being represented 
twice, through both their governments and their NGOs while developing 
countries may lack any NGO representation at all. In this section, I want 
to question Held’s own criteria for inclusion and participation. Held’s sixth 
principle, the principle of inclusiveness and subsidiarity, is stated as 
follows:
[Those] significantly affected by public decisions, issues, or 
processes, should, ceteris paribus, have an equal opportunity, 
directly or indirectly through their representatives, to influence and 
shape them (Held, 2004, p. 174).
179 For an example of data on the level of Western influence over NGOs, 
see Hurrell:
Around 87 per cent of the 738 NGOs that were accredited at the 
[WTO] Seattle Ministerial were based in the industrialized 
countries. In the case of human rights, Hopgood noted the picture 
of Amnesty’s membership and activisim: in 2005, there were 
1,157,939 members in North America and Western Europe, 
compared to 56,195 in Asia-Pacific and 4,201 in Africa.
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My concern is about the formulation of this principle. As stated, Held’s 
principle implies that all those affected should be equally able to influence 
the outcomes of procedures. However, it is possible to provide examples 
of cases where providing equal opportunity to influence decisions is not 
the most obviously appropriate response. This involves drawing a dis­
analogy between developed and developing countries.
The dis-analogy is that in developed countries, NGO activity goes on 
against a background in which, for most people, basic needs are usually 
securely provided. Most developed countries have at least some welfare 
provision and social security. Wolf points out that the opening of markets 
in rich Western countries to foreign trade has been particularly hard on 
unskilled Western workers:
[To] put this point more brutally, the working people of the high 
income countries have historically benefited from the monopoly of 
their countries in manufacturing. Now, however, they are in 
competition with the unskilled of the world, with potentially 
devastating results (Wolf, 2004, p. 170).
Consider two versions of this case. In one, the workers involved are all 
citizens of the same, developed country. The developed country provides 
decent welfare and retraining for unemployed people. Now, imagine that 
a factory plans to relocate from region A to region B within the country. 
Because the workers’ basic needs are protected, it seems fairly 
appropriate in this case to treat them as having some sort of claim to 
equal influence over the decision about relocation, perhaps via their trade 
unions in this case.
Compare this with a case in which a company plans to relocate from 
developed country A to developing country B. Allow that A is able to 
provide for its workers, and that the new jobs created in B would lift a 
significant number of people above some basic level of welfare180.
180 It is worth noting here that Wolf also argues that globalization has not 
significantly limited the ability of developed countries to pursue domestic 
policies of taxation and redistribution of wealth. See Wolf, 2004, ch12. 
See also Banting, who emphasises the differences in social policies 
among developed countries as a sign that domestic policy making is still 
relevant: “the global economy does not dictate the ways in which
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Because the workers in B have a basic level of welfare at stake in this 
case, whereas the workers in A do not, it seems inappropriate to treat the 
two cases equally. Indeed, as Wolf argues, if the workers in B have 
urgent interests at stake, it is arguable that allowing the factory to relocate 
-  while providing assistance to A’s own workers - would be one way to 
fulfil a moral responsibility to them:
The right response is to help those adversely affected by low-wage 
imports, through retraining, improved education, generalized wage 
subsidies for low-wage labour and, if all else fails, simple transfers 
of income. It would be immoral for rich countries to deprive the 
poor of the world of so large an opportunity for betterment merely 
because they are unable to handle sensibly and justly the 
distribution of the internal costs of a change certain to be highly 
beneficial overall (Wolf, 2004, p. 170).
The point here is that, even though the different workers in the two 
countries have significant interests at stake, it is not necessarily 
appropriate to include them equally in the sense of giving them equal 
opportunities to influence the outcome of the decision, yet that is what 
Held’s formulation of his sixth principle seems to require181.
The problem here is that Held again seems to move from his first moral 
principle about individuals as equal targets of moral concern to his 
various later (political) principles that argue for equal inclusion or 
influence over decisions. However, the case just outlined indicates that 
even though the workers in both countries are equal targets of moral 
concern, in this case it is not clear whether giving them equal influence 
over this particular decision is appropriate. This is because the workers in 
country B have very urgent interests at stake. As Ian Shapiro puts this 
point,
governments respond, and different nations are responding in distinctive 
ways that reflect their domestic politics and culture” (Banting, 1997, p. 
286).
181 This point could also be extended as a question about how Held might 
explain how to get from “here” to “there”. In this case, the challenge is as 
follows: even if we accept cosmopolitan democracy as a long term aim, 
its principle of equal inclusion is not particularly helpful if we are starting 
from a position of great inequality.
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Allowing an equal say in a decision to people with greatly differing 
stakes in the outcome generates pathologies similar to those 
involving large differences in capacities for exit (Shapiro, 1999, p. 
235).
In the case outlined, we could argue that equal moral concern for the 
developed country workers is shown to them through the provision of 
welfare, retraining and other goods182.
With regard to NGOs, the relevant distinction here is between the 
different situations the workers face. For the workers in country A, a 
decision to relocate the factory to country B could be mitigated through 
the various measures Wolf refers to, and their union would presumably 
be in a position to press for the use of such measures. The workers in 
country B may not have a state capable of providing such measures, and 
in this case a union that might represent them (for example in lobbying for 
the relocation of the factory) is more directly and urgently responsible for 
their basic needs. To put this point another way, the relevant disanalogy 
is between a case in which an NGO represents people against a 
background in which those represented have secure provision of basic 
goods and a case in which at least some of those represented do not 
have such secure provision. The problem is of course compounded in the 
case of non-democratic countries, which have an even more limited claim 
that their delegates at international institutions are genuinely 
representative of the interests of those they represent183. This gives us a 
rationale for distinguishing between developed country and developing
182 Equal moral concern is also expressed if these goods are provided 
through a state that is itself subject to effective democratic control through 
electoral competition that extends suffrage to all adult citizens.
183 Consider the ILO in this context. The ILOs members include states like 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates. 
Freedom House has classified all these states as “not free” or “partially 
free”. The states have also been accused of serious violations of basic 
labour rights (see Human Rights Watch, 2007). The ILO provides 
technical assistance to these governments in writing and enacting labour 
legislation, but it is hard to see how this will help if the ILO only interacts 
with their undemocratic governments. Since their citizens are denied 
freedom of association, it is hard to see how they could influence their 
own governments.
country NGOs: the latter are often responsible for people who lack a state 
capable of protecting even their most basic interests when a decision 
goes against them. In some cases, they may also be the only direct 
representation people in non-democratic countries have at all.
c) Inclusiveness and Subsidiarity or Avoidance of Serious 
Harm?
One move Held might make in response to the argument above is to 
stress that cases like these are simply not best dealt with by the principle 
of inclusiveness and subsidiarity. Because the situation of the workers in 
country B is comparatively more urgent than those in country A, it is more 
appropriate to invoke the seventh principle, the principle of avoidance of 
harm and the remedying of urgent need. Held states,
[This] is a principle for allocating priority to the most vital cases of 
need and, where possible, trumping other, less urgent public 
priorities until such a time as all human beings, de facto and de 
jure, are covered by the first six principles, that is until they enjoy 
the status of equal moral value and active agency and have the 
means to participate in their respective political communities and in 
the overlapping communities of fate which shape their needs and 
welfare (Held, 2004, p. 175).
Held’s formulation of this seventh principle raises a puzzle about its 
relation to the other six principles, though. The claim that fulfilment of 
urgent needs and the avoidance of serious harm should take priority until 
the other six conditions are fulfilled indicates that there are some 
circumstances under which the previous six conditions, including those 
relating to participation and inclusion, might be suspended. Admittedly, 
there are urgent emergency cases where this might be appropriate. 
However, Held’s own endorsement of universal principle regarding 
individuals as units of moral concern and of connected principles about 
agency, influence and participation indicates that there is a need for 
caution in suspending those principles in the name of some seemingly
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more basic concern. I simply do not know what Held might say here184. I 
assume that he would not want to deny some sort of moral agency -  and 
thus participation - to people even in many situations of serious harm or 
urgent need, but he does not provide us with a clear guide to the 
relationship of priority between the principles. As I argued above, a 
principle of equal influence does not seem appropriate. Nevertheless, it is 
possible to show that some forms of participation may be appropriate 
even if background conditions for full equality are missing. I will again 
illustrate using the example of labour standards.
One of the basic claims many of the commentators in the literature on 
labour standards make is that workers are often the most effective 
monitors of labour standards:
Workers themselves have the strongest interest in combating 
sweatshop conditions...According to some researchers, employer- 
sponsored monitoring systems that aim to reform sweatshop 
conditions but fail to involve workers in a meaningful way are often 
ineffective or actually harm workers (Young, 2006, p. 125)185.
Two further points should be added. First, monitoring and participation 
here does not necessarily require that workers meet a high threshold of 
substantive equality to participate. They may not even need to be literate. 
Despite the fact they have very urgent interests at stake, and may be
184 My own view is that participation in political decisions -  including 
decisions about provision of basic goods - is one of the ways in which to 
give expression to the cosmopolitan claim about the moral equality of 
individuals. However, participation itself often imposes costs on 
individuals, particularly in an unequal world. Two concerns follow from 
this. First, we ought to be concerned with ensuring that the costs of 
participation do not themselves undermine individuals’ capacity for moral 
agency. Second, a universal, general and equal concern with such moral 
agency indicates that we ought to prefer institutions and procedures that 
provide some opportunities for such agency over those that offer none.
185 Elliott and Freeman draw a similar conclusion, and add that 
participatory forms of monitoring may even be in the interests of firms as 
well:
[Participatory monitoring efforts] reflect a belief that workers 
themselves are the most effective and efficient monitors of working 
conditions. Using workers rather than outside firms to monitor 
conditions should also be less expensive than hiring expensive 
auditors (Elliott and Freeman, 2004, p. 72).
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subject to serious potential harm, they nevertheless have a participatory 
contribution to make in monitoring standards and even suggesting 
solutions to specific problems. Second, the vulnerable situation of many 
workers requires that participatory processes be carefully designed in 
order to enable workers to participate in ways that do not threaten their 
other interests. For example, where it is obviously the case that a 
particular worker has raised a complaint, there is clearly a risk that she 
may face reprisals for doing so. Dara O’Rourke stresses this point: 
“Workers may also be punished for complaining to auditors, as these 
systems often have limited protections for those who complain” 
(O’Rourke, 2003, p. 23)186. One important strategy in designing 
participatory forms of workplace monitoring is to try to reduce the costs of 
engagement for the parties involved, as Archon Fung notes (Fung, 2003, 
p. 66). In fact, in this case the remedies may be fairly simple: they may 
involve interviewing workers away from factories, providing anonymous 
surveys, or setting up telephone or e-mail services so workers can raise 
complaints about working conditions without facing intimidation or threats 
of dismissal. The point of these examples is to suggest that even when 
some people are near or even below the threshold for serious harm, it is 
still possible to include them in certain kinds of participatory process. This 
is consistent with seeing them as targets of equal moral concern.
I want to stress three points about the argument that has been made in 
this sub-section. First, I am not trying to argue that the participatory 
processes outlined here are somehow preferable to or an acceptable 
substitute for a more fully realised cosmopolitan order. Rather, my aim 
has been to try to make more room than Held does for different forms of 
participation even under conditions in which people have very urgent 
interests at stake. My aim is thus to try to avoid overriding a cosmopolitan 
concern with individual moral agency in the name of seemingly more
186 As a result of this, O’Rourke emphasises the importance of auditors 
conducting interviews away from factory sites and generally taking steps 
to ensure anonymity for complainants. The steps O’Rourke describes 
seem to be relatively simple and undemanding ways of reducing the 
“participation costs” of sweatshop employees.
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urgent needs. This will not always be possible, but a commitment to 
universal cosmopolitan concern gives us reason to try.
Second, I am not claiming that the type of participation outlined here is 
necessarily democratic in any strong sense. Rather, it expresses a more 
basic concern with the ultimate, general and equal moral status of the 
individuals involved.
Third, I want to avoid the impression that I am claiming that individuals 
should only participate because they already meet some standard that 
makes it more likely that their participation will advance their interests. 
Rather, my argument is that cosmopolitan respect for the moral status of 
individuals requires us to try to find ways of including people that do 
justice to their status as moral agents. Again, this has two consequences. 
First, we ought to look for forms of participation that are compatible with 
the moral agency of individuals187. This rules out forms of participation 
that are incompatible with such moral agency. Second, if choosing 
between alternative solutions, we ought where possible to prefer forms of 
participation that are compatible with such moral agency over solutions 
that deny any participation, even in situations where urgent needs or 
serious harm are at stake.
I have developed a pair of analogies and dis-analogies in this section to 
question Held’s focus on equal opportunities for influence over decision 
making in cosmopolitan institutions. Civil society actors play an important 
role in democratic societies and often need both independence from the 
state and an effective functioning state in order to fulfil that role. However, 
the role of civil society actors and NGOs (including trade unions) at the 
global level is different. Because they sometimes directly represent 
people with urgent interests at stake, it is inappropriate simply to provide
187 This view is indebted to Shapiro, who advocates seeing democracy as 
a subordinate good:
[We] should resist every suggestion that just because democracy 
is a foundational good, it is the only good for human beings, it is 
the highest human good, or it should dominate the activities we 
engage in. Democracy operates best when it facilitates our 
activities, not when it displaces them (Shapiro, 1999, p. 21).
167
them with equal opportunity to influence decisions. The question about 
Held’s move from a cosmopolitan principle of moral equality to principles 
of political equality returns here. Held’s commitment to moral equality and 
agency does not necessarily entail that equal opportunity for influence is 
the most appropriate principle. I also asked whether Held could instead 
move to his seventh principle, about urgent needs and avoidance of 
serious harm. Although this seems appropriate in many of the most 
serious cases, I argued that Held is not clear about whether this would 
still involve participation. His argument can be read as implying that 
suspending participation would be justified in cases of urgent need and 
serious harm. I would defend a reading in which the importance of the 
universal commitment to equal moral worth implies that we ought -  as far 
as possible - to find ways to include people in ways that are compatible 
with their moral agency across different areas of their lives. Again, this is 
derived from a commitment to concern with individuals as moral 
agents188. The argument is thus not a direct criticism of Held. Rather, the 
aim is to push him to think through more clearly the way participation fits 
in with a more general concern with individuals as moral agents. In 
particular, it pushes in the direction of trying to find forms of participation 
that are attentive to the possibility that participation often has serious 
costs for the worst off, but that there may be ways to mitigate those costs 
even when people are not substantively equal.
VI) Conclusion and Summary
188 Shapiro’s conception of democracy as a subordinate foundational 
good is again relevant to this point. We might argue that democracy (or 
participation more generally) is the means for people to protect their 
interests that is most compatible with seeing them as independent moral 
agents. However, this does not mean that democracy and political 
participation themselves should be so demanding as to make it 
impossible for people to pursue their interests in other areas. The 
institutional challenge is to find forms of political participation that do not 
undermine people’s capacity to pursue their interests in other areas.
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In the three main critical sections of this chapter, I have raised a number 
of concerns about Held’s most recent formulations of his cosmopolitan 
principles and their relationship to his political and institutional proposals. 
Miller’s criticism of cosmopolitanism in general is applicable to Held. Like 
other cosmopolitans, Held needs to give a substantive account of how to 
move from his basic commitment to general, universal and equal moral 
concern with the moral status of individuals to his political and institutional 
proposals. Although Held’s discussion of interests and avoidance of 
serious harm provide him with some resources to do this, he needs to do 
more to show how to make this move.
As I argued in section three, when we work out how democratic equality 
functions in electoral competition within democratic societies, it becomes 
possible to argue that competitive democracy does meet the 
requirements Held sets out. Electoral competition works to prevent 
arbitrary rule that would conflict with people’s status as moral agents. 
Arguably, the fact that people also have equal votes provides at least 
some acknowledgement of their status as moral agents. It is worth noting 
that there is little reference to electoral competition in Held’s account of 
cosmopolitan democracy. Furthermore, although there are limits to the 
effectiveness of electoral competition in large scale, linguistically diverse 
societies, the pressures on elected representatives serve to provide 
indirect forms of control over international institutions. This leads us to 
recast Held’s own argument about cosmopolitan institutions. One of the 
main cosmopolitan priorities would be to ensure that states are internally 
democratic. This still requires concern with cosmopolitan institutions, in 
part because the process of moving towards domestic democracy can 
itself impose unequal burdens, particularly on citizens of non-democratic 
states.
I also looked at Held’s account of the role of civil society and NGOs. I 
argued that although there are similarities between the functions of NGOs 
at the domestic and global levels, it is also important to notice significant 
differences between them. Most obviously, NGOs working in poorer and 
non-democratic states are often more directly responsible for the interests 
of those they (claim to) represent. Whereas developed, democratic
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countries are often able to respond if their citizens lose out in a particular 
decision (through provision of welfare, compensation and so on), 
developing countries are less likely to be in a position to do this. This 
provides a clearer rationale for Held’s distinction between developed 
country and developing country NGOs.
Finally, I argued that Held’s invocation of a principle of serious harm or 
urgent need raises concerns about how to reconcile that principle with his 
other principles about moral equality. I argued that a basic and universal 
concern with individual moral agency requires us to try to find ways of 
enabling people to participate, even in many situations that involve urgent 
needs and potential serious harm. This does not always require equal 
participation, but on Held’s formulation, it is not clear whether it requires 
participation at all. I argued that participation in these cases may be 
possible, but it needs to take account of the fact that participation itself 
often has significant costs for the individuals involved.
\
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Five. Cohen and Sabel: Global Democracy in the 
Absence of a State?
Outline of the chapter
I) Introduction
II) Substitute deliberation
III) Incentives for inclusion
IV) Absence of states
V) Conclusion and Summary
I) Introduction
In their 2006 paper, “Global Democracy”, Cohen and Sabel borrow a 
model of accountable decision making from theoretical discussion about 
the EU. Their distinctive claim is their argument that this model can be 
used to generate legitimate policy decisions even in the absence of 
electoral democratic accountability for decision makers. They claim that 
this would work by requiring decision makers to engage in comparative 
deliberation about their decisions with comparable actors in similar 
situations. This works by requiring similar actors to give accounts to each 
other of why they have chosen to act in particular ways. It is this process 
of mutual reason giving that makes deliberative polyarchy deliberative. 
Although Cohen and Sabel are not explicit, I think the fact that the model 
is not based on electoral accountability is the source of its polyarchy 
component189. Cohen and Sabel thus answer the question of who should 
be included in decisions in the following way: “The people best placed to 
evaluate the validity of reasons for particular choices by decision-makers 
are other decision makers who are addressing comparable problems”. I 
want to look at three major objections to deliberative polyarchy in this
189 Cohen and Sabel appear to borrow the term polyarchy from Robert 
Dahl, who uses it to refer to states that have basic electoral institutions 
and rights that are necessary but not sufficient for them to claim to be 
democracies. It is interesting to note, though, that for Dahl, these include 
elections (see Dahl, 1989, p. 218ff).
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chapter. The first is that it is form of substitute deliberation: it substitutes 
(supposedly) rational procedures for actual participation by people with 
affected interests in decisions that affect them. I elaborate on this by 
comparing deliberative polyarchy with functionalism. The second 
objection is that it fails to provide incentives to decision makers to include 
those people most seriously and directly affected by their decisions. 
Finally, it rests on an unclear claim about what it means for a state to be 
absent and the normative or moral demands that apply when states are 
absent.
I) Substitute deliberation
In his critical discussion of the possibility of using the E.U. as a model for 
global politics, the legal scholar Martin Shapiro identifies a distinctive 
problem with the way deliberative democracy as an ideal has been 
applied in practice. Shapiro argues that the E.U. has been characterised 
by attempts "to recruit technocratic legitimacy for government regulation 
as a substitute for democratic legitimacy” (Shapiro, 2005, p. 345). He 
suggests that deliberation shades into technocracy, because the 
participants in the process are experts who purport to share a desire to 
promote the common good:
The whole paraphernalia of deliberation is employed as a cover for 
technocratic government. Indeed, a kind of super-deliberation is 
imagined in which very knowledgeable people, devoid of any 
interests except the interest in truth, talk together (Shapiro, 2005, 
p. 351).
What is the source of this distortion of the supposedly democratic 
credentials of deliberative democracy? I suspect that the problem arises 
because of the central role that hypothetical devices play in two of the 
most widely known approaches to deliberative democracy. Rawls uses 
the device of the original position to explain why citizens of a democratic
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society would affirm a set of primary goods including personal and 
political liberties. Habermas originally used the ideal speech situation as a 
guiding principle for genuinely democratic communication. The basic 
worry about these seemingly counterfactual constructions is that they 
conflict with the more radical democratic claim: that morally binding 
decisions can only emerge from a genuinely participatory process. They 
seem to open the possibility that we can second-guess democratic 
processes by independently establishing what the outcome should be. 
Or, as Cohen himself puts it:
The real concern about the subordination of democracy is that 
[hypothetical devices] understand actual democratic politics, and 
the debate surrounding it, to be guided and restricted by 
substantive principles that we arrive at through reasoning that can 
be conducted independently of open public argument between and 
among citizens (Cohen, 2003, p. 112).
It is important to stress that deliberative democrats would see this as a 
serious misreading: democratic participation is required in order to show 
due respect to persons as free and equal190. The move from claims about 
the value of hypothetical or rational procedures for arriving at conceptions 
of justice to the claim that groups of experts can take the place of citizens 
is fundamentally at odds with a democratic commitment to the idea that 
people are free and equal.
Given this fairly obvious misunderstanding and misapplication of 
deliberative democracy, is it appropriate to accuse Cohen and Sabel of
190 For Rawls, the political liberties, including rights to democratic 
participation, follow from a background conception of persons as free and 
equal. The political liberties “depend on a moral conception of the person 
that embodies a certain ideal...Primary goods are what persons need in 
their status as free and equal citizens” (Rawls, 1971, p. xiii). Similarly, 
Habermas argues, “private and public autonomy mutually presuppose 
each other in such a way that neither human rights nor popular 
sovereignty can claim primacy over its counterparts” (Habermas, 1998, p. 
259). There is already a significant difference between Rawls’s primary 
goods and Habermas’s emphasis on the personal liberties as human 
rights.
advocating substitute deliberation as a way of arriving at supposedly 
legitimate decisions? There is room to make this accusation because of 
the way Cohen in particular makes use of Rawls’s claim that A Theory of 
Justice is an attempt to make explicit a conception of justice that is 
implicit in the political opinions and attitudes of citizens of democratic 
societies. More specifically, it is an attempt to defend principles of justice 
for “a society whose members are understood in the political culture as 
free and equal” (Cohen, 2003, p. 87, emphasis added)191. This emphasis 
on political culture is crucial to the distinctions that Cohen and Sabel draw 
between different societies. For Cohen, not all societies share a political 
culture in which all members are (in principle) free and equal. On this 
view, it is unreasonable and intolerant to expect societies that do not 
share a democratic political culture to accept democratic political 
institutions. As Cohen puts it, “The question is whether a system with 
unequal political rights should be tolerated -  on the assumption that it 
ensures collective self-determination and protects a reasonably wide 
range of other human rights” (Cohen, 2006, p. 246)192. Cohen answers 
the question positively: such a system should be tolerated. This 
distinction between different political cultures leads Cohen and Sabel to 
affirm a much weaker moral demand that applies to all political 
associations. They describe this demand using rather vague terms like 
“membership” and “inclusion”, which they distinguish from equality. On
191 Cohen also argues that human rights are specifically institutional 
demands that apply when people are joined together in a political society. 
However, he suggests that democracy is not among the human rights 
that “are owed by all political societies in light of basic human interests 
and the characteristic threats and opportunities that political societies 
present to those interests” (Cohen, 2006, p. 232 n. 10). My argument is 
that a limited form of democracy does play a part whenever people are 
joined together by the distinctive institutions of the state.
192 The concern with toleration suggests that Cohen is following 
something like Rawls’s line in The Law of Peoples:
The effect of extending a liberal conception of justice to the Society 
of Peoples, which encompasses many more religious and other 
comprehensive doctrines than any single people, makes it 
inevitable that, if member peoples employ public reason in their 
dealings with one another, toleration must follow (Rawls, 1999, p. 
19).
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this view, “membership is a normative idea, and a person is treated as a 
member if, and only if, the person’s good is given due consideration in 
law and policy” (Cohen and Sabel, 2006a, p. 173). There is no emphasis 
at all on participation in this conception of inclusion, though. The rights to 
a full set of political liberties -  which includes democratic rights to 
participation -  only hold in democratic societies, where they are 
demanded by the background conception of citizens as free and equal. 
This argument carries over into their discussion of deliberative polyarchy, 
which they present as a description of less demanding moral standards 
that apply outside the state:
[Interdependence] and organized cooperation in the absence of a 
state trigger normative demands that are greater than 
humanitarianism even if they fall short of the full measure of equal 
respect and concern that underpins arguments for domestic 
distributive justice (Cohen and Sabel, 2006b, p. 771).
The existence of a state in a democratic society generates a demand for 
equal respect and concern: this includes a demand for some form of 
participation. However, it appears that Cohen and Sabel believe that the 
absence of a state and of a democratic political culture mean that there is 
no demand for political participation. The steps in the argument are 
somewhat unclear, but I can only emphasise that this is because Cohen 
and Sabel are not clear about exactly what role political participation 
plays in their account. What they do say is that the lines of accountability 
in deliberative polyarchy run primarily between different decision makers 
and not between decision makers and ordinary citizens:
At the limit, then, principal-agent accountability gives way to peer- 
review, in which decision makers learn from and correct each other 
even as they set goals and establish provisional rules for the 
organization (Cohen and Sabel, 2006b, p. 778).
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This emphasis on peer review between decision makers is the main 
original claim in Cohen and Sahel's account of deliberative polyarchy. 
They emphasise that this is part of a more general normative demand for 
accountability, but the account is in the first instance owed to other 
decision makers.
The emphasis on democratic culture suggests that demands for 
participation only hold in societies where a democratic culture is
established. This gives Cohen and Sabel room to suggest that a
procedure in which ordinary people do not participate can be seen as 
legitimate outside a democratic society, as long as it has a chance of
approximating to some sort of ideal outcome. They suggest that a
process of adjustment and correction between peers can provide a 
chance of such approximation. Thus, there is room for a conception of 
substitute deliberation in Cohen and Sahel's account of deliberative 
polyarchy.
A broad definition of substitute deliberation might run as follows: 
“decisions are made on behalf of persons A with very urgent interests at 
stake by persons B who do not have the same interests at stake. Persons 
A do not have the opportunity to influence or take part in the decision 
making process”. At the formal or institutional level, worries about the 
inclusion of a social clause in WTO legislation do express a concern 
about the possibility of something like substitute deliberation. A WTO 
social clause would include labour standards legislation. However, there 
are two major reasons why we might see the design and implementation 
of labour standards legislation at the WTO level as a case of substitute 
deliberation. First, as many commentators point out, the WTO is heavily 
influenced by nations that have the power and incentive to use the 
legislation for protectionist purposes:
[Despite] the stated good intentions of the non-trade agenda, it is 
difficult in practice to ensure that these noble standards will not be 
used as non-tariff barriers against imports from the developing
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countries and deprive them of whatever competitive advantage 
they enjoy (Narlikar, 2005, p. 131 )193.
In this case, those likely to be able to influence the design and 
interpretation of legislation have different interests at stake from workers 
in poor countries. Second, the nature and structure of the WTO makes it 
ill-suited to the interpretation of broadly defined labour standards. The 
interpretation of labour standards in domestically democratic countries is 
open to influence from a broad range of agencies in comparison to the 
WTO. As Bhagwati puts it,
To believe that the WTO can be endowed with undefined 
rights....and then its members should be subject to sanctions 
depending on how these undefined obligations are interpreted in 
regard to specific practices by an unelected body of judges is 
startling to say the least (Bhagwati, 2004, p. 248).
The WTO operates through a combination of bureaucracy and power- 
politics. It is inappropriate to charge it with setting or governing the 
application of moral standards on issues such as human rights, the 
environment or labour relations. In this case, substitute deliberation 
involves the wrong institution making the wrong kinds of decision.
Cohen and Sabel might reply that all this misses the point. They would 
reject the claim that an institution like the WTO should be seen as a 
centralised authority giving orders to subordinates lower down the 
hierarchy. On the hierarchical model, lower agents owe accountability to 
higher principals. In deliberative polyarachy, agents owe accountability to 
one another:
At the limit, then, principal-agent accountability gives way to peer 
review, in which decision makers learn from and correct each other
193 See also Bhagwati, 2004, p. 245ff and Basu, 2001, p. 61.
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even as they set goals and establish provisional rules for the 
organization (Cohen and Sabel, 2006b, p. 778).
However, this description gives no criteria at all for identifying who has a 
claim to be an agent. As a speculative suggestion, one way to fill this out 
might be to refer to their normative demand for inclusion from their 
discussion of Nagel. They never say so, but perhaps peers in their peer 
accountability model would be bound by some sort of demand for 
inclusion, in the sense of giving due weight to the good of those bound by 
the agents’ rules and decisions. Note once again, though, that inclusion is 
not the same as participation: even this speculative answer to the 
normative question does not commit Cohen and Sabel to demand 
participation by those bound by the decision or their representatives.
To illustrate, imagine the WTO adopts a social clause that includes a ban 
on child labour. It is very unclear to me what demands would fall on the 
peers who pursue the project of actually putting an end to the practice of 
using child labour. On a strong reading - taking only the definition used in 
the “Global Democracy?” paper -  peers might only include those who 
want to put a stop to child labour, perhaps at all costs. On a weak reading 
-  which would include the normative demands from the criticisms of 
Nagel -  the demands might include some consideration of the good of 
the children involved and the good of other people affected by the 
external effects of the ban. Even in the latter case, though, there seems 
to be no demand that the people affected actually participate in the 
process. If so, the peers might be seen as doing a form of substitute 
deliberation. They would be trying to work out who is affected by the ban 
on child labour. However, they would not be under any commitment to 
actually allow those affected to participate in deciding whether or how to 
make the ban effective.
I have argued that there is room for a form of substitute deliberation in 
Cohen and Sabel’s account of deliberative polyarchy. Why is this so 
troubling, though? In the following sections, I will look at some reasons 
why we might worry about deliberative polyarchy and its use of substitute 
deliberation.
One way to begin a critical account of deliberative polyarchy is to look at 
an approach to international integration and interdependence that bears 
some resemblance to Cohen and Sabel’s model. Functionalism was a 
model for international political integration that emerged in the early to 
mid-twentieth century, partly in response to the promise and failure of 
early forms of international organisation like the League of Nations194. I 
will look at two aspects of functionalism and ask if the criticisms that can 
be levelled at them can also be levelled at deliberative polyarchy. The 
first aspect is the functionalist claim that institutions that are defined in 
terms of specific functions will gradually undermine sovereign states. The 
second is that there is a clear separation between culture and the more 
technical tasks of providing public goods. Sovereign states might 
traditionally have claimed to draw territorial boundaries and confine the 
provision of co-operative and public goods to within those boundaries. 
For Mitrany, the appearance of organisations that specialise in the 
provision of particular goods across state boundaries will gradually 
undermine sovereignty. This is partly because individuals will be more 
loyal to institutions that are functionally defined, and thus able to provide 
specific goods in a more efficient way. It is also suggested that many of 
the institutions will perform functions that are not restricted to a specific 
geographical location, undermining the territorial basis of the state.
The most powerful criticism of this approach is that it ignores the problem 
that many seemingly technical solutions also involve political issues. The 
process of actually applying technical solutions will involve distribution of 
burdens and benefits to different people. So, for example, imposing high 
labour standards across the entire globe may (unwittingly) favour rich 
countries that already have the legislation and institutions to enforce high
194 Molly Cochran suggests that a pragmatist version of cosmopolitan 
democracy might define democratic publics along functional lines, and 
that cosmopolitan theory generally has something to learn from 
functionalism. A pragmatist model of cosmopolitan democracy would 
understand democratic “responsibilities to be defined as those between 
persons who share in common problematic situations and recognise a 
need for social cooperation in seeing to their solution” (Cochran, 2002, p. 
536).
standards in place. It may force factories to move away from poorer 
countries, leaving the workers worse off195. Poorer countries might have 
to divert resources from other areas to pay for legislation and the capacity 
to enforce it. This is before we even consider the possibility that states 
may actively abuse high labour standards as a form of covert 
protectionism, as many commentators complain. Finally, higher 
production costs may make previously cheap goods unaffordable for 
many people196.
Can the same charge of a-political tendencies be levelled at Cohen and 
Sabel’s deliberative polyarchy? I think they can avoid the strongest 
version of the charge, but they can only do so at very substantial cost to 
the distinctiveness of their claims about deliberative polyarchy as a 
source of legitimacy. Cohen and Sabel do explicitly acknowledge the 
political dimension of problem solving:
[All] complex practical problems...are political in the sense that 
they implicate a range of distinct values, that reasonable people 
disagree about the precise content of and weights to be assigned 
to those values, that some form of collective decision is needed 
despite those disagreements, and that a normatively desirable way 
to make such a collective decision is by a process in which 
participants offer reasons that others can be expected to 
acknowledge, even as they disagree about how the variety of 
relevant reasons add up (Cohen and Sabel, 2006b, p. 780).
195 As Basu puts it, “Joan Robinson, the eminent British radical economist 
once noted, in some situations what is worse for a worker than being 
exploited is not being exploited” (Basu, 2001, p. 62).
196 Cochran notes this classic criticism of functionalism, but does not 
seem to suggest how or why the criticism needs to be accommodated. 
Commenting on the historical fate of functionalism, she states that
[Functionalist] writing was criticized for the absence of power and 
politics in its analysis, its progressivist orientation, and its 
normative proclivities...However, the balance could shift again; it 
could be that a resurgence of interest in a theory of international 
institutions which is grounded in democratic concerns could 
emerge from critiques of regime theory (Cochran, 2002, p. 542).
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The upshot of all this is that acknowledgement of the political dimensions 
of problems should emerge from the process of reason giving among 
peers. The major objection to these claims is that there is reason to doubt 
that reason giving among peers is likely to do full justice to the political 
nature of the problems at stake. In the labour standards area, many 
commentators stress the point that workers themselves are best placed 
to know what it is they need, even if they do not have the precise 
technical knowledge required to come up with solutions. Elliott and 
Freeman point out that workers are best placed to assess a range of 
possible improvements in their conditions: “Workers are the best judges 
of improved working conditions and of the wage that they can gain 
through bargaining -  a wage that improves their living standard without 
risking loss of employment” (Elliott and Freeman, 2003, p. 71). By 
contrast, there is a worry that other possible agents might lack the 
incentives to address their solutions to those most directly affected by 
them. For example, using private monitoring firms such as Global Social 
Compliance to inspect factories is considered highly suspect because the 
firms are often paid directly by the factories being inspected (O’Rourke, 
2003, p. 16). They are thus vulnerable to various forms of manipulation.
A further response from Cohen and Sabel on the point about the 
apparently a-political nature of their proposal is that there are contexts 
where rights to greater involvement by a range of actors are protected by 
legislation. They point to the EU as a case where legislation requires 
governments to justify their decisions in a more public context, and that 
this demand for public justification itself opens up a space for more lively 
and active deliberation:
The requirement that each national administration justify its choice 
of rules publicly...allows traditional political actors, new ones 
emerging from civil society and coalitions among these to contest 
official proposals against the backdrop of much richer information 
about the range of arguably feasible choices (Cohen and Sabel, 
2006b, p. 784).
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However, they later add that there are further protections for non-state 
actors as well: "Civil society actors as well as governments can
increasingly rely on a body of EU administrative law to protect certain 
rights to participate in, or at least be informed of...deliberations” (Cohen 
and Sabel, 2006b, p. 786). This suggests that there is some scope for 
greater political debate and even direct involvement in some EU policy 
areas. However, if rights to participate are protected by legislation, this 
raises the question of whether legitimacy comes from the deliberative 
polyarchy side of the process, or whether ordinary citizens perceive these 
processes as legitimate to the extent that they believe they actually have 
a legally protected right to participate in and contest them. While 
deliberative polyarchy may provide a richer set of subject matter for public 
discussions, it does not seem to be doing a lot of work in generating 
democratic legitimacy for the policy making processes: legislation to allow 
affected people to participate in and contest decisions seems more 
important here. In summary, Cohen and Sabel do seem able to avoid the 
strongest version of the charge that functionalism is a-political. They 
acknowledge that there are political issues -  such as the distribution of 
benefits and burdens -  at stake in seemingly technical decisions, and that 
decision makers and experts have to take account of those issues. 
However, their claims about how this might work are not convincing. On 
the one hand, substitute deliberation may miss the real issues that are at 
stake for people affected by a decision, as when a decision about labour 
standards in a factory is made on the basis of dubious reports by private 
monitoring firms. On the other, the demand that decisions take account of 
a wider range of opinions and interests is partly protected by legislation in 
the EU. This raises the question of the principles that underlie the 
legislation: who is it designed to protect, and does it succeed in doing so? 
Cohen and Sabel do not address these questions.
A second criticism of functionalism tells directly against Cohen and 
Sabel’s deliberative polyarchy. Mitrany argues that it might be possible to 
distinguish between technical and cultural activities and devolve cultural 
powers to local communities:
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[Human] progress might be served best by a combination of the 
two lines of political organization which have hitherto been applied 
rather in opposition to each other. A functional integration of 
technical services on the largest possible international scale would 
seem to be as indispensable, as a more liberal devolution of 
cultural activities, which should free the individual genius of each 
regional or national group, would seem to be desirable as a more 
rational approach to the ideal ends of political society (Mitrany, 
1933, p. 102).
This approach suggests that it is possible to separate out technical and 
cultural services and provide them independently of one another. 
However, it is often difficult to actually make such a clear separation in 
practice.
For example, in the child labour case, it is often pointed out that outright 
bans on child labour can leave children worse off. As Basu puts it,
[There] are worse things that can happen to children than having 
to work. In very poor regions, the alternative to work may be to 
suffer acute hunger or starvation (Basu, 1999, p. 1115).
In these cases, the imposition of a ban by more powerful countries or 
international institutions can seem like an insensitive application of a 
cultural or moral dislike for child labour that is not shared in poorer 
countries. At its worst, it can seem that cultural disapproval towards child 
labour in rich countries is given priority over the more urgent interests of 
poor children. In this type of situation, the problem is that a seemingly 
well-intentioned attempt to put an end to child labour can in fact seem like 
an imposition of an outside cultural standard.
A slightly different problem is that cultural norms may be relevant to the 
success or failure of particular policies. So, again, “Albert Hirschman has 
rightly argued that the decision to send a child to work is partly a matter of 
social norm" (Basu, 1999, p. 1103). The presence or absence of social 
and cultural norms against child labour may determine whether it is
necessary to impose legal bans in a particular society: if no stigma 
against child labour exists, it is possible that parents in some societies 
might continue to send children to work even if they can afford not to. It is 
also important to distinguish carefully between culturally accepted 
practices and practices that are universally unacceptable, as Bhagwati 
notes.
Few children grow up even in the US without working as 
babysitters or delivering newspapers; many are even paid for 
housework in the home. The pertinent social question...is rather 
whether children at work are protected from hazardous and 
oppressive working conditions (Bhagwati, 1995, p. 755).
The point here is that it is harder than Mitrany acknowledges to draw a 
sharp line between the technical provision of services and more local 
cultural activities. Often, culture is entangled with working practices and 
may partly be a response to working conditions. It is also worth noting 
that it may in some circumstances be more effective to try to identify and 
work with local cultural norms that push against unacceptable practices 
than to impose legal bans on them.
Do Cohen and Sabel make the same mistake of trying to draw a sharp 
line between technical services and cultural practices? Again, it is rather 
hard to tell because their definition of the relevant decision making agents 
is very broad and flexible. They suggest that decision makers are those 
who are in a position to make administrative rules that determine or 
influence the behaviour of “individuals, firms and states” (Cohen and 
Sabel, 2006b, p. 772). This focus on administrators may explain the 
tendency to worry that Cohen and Sabel’s proposals are a form of 
bureaucracy or technocracy, where an elite that claims to have some sort 
of privileged knowledge makes the rules. When Cohen and Sabel answer 
this charge, they do seem to acknowledge that technical issues and 
policy making are often entangled with local cultural standards. For 
example, they state, “diversity implies that decision making in each needs 
to be friendly to local experimentation in the policy area in question,
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drawing on local knowledge and values” (Cohen and Sabel, 2006b, p. 
781). This suggests that local policy- and decision- makers themselves 
have enough knowledge about local values and standards to tailor 
broader policy proposals to local conditions. However, it is not always 
clear that this is the case. It may be necessary for decision makers to 
work with those who do not have specialised knowledge of the particular 
policy area in order to adapt their proposals. So, for example, an 
organisation might be working to end child labour in a society with very 
strong religious commitments. In this case, it would be necessary for the 
decision makers to work with those who know about the religion in order 
to assess whether the religious doctrines held in the society condone or 
condemn unacceptable forms of child labour. However, this proposal 
broadens the scope of possible participants far beyond those with 
technical knowledge of the specific policy area in question197.
The problem with Mitrany’s account of culture and technical services is 
that it almost seems to view the issue as if these different things were 
separate horizontal layers of a cake. The different layers can exist in 
relative isolation. A more realistic view is that we often need to make a 
vertical slice through the layers, looking at how they fit together and 
depend on one another. Cohen and Sabel do acknowledge at least some 
connection between the vertical layers. However, their focus on policy- 
and decision- makers seems to suggest that it is possible to take account
197 David Miller points out in his discussion of the basis for human rights 
doctrine that it is important to separate political and moral reasons for 
participation by adherents of non-Western traditions in justifying human 
rights:
Much effort in recent years has gone into showing how human 
rights can be grounded in [religious] traditions...By searching for 
an overlapping consensus, we show our respect for these non- 
Western traditions, and make it easier for those who embrace 
them to accept human rights doctrine (Miller, 2008, p. 174).
However, this is a political process, and is concerned with defending a list 
of human rights that is already quite clearly defined and not open to 
change. The political process involves convincing people to accept the 
pre-defined list.
A more obviously moral concern could be put in terms of the 
communitarian claim be that people’s religious and cultural beliefs are 
themselves an important requirement for autonomy or personal agency, 
and cannot simply be overridden without justification.
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of the cultural and religious dimensions from within the perspective of the 
technical layer. I would argue that it is often necessary to bring in people 
who are not experts in the particular policy area, precisely because it is 
often necessary to explain and justify policies to affected people in terms 
they can understand. So, returning to the child labour issue, it may be 
necessary to work with those who know the religious background of a 
particular society in order to show that preventing child labour is 
consistent with the moral demands of their religious doctrine.
The basic criticism of functionalism is that it is a-political. It fails to 
account for the problem that technical solutions also involve sharing 
burdens and benefits, and that technicians or bureaucrats are not always 
well placed to assess whether these burdens and benefits are shared 
fairly. Similarly, it fails to acknowledge that technical solutions often get 
tangled up and clash with local cultures. In these cases, cultural as well 
as technical knowledge is important if solutions are to be democratically 
legitimate and effective.
Cohen and Sabel can escape these criticisms to some extent by 
reference to things like EU laws that guarantee some rights to protest and 
even participation. It is not clear from their account if these laws are 
adequate as they stand, or how they work to protect people affected by 
these decisions. It is more immediately obvious that these laws do not yet 
exist at the global level. Furthermore, focusing on these laws comes at a 
high price for their claims about deliberative polyarchy as a source of 
democratic legitimacy. If these laws actually do allow people to protest or 
even contest decisions, surely this must be doing some work in making 
the decisions fairer or more democratically legitimate. This leads us to 
question their emphasis on deliberation among decision-, policy- or rule- 
makers as the main source of legitimacy in deliberative polyarchy. With 
regard to the cultural issue, Cohen and Sabel again acknowledge that it is 
not possible to isolate sets of issues that are entirely politically or 
culturally neutral. However, it is not clear that decision- or policy- makers 
are always best placed to deal with these issues. It may be the case that 
it is necessary to involve non-experts. In both cases, it is important to give 
an explanation of why those who claim to participate have an interest at
stake in a particular decision. Cohen and Sabel do not give any clear 
account of this.
II) Incentives for inclusion
I stressed in my critical discussion of Held that a competitive electoral 
democracy can protect minorities to some extent, because opposing 
parties have incentives to seek out minorities who may make the 
difference between electoral success and failure. Furthermore, as Sen 
points out, active opposition parties have an incentive to expose 
incompetence and corruption on the part of governments. Governments 
themselves may have an incentive to provide social programmes, if only 
to diminish the appeal of political opponents198. Cohen and Sabel 
explicitly reject any focus on elections199: deliberative polyarchy is aimed 
at creating “many global public spheres, loosely linked by elements of 
global public reason and global politics more generally” (Cohen and 
Sabel, 2006b, p. 796). My worry about all this is that the absence of 
competition results in an absence of incentives to address binding rules 
and decisions to the people who ultimately have to uphold those rules 
and decisions.
Cohen and Sabel stress that the aim of deliberative polyarchy is to 
compel decision makers to provide good explanations for their decisions, 
by requiring them to compare and justify those decisions to others who 
are responsible for taking similar decisions. They thus aim to increase the 
accountability of decision making by non-state rule makers at the global
198 It is important to note that Sen does not think these effects always 
follow automatically from the existence of a set of democratic institutions: 
“while we must acknowledge the importance of democratic institutions, 
they cannot be viewed as mechanical devices for development. Their use 
is conditioned by our values and priorities” (Sen, 1999, p. 158).
199 They state that deliberative polyarchy aims to democratise global 
administration by creating a public sphere and “not by creating institutions 
of electoral accountability for a global government” (Cohen and Sabel, 
2006b, p. 766). Similarly, they suggest that deliberative polyarchy “could 
not be defined around a competitive process for control of [an] 
authoritative centre” (Cohen and Sabel, 2006b, p. 796).
level. However, it is important to note that accountability -  like legitimacy 
-  has both normative and sociological dimensions. Despite their apparent 
appeal to normative demands that might apply to global governance, 
Cohen and Sabel’s definition of accountability does not draw a clear 
distinction between these two dimensions. They state, “[Accountability] 
generically understood means presenting an account of one’s choices 
that is owed to others in comparable situations” (Cohen and Sabel, 
2006b, p. 779). This definition makes room for some rather unattractive 
sociological versions of accountability, though. For example, it may 
include a member of one criminal gang explaining his choice to move 
from drug smuggling to people trafficking to other connected gangs. This 
contrasts with their argument in their paper “Extra Rempublicam, Nulla 
Justitia”, in which they argue that inclusion can be used to describe the 
normative demands on all political institutions (presumably including both 
states that lack a liberal democratic political culture and international 
institutions). As they put it, “membership is a normative idea, and a 
person is treated as a member if and only if the person’s good is given 
due consideration in law and policy” (Cohen and Sabel, 2006a, p. 173). 
Here again, though, it is not clear why institutions that are not subject to 
some form of democratic, electoral accountability are under any incentive 
or pressure to ensure that this normative demand for membership is met. 
At the level of states, there is not a lot of evidence to show that non- 
democratic states protect even the more minimal set of rights that Cohen 
appeals to in his discussion of democracy and human rights200. The 
question is somewhat more difficult in relation to non-state institutions. 
Interestingly, a suggestion that a combination of competition and 
comparison between non-state institutions might serve to protect and 
improve labour standards can be found in Sabel’s collaborative work on 
labour standards. In a paper with Fung and O’Rourke, he argues that
200 Shapiro makes this point with regard to Tocqueville’s fears about 
majority tyranny: “Robert Dahl has recently reminded us that in the 
century and a half since Tocqueville articulated his fears, the individual 
rights and freedoms that he prized have turned out to be substantially 
better respected in democracies than in non-democracies” (Shapiro, 
2003, p. 19).
competition can be combined with something like the comparative 
deliberation advocated in deliberative polyarchy. On this model, the 
possibility that many consumers do now view sweatshop labour as 
morally unacceptable gives companies a commercial incentive to improve 
standards: “High-profile companies currently compete informally to 
protect and build their reputations as socially responsible actors” (Fung, 
O’Rourke and Sabel, 2001, p. 21). There are a couple of large questions 
about this approach, though. Firstly, Fung, O’Rourke and Sabel suggest 
that it is necessary to distinguish different levels of economic 
development. Their aim is to try to secure
[The] most ambitious and feasible labour standards for workers 
given their economic development context. Standards emerge by 
comparing similarly situated facilities. The labour practice of a 
facility in Vietnam might be compared to one in Indonesia, but not 
initially to a European or North American facility (Fung, O’Rourke 
and Sabel, 2001, p. 6).
It is tempting to ask why this distinction should be drawn, though. Many 
authors in the literature on sweatshops would agree that developing 
countries are justified in having lower labour standards than their rich 
counterparts. However, the fact that poor states lack the infrastructure to 
enforce better standards does not seem like the best argument: this 
would seem like an argument for strengthening the infrastructure where 
possible. A better argument might be that imposing very demanding 
standards on poorer countries would endanger their comparative 
advantage and ultimately the jobs of poorer workers. However, this is not 
Sabel’s argument. Similarly, Cohen and Sabel give little guidance as to 
how to decide which decision-making units are similar enough to warrant 
comparison with each other.
A second concern about the informal approach is that it is not clear that 
the kind of competitive comparison Fung, O’Rourke and Sabel describe 
actually would succeed in improving labour standards for all workers in 
poor countries. The distinctive claim in their proposal is that firms with a
commercial incentive to protect their reputation for social responsibility 
will compete to attract the most credible monitors. Monitoring would 
generate information on the performance of firms, and
[This] knowledge could be used by an array of actors to generate 
complementary competitive pressures on firms. Hundreds of 
millions of socially sensitive consumers would utilize these data in 
their purchasing decisions. Journalists, activists and investors 
would use the information to shame poorly performing companies 
(Fung, O’Rourke and Sabel, 2001, p. 27).
The question we need to ask here is whether all this is actually serves to 
protect labour standards for the poorest and most vulnerable workers. 
Critics of the use of social sanctions and consumer action often point out 
that the effect of such informal action is to push poorer workers into less 
visible areas such as agriculture or the manufacture of raw materials, 
where labour conditions may be even worse than in factories run by large 
companies.
This does not mean that we should reject competition as a way of 
securing improvements in the situation of the worst off. A competitive 
electoral democratic system has the advantage of shifting some of the 
burden of participation and deliberation from voters onto the competing 
parties. It gives parties an incentive to address citizens in an accessible 
way. However, the problem of insular minorities suggests that it may be 
necessary to restructure competition in some circumstances, so that it 
does more to serve the interests of excluded or vulnerable groups201. 
Trade unions or other NGOs that are funded by workers themselves to 
carry out monitoring could be defended in terms of restructuring
201 Phiippe Van Parijs discusses a relevant example of competition that 
was restructured in order to serve the interests of a disadvantaged group. 
The Poona Pact in India granted a number of reserved parliamentary 
seats to members of the “untouchable” caste (the term dalits is now 
considered more appropriate). However, these seats were not in dalit 
majority areas: the outcome was that more moderate dalits tended to be 
elected. See Van Parijs (1995).
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competition in this way. Unions that are funded by workers to carry out 
monitoring have an incentive to show that they are using the workers’ 
money in an effective and efficient way. They also have an incentive to 
discourage states from making legislation that is expensive and difficult to 
put into practice. They are more likely to be independent of corporations 
than private monitoring firms that are paid for by the corporations 
themselves. Of course, there are limits to this approach, particularly in 
authoritarian countries that prevent the formation of unions. However, the 
point of the example is to emphasise that it is possible to use and to 
structure competition in different ways. Competition is not inherently 
benign or beneficial for the worst off; it will not always create incentives to 
take account of their interests. However, the absence of incentives makes 
it less likely that those with decision making power and rule making 
authority will address the concerns of those adversely affected by their 
decisions. Cohen and Sabel do not provide any description of the 
possible incentives that might encourage decision makers to show that 
the rules and decisions they make meet the normative conditions for 
membership that they set out elsewhere.
Ill) Absence of states
The final objection I want to raise targets Cohen and Sahel's discussion 
of the state. There are two problems with this discussion. First, it is not 
clear what normative status the state has in their account. Second, 
although they repeatedly refer to “global public administration” or to 
“global public administrative law” as spaces in which the state is absent, 
this claim about the absence of a state is highly ambiguous.
Cohen and Sabel’s definitions of a state in their paper “Global Justice?” 
are very brief. For example, they describe it at one point as a
[Central] authority giving directives to formally subordinate agents 
[with a] clearly defined public in whose name the authority is 
exercised (Cohen and Sabel, 2006b, p. 773).
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This description is normatively very thin. There is some allusion to 
normative or moral standards that might apply to the state in the 
reference to the claim that the state’s authority is exercised “in the name 
of’ the public. However, that is about as far as the normative discussion 
of the state goes in this context. We might turn to Cohen and Sabel’s 
discussion of Nagel to try to find a more detailed account of their position. 
However, as I stressed in the chapter on Nagel above, the account of 
demands for inclusion there relies heavily on the “involvement of will” 
thesis. I argued that the involvement of will thesis is unconvincing 
because it is possible to come up with cases where people are asked to 
uphold rules -  so their will is involved -  but the rules are morally rather 
trivial. A further problem with the involvement of will thesis is that it does 
not allow us to draw a very sharp line between the state and other rule 
making bodies. It does not allow us to say what is distinctively morally 
important -  and potentially morally troubling -  about state power.
With regard to the second point, Cohen and Sabel frequently refer to the 
“absence of the state" in the space of global administration and 
administrative law. However, the idea that the state is “absent” is very 
vague indeed. We can distinguish at least four senses in which a state 
might be absent:
i) The state might securely provide for all of its citizens’ most 
basic needs. Against this background, there would be a space 
in which other interactions between citizens might be seen as 
being free or voluntary. Sangiovanni alludes to this idea when 
he argues that “the only reason that secondary associations 
within the state are considered voluntary is precisely the 
existence of the background system of entitlements and 
protections provided by the state” (Sangiovanni, 2007, p.
12)202.
202 The reference to a space outside the state’s influence may remind the 
reader of the classical liberal distinction between the public and the 
private sphere. This distinction has been widely criticised, most notably
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ii) The state might fail to or refuse to protect some of its citizens’ 
basic needs. In this case, secondary or civil society 
associations might emerge to take up these tasks.
iii) Combining the first and second possibilities, it might be felt that 
it is unwise to allow the state to be the only provider of basic 
needs. If so, some allowance might be made for secondary or 
civil society associations as alternative sources of provision of 
those needs.
iv) Finally, the state might be absent in the sense of breaking 
down altogether. This might happen to individual states for 
various reasons. It might also happen globally, according to 
some of the more extreme accounts of the direction in which 
globalisation is going.
Cohen and Sabel do not seem to acknowledge these possible 
distinctions, beyond pointing out that “states remain essential players” 
(Cohen and Sabel, 2006b, p. 764).
The upshot of these two points is that it is not entirely clear whether 
Cohen and Sabel see the absence of the state as a cause for regret or 
concern, or as an opportunity to expand the reach of their deliberative 
polyarchy model. It is slightly clearer that they think it could be expanded 
into a range of areas. They refer to examples including health and safety 
standards, labour standards, forestry, pollution and even human rights203. 
However, acknowledging the distinction between different possible 
senses of the idea of the absence of the state raises the question of 
whether deliberative polyarchy is really appropriate in the different
by feminists. It is worth noting, though, that providing background of 
resources and entitlements probably requires a more robust state than 
the classical liberals acknowledge. See Okin (1989), Rawls (1999b) and 
Miller (2003) for discussion of some of the very large issues here.
203 One problem with using the EU as a model for deliberative polyarchy 
is that its domain of action is quite strictly limited. Andrew Moravcsik 
defends the EU against accusations of a democratic deficit by pointing 
out that the policy areas it covers -  such as monetary policy -  are not 
subject to democratic determination or influence even within member 
states (Moravcsik, 2002).
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situations outlined above. It should be fairly clear that something like 
deliberative polyarchy might be appropriate or acceptable in the first 
case. If states really were always able to provide a secure background of 
basic goods, any further interactions and associations between people 
might properly be seen as voluntary. Since the parties to any association 
would not have any urgent interests at stake, it might be appropriate to 
decide which policies to pursue or which rules to apply using some sort of 
deliberative comparison with comparable situations. The parties could 
then take or leave the outcome of the deliberation, on the assumption that 
they have no urgent needs that are fulfilled by taking part in the 
association. This is suggested in Bhagwati’s reference to a rather rosy 
sounding account of conditions in a Chinese sweatshop. Bhagwati 
suggests that the “young women who work long hours are often doing so 
voluntarily. Why? Because many want to earn as quickly as possible the 
money they planned to earn and then return to their homes” (Bhagwati, 
2004, p. 175). A very optimistic reading of the situation would be that the 
women’s basic needs are already provided for at home and that they are 
merely working to provide extra income for themselves or their families. If 
so, and if their employers decided to start demanding even longer hours 
or a pay cut, or less attractive working conditions, it might be appropriate 
to say that they could take or leave the job they have. The state would be 
“absent” in this case because the decision to carry on working at the 
factory would be based only on whether the extra income was worth the 
less attractive conditions.
This would contrast quite sharply with a situation in which the women 
relied largely or entirely on the income from their job to provide for much 
more basic needs, perhaps even for subsistence needs. If the Chinese 
state were unwilling or unable to provide for these needs, the workers 
would be much more vulnerable to reductions in pay or working 
conditions because they would not be in a position to take or leave what 
is offered by their employers. The absence of a state has a very different 
meaning here, in that the employer is in a more direct relationship of
194
moral responsibility to the workers because the state does not provide a 
background of protection for them204.
The third situation is much more complicated. The basic idea is that the 
state should not have a monopoly on the provision of basic goods. The 
assumption here is that such monopolies leave people vulnerable: I will 
leave a full account of this until later. For the moment, I want to stress 
that this division between state- and non-state provision requires a range 
of possible agencies that have a degree of independence from the state.
In the area of labour standards, this would include employers, trade 
unions, and possibly other forms of non-state monitors. However, as I 
stressed in my discussion of Nagel, if these monitors are (relatively) 
independent of the state, we have to ask what moral standards we should 
apply to them205.
This brief discussion of three of the senses in which a state might be 
absent is intended to emphasise a general concern about Cohen and 
Sahel's general approach to inclusion and participation. In both their 
article on deliberative polyarchy and their critical discussion of Nagel, 
they refer to the idea that there are normative demands that apply to 
associations and institutions outside the state. In both cases, they 
suggest that these norms would be less demanding than the standards of 
justice that apply to state institutions:
Whatever the more precise content of inclusion (and the content 
varies across co-operative relations), the norm of inclusion (the 
requirement of treating people as members, whose good counts
204 Bhagwati makes a similar point with regard to oil companies in 
Nigeria: “If the Nigerian government had no environmental policies, and if 
the oil companies then proceeded to pollute freely and knowingly, the 
local population certainly had an economic and moral case against the oil 
companies” (Bhagwati, 2004, p. 170). In this case, the absence of a state 
does not in any sense relieve the moral burden on the oil company: the 
fact the state did not legislate in this area does not mean the company 
can do just what it likes.
205 I have not examined the fourth case -  the complete breakdown of 
state authority. This is partly because Cohen and Sabel do seem to apply 
their deliberative polyarchy model against a background of some kind of 
state authority.
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for something) requires more than humanitarianism but need not 
be egalitarian (Cohen and Sabel, 2006a, p. 155)206.
However, there are different ways in which states can be absent in 
relation to cooperative relations between people. Furthermore, in some 
cases, it seems that the “absence” can raise demands that are at least as 
demanding as the norms of justice that apply to state institutions, if not 
more so. For example, in the second case, an employer might be the sole 
source of the income a worker needs to provide for the most basic needs. 
This would be because the state is absent in the sense of failing to 
provide even a basic minimum of welfare in cases of unemployment. The 
employer is in a position of much greater responsibility with regard to the 
workers than if they were merely working to generate extra income. In 
these cases, it may even be appropriate to treat workers as having a 
more than equal claim against the interests of their employers, given their 
situation of vulnerability.
As a further point regarding Cohen and Sabel’s claims about the absence 
of a state, it is worth re-emphasising the tension between their claims 
about deliberative polyarchy as an independent source of legitimacy and 
the role of legal protections for participation and contestation. They stress 
that the existence of a range of supra-state administrative and rule 
making institutions is the starting point for the formation of a global public 
sphere. Discussions about rules and standards attract the attention of 
civil-society groups and provide the starting point for debate about the 
nature and relevance of such standards. The discussion about whether 
the WTO should include a social clause that covers areas such as labour 
legislation, human rights and environmental standards is an example of 
this. As I stressed above it is not clear that the discussions between 
decision-, rule- and policy- makers such as WTO bureaucrats is really 
doing much work in terms of promoting the legitimacy of these
206 See also the “Global Democracy?” paper: “interdependence and 
organised co-operation in the absence of a state trigger normative 
demands that are greater than humanitarianism even if they fall short of 
the full measure of equal respect and concern that underpins arguments 
for domestic distributive justice” (Cohen and Sabel, 2006b, p. 771).
organisations. The rules for public inclusion and participation in EU 
deliberations may be much more significant, to the extent that they 
actually work. However, many of these rules are already in place within 
the legislation of separate democratic states. In order to function as 
competitive multi-party democracies, these states have to provide for 
freedom of speech and association and provide some protection in areas 
such as property rights and individual freedom. The point here is that the 
state is not absent in these cases. Rather, it serves to provide some of 
the very conditions that allow for at least the minimal opportunity to 
become informed of and to protest about decisions taken by bodies such 
as Cohen and Sabel’s institutions of global public administration and 
administrative law. If this is the case, it generates an argument for 
strengthening and protecting domestic, state-level protections of these 
rights207. To some extent, a great emphasis on bodies like the EU as 
protectors of rights such as free speech and free association is a bit 
redundant if these rights are already protected domestically.
A more morally urgent and compelling problem is that not all states do 
protect these rights. It is one thing to argue that citizens of a country like 
the UK have a reasonable opportunity to protest if their government 
proposes to lower labour standards in line with WTO demands to prevent 
protectionism. It is quite another to try to claim that citizens of a country 
like China -  which does not guarantee freedom of speech and 
association -  have had the same opportunity. This simply underscores 
the point that deliberative polyarchy on its own is not enough. The fact 
that officials from the UK and China might have deliberated about the 
decision is not enough to show that those Chinese citizens whose most 
urgent interests might be at stake have had an adequate opportunity to 
protect their interests. As Bhagwati points out, there is a relevant
207 Cohen and Sabel do refer to the possibility that deliberative polyarchy 
in a space of global public administration might re-invigorate domestic 
democratic politics, but they do not put this in terms of reinforcing 
domestic democratic rights and freedoms. Rather, they suggest that 
global administration will provide more information for domestic debate, 
for example by making alternative policy proposals from other countries 
more accessible to rival political parties (see Cohen and Sabel, 2006b, p. 
766).
difference between poor democratic and poor non-democratic countries 
here. He notes that Indian unions have not generally supported the Social 
Clause at the WTO, in contrast to other countries:
Many other unions from other poor countries support the AFL-CIO 
efforts because they want solidarity from the organised unions in 
the United States in their struggle to win civil and political rights, 
including the right to organise. The economic aspects that threaten 
their jobs are far less important to them than the fight for their 
rights. But the Indian unions already enjoy these civil and political 
rights; for them...the economic implications are far more important 
(Bhagwati, 2004, p. 246).
It is not entirely unrealistic to assume that Union representatives from a 
democratic country like India can be trusted to represent the interests of 
their members to at least some extent. It is much less realistic to assume 
that workers themselves from non-democratic poorer countries might 
have any indirect influence over decisions that affect them. The challenge 
is to try to find ways to identify and include such people in the short term, 
when their states do not protect freedom of speech and association.
Cohen and Sabel’s argument for deliberative polyarchy suggests that a 
global public sphere might form around decision- and rule-making 
institutions that exist at a global level. The democratic legitimacy of 
decisions made at this level would be secured by some combination of 
deliberation among different actors addressing comparable problems and 
pressure from ordinary citizens. I have developed three main arguments 
from my concerns about this claim. First, I think Cohen and Sabel can be 
criticised for advocating a form of substitute deliberation -  that is, for 
claiming that legitimate outcomes are possible even in the absence of 
actual participation by those people most directly affected by particular 
decisions. This is partly because they seem to be committed to the idea 
that actual participation is mainly valued by citizens of states with a 
democratic political culture. Citizens of other states are not so directly
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concerned about being able to take part in decisions. My main criticism of 
substitute deliberation is that it ignores or sidelines the possibility of 
political opposition to solutions arrived at by deliberation among decision­
makers. Cohen and Sabel answer that there is a range of possible legal 
tools that can be used to protect more direct participation. However, this 
undermines the distinctiveness of their claim about deliberation. It also 
raises the question of the criteria upon which non-experts or non-decision 
makers might be included. Cohen and Sabel do not address this 
question.
Second, Cohen and Sabel offer no account of why decision makers have 
an incentive to address their decisions to those most directly affected. 
Competition may create some pressure to address decisions to a wider 
audience, but it is not always the case that the audience will consist of the 
people most directly affected. As we have seen, competition to improve 
labour standards may be directed to consumers in rich countries, leaving 
workers themselves neglected and even worse off in some cases.
Third, Cohen and Sabel are vague about what they mean when they say 
deliberative polyarchy operates in the absence of a state. It may be an 
acceptable form of decision making against a background in which 
citzens’ basic welfare is provided for -  as in the case of most citizens of 
the EU. It is much less attractive when basic welfare is not secured, 
though. In this case, the people affected by a decision may have very 
urgent interests at stake, as when workers in a sweatshop rely on their 
income as the only means by which they can provide for their basic 
needs. Furthermore, the claim that basic political freedoms are protected 
in the absence of a state is unconvincing. Many of the freedoms to 
participate and associate that Cohen and Sabel see as a background to 
deliberative polyarchy are protected because they help ensure that 
democratic states have functioning multi-party competition. This does not 
mean these freedoms cannot also be used to protest against or even 
contest decisions by international institutions, for example through 
indirect pressure by the public. However, it does emphasise that these 
protests depend on the state protecting these freedoms: the state is not 
“absent” here.
I want to conclude this chapter by looking at how an apparent attempt to 
apply something like the deliberative polyarchy model to the labour 
standards issue has fared. Fung, O’Rourke and Sabel proposed a model 
they call “Ratcheting Labour Standards” in their 2001 book on 
sweatshops. The model shares many features with deliberative 
polyarchy. Perhaps most importantly, it combines social sanctions with 
comparative monitoring of practices by non-state agencies. The aim is 
that public disclosure of bad practices by sweatshop manufacturers will 
lead to social pressure to improve working conditions. As Fung, O’Rourke 
and Sabel put it,
RLS would do two things. First, it would use monitoring and public 
disclosure of working conditions to create official, social and 
financial incentives for firms to monitor and improve their own 
factories and those of their suppliers. Second, it would create an 
easily accessible pool of information with which the best practices 
of leading firms could be publicly identified, compared and diffused 
to others in comparable settings (Fung, O’Rourke and Sabel, 
2001, p. 4-5).
I think the fate of this proposal in the face of criticism is instructive for the 
deliberative polyarchy model. One of the most common criticisms of the 
RLS proposal was that unofficial sanctions and comparison between 
monitors was not enough by itself. Commentators from different 
backgrounds argued that the priority should be to strengthen labour 
standards legislation and enforcement within individual nations, and to 
protect the role of unions in monitoring, enforcement and negotiation (see 
Basu, 2001, and Moberg, 2001). The conclusions reached in other 
discussions of the issue are similar: given the contextual differences 
between states, it is better to find ways to encourage them to raise their 
labour standards domestically (see Compa, 2004, Young, 2006 and 
Bhagwati, 2004). O’Rourke appears to concede this point in a later paper 
on the subject when he notes that non-governmental regulation and
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monitoring systems “harbour the peril of privatizing regulation, effectively 
closing off democratic forms of regulation and bypassing local 
governance” (O’Rourke, 2003, p, 23). The general conclusion seems to 
be that these semi-official, semi-formal systems of monitoring are at best 
a supplement to official monitoring, or a way of pushing states to adopt 
their own standards.
Archon Fung’s response to this criticism is expressed in a separate paper 
on the labour standards issue. Fung rejects the exclusive focus on social 
sanctions and consumer action, and suggests that the focus should be 
directed towards using deliberative democracy to secure more robust and 
enforceable labour standards:
[Decentralised] participatory deliberation around labour standards 
should, in principle, be articulated to formal, centralised and 
muscular mechanisms that enforce basic labour standards at the 
firm, local, national, and trans-national levels (Fung, 2003, p. 56).
The aim of participatory deliberation here is to produce a “substantive 
consensus” on labour standards that can be used to generate rules that 
can be enforced with public power at a range of different levels. Fung 
emphasises that this should be a bottom-up approach, based on 
deliberation among activists, workers and consumers rather than inter­
governmental organizations. Fung thus contrasts his approach with a 
senatorial approach to deliberation; in this case, this would involve 
governmental and inter-governmental organizations coming to their own 
consensus. This also draws a helpful contrast with Cohen and Sabel’s 
approach. Cohen and Sabel advocate deliberation among decision 
making units, but with less emphasis on any use of public power to 
enforce or monitor standards208. Cohen and Sabel thus seem to uphold
208 With regard to prevention of torture, they suggest that signing up to 
documents such as the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment may help victims seek 
redress:
Whether it does or not may depend less on the explicit 
enforcement powers of the regime in question than on the capacity
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the central focus on semi-official and semi-formal processes that was 
found in the proposal for Ratcheting Labour Standards, despite the 
criticisms levelled at the original proposal.
Fung’s focus on grass-roots and bottom-up deliberation is somewhat 
more attractive than the deliberative polyarchy model, at least in that it 
seems to avoid the lurking suspicions of technocracy that haunt Cohen 
and Sabel’s focus on decision-making units. Fung is also quite open in 
acknowledging the problem of substantive inequality between the 
different stakeholders in deliberation about labour standards. For one 
thing, “Relations between employers and their workers are frequently 
characterised by corrosive inequalities” (Fung, 2003, p. 63). For another, 
“The domination of voices from developed nations can twist labour- 
standards deliberation to the detriment of those in developing ones” 
(Fung, 2003, p. 64). Although he acknowledges these problems, Fung 
does not offer any clear concrete solutions to them. As a result, there is a 
worry that his proposals might be hostage to the following objection: In 
the absence of strong substantive equality, there may be a tendency to 
exclude or ignore the voices of those who have the most urgent stakes in 
decisions, precisely because their lack of resources is seen as an 
obstacle to meaningful participation.
Neither Cohen and Sabel nor Fung thus provide any rationale for 
including people who have an urgent stake in decisions about issues 
such as labour standards when they do not meet the standards of 
substantive equality that deliberative democracy is often understood to 
require. As Fung, O’Rourke and Sabel acknowledge,
It is crucial that the voices of workers in developing countries be 
present in this debate. Though international labour standards are 
pursued in their name, they are too seldom heard in discussions 
about standards and enforcement (Fung, O’Rourke and Sabel,
2001, p. 28).
of local civil society actors to transmit their grievances to trans­
national actors (Cohen and Sabel, 2006b, p. 790).
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However, there is still a large gap between these aspirations to include 
developing country workers and the practical proposals the authors offer. 
This can be seen when we contrast the aspiration to include developing 
workers with the actual practical proposals Fung, O’Rourke and Sabel 
offer in regard to promoting competition between firms to raise standards: 
“Firms would vie to show consumers and regulators that they are better 
than their competitors” (Fung, O’Rourke and Sabel, 2001, p. 27). Where 
are the workers here?
A more obvious common point between these different applications of 
deliberative democracy to the trans-national level is that they all argue 
that institutions can serve to focus moral attention. As Fung points out, 
his bottom-up deliberative model aims
[To] push the labour standards issue into the global public sphere.
It would seek to create broad public discussion about labour 
standards that would include not only firms and regulators, but also 
consumers, non-governmental organizations, journalists and 
others (Fung, 2003, p. 51).
This fits broadly with Cohen and Sabel’s claim that a global public sphere 
might emerge from public debates about the rules and decisions made by 
the institutions of global public administration. More broadly still, it fits with 
Andrew Hurrell’s claim that “international institutions are important 
platforms for moral debate” (Hurrell, 2001, p. 52). However, it is not 
necessarily the case that the most appropriate outcome for moral debate 
should be to try to directly influence the institution in question. To make 
this rather cryptic point a bit clearer, consider Bhagwati’s comments on 
the Social Clause in the WTO. Bhagwati points out that the WTO is not 
necessarily the most appropriate institution to address the labour 
standards issue. The ILO has more experience in this area, and Bhagwati 
notes that
[The] conventions or codes on specific practices that suitable 
agencies such as the ILO evolve are also likely today to translate
203
in democratic countries into domestic legislation that domestic 
NGOs can help to monitor and enforce. And in an interesting 
development that has gone unnoticed in the media in rich 
countries, judicial activism has begun to translate these norms and 
conventions into effective domestic law (Bhagwati, 2004, p. 251).
The point here is that, while moral debate about issues like labour 
standards is no doubt valuable and useful, there needs to be more careful 
reflection on where the institutional pressures that should result are to be 
directed. In this case, as Bhagwati notes, the pressure does seem to 
have gone in the right direction. The ILO ultimately directed its assistance 
through the governments of democratic states.
Conclusion and Summary
There are two basic problems with Cohen and Sabers deliberative 
polyarchy model. The first is that it does not give any account of the 
principles that should guide inclusion in particular decisions. 
Cosmopolitan democracy, by contrast, is at least clear on this point: those 
with significantly affected interests should have an equal right to influence 
decisions. Because of the lack of principles for inclusion, it is not clear 
how important laws guaranteeing rights to participate or protest actually 
are: this may explain why the model has been accused of being 
technocratic. The second problem is that Cohen and Sabel seem to want 
to expand a model based on the experience of the EU to the global level. 
However, the discussion of the ambiguity of the phrase “absence of a 
state” should bring home some of the problems with this. In particular, it 
might be plausible to argue that deliberative polyarchy is appropriate in 
the EU because the EU works against a background of democratic states 
that provide at least some sort of welfare provision for their citizens. It is 
much less appropriate to apply the model when states do not provide this 
background, yet Cohen and Sabel seem to want to do just that. There 
has been a huge amount of discussion surrounding the issue of the
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democratic legitimacy of the EU, but it seems to me that the more morally 
urgent issue is to try to look at the problem of participation in decisions by 
people in situations where the state is absent in the sense of either failing 
to provide basic goods or having broken down altogether.
I suggested that the involvement of will argument is not a convincing 
moral criterion for rights to participate in decisions. As a final point, I want 
to note Cohen and Sabel do allude to a more obviously moral problem, 
namely that many international institutions do have something like 
coercive powers, even if they are not the same legally authorised, 
centralised coercive powers that are usually wielded by states:
[Rule-making and rule-applying] bodies guide conduct by providing 
incentives and permitting the imposition of sanctions, even when they 
lack independent coercive powers. Moreover, as membership in these 
bodies often confers substantial benefits, the threat of exclusion is 
itself often tantamount to a sanction (Cohen and Sabel, 2006b, p. 
764).
This point seems to me to be absolutely central to the moral problems 
surrounding various types of international and transnational agents, but it 
receives barely any attention in Cohen and Sabel’s account. Combined 
with the problem of what Cohen and Sabel mean by the absence of a 
state, this gives us the main question I want to take from this discussion: 
what are the criteria that define demands for inclusion or participation by 
affected people in decisions when the state is not able or willing to 
provide a background of protected basic goods?
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Summary of Chapters Two to Five
The previous four chapters looked at different arguments about the role of 
democracy and political participation in preventing domination at the level 
of global politics. In this summary, I want to try to identify the main tasks 
for the constructive parts of the thesis that will follow. The discussion of 
Dryzek focused on the issue of the responsible pursuit of political 
objectives by actors in global civil society. One of the important dis- 
analogies between the domestic and the global level is that, at the 
domestic level, a range of measures such as social security and welfare 
are available to protect and compensate those who lose out in particular 
political decisions. Equivalent institutional structures are often missing at 
the global level. Developing countries may not be able to afford to 
compensate their workers if a boycott of sweatshops leads to poor 
workers losing their livelihoods. This places more direct moral 
responsibility onto civil society actors, and raises the question of what 
principles apply to them in the pursuit of their political objectives.
I also set out four concerns about the moral agency of the state during 
the discussion of Dryzek’s work. These were as follows. 1) a 
cosmopolitan concern with individuals requires some concern with the 
provision of resources necessary to live a decent life. 2) The state is a 
moral agent in that it is charged with providing such resources, at least for 
its own citizens. 3) The state’s capacity to provide such resources 
involves concentration of power that is itself a potential threat to its 
citizens. 4) Democracy is often seen as an appropriate way to constrain 
the state’s power. In the subsequent chapters, I developed aspects of 
these concerns further.
The discussion of Nagel addressed these concerns in further detail, partly 
by looking at the statist argument about the role of coercion. I argued that 
the coercive power of the state is necessary to ensure that people 
dependent on the state for the provision of basic goods have secure 
access to those goods, and are not vulnerable to those who are less 
directly dependent. However, that coercive power itself poses a threat to
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citizens if it used arbitrarily. Competitive democratic processes prevent 
the arbitrary use of coercive power because competing parties have 
incentives not to impose unfair policies on minorities on whom they may 
depend for electoral support.
The discussion of Nagel also raised the issue of relationships upon which 
people depend for the provision of basic goods. The state is one such 
relationship, but I suggested that other, similar relationships are also 
possible. These are of particular moral significance when people depend 
directly on them for the provision of basic goods.
The chapter on Held added further depth to the discussion of the role of 
competitive democracy in preventing domination by the state. It set out 
the mechanisms by which electoral competition works to prevent 
domination, but argued that these mechanisms are less likely to be 
effective on a large scale, or in linguistically diverse communities. 
However, it was also argued that domestic democratisation could work to 
prevent arbitrary uses of power by global and trans-national political 
institutions. This argument is compatible with the moral cosmopolitanism 
that forms the basis for Held’s most recent formulations of his 
cosmopolitan democracy.
This chapter argued that Held is vulnerable to a criticism that Miller levels 
at other cosmopolitans: Held needs to give a more substantive account of 
what it means to treat individuals as moral equals. This is necessary in 
order for him to move from his moral to his political cosmopolitan 
principles.
The discussion of Held also returned to the issue of the difference 
between NGO activity in developed and developing countries. It was 
pointed out that NGOs in both cases need a degree of independence 
from the state, but also that they need effective state institutions to back 
up many of their functions. There are also increasing demands to include 
NGOs from developed and developing countries in decision making at the 
global level. However, Held distinguishes between developed and 
developing country NGOs. I argued that the best rationale for Held’s 
distinction is that developing country NGOs are often more directly 
responsible for those they represent. This raised a problem with Held’s
move from his principle of equal moral concern with individuals to his 
political principle demanding equal inclusion or opportunity to influence 
decisions: there are cases in which appropriate cosmopolitan moral 
concern with individuals is not best expressed through equal 
opportunities to influence decisions.
Finally, the discussion of Held raised the issue of whether it is acceptable 
to override concerns with participation in particularly urgent cases. I 
argued that participation may be both possible and valuable in such 
cases, but it needs to be carried out in ways that are sensitive to the fact 
that participation itself has significant costs for vulnerable people.
The chapter on Cohen and Sabel looked at the issues of inclusion, 
incentives and competition and the idea of the absence of the state at the 
global level. Although Cohen and Sabel focus on the EU as a practical 
example of their deliberative polyarchy model, their discussion also 
revealed that EU law plays a more political role in ensuring that different 
affected groups have at least some right to participate in or influence 
decisions that affect them. Deliberative polyarchy does not provide 
appropriate principles for deciding which groups are affected by 
decisions, though. I also emphasised that, although deliberative 
polyarchy makes some room for competition, it does not provide 
incentives to ensure that competition serves the interests of the worst off 
or most badly affected. Again, principles to identify these groups and 
practical proposals to promote their inclusion are missing from Cohen and 
Sabel’s account. Finally, the last section of the chapter returned to a 
different form of a theme that first emerged in the chapter on Dryzek. This 
is the question of appropriate moral principles that apply when states are 
absent. Cohen and Sabel fail to distinguish adequately between different 
senses in which states can be absent. This makes it difficult to carry over 
their proposals from the EU to the global level, precisely because at the 
global level, states are absent in the sense of not being willing or able to 
protect their citizens’ basic interests.
There are four major issues that have emerged from this summary of the 
discussion so far. First is the question of how to move from a 
cosmopolitan affirmation of the moral status of individuals to a set of more
practical, political proposals. As Miller stresses in his criticisms of 
cosmopolitanism, this requires a more substantive account of the 
interests that are at stake in treating individuals as targets of equal moral 
concern. This point mainly emerged from the discussions of Nagel and 
Held. Second is the question of whether different institutional 
relationships that raise moral demands are possible outside the state. 
This issue mainly emerged from the discussion of dependency for the 
provision of basic goods in the chapter on Nagel. Third is the question of 
how to structure participation in ways that ensure that severely affected 
people have an appropriate opportunity to influence decisions that affect 
them. This issue emerged from the discussion of NGOs in relation to 
Held, and from the discussion of competition and incentives in the 
discussion of Cohen and Sabel. The fourth main issue is the question of 
moral responsibilities in the absence of the state. This issue appeared in 
various forms throughout the different chapters. The basic concern here 
is that there is an important difference between the domestic level, at 
which various procedures and institutions exist to compensate those 
made significantly worse off by particular decisions, and the global level, 
at which such institutions are often absent.
These four issues will inform and structure the discussion in the next 
three chapters. The basic aims are as follows: to provide an appropriate 
account of the kinds of human interests that are at stake in decisions at 
the global level; to explain the significance of institutional relationships in 
terms of the way those relationships generate dependencies that can 
result in domination; to describe some of the moral responsibilities that 
apply when people are in relationships in which some of the parties are at 
risk of domination; and to look at the possibility of institutional and 
practical proposals that might reduce the risk of domination occurring.
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Six. Domination and Basic Interests
Outline of the Chapter
I) Introduction
II) Defining Domination
i) Basic Interests
ii) Arbitrariness
iii) Exit Options
III) Domination in Practice
IV) Preventing Domination
i) Exit, Resources and Redistribution
ii) Voice
Introduction
My aim over the next few chapters is to defend the claim that, although 
people are subject to various forms of domination that occur when states 
fail to sustain basic welfare, this domination can be mitigated by 
participatory forms of deliberation. Put another way, the claim is that 
people who are at risk of domination have a strong claim to priority when 
deciding who should participate in decision and policy making processes 
by institutions. Since I have a specific conception of domination in mind, I 
shall set it out as clearly as possible in this sub chapter, before looking at 
arguments for participation in the next chapter. The theory of domination I 
outline here should stand independently of the arguments I make about 
participation. Regardless of the outcome of those arguments, the claims 
here should constitute a rebuttal of Nagel’s sceptical claim that there is no 
justice outside the state: I aim to show that there are morally significant 
relationships that appear when states fail to provide basic forms of 
welfare. Of course, I also believe that providing a clear account of these
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relationships should provide us with some basis for a better institutional 
response to the problems as well, but that is a separate task.
The basic definition of domination I want to elaborate runs as follows:
D) Domination occurs when agent A's lack of resources leads to a 
lack of exit options that allow agent B to impose arbitrary 
reductions in agent A's capacity to fulfil his basic interests.
This definition owes a lot to Ian Shapiro’s discussion of these issues209. In 
particular, the focus on lack of exit options and on basic interests is drawn 
from his discussion210. However, I want to make a couple of modifications 
to Shapiro’s basic argument, and to extend it in a direction that he does 
not (as far as I can tell) take211.
I) Defining Domination
209 Other valuable discussions of the issue include Lovett (2001), Barry 
(2001) and Miller (1999). Lovett places emphasis on power imbalances, 
dependency and absence of rules as sources of domination. To some 
extent, power imbalances and dependency correspond to my concern 
with basic interests and lack of exit options. Barry refers to the role of exit 
costs in determining whether associations between people are truly free 
and thus morally unproblematic from a liberal perspective. Miller 
discusses issues relating to international political economy under the 
heading of “exploitation” in one of his early articles on global justice. 
Interestingly, Miller suggests that the best way to proceed is to focus on 
specific examples that seem intuitively unjust and work out what leads us 
to respond in this way. Oddly, this interest in exploitation falls out of the 
picture in his more recent work (2002, 2004, 2008).
See Shapiro, 2003, p. 43-5.
211 The use of the term domination evokes connections with republican 
thought and with the work of Philip Pettit in particular. The central place of 
arbitrariness in the definition suggests a link with Pettit’s concern with 
arbitrary interferences in agents’ freedom. However, Pettit does not make 
a concern with resources or basic interests a central focus of his theory. It 
could also be argued that he is not concerned with drawing a clear or 
sharp distinction between domination practised by states and domination 
practised by other agents (Pettit, 1997, 2007).
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The three key components of my definition are basic interests, 
arbitrariness and exit options. I will look at each of these separately 
before showing how they fit together.
i) Basic Interests
As Shapiro points out, basic interests can be understood in terms of 
resources and the way control of such resources can be used to 
dominate people. He makes the point neatly and with obvious relevance 
to our concern with labour standards:
Anyone in a position to threaten a person’s basic interests 
evidently has great power over him. An employer who can fire an 
employee in a world where there is no unemployment 
compensation has power of this kind (Shapiro, 2003, p. 45).
This approach implies a resourcist and sufficientist approach to basic 
interests. Sufficientists hold that it is morally troubling when people lack 
sufficient resources to do certain things, usually defined in terms of the 
capacity to live a decent, worthwhile, flourishing or successful human 
life212. Sufficientism is usually invoked in criticisms of egalitarianism. For 
example, it is argued that inequalities of wealth themselves are not 
morally objectionable as long as all people have enough to live a 
successful life (Raz, 1995). In this context, sufficientism will make some 
reference to people’s capacity to prevent or avoid domination. The classic 
problem for sufficientism is the question of the boundary or threshold at 
which sufficiency is reached. This raises a couple of problems for Shapiro 
that I want to try to address here.
Shapiro defines basic interests as follows:
We can think of people’s basic interests by reference to the 
obvious essentials that they need to develop into and survive as
212 Examples of sufficientist views include Frankfurt (1987), Raz (1986, 
1995), Anderson (1999), Tasioulas (2005) and Miller (2008).
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independent moral agents in the world as it is likely to exist for 
their lifetimes (Shapiro, 2003, p. 45).
There are two major charges that can be levelled at this definition. The 
first is an accusation of conservatism: doesn’t this definition in terms of 
the world as it is likely to be for the foreseeable future privilege the status 
quo? Doesn’t it trap people in conditions that they find intolerable and 
would not endorse if they had greater capacity to change them? The 
second is an accusation of insufficiency. As we have noted, sufficientists 
often tend to talk in terms of resources required for successful, flourishing 
or fully functioning human lives. Shapiro’s argument makes no reference 
to these more demanding requirements, which might be taken as a sign 
that he is not concerned about them, and is setting the bar too low. This 
is not quite right: in the different context of child care, he does distinguish 
between basic and best interests:
If basic interests are conceived as emerging out of the minimum 
conditions for satisfactory interaction, best interests have to do 
with the full development of human potential (Shapiro, 1999, p. 90-
1).
However, I think the way he distinguishes between basic and best 
interests is problematic, as I shall show below.
With regard to the charge of conservatism, it is important to note that 
Shapiro does not claim that people living under particular conditions 
necessarily have to endorse those conditions as fair or just. There are 
two ways to elaborate on this response. First, if I work for a factory that 
pays minimum wage and my employer decides to lower my wages to 
below that level, my protest at this decision does not have to rest on a 
belief that the minimum wage level is the fairest or most just wage. It can 
rest on the more urgent need for a wage that provides for my needs, or 
on the principle that minimum wages prevent this kind of arbitrary 
behaviour. Secondly, as Shapiro points out, any claims for reform or 
change will have to begin from the institutions and practices that actually 
prevail in a given society: a knowledge of those institutions is itself a
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requirement for meaningful attempts to change them, if this is required213. 
As he puts it, people redesign institutions more often than building them 
from scratch, but “Doing this well requires the insider’s wisdom necessary 
for intelligent redesign, and teaching people to function adequately in the 
existing system is in turn required to develop the relevant insider’s 
wisdom” (Shapiro, 1999, p. 87).
The second charge, that Shapiro’s definition of resources is too limited in 
scope and ambition, is somewhat harder to answer. Shapiro defends this 
limited view in terms of a concern about maintaining a plurality of different 
conceptions of what best interests are. This might in part be intended as 
a response to the charge that a more ambitious conception of basic 
interests runs the risk of paternalism or cultural bias that is often levelled 
at sufficientists and similar theorists214. The counter-response is that 
setting the bar too low can leave people without the resources needed to 
achieve more ambitious conceptions of best interests. In relation to our 
particular example, it leaves employers with too much room to disclaim or 
evade responsibility for the broader well being of their workers. In cases 
of countries such as Colombia which (according to ILO reports) lack 
properly functioning welfare provision, this is particularly problematic 
because workers depend more directly on their employers for resources 
that they might need to achieve whatever conception of well being is 
possible in their society. Nevertheless, two better arguments for Shapiro’s 
rather minimal conception of basic interests can be given.
First, a conception of independent moral agency can be defended in 
terms of a person’s capacity to revise or reformulate an initial conception 
of a successful life in the face of changing circumstances. This does not 
mean that I want to commit myself to the controversial idea that people’s 
conceptions of their own successful lives are entirely objects of individual
213 The point is turned into an attack on contemporary political philosophy: 
Democratic justice is intended to militate against the tabula rasa re- 
evaluation of all social institutions, characteristic of much political 
philosophy at least since Rawls, from the perspective of every individual 
who is on the hypothetical threshold of entering them (Shapiro, 1999, p. 
87).
214 See, for example, Fabre, 2008, p. 14.
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choice. Rather, it reflects two distinct but related possibilities. First, a 
person’s pursuit of their conception of a successful life may be 
circumscribed by changes in circumstance that require them to revise that 
conception. If someone unexpectedly becomes pregnant, this will require 
them to reconsider some of their priorities and projects, and a capacity for 
some sort of independent moral agency will be needed to do this. I do not 
think employers should be able to hinder such an attempt to reorder 
priorities on the basis that they are only responsible for a more minimal 
set of basic interests. Having a child should not put a person in a situation 
in which they have to work long hours to provide for the basic interests of 
their family. Second, most thriving or healthy cultures allow for a range of 
ways for people to express their commitment to that culture. Again, this is 
helpful if circumstances make it difficult for a person to pursue their 
conception of a successful life in one specific way. A culture that offers a 
person a range of different ways of expressing their commitment may be 
better placed to survive changes of circumstance. Again, a degree of 
independent moral agency seems necessary, both so that people can 
collectively sustain this range and to evaluate the different possibilities it 
offers. Furthermore, this point emphasises that Shapiro may be 
exaggerating the worry that pursuit of a more demanding conception of 
well being will necessarily lead to a dismal, paternalistic set of state 
sponsored initiatives. The division does not need to be as sharp as that. 
Perhaps states and even employers could sponsor a range of initiatives 
that have some connection to promoting the pursuit of conceptions of a 
successful life. Perhaps people could have room to co-operate among 
themselves to nurture the social institutions needed. In general, Shapiro’s 
worry about paternalism seems exaggerated and threatens to set the bar 
of sufficiency too low as a result. My conception of basic interests 
(including a conception of independent moral agency) as requirements for 
the pursuit of well being or a successful life aims to avoid this problem.
As a second point, it is worth considering the idea of a threshold between 
two levels of interests that is included in Shapiro’s distinction between 
basic and best interests. Again, the general idea of such a threshold is 
defensible, but not on quite the terms Shapiro uses. For Shapiro, the
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failure to pursue or protect basic interests triggers legitimate state 
intervention. States should provide basic interests or intervene to ensure 
others provide them. Families that do not feed their children are legitimate 
targets of state intervention; likewise firms that do not protect their 
employees’ health and safety. This is not the case for best interests. 
Shapiro again draws the distinction based on worries about paternalism: 
Given the corrigibility of human knowledge in general and the 
Orwellian dangers of permitting partisans of one view to impose 
what they take their knowledge to be, it is better to opt for a system 
that permits considerable latitude in developing one’s best 
potential (Shapiro, 1999, p. 91).
As I pointed out above, I think this worry about Orwellian dangers is 
exaggerated and can be addressed. Nevertheless, I think there is a better 
reason to distinguish levels of interests.
We can distinguish two rough levels of interests. First, there are cases 
where clashes between basic interests are possible. Second, there are 
cases where clashes between different non-basic interests are possible. 
While some sort of fair procedure may be needed to adjudicate both of 
these, it seems important to keep them separate. To illustrate: in one 
situation, it may be necessary to decide which of a group of workers who 
depend on their wages to provide for their basic interests will have to lose 
his job. This is, of course, a painful decision to have to make. On the 
other hand, the decision may be between workers for whom loss of 
wages means loss of the ability to pay for a foreign holiday or a new car. 
Again, it would seem very unfair to the first group to include members of 
the second group in the decision on the same footing. This is an attempt 
to defend more careful consideration of whose interests are at stake in 
particular decisions, but it rests on a different distinction than Shapiro’s 
distinction between basic and best interests.
The upshot of this is that my definition of basic interests modifies 
Shapiro’s in the following way: basic interests can be defined in terms of 
the essentials people need in order to pursue a reasonably successful life 
in the world as it is likely to exist in their lifetimes. The main reason for 
this is to avoid the situation where those who control access to these
resources or essentials can disclaim responsibility for anything above 
providing a bare minimum. It should also be stressed that the definition 
includes some conception of independent moral agency, again for the 
reasons relating to the capacity to make adjustments to a person’s 
capacity to formulate a conception of a successful life that were outlined 
above. Finally, this conception of basic interests remains very limited in 
terms of its actual content. In contrast to the extensive lists of capacities 
and functions set out by people like Sen, or the list of requirements for 
autonomous participation set out by Held, it does not specify much in the 
way of actual concrete goods. There are good reasons for this that I shall 
return to later. For the moment, I want to look at the other two dimensions 
of my definition of domination.
ii) Arbitrariness
The use of the term arbitrary in the definition signals the need to 
distinguish between more and less justifiable arguments for interfering 
with people’s basic interests. It is worth considering some of the 
formulations of the idea of domination in Pettit’s work in this context. Pettit 
provides two different versions of his definition of domination. The first, 
earlier, one seems somewhat self-regarding:
One person is dominated by another, so I shall assume, to the 
extent that the other person has the capacity to interfere in their 
affairs, in particular the capacity to interfere in their affairs on an 
arbitrary basis. The capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis is the 
sort of capacity that a master has in relation to a slave or subject. It 
is the capacity to interfere in a person’s life without regard to their 
perceived interests (Pettit, 1999, p. 165).
On this view, the only relevant consideration when identifying domination 
between A and B is whether A is acting without regard to B’s interests. 
This definition seems far too narrow. In a subsequent article, Pettit refers
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to a different conception of interests under the heading of common 
interests: “A certain good will represent a common interest of a 
population, I say, just so far as cooperatively avowable considerations 
support its collective provision” (Pettit, 2000, p. 108). Although Pettit 
takes this discussion in a rather different direction than the one being 
developed here215, the reference to cooperation is what I take to be 
central. The case of labour standards is an area in which the provision of 
basic interests is carried out through a cooperative practice, and claims 
against interests thus have to be made in the context of sustaining that 
practice. Claims against employers have to be made in a context in which 
other people have similar claims based on the fact that their work is the 
main source of resources through which they vindicate their basic 
interests. Pettit’s first definition seems to imply that the only consideration 
for arbitrariness is the interests of each person taken individually in their 
relationship to a potential dominator; this just seems wrong when we 
consider that other people are likely to be similarly dependent216. So 
again, the upshot is that arbitrariness should be other-regarding. A 
reduction in someone’s ability to fulfil their interests is arbitrary if it is done 
without regard to basic interests that may be at stake -  both their own 
interests and the interests of others.
iii) Exit Options
The third dimension of the definition of domination aims to capture the 
point that people can have significant interests at stake in decisions, but
215 Pettit elaborates on this definition by claiming that common interests 
are “those considerations to which no participant in a collective scheme 
could deny weight or relevance under ordinary standards of 
conversational practice” (Pettit, 2000, p. 108). He adds that this approach 
is “broadly contractualist in spirit” (Pettit, 2000, p. 108).
216 As Shapiro puts it, “the idea of responsible pursuit of interests is other- 
regarding; it has to do with the expectations that others may reasonably 
entertain about the ways in which others pursue their interests” (Shapiro, 
1999, p. 86).
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that some of them can also have easily available alternative means of 
vindicating those interests. Loss of a job will generally have some impact 
on different people’s ability to vindicate their interests, since they usually 
depend on the income they receive to purchase many of the goods they 
need to do so. However, in a society with a reasonably well-functioning 
welfare state, this loss will not be as devastating as in a society where no 
such protection is provided. Similarly, in a society with an open and 
functioning labour market, loss of employment will not be devastating 
because people will have other employment opportunities. I assume that 
countries that have to attract outside investment and development by 
offering concessions to potential investors are likely to lack such an open 
market.
There are three points to be added here: I draw two of these from Brian 
Barry’s discussion of exit costs and their relationship to free association. 
First,
Barry notes that it is possible to distinguish different types of exit costs 
and to worry about what can be done to provide some of them. I do not 
want to get caught up in the details of Barry’s argument, but he notes on 
the one hand that there are some costs that the state cannot do much 
about. This can be because they are intrinsically impossible to alleviate 
through normal state action. Alternatively, they might result from people 
acting in legitimate ways. On the other hand, there are areas where the 
state can take action to alleviate the problem. Suffice to say that most of 
the issues that arise in the area of labour standards seem to fit the 
second set of cases. The most obvious connection between work and 
basic interests is through money: people work to earn the money they 
need to provide for basic interests. The state can usually intervene by 
providing welfare, by protecting minimum wages, by ensuring conditions 
in which alternative jobs are available and so on. Even less obvious 
cases seem open to some sort of state intervention. For example, the fact 
that parents need time to spend with their children could be dealt with by 
providing flexible working hours or child care facilities.
Second, as Barry points out, it does not make much moral sense to 
define exit costs purely in terms of comparison with available alternatives.
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My choice might be between my present life as a well-paid supermodel 
on the one hand and life as a manager of a shop on the other. Although 
the loss in terms of earnings and glamorous opportunities is large, it is 
hard to argue that the latter job condemns one to a situation in which no 
reasonable conception of a successful life is possible217. This point 
serves to reinforce the emphasis on a sufficientist approach to the 
definition of basic interests. Comparisons between my present situation 
and the available alternatives are less important than awareness that the 
alternatives provide sufficient resources to vindicate my basic interests. 
Third, it is also important to be careful when comparing in other regarding 
ways. As Shapiro points out, a wealthy employer may stand to lose more 
in purely financial terms from a particular decision than her employee, but 
this is beside the point, morally speaking. Rather, the important point is 
that the employee has basic interests at stake whereas the employer 
does not.
The point of including exit options in the criteria for domination is to avoid 
the kinds of problem with over-inclusiveness that were seen above in the 
discussion of the difference between basic and best interests. There, it 
was pointed out that it is inappropriate to play certain types of interests off 
against one another. The same is true in the case of exit options218. 
People with a wider range of exit options stand in a better bargaining 
position than those with limited options, and this is relevant when basic 
interests are at stake. Bargaining strength should not be used to 
arbitrarily reduce the weaker group’s access to the means to vindicate its 
basic interests.
This is not to say that we can entirely avoid situations where the decision 
is a question of basic interests among a group, all of whom have limited 
exit options. It may be the case that the only employer in a region that
217 This conclusion is perhaps reinforced if we note the importance of the 
range of viable alternatives that a flourishing culture should be able to 
sustain that was discussed above.
218 I draw this general point from Shapiro: “Allowing an equal say in a 
decision to people with greatly differing stakes in the outcome generates 
pathologies similar to those involving large differences in capacities for 
exit” (Shapiro, 1999, p. 235).
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pays enough for its employees to vindicate their basic interests has to lay 
off some workers in order to avoid shutting down altogether. In this grim 
situation, all might be said to have basic interests at stake and limited exit 
options. The only point to be added is that none of the workers is in a 
position to dominate any of the others, since they all have similar 
interests at stake219. It is worth noting that the grimness of this particular 
example should prompt us to sound a note of caution about equality. 
Since it was pointed out that the workers in this case are not in a position 
to dominate one another (by virtue of the fact that they have roughly the 
same interests at stake), it may be tempting to suggest that a strong 
version of equality is the best way to prevent domination. However, this 
particular example suggests that we need to be a bit more careful in 
thinking about the role of equality. The fact that some people are likely to 
be pushed below the threshold of sufficiency in this case emphasises the 
need to weigh equality against other considerations.
II) Domination in Practice
Having outlined the main components of my definition of domination, I 
now want to give a couple of brief illustrations of how domination might 
actually occur in practice. I borrow these general examples from Basu. 
The first case relates to child labour. In very poor societies, children may 
be sent to work because the alternative is starvation for them or their 
families. This obviously creates a situation that employers are able to 
exploit, by offering children low wages. However, it also deprives children 
of the opportunity to go to school. It is hardly implausible to suggest that 
some basic level of education is necessary for children to live a
219 This point is again drawn from Shapiro: “So long as all have equally 
strong interests at stake...then no one has power over anyone else by 
virtue of the decision making procedure, and there is no reason for 
outsiders to second guess it” (Shapiro, 2003, p. 44).
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successful life in the world as it is likely to exist for the foreseeable future. 
For example, at the very least, some basic degree of literacy and 
numeracy seems necessary for employees to check they have not been 
underpaid. By being made to work, the child is being deprived of access 
to resources necessary to vindicate basic interests -  education, in this 
case220. Assuming the employer himself does not also have similar basic 
interests at stake, we can argue that this is an example of domination. 
Interestingly, Basu stresses that it is possible that employers might 
reconcile work with education in very poor countries. There is no need to 
see the two as mutually exclusive, or indeed to see child labour as 
inherently wrong, since it is considered acceptable in Western societies 
for children to have paper rounds, work as babysitters and so on (see 
Basu, 1999, p. 1115). From the perspective of the theory of domination 
outlined here, this is interesting because it suggests that employers 
cannot in this case get themselves off the hook by arguing that there is a 
simple and irreconcilable clash between two basic interests. They cannot 
claim that they are providing one basic interest that is just incompatible 
with another in this context. It is not inevitably the case that child 
labourers are faced with a choice between the subsistence provided by 
their wages and the need for education.
A second case is based on Basu’s discussion of sexual harassment. 
Basu notes the morally troubling point that freedom of contract implies 
that workers should be able to enter into contracts that allow for sexual 
harassment of workers by their superiors. If this were so, workers who 
were willing to put up with sexual harassment could gain competitive 
advantage over their fellows. Basu argues that this is unjustifiable 
because it imposes unfair costs on those who are not willing to enter such 
contracts: it makes those who are opposed to such harassment bear the 
costs of their opposition. He points out that this kind of burden shifting is 
unfair in cases where fundamental preferences are at stake, but admits
220 Basu also quotes Alfred Marshall and John Stuart Mill, both of whom 
point out that lack of education also has impacts on society in general. 
Mill argues that the community as a whole is “liable to suffer seriously 
from the consequences of ignorance and want of education” (Mill, quoted 
in Basu, 1999, p. 1095).
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that he does not have a clear definition of what fundamental preferences 
are. The definition of basic interests above can be used here. The threat 
of sexual harassment at work is sufficiently at odds with the idea of 
independent moral agency included in the definition of basic interests 
above to suggest that people should not have to bear the costs of 
upholding that interest. People who are subject to sexual harassment are 
not in a position to act as independent moral agents. This contrasts with 
Basu’s other example, which is the case of a person who is reluctant to 
go to work because he wants to watch a cricket match. In this case, he 
will obviously lose out to those eccentrics for whom cricket holds no 
interest. However, it is hard to see how this has any direct impact on the 
person’s ability to be an independent moral agent. Two further points. 
First, it is worth stressing that competition for employment leads to this 
type of situation: where jobs are scarce, employers are in a stronger 
position to lower wages and conditions. Second, the example obviously 
extends to other areas such as health and safety. Some workers may be 
willing to take greater risks, but employers should not use this as a 
source of advantage. Again, where workers need the wages offered to 
provide their most basic subsistence needs, they may be faced with a 
grim trade off between the wages they need and decent working 
conditions.
The above two examples are intended to illustrate how control of one 
resource needed to vindicate a complex set of basic interests can be 
used to impose arbitrary reductions in access to other resources needed 
to vindicate those interests. In the first case, work conflicts with the need 
for education. In the second, it conflicts with the demand for a working 
relationship free from sexual harassment, which is itself connected to the 
demand for some form of independent moral agency.
Of more direct relevance to our concern with participation and 
democracy, it is important to stress that domination of this kind can also 
be applied to the kinds of participatory structures and institutions that 
workers use to protect their other basic interests. We might argue in 
semi-circular fashion that people have a basic interest in institutions or 
structures that enable them to protect their basic interests. However,
domination can be used to limit people’s access to those institutions or 
structures. To illustrate, O’Rourke provides two examples of ways in 
which workers can be prevented from participating in non-governmental 
and non-union based monitoring programmes. First, workers can be 
directly discouraged from participation: “Workers may...be punished after 
complaining to auditors, as these systems often have limited protections 
for workers” (O’Rourke, 2003, p. 23). This is particularly evident in the 
practices of Global Social Compliance (formerly Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers). GSC conducts interviews inside factories under conditions in 
which management can identify which workers have been interviewed 
(O’Rourke, 2003, p. 23). This issue fits the model of domination outlined 
above because workers who have limited sources of income are 
particularly vulnerable to the threat of dismissal from work. As a result, 
their lack of resources in one area (income, in this case), is used to 
reduce their capacity in another area (in this case, their capacity to report 
on violations of labour standards). A less direct version of the same effect 
can also occur: “Monitoring reports can lead firms to cut contracts with 
poor performing factories, leading to job losses” (O’Rourke, 2003, p. 23). 
Again, vulnerable workers may be discouraged from participating in 
monitoring if the outcome threatens their jobs.
A similar point can also be applied to migrant workers in wealthy 
countries. In this case, lack of basic citizenship rights leads to a form of 
domination. The point is a simple one: illegal migrant workers face the 
threat of deportation by the authorities of the state in which they work. 
This means they cannot report violations of labour standards to official 
agencies, since this is also likely to result in their deportation. This is a 
point that both Legrain (2007, p. 36-7) and Bhagwati (2004, p. 128) 
make221.
221 Bhagwati adds that until quite recently, trades unions and religious 
groups in the US tended to encourage strong enforcement of border 
controls and removals of illegal immigrants. This has changed as these 
groups have realised that many immigrants are working class Christians 
-  the natural membership constituency of both these groups (Bhagwati, 
2004, p. 128n9).
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One common point that these examples share is that they seem to point 
in a somewhat contextualist direction when it comes to judging whether 
domination has occurred in practice. The details of the different cases 
show how lack of access to one good or resource can be used to reduce 
access to another good or resource, but that this can occur in a number 
of ways. So, for example, lack of income can be used to reduce children’s 
access to education and to reduce women’s right to work in an 
environment free of sexual harassment. There are a couple of remarks 
that are worth adding to this conclusion, though. First, the three-part 
framework for assessing domination is intended to provide a more robust 
set of criteria than more obviously contextualist approaches. For 
example, David Miller denies that there is a simple general theory of 
international exploitation, suggesting, “the exact mechanism will vary from 
case to case” (Miller, 1999, p. 207). I have argued that people who meet 
the three criteria outlined above are especially vulnerable to domination 
and should thus be given priority consideration. Second, lack of material 
and financial resources does seem to be a fairly common factor. In the 
cases discussed, the lack of a welfare state or realistic alternative 
employment makes people vulnerable because loss of income threatens 
their basic interests. Nevertheless, the example of migrant workers in the 
US suggests that lack of financial resources is not the only problem.
I have used a modified version of Shapiro’s basic framework for analysis 
domination. The antidote or means of mitigating domination that I want to 
outline here also borrows from Shapiro’s basic argument222. In his 2003 
book The State of Democratic Theory, Shapiro focuses on the problem of 
people with limited exit options in given situations, arguing that these 
people should be given a more effective voice in decisions that affect 
them. This basic point in fact suggests that there are two strategies for 
mitigating domination: either provide the people involved with more 
effective means of exiting a particular relationship or provide them with a 
more effective voice in deciding the terms of the relationship. I will explore 
these two alternatives in turn.
222 Shapiro’s argument itself is borrowed from Albert Hirschman’s theory 
of different responses to the decline of institutions (1970).
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HI) Preventing Domination
i) Exit, resources and redistribution
In this section, I want to provide a brief outline for a distinctive rationale 
for redistribution. This focuses on the specific features of the kind of 
domination that is possible in relationships between workers and 
employers in countries with weak welfare provision and limited job 
markets. The basic argument is that redistribution of resources is justified 
as a way of preventing domination because it provides the recipients with 
alternative ways of accessing the resources they need to vindicate their 
basic interests. Recall that, according to the theory of domination outlined 
above, people are at risk of domination if they are reliant on a single 
source for these resources. Control of one resource can be used to 
impose arbitrary reductions in the capacity to access other resources, as 
was illustrated by the examples of sexual harassment, child labour, and 
migrant labour above. In the case of work and labour standards, the most 
obvious potential source of domination is workers’ reliance on their 
income as a general means of vindicating basic interests. Reducing 
workers’ exclusive reliance on their employers as a source of this income 
provides a basic rationale for redistribution in the form of welfare 
provision. Providing exit options in this form may also mitigate other forms 
of domination, most notably low health and safety standards. Where 
workers have greater capacity to exit from particular work relationships, 
they will presumably have greater capacity to demand more favourable 
terms, which could include better provision of safe, decent working 
conditions.
There are a couple of points about this basic argument that I want to 
emphasise by contrasting them with the rationale Held gives in some of 
his earlier work for redistribution of wealth. In Democracy and the Global 
Order, Held argues for substantial (and substantive) redistribution on the 
democratic grounds of providing the preconditions for equal and
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autonomous participation in political decision making (see especially 
Held, 1995, chapters 7 and 8, and also Held, 1999).
The first point to note is that Held here advocates a common structure of 
political action that would take the form of a cosmopolitan rechtstaat 
capable of providing the cluster of rights and obligations that allow 
citizens to participate on a basis of equality and autonomy (Held, 1999, p. 
105). These rights include substantive goods as well as civil and political 
rights. My concern about this approach is that it threatens to centralise 
exclusive power to determine the distribution of these goods in the hands 
of the cosmopolitan institutions Held advocates. The worry is that this 
kind of exclusive control creates the danger of domination precisely 
because the institutions Held advocates would become the main or only 
source of the resources people need to vindicate their basic interests. As 
I have stressed, this type of exclusive control makes it possible for 
institutions to impose arbitrary reductions in people’s access to different 
kinds of resources.
In general, Held’s argument is symptomatic of a broader institutional 
cosmopolitan failure to distinguish between two understandings of why a 
plurality of institutions might be necessary223. The first claim is a broadly 
functional one: some purposes may be better served by large scale 
institutions with global reach, while others may be better served by local 
institutions. Some forms of environmental protection fit the former, while 
cultural activities dependent on local languages are an obvious case of 
the latter. This rather functional understanding of the proper role of 
different institutions is one rationale for the multi-level system of 
governance that institutional cosmopolitans like Held and (in a rather 
different context) Simon Caney advocate. The second sense in which a
2231 use the label institutional cosmopolitan to distinguish Held and Caney 
from moral cosmopolitans who advocate global principles of moral and 
distributive equality but are less willing to describe the kinds of political 
institutions required to promote those principles. David Miller points out 
that contemporary cosmopolitans such as Charles Beitz, Brian Barry and 
Thomas Pogge can be understood to be moral cosmopolitans since they 
“are at pains to insist that moral cosmopolitanism does not entail political 
cosmopolitanism understood as a theory of world government” (Miller, 
2004, p. 65).
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plurality of institutions can be understood relates to the possibility of exit 
from a given relationship. Providing a plurality of different ways of 
vindicating basic interests means people have a better chance of exiting 
relationships. As I have already stressed, this possibility of exit is one way 
to mitigate domination. I do not think Held or Caney draw any clear 
distinction between these two senses224. However, if we are serious 
about ensuring that robust global or cosmopolitan institutions do not 
result in the kind of domination I have been describing, it seems more 
important than either Held or Caney acknowledge to recognise the 
distinction. It is also worth acknowledging that the two senses of 
institutional pluralism can conflict. If we take the functional understanding 
seriously, it is possible that such institutions would neglect alternative 
ways of providing resources to people with basic interests at stake.
The approach I have outlined focuses on the importance of institutional 
arrangements in which a range of ways of providing resources that can 
be used to vindicate basic interests is possible. It expresses a worry 
about a cosmopolitan institutional structure that claims to offer people the 
resources to participate on an equal footing, yet at the same time seems 
to aspire to be the only source of those resources. Held’s argument 
neglects the possibility that strong cosmopolitan institutions might 
themselves be a source of domination.
It is also worth noting that none of the other approaches to the problem of 
participation express this concern about resources and domination. 
Dryzek perhaps comes closest when he invokes Hayek to illustrate the 
potentially worrying outcome of centrally planned, top down, multilateral 
institutions. However Dryzek does not make his point in terms of the way 
control of resources might be used to dominate people. Rather, his 
concern is that constitutionalism will lack the flexibility and spontaneity to 
deal with problems in a truly rational way (Dryzek, 2006, p. 142). Nagel’s
224 At one point, Held does advocate short term promotion of 
“experimentation with different democratic organizational forms in the 
economy” with a view to a long term creation of “pluralization of patterns 
of ownership and possession” (Held, 1995, p. 280). However, he does not 
defend this proposal in terms of preventing domination or providing viable 
exit options.
view of institutions is too static and state bound: he does not seem to 
appreciate that non-state institutions stand in a much more direct 
relationship with citizens when state institutions are weak225. Cohen and 
Sabel do acknowledge that there are significant decision making 
agencies outside the state, but seem to place too much emphasis on the 
belief that peer-level deliberation alone can generate recognition of the 
moral demands that might fall on such decision makers.
A second contrast relates to the central place Held gives to participation 
in Democracy and the Global Order. In that work, Held argues that the 
substantive goods that institutions should provide are justified in terms of 
their contribution to people’s capacity to participate as autonomous 
equals in decision making. However, it is not clear that people will be very 
likely to be motivated to participate in such decision making if a wide 
range of their substantive needs are already fulfilled as preconditions for 
participation. Put another way, fulfilling Held’s wide range of substantive 
needs may leave little for people to argue about in participatory forums. 
More importantly, deliberation and participation can themselves impose 
costs on the participants. In some cases, these may be costs that 
interfere with their legitimate pursuit of other goods. In these cases, 
redistribution to provide potential participants with exit options might be 
justified in terms of not requiring them to participate. Taking one of the 
examples above, we might face a choice between two alternatives. On 
the one hand, women might be given exit options that mean they do not 
have to take jobs that involve sexual harassment in order to access basic 
resources. On the other, the women might be required to negotiate the 
terms of what actually counts as harassment for them in each case. I 
think it is only if we place a high intrinsic value on participation -  as Held 
seems to -  that we are necessarily pushed towards the latter position.
225 Onora O’Neill does argue that non-state institutions can have 
responsibilities of justice, but her argument is not based on the possibility 
of domination. Rather, her claim seems to be that non-state institutions 
such as trans-national corporations are able to accumulate the resources 
and knowledge to act as agents of justice, and that this imposes 
responsibilities on them (O’Neill, 2001).
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This second point suggests that the availability of exit options is likely to 
be used as a way of deciding who should be excluded from decisions, 
and that redistribution to provide people with exit options could be used 
as a principled way to exclude yet more people. Again, I do not think this 
is necessarily troubling if we do not place a high intrinsic value on 
participation. Nevertheless, the burden of proof should lie with those who 
claim that particular groups should be excluded.
In summary, the differences between the approach taken here and Held’s 
approach to redistribution of resources can be understood in terms of 
differences in both the how and the why of redistribution. In terms of the 
how, an approach focused on domination emphasises the need for exit 
options in the means available to people when vindicating their basic 
interests. This suggests a need for a plurality of different institutions. In 
the case of labour relations, it emphasises the need for a combination of 
welfare provision and an open job market. In terms of the why, 
redistribution may provide goods in a way that diminishes people’s 
motivation to participate political decisions, but this is only troubling if the 
outcome is that they are also subject to domination.
ii) Voice
Barry’s analysis of different kinds of exit costs indicates that there are 
many situations in which exit is simply not a viable option for people226. In
226 Barry distinguishes between intrinsic, associative and external costs 
(Barry, 2001, p. 150-1). Intrinsic costs are costs the state can do little to 
alleviate, and might include the emotional effects of leaving a long term 
relationship, or the threat of excommunication imposed by some 
churches. Associative costs are costs the state might be able to alleviate 
but which come about through people’s pursuit of legitimate decisions. 
This might include an employer’s decision not to hire a candidate based 
on the belief that the candidate is not competent to do the job. External 
costs are costs the state can and should alleviate, and might include the 
costs of leaving a job that fall on competent employees in poor societies. 
As I noted above, the labour relations issue seems mostly to bring in 
questions relating to associative and external costs, in part because 
people mainly rely on their work for financial resources which could
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these situations, voice becomes more important as a way to mitigate 
domination: people should have a right to participation in decisions when 
their exit costs are very high. This raises two questions. First, how to 
decide who is included? How should they be included? The crude 
answers are: first, people subject to domination. Second, they should be 
included in a way that enables them to ensure their basic interests are 
protected.
With regard to the first point, the definition of domination I have outlined is 
intended to provide a more robust way of deciding who has significant 
interests at stake in a particular decision. However, this leaves open the 
more obviously practical issue of who is to make the more detailed 
decisions in particular cases.
It is possible to put the answers that the different thinkers I have 
examined might give to this question on a continuum based on how 
democratic their approach is. At one extreme, we might take a very 
proceduralist interpretation of Held as claiming that the decision itself 
should be made democratically, possibly by referendum. At the other 
extreme, we might take existing authorities as the baseline. This is a 
strong interpretation of Nagel’s claim that principles of justice only apply 
within the sovereign state, even if the boundaries of such states are 
determined arbitrarily and perhaps by historical accident (Nagel, 2005, p. 
121 )227. The obvious criticism of the first view is simply that it is wildly 
impractical. If there really is no non-procedural standard to which the 
initial decision about who should be included can be held, then perhaps
generally be provided by other means such as welfare payments or 
alternative jobs.
227 These different extremes are caricatures of the different positions in 
question. Miller (2000, p. 95) claims Held does believe that constituencies 
can be decided by referendum. However, Held’s own emphasis on 
significantly affected interests suggests that he thinks there are 
independent standards to which decisions about jurisdictions can be held. 
My own criticism of Held is that his standards are too weak and vague to 
be of much use. At the other extreme, Nagel does not think states have 
sovereignty just in virtue of the fact they happen to be states. He does 
think there are moral standards to which states can be held, but denies 
that these same standards can be meaningfully applied to non-state 
institutions. Again, my aim is to elaborate standards that can be applied 
to non-state institutions.
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the only thing to do is to hold referenda with global scope on each and 
every issue. At the other extreme, a strong interpretation of Nagel’s view 
of states seems too static and rigid. As I have stressed repeatedly, when 
states are weak or incapable, other agencies may be in a position to 
make decisions that have severe impacts on the people affected. 
Employers have the right to decide whom they employ, but this decision 
is clearly much more morally significant in situations where the job at 
stake is the only source of the most basic resources for the candidate. 
Dryzek’s voluntarist approach to participation lies closer to Held’s. It is 
perhaps less obviously democratic, since the decision about participation 
is itself taken by the participants and not by a democratic process. 
However attractive a more bottom up approach may be, the obvious 
problem is that we cannot always take actual participation as a sign that 
urgent interests are at stake, in the manner of revealed preferences. As 
the outline of domination above shows, it is possible that people do not 
participate because they have other interests at stake that would be 
threatened by such participation. So, to repeat, sweatshop workers are 
unlikely to complain to auditors if they know their managers will be aware 
who has made particular complaints.
Finally, Cohen and Sabel’s approach is closer to Nagel’s in that it seems 
to accept that decision making authorities may appear as a result of 
various historical and practical contingencies228. I find this approach 
attractive partly because it is pragmatic. Like Nagel’s political approach to 
the state, it avoids attaching ultimate value to the associations or 
relationships in which people find themselves, and instead asks what kind 
of standards can be used to assess those relationships. In contrast to 
Nagel, though, it extends that question to non-state relationships. Of 
course, as we have seen, I do not find Cohen and Sabel’s deliberative 
polyarchy model very convincing as an account of the content of the 
standards. However, the point I want to emphasise here is that they take
228 Cohen and Sabel claim that there is an increasing number of rule- 
making bodies at the global level and that these bodies make rules that 
are consequential for individuals, associations and states. However, 
these claims are starting points for their discussion: they do not aim to 
discuss the origins of the rule-making bodies.
a more pragmatic approach to the question of where particular decision 
making authorities come from, but also focus on the possibility that those 
authorities themselves might be held to more demanding procedural and 
substantive standards.
To illustrate briefly: employers are not democratically elected, but it is 
generally accepted that they have -  and in practice need -  some 
authority to make decisions about who to employ and when to dismiss 
workers. This is not to say that they should be given the power to make 
such decisions in an entirely arbitrary way, though. When an employer 
announces an intention to dismiss a particular worker, the worker has a 
claim to be shown that this decision is not merely arbitrary, but takes 
account of the possibility that she may be highly dependent on the 
income her job generates.
With regard to the question of how to include people in decision making 
processes, I would advocate a form of contestation in which people who 
are subject to domination have a right to take part in a process designed 
to provide solutions that take their basic interests into account229. The 
actual content of this process might be described as substantive 
minimalism. This approach is based on a claim that contestation by 
people subject to domination should require those in a position to 
dominate to show that their actions do in fact take the basic interests of 
those affected by their decisions into account. However, it aims to avoid 
specifying the content of those basic interests beyond the outline 
provided above. The view is thus substantive because it requires 
participants to justify their claims with regard to a general substantive 
conception of basic interests, but is minimalist in the sense that it avoids 
specifying what those basic interests actually are in any given case. I 
have four main arguments to make in defence of this approach. The first
229 The approach I advocate might usefully be contrasted with Rainer 
Forst’s proposal for a qualified veto right for the worst off (see Forst, 
2001). Although is has some appeal, Forst’s proposal has two major 
shortcomings. First, he does not provide any clear criteria for identifying 
who the worst off actually are. Second, a standard objection to veto rights 
is that they favour the status quo and make it more difficult for states to 
act to alleviate injustices (see Van Parijs, 1999, for a version of this 
objection).
two attempt to respond to the claim that substantive approaches 
effectively second guess democratic procedures. The third responds to a 
criticism of a veto-based version of contestation. The fourth makes a 
strategic point about the costs of deliberative processes.
First, it is often argued that substantive approaches hand decision making 
power to courts and similar authorities. It is likely that some sort of 
authoritative site of appeal will be needed in the kinds of cases discussed 
here: institutions like the WTO and the ILO do provide some forms of 
dispute settlement. However, as Shapiro stresses, it is far from clear that 
judges and other officials are always best placed to make detailed 
decisions on the best solutions230. As many of the authors in the 
sweatshop literature point out, workers are likely to be well placed to 
know about the dangerous working conditions they may face, the effects 
of inadequate wages, or the problems that result from having to work 
excessively long hours. As a result, there is a case to be made for 
participation that can then be judged according to whether it continues to 
involve obvious forms of domination.
Second, even if authorities do apply substantive standards in a case, the 
risk that they will do so without genuine attention to the interests at stake 
is sufficient to justify the demand that they actually explain why they have 
taken particular decisions. Keeping the substantive content of the 
standards they apply to a minimum is one way to ensure that this actually 
happens. For example, if an authority were to decide against an 
employee who demands prayer facilities at work, the court might be 
required to show why that employee’s religion does not demand that 
people pray during working hours.
230 “[Even] when basic interests are threatened, it is far from self-evident 
that governments are well placed to do much about it. This is one reason 
to press for deliberative solutions when they can be successful” (Shapiro, 
2003, p. 46). Compare also Barry, who argues that even if courts cannot 
always determine the content of particular conflicting interests, they might 
still insist that disputes about those interests be settled according to 
minimal procedural standards. In the case of excommunication, it could 
be required that “courts be prepared to adjudicate challenges to the 
church’s procedures or its fidelity to them in the case at hand” (Barry, 
2001, p. 154).
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Third, it can be argued that veto rights are particularly problematic when 
people are involved in reciprocal relationships, such as the relationship 
between fellow employees. A veto right against an employer who has to 
dismiss employees in order to save an ailing company has potential to 
cause major problems. The right to veto any individual dismissal is not 
helpful if it results in the entire company collapsing. A more open-ended, 
contestatory approach may be preferable if it compels the employer to 
show how different interests were taken into account.
Finally, contestation can often have significant costs for those involved. 
To some extent, this might be useful if it provides an incentive for 
authorities to get their decisions broadly right the first time round. An 
employer who faces the potential threat of contestation when deciding 
who to dismiss may be compelled to find better ways of making the 
savings. It is worth adding that employees will also face costs in such 
processes: taking part in an arbitration procedure is doubtless time- 
consuming and expensive. However, the effect of encouraging decision 
makers to get their decisions right in the first place might be strengthened 
if they have to bear the costs of the weaker party’s participation. In 
practice, this might mean for example that employers would have to 
continue to pay employees who contested a particular decision until the 
process was resolved. This is more likely to be viable if limits are placed 
on employees’ rights to contest a given decision: domination as defined 
above can be used to provide the criteria for this kind of decision.
In conclusion to this chapter, I have provided an account of domination 
that is intended for use as a way of deciding who has genuinely 
significant interests at stake in a particular decision. I argued that lack of 
exit options leaves people vulnerable to arbitrary reductions in their 
capacity to vindicate their basic interests. I do not think any of the 
previous views I looked at provided a compelling account of these kinds 
of interests. Dryzek tended to celebrate the supposed lack of constraints 
on global civil society actors without acknowledging that their actions and 
campaigns can have severe effects on people. I would argue that if a civil 
society group campaigning against child labour succeeds in getting a 
blanket ban on child labour in a given country, but only at the expense of
the welfare of the children, it is guilty of a form of domination. Nagel’s 
approach ignores the possibility that domination might occur outside the 
state. The state is one form of association through which people can 
secure the goods they need to vindicate their basic interests. The state’s 
capacity to control those goods means it also has the potential to 
dominate people. However, this does not mean that other agents cannot 
be in a similar position, particularly when the state itself is weak. This 
point is absent from Nagel’s argument. Held’s account focuses on 
substantive equality as a precondition for democracy. A case could be 
made that substantive equality is also a way of preventing domination: if 
all have the same resources, none is in a position to dominate the others. 
Providing for such equality is likely to require strong redistributive 
institutions, as Held acknowledges. Yet this is something we obviously 
lack at the global level. My approach is intended to show that it may be 
possible to alleviate domination even in the absence of strong substantive 
equality, but that this requires careful attention to the way domination can 
occur in different contexts. Furthermore, alleviating domination may work 
against the participation that forms the centre of Held’s cosmopolitan 
democracy. Finally, Cohen and Sabel take a more pragmatic approach to 
the existence of decision making authorities that I suggested may have 
some appeal. However, it only does so in the presence of strong moral 
criteria by which to judge the decisions of those institutions. I argued that 
a clearer understanding of domination is a better source of such criteria 
than deliberative polyarchy.
As a final point, Elliott and Freeman provide an example that can be used 
to provide a useful illustration of the general approach I advocate. They 
refer to a campaign against child labour in Bangladesh:
Whatever the motivation of the activists, globalization enthusiasts 
point to the firing of children by Bangladeshi garment 
manufacturers in the early 1990s as evidence of how campaigns 
can have unintended consequences. But this was not the intent of 
the activists, and their critics either do not know or ignore the part 
of the story in which the activists kept the pressure on until the
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manufacturers agreed to work with the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and UNICEF to build schools and rehabilitate 
the children...Indeed [other campaigns] have resulted in similar 
multistakeholder initiatives (Elliott and Freeman, 2003, p. 128).
How does this illustrate the points made in this chapter? First, the 
activists involved in this particular case came to recognise the need to 
provide exit options for the children: they continued their campaign until 
the children had access to welfare and education231. They could thus be 
said to have avoided the charge of domination outlined above. Second, 
the activists were not democratically appointed but nevertheless were in a 
position of influence over the workers and their employers. However, they 
were nevertheless able to recognise the moral significance of their 
actions and adapt their campaign as a result. This relates to the 
pragmatic point made above: the decision makers were the activists in 
this case, but they responded to the effects of their own campaign. This 
suggests that the criteria of domination do not always require institutions 
in order to make moral sense. The activists were able to recognise what 
happened and alter their behaviour even in the absence of courts or other 
authorities to judge what had happened. Nevertheless, I think the case 
also shows how people can find themselves in an ongoing and even 
institutional relationship as a result of their actions. This case is more 
institutionally dense than Nagel’s minimal humanitarianism, even if it is 
less dense than the relationship between citizens of the same state. The 
point here is that while people can find themselves to be in morally 
demanding institutional relationships, I do not see why they also always 
need institutions to judge those relationships. Third, this case suggests 
that it is possible to alleviate at least some forms of domination even in
231 I think the case also undermines Miller’s criticism of global civil society 
(referred to in the chapter on Dryzek) to some extent. Miller suggests that 
global civil society actors are not bound by the same ties of reciprocity as 
fellow citizens, and that this undermines responsibility. However, this 
case suggests that responsible action is possible: if Miller is claiming that 
responsibility is only possible within bounded communities, he is 
overstating his case.
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the absence of strong substantive equality. Careful attention to the way 
control of one resource can be used to reduce access to another 
resource is necessary, but this does seem to be what the activists in this 
case provided. Of course, this is not to say that a world in which such 
domination is possible is more attractive than a more substantively 
egalitarian situation. However, it does show that intermediate possibilities 
for the alleviation of domination do exist.
Although the example used provides some support for the arguments 
about domination made here, it would be fantastically optimistic to 
generalise too far from this particular case. It is unlikely that all 
campaigns meet these standards, and there are other institutions that 
lack the moral motivation that presumably prompted these groups to act 
in the first place. The arguments I have made here do have broader 
institutional implications though, which I want to develop in the next 
chapter.
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Seven. Domination and International Labour 
Standards: Institutional Proposals
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Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to consider ways in which a specific existing 
institution might do more to alleviate domination of the kind described in 
the previous chapter. Before looking at the argument I want to develop, I 
want to pause to consider a couple of institutional alternatives. Bhagwati 
raises these possibilities as alternative ways of understanding the role of 
the ILO in relation to other institutions, before describing his own 
approach. The first is more obviously cosmopolitan, based on an 
ambitious expansion of existing institutions. The second is state-based, 
following the path of encouraging states to enforce high labour standards 
against one another. The third is a hybrid approach: giving states more 
capacity to set their own labour standards, but also enabling international 
institutions to assist in the implementation and enforcement of those 
standards. I find the general conclusions he draws convincing, although 
they can be further developed in line with the proposals for alleviating 
domination referred to in the previous chapter.
I) Defining Cosmopolitan Institutions
One of the key claims of institutional cosmopolitans like Held and Caney 
is that a range of robust institutions is needed at the supra-state level.
240
They argue that these institutions are needed to deal with problems 
states cannot address unilaterally, to deal with inter-state problems that 
result when states exercise their power in various legitimate and 
illegitimate ways, and to pressure states that are internally illegitimate to 
improve their domestic behaviour. These cosmopolitan institutions have 
three main features. First, they would have global, ultimate control over 
functionally defined policy areas. Second, they would be subject to some 
kind of direct democratic control. Third, they would have some sort of 
(possibly last-resort) coercive power. Although there are many 
international institutions that might fulfil some of these criteria232, it is hard 
to think of any that fulfil all of them. Assuming that these institutions are 
both necessary and attractive raises the question of how we might 
progress from the current situation to one in which genuinely 
cosmopolitan institutions actually exist and function233.
Bhagwati rejects two possibilities. The first is for existing institutions like 
the WTO to widen their mandates and begin to act more like states, 
covering a range of issues such as human rights, the environment, labour 
standards and so on234. Part of the justification for this is that these 
institutions already have some coercive capacity. The WTO can impose 
trade sanctions, for example, and partly for this reason, Elliott and 
Freeman advocate the use of sanctions by the WTO to enforce labour 
standards when such violations are relevant to trade issues. The second
232 For example, both the UN and NATO have used military intervention 
justified in terms of protecting human rights. They both have some 
capacity for coercion, but since two different agencies are both capable of 
intervening in this policy area, it is clear that neither of them has exclusive 
or ultimate control. See Hurrell, 2008, p. 63-4. The same could be said of 
economic institutions like the WTO and World Bank.
233 Nagel raises this question in a forceful and morally troubling manner 
when he argues that there are no standards of justice to which we can 
hold institutions that are not states. His own view is that any such 
transition is likely to involve a period of illegitimate and unjust behaviour 
on the part of international institutions.
234 A further reason to reject this approach is Thomas Carothers 
argument about sequencing. Carothers’ argues that strengthening 
undemocratic state institutions at the domestic level has not generally led 
to democratisation and may have consolidated the position of 
authoritarian rulers (Carothers, 2007).
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is for individual states to broaden their mandates in a similar way, passing 
more substantive judgements on the failures of other states to meet their 
own domestic standards and possibly intervening to correct those 
failures.
Bhagwati rejects the first possibility for two main reasons. First, he argues 
that there is a real danger that powerful states will use regulations on 
issues such as labour standards as an excuse to impose protectionist 
barriers on cheaper goods from countries with lower production costs235. 
Weaker states are less able to do this because they cannot retaliate 
against such decisions, for example by withdrawing development aid. The 
fact that issues such as labour standards are generally broadly defined at 
the global level in order to achieve moral consensus makes this more 
likely to occur in practice236. Second, the WTO is itself badly suited to 
expand its mandate, partly because it is not well funded enough and 
partly because it is a specialised institution with limited knowledge of 
other policy areas237. While some critics point to the expansion of the 
WTO mandate into intellectual property (TRIPs) and other areas, as a 
sign that the organization should also play a more active role in promoting
235 For further arguments against the use of the WTO to enforce labour 
standards, see Maskus (2004) and Srinivasan (2004). Maskus expresses 
doubts about whether the WTO could restrict resort to protection through 
its article XX clauses, or whether expansion of labour rights sanctions into 
non-trade areas could be prevented (Maskus, 2004, p. 502). Srinivasan 
observes that Elliott and Freeman base their case for WTO enforcement 
on the US incorporation of labour standards in its Generalised System of 
Preference (GSP) trade agreements. He argues that this is of doubtful 
relevance because it relates to bilateral agreements between the 
powerful US and not to multilateral agreements in the WTO.
So Bhagwati points out that various studies have argued that the US 
violates freedom of association with its current labour laws. He suggests 
the main reason this is not used by other states as an excuse for 
protectionist regulation is the threat of retaliation in other areas 
(Bhagwati, 2004, p. 245).
Amrita Narlikar makes the same arguments against expanding the 
mandate of the WTO, and adds two further points. First, states are 
unlikely to accept the further restrictions of their capacity to determine 
their own policies that would result if the WTO were expanded. Second, 
the predecessor to the WTO, the ITO, did attempt to deal with a wider 
range of issues, but collapsed because it could not reconcile the many 
different interests that were involved (Narlikar, 2005, p. 131-2).
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labour standards and other social issues, others respond that even the 
expansion into intellectual property was a mistake238. Similar claims can 
be levelled at the other major international financial institutions, which are 
often accused of pursuing trade and economic liberalization at all 
costs239.
The other alternative is that individual states could hold other states to the 
domestic standards that they already have in place, so if India violates 
Indian labour standards, the USA or Britain would have standing to refuse 
to trade with it240. The four main objections to this are as follows. First, 
domestic trade unions in countries like the US have pressured less 
developed countries to raise their standards, but it can be argued that 
they do so partly out of protectionist motives. Second, revisions of 
domestic standards are at least in part necessary due to changes in 
circumstance and difference in context. This flexibility would be lost if 
other states had an incentive to ensure states maintained standards at 
present levels. Third, Bhagwati argues that countries such as India have 
put in place very high labour standards that they cannot and do not intend 
to enforce, partly in order to appease various domestic groups. Finally, it 
can be argued that any attempt to monitor domestic standards by other
238 “[One] can argue that introducing intellectual property rights into the 
WTO was a mistake in terms of its imbalance of benefits and of the 
questionable relationship to trade in the context of deep standards” 
(Maskus, 2004, p. 500). See also Narlikar, who refers to the problems 
developing countries face in implementing standards that mainly serve 
the interests of developed countries (Narlikar, 2005, p. 83-4).
239 Held advocates broadening the economic agenda of the WTO and 
other international financial institutions, suggesting that they,
[need] to move their agenda away from a narrow set of policies 
concerned with market creation and supervision to a broader 
range of policies which encourage different national economic 
systems to flourish within a fair and equitable rule-based global 
market order (Held, 2004, p. 53).
It is not clear if this involves extension into areas such as social policy, 
but Bhagwati and Narlikar would resist such moves.
240 This is different from current practices, in which individual states and 
regional bodies refuse to trade with countries on the grounds that goods 
from those countries do not meet their own standards. Examples include 
the EU ban on US beef imports on health grounds and the US ban on 
Mexican tuna due to failure to use dolphin friendly nets. The WTO judged 
both bans to be illegal (Woods and Narlikar, 2001, pp. 571-2).
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states is likely to be seen as partisan and biased, especially considering 
that alleged violations of domestic standards can be used as a cover for 
protectionism.
II) Bhagwati's Approach
If these two possibilities -  expanding existing institutions or encouraging 
states to act in a more cosmopolitan fashion -  are rejected on the 
grounds given, what is Bhagwati’s preferred approach? Broadly speaking, 
he argues that independent institutions like the ILO should play a greater 
role in negotiating and monitoring the domestic standards that states 
set241. Once the ILO negotiates such standards, they can then be 
adopted by states242. There are two main advantages of this approach
241 This approach in some respects resembles the practice of requiring 
heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) to produce poverty reduction 
strategy papers (PRSPs) that the IMF and World Bank have jointly 
instigated. This practice originally envisaged broad participation in 
producing nationally owned strategies. Two shortcomings have been 
noted, though. First, “in many cases the ideal of ensuring local 
participation in planning poverty reduction has given way to the urgent 
need to disburse debt relief. Hence a large number of countries have 
adopted a blueprint PRSP rather than instigated the kinds of participatory 
processes envisaged” (Woods and Narlikar, 2001, p. 575). Second, “the 
world bank has published a voluminous sourcebook on how to write the 
plans. Borrowing governments know very well that unless plans are in 
keeping with the model they will not be acceptable to the funders” 
(Thomas and Reader, 2005, p. 90). One possible remedy for these 
defects could be to increase ILO involvement in writing such strategies, at 
least in relation to areas relevant to the ILO’s mandate.
242 This proposal resembles Cohen and Sabel’s claim that member states 
of international regimes are
[Agreeing] to remake their rules, in domain after domain, in light of 
the efforts of all the others to reconcile their distinctive regulations 
with general standards in whose determination they participate and 
that are assumed to be attentive to the interests of others 
elsewhere (Cohen and Sabel, 2006b, p. 786).
It is important to stress two significant differences, though. First, Bhagwati 
is much clearer in his insistence that states adopt such standards through 
internally legitimate procedures, and that the states must themselves be 
democratic. Second, the ILO is a tripartite organisation that includes 
representatives from business and labour unions, so it has a degree of 
independence from state influence.
over the two alternatives outlined above. First, it allows for greater 
flexibility in the determination of standards than any attempt to strengthen 
an institution like the WTO would. The concern with that proposal is partly 
that setting standards very high or very vaguely at the outset will make 
poorer countries subject either to sanctions or intervention from wealthier 
or more powerful ones. Secondly, in comparison to letting states monitor 
one another directly, it reduces the likelihood that local standards will be 
used in a partisan way by other states to justify sanctions or intervention. 
Given these two advantages, I believe this is the approach that deserves 
further elaboration in the terms of the theory of domination I have already 
outlined243. Before proceeding, though, I want to stress that I would not 
endorse the claim that the ILO is adequate to perform the functions 
outlined below in its present form244. The proposals set out below are, I 
believe, broadly in line with the ILO’s existing objectives and practices, 
but would involve extension of its powers in some areas245.
243 Similar arguments for the use of the ILO as the most appropriate 
international institution to promote labour standards can be found in 
Maskus and Srinivasan. Maskus argues that the WTO should have 
greater power to approve multilateral sanctions of egregious violations of 
core standards, “analogous to the sanctioning power of multilateral 
environmental agreements” (Maskus, 2004, p. 502). Srinivasan argues 
that the ILO’s present enforcement capacities are adequate (Srinivasan, 
2004, p. 514). This argument does neglect the problem that many 
member governments of the ILO are not democratic and have various 
reasons to resist the implementation of standards that would serve the 
interests of their own citizens. Maskus makes this point: “Where 
governance is weak and corruption is rife, all manner of efficient 
regulation [including labour standards] can be stifled in the name of 
‘enterprise’, where that is a euphemism for monopoly” (Maskus, 2004, p. 
499).
244 Some sceptics see the emphasis on the ILO in its present form as the 
appropriate organization to deal with labour standards among free trade 
enthusiasts as a way to avoid raising labour standards at all: “calls to rely 
exclusively on the ILO, as in the WTO’s 1996 Singapore ministerial 
commuique, without increasing the ILO’s capacity to act, could simply be 
a way to preserve low standards without directly saying so” (Elliott and 
Freeman, 2004, p. 532).
245 Elliott and Freeman note in a paper published after their book on 
labour standards that lack of local enforcement of existing legal standards 
is often a problem:
[Many] developing country governments, even though they ratify
ILO conventions and pass labour laws that sometime exceed rich
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The first possibility is to prevent domination by providing better exit 
options to those at risk. In the case of labour standards, the main priority 
is to provide alternative means for people to access the resources they 
need to vindicate their basic interests. There are two rationales for this. 
First, providing exit options reduces the likelihood that workers are reliant 
on their employers as the sole source of income, and thus that employers 
can impose otherwise unacceptable working conditions on them. David 
Miller describes an international corporation setting up a nuclear 
reprocessing plant in a developing country with safety standards that are 
lower than those in the developed world. As Miller notes,
[Given] the levels of unemployment prevalent in many poor 
countries, those who sign up with the corporation are likely to be 
desperate to earn wages and therefore willing to take on these 
jobs despite the health and other risks they pose (Miller, 1999, p. 
206)246.
Miller is (unwittingly) describing a form of domination here: the workers 
lack of income is used to impose lower standards than would be accepted 
in developed countries.
Second, the presence of viable exit options may lead to competition that 
ultimately compels employers in different sectors to improve their 
standards. It is important to distinguish different ways of developing this 
approach, though. One interpretation of Wolfs arguments suggests that
country standards, often do not comply with their own standards, 
for a number of reasons. We noted that in some cases, 
governments lack the political will to stand up to powerful private 
interests, and that in others dictatorial regimes oppose 
independent political power. In yet other cases, lack of financial 
and technical capacity prevents effective enforcement. We focused 
on the supply of standards in the private sector as a means of 
supplementing or complementing government efforts where 
capacity is weak (Elliott and Freeman, 2004, p. 534).
The approach described below focuses more directly on developing a 
range of relevant local capacities, both governmental and non­
governmental.
246 Miller uses the term “exploitation” to describe the situation of the 
workers in his example, although he tries to distinguish this from the 
Marxist theory of exploitation based on the value of labour. For a 
discussion of the Marxist theory, see Roemer (1995).
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he believes that competition alone should be used to raise standards and 
wages (see Wolf, 2004, pp. 236 and 240)247. The problem with this 
approach is that Wolf seems to focus on comparisons with other workers 
in the same countries, rather than on the establishment of a minimum 
baseline for standards. While some of the improvements in wages and 
standards that Wolf cites seem impressive, and may on an optimistic 
interpretation be viewed as part of an upward trend, it is important to note 
that even a very large improvement in wages or standards for the very 
poorest people may not yet bring them above the threshold of sufficiency 
for an adequate or decent life.
A more ambitious version of the same proposal would focus on 
competition that might occur once a minimum baseline has been set. So, 
in Miller’s case, the owners of the reprocessing plant might be compelled 
to offer better safety conditions and protection for their workers if those 
workers already have a meaningful choice about working at the plant. 
This meaningful choice would itself be based on the availability of other 
jobs that meet a minimum standard for wages and working conditions, not 
merely on comparison with the only other alternatives available.
Ill) The ILO and Exit Options
There are three main ways in which the ILO might work to promote better 
provision of the kinds of exit options I am advocating here. The first two 
are quite closely connected to the ILO’s existing mandate and practices. 
The third extends into areas that are not currently seen as core ILO 
priorities.
The first priority is the improvement and extension of social security and 
welfare provision. The ILO estimates that only 20 percent of the world’s 
population has adequate access to social security and that more than half
247 See also Moran (2002, 2003) for a version of the claim that labour 
standards can be set by competition among employers to provide better 
voluntary standards. For a sceptical view of this argument, see Lipschutz 
(2004).
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of people have no access to social security at all248. From the point of 
view of domination, this situation is troubling because people who do not 
have access to adequate social security are more directly dependent on 
their employers and the job market for the resources they need if they or 
their dependents are to live a decent or successful life. Provision of social 
security in areas like health care means that workers are less directly 
dependent on their employers and thus less vulnerable to domination. 
Similarly, provision of unemployment benefit means workers have more 
viable exit options from abusive and exploitative working conditions.
The ILO currently provides assistance on the design and implementation 
of domestic social security schemes through its Social Security 
Department. There appears to be emphasis on a range of different 
possible ways of providing social security, as indicated by references to 
both national and community level social security programmes249. This is 
broadly consistent with Miller’s observation that there are several ways in 
which welfare can be delivered:
It does not matter, from this perspective, whether the institutions 
and policies in question are formally integrated into the state, as 
they are in some countries, or whether they are partly located in 
civil society, for instance, when employers and/or trade unions 
provide employees with health insurance or unemployment 
benefits on terms laid down by the government (Miller, 2003, p. 
95).
It can be argued, though, that these differences do matter for two 
reasons. First, differences in the political and social cultures and in the 
level of development of different countries may mean that private or civil 
society provision of social security is more appropriate, and it thus makes 
sense to pay attention to the full range of possibilities for provision if we 
want to ensure wider coverage. Secondly, from the perspective of
248 See ILO, http://www.ilo.org/Qlobal/Themes/lanq--en/index.htm. 
accessed 2nd January 2009.
249 See http://www.ilo.ora/alobal/Themes/Social Securitv/lana- 
en/index.htm. accessed 2nd January 2009.
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domination, it may make sense to focus on providing a range of sources 
of welfare in order to provide people with better exit options. For example, 
exclusive state provision of welfare may lead to clientelism. Similarly, 
employer provision of health insurance may leave employees vulnerable 
if they are dismissed from their jobs and lose the benefits the job 
provides. In general, the ILO’s focus on a range of possible ways of 
providing social security seems appropriate from the perspective of 
preventing domination.
A second contribution the ILO can make to the prevention of domination 
is through provision of training and skills development. The rationale here 
is that providing people with a range of work skills can reduce their 
dependency on a single source of income and resources, and thus 
reduce their vulnerability to domination. There is particular emphasis on 
the importance of these programmes for women and disabled people in 
developing countries. This is because these groups have often lacked 
some of the basic skills needed to seek employment. It has been argued 
that this situation has contributed to the low social standing of these 
groups, and that provision of better employment prospects can be an 
important factor in their liberation250.
This area is dealt with through the Skills and Employability Department of 
the ILO. It is worth noting that the department places emphasis on the 
development of both state and non-state based programmes of training 
and skills development. Again, sensitivity to local conditions is important 
here, and a focus on local level programmes seems to form an important 
part of the department’s work. Furthermore, there is also a link to micro- 
credit agencies which allow people with new skills to set up businesses: 
this is an area that is not directly within the ILOs mandate, but shows a 
need for co-operation across different agencies.
The third area the ILO can focus on to reduce domination is the openness 
of labour markets and the variety of jobs available in developing 
countries. Again, the rationale in terms of reducing domination is fairly 
simple: provision of a wider range of job opportunities reduces the
250 See, for example, Sen, 1999, p. 115-6.
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chances that workers are dependent on a single employer for the 
resources needed to vindicate their basic interests. This question raises 
the broader issue of foreign direct investment and the best way to ensure 
a diverse and varied labour market. One standard view is that foreign 
direct investment is a form of exploitation of very poor countries -  that 
outside investors such as multi-national companies exploit the low labour 
and wage standards of developing countries in order to increase profits. 
Both Martin Wolf and Theodore Moran dispute this claim. Wolf points out 
that most foreign direct investment continues to flow to developed 
countries that are politically stable and have effective state institutions, 
skilled workers and large markets251. Furthermore, poorer countries that 
share these features attract more investment than poorer countries that 
do not.
There are two important areas in which this argument about investment 
needs further elaboration. First, Moran argues that the attempt by some 
developing countries to attract foreign investors and employers by 
focusing on low skilled work and export processing zones with weak 
labour standards has generally been misguided and is being changed:
Overall, the idea of trying to use a large unskilled labour pool with 
low wages and no employment alternatives to attract FDI has 
given way to a recognition that investment promotion has been far 
more successful in countries and regions where educational 
institutions produce a literate, semi-skilled and trainable workforce. 
In Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and the Philippines, 
vigorous secondary education and vocational training programmes
251 See also Maskus (2004) and Kucera (2004), both of whom dispute the 
claim that strong labour standards discourage foreign direct investment. 
Maskus refers to evidence that “recognition and enforcement of the core 
labour standards...are more likely than not to improve productivity and 
export performance for developing countries” (Maskus, 2004, p. 498). 
Kucera cites a sophisticated study that asked managers of multinational 
corporations to rank a set of FDI criteria in order of importance. The 
results indicated that although labour rights might be associated with 
higher labour costs, this was offset by other benefits: “Thus, stronger 
trade union rights might be associated with no less or even more foreign 
direct investment, even if they lead to higher labour costs” (Kucera, 2004, 
p. 518).
have had a high payoff in pulling FDI in industries like 
electronics...alongside more traditional garment and footwear 
producers. The same has been true of Mexico (Moran, 2003, p. 
13)252.
The point here is that it is preferable for developing countries to try to 
attract a broader range of outside investment, and that repressing 
workers and limiting their access to training and education is a very bad 
way to do this. Again, I would stress that developing a range of 
employment opportunities is also relevant to limiting domination, for the 
reasons outlined. Furthermore, Moran adds that attracting employers who 
need skilled workers can actually improve conditions, as employers begin 
to recognise the need to offer conditions that can draw these workers 
away from other jobs (Moran, 2003, p. 13). The quality of foreign 
investment is important as well as the quantity.
The other issue is that the very poorest developing countries often rely on 
natural resources to attract foreign investment, but that this reliance tends 
to make them more prone to corruption and authoritarian governments. 
The increasingly well-documented resource curse makes it more likely 
that one elite will control the countries in question, as in Nigeria where the 
top 2 per cent had the same income as the bottom 55 per cent in 2000 
(Wolf, 2004, p. 146). Furthermore, it makes it more difficult for these 
countries to pursue policies that might attract a diversity of industries and 
employment opportunities, as Wolf suggests:
A country that has specialised in natural-resource exports will find 
it correspondingly hard to shift into competitive manufactures as it 
must break into world markets after having already achieved quite 
high real wages and, correspondingly, must do so at relatively high 
levels of productivity (Wolf, 2004, p. 148).
252 Moran also argues that the perception that low labour standards are a 
good way to attract investors is more damaging to workers’ rights than 
the reality. Although some countries have carried out very repressive 
policies, for example against trade unions, Moran cites evidence from two 
sources that suggest that there is little evidence to link low labour 
standards to foreign investment.
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Again, this makes the risk of domination higher if it means moce-people 
rely on a small range of employers and industries as their main sources 
of income253.
Economic policies and conditions can thus play an important indirect role 
in attracting the diversity and quality of employment opportunities that can 
play a role in reducing the risk of domination. Unlike the previous 
examples, these policies are not a central part of the ILO’s mandate or 
expertise. Nevertheless, they are relevant to its broad concerns with 
promoting decent work and sustainable development. As a result, the ILO 
has an interest in encouraging both states and international institutions 
with more direct economic responsibilities to find ways to follow these 
policies. I have also argued that the policies are relevant to the attempt to 
prevent domination. In terms of the current ILO priorities, these issues 
might be pursued through its programmes on decent work, economic and 
social development, and employment promotion.
There are thus at least three areas in which the ILO can work to prevent 
the kind of domination I have outlined. To some extent, the current 
priorities of the organisation already reflect possible ways of preventing 
domination. The organisation’s focus on welfare and social security 
reflects a need to ensure that people are not entirely reliant on any single 
source for the resources they need to vindicate their basic interests. This 
is justified in my view as a way of providing people with exit options. The 
ILO’s efforts in this area could thus be focused on ensuring that countries 
are more able to provide a range of social security provision, from local 
and community based initiatives to more traditional state forms of social
253 As Held notes, reliance on a small number of primary commodities by 
poorer countries has been a major obstacle to development in some of 
the poorest countries:
Fifty of the world’s poorest countries, in fact, depend for over half 
their export earnings on three or fewer primary commodities. 
Today, low and unstable prices for such commodities are a major 
factor hindering trade from working for many of them...For 
example, since 1997 coffee prices have fallen by over 70 per cent, 
costing developing country exporters some $8 billion in lost foreign 
exchange earnings and creating severe hardship for already 
vulnerable communities (Held, 2004, p. 40).
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security. Similarly, training and skills development reduces the likelihood 
that people will be entirely reliant on one source for their income and thus 
provides them with exit options. The ILO’s efforts in this area are thus to 
be encouraged and could be better funded and supported as a means of 
preventing domination. Finally, there are different economic policies that 
can do more to ensure that countries attract a diversity of employers, 
again reducing the dependency of employees on a single source of 
income. I have stressed that the ILO is best placed to co-operate with 
other agencies to ensure that developing countries pursue policies that 
attract a range of industries and develop a broader range of skills. This is 
a more obvious departure from the ILO’s current mandate and involves 
more direct co-operation with outside agencies. Nevertheless, since it is 
connected to the way employment opportunities can be used to mitigate 
domination, it is relevant to the ILO’s work254.
The main objection to these proposals is that it not immediately obvious 
what this has to do with democracy or encouraging participation. I have a 
couple of general responses to this criticism. First, the aim of this 
proposal is to alter institutional power relations in a way that limits the 
likelihood that they will involve domination. There are a number of 
different ways of doing this. As I noted in the previous chapter, one 
possibility is to pursue a strong policy of egalitarian redistribution. My 
worry is that without appropriate democratic control, this is itself a 
possible source of domination. A second way is to pursue more 
conventional forms of democratic equality. However, my discussion of 
Nagel and Held in the earlier chapters focused on the role of a limited 
form of political equality in a competitive electoral system. I argued that
254 See also Kucera’s comments on poverty reduction and its relationship 
to labour standards. Responding to Elliott and Freeman’s proposal that 
the WTO should be able to place trade sanctions on persistent violators 
of labour standards, Kucera concludes:
It should be emphasised...that poverty is an important determinant 
of forms of forced labour and child labour both...Therefore, if 
[Elliott and Freeman’s] proposed WTO system were to work 
similarly to the GSP system, one outcome could be further 
impoverishment of poor countries, giving rise to more poverty 
related labour standards violations, setting off a downward spiral 
(Kucera, 2004, p. 522).
the purpose of this form of equality is to prevent domination by the state. 
There are three reasons to doubt whether the same approach can be 
applied to other institutional relationships. First, there is the question of 
whether it is really feasible to pursue a system of political competition in 
smaller contexts such as employment relationships. Second, one reason 
for ensuring greater participation in state decisions is that, for most 
people, exit costs are almost by definition very high indeed. The state 
enforces most laws through coercion, which can be understood as an 
artificial way of limiting exit options. Similarly, for most people, emigration 
from their own country is difficult and expensive. Finally, it can be argued 
that states do not in practice require a high degree of democratic 
participation in areas in which it is feasible to provide exit options255. The 
aim of providing the exit options outlined above is to provide an 
alternative way of ensuring that people do not find themselves in 
institutional relationships in which they are vulnerable to domination. 
Second, it could be argued that provision of exit options contributes to a 
form of participation by putting people in a better bargaining position with 
regard to their employers.
Third, it is important to stress the focus on the quality of the options 
outlined above. I have argued that it is not enough that people should 
have exit options that are simply equivalent to their current situation, or 
even worse. It is not enough to argue that people working in a sweatshop 
can always go back to their gruelling former job as an agricultural
255 On the one hand, provision of goods such as food in a market based 
system does usually provide people with a range of different sources and 
is not subject to democratic demands. On the other, decisions about 
planning such as the construction of major roads generally do involve 
people for whom exit costs are high and they are thus subject to 
demands for greater participation. Shapiro describes some interesting 
intermediate cases such as health care and education provision in 
societies where some can afford to opt out of state provision but others 
cannot. He argues that we need to find ways to strengthen the position of 
those who cannot opt out (see Shapiro, 2003, p. 47). These cases are 
closest in character to the situation of workers in countries with weak 
welfare provision and limited job options.
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labourer256. In this regard, the ILO might criticise countries that pursue 
policies designed to attract employers offering large numbers of low- 
skilled jobs in narrowly defined industries when it is possible for those 
countries to try to attract a broader range of employers and job types. 
Similarly, exit options make more sense against a background in which 
workers have access to welfare provision that provides for their basic 
interests.
IV) The ILO and Voice
I have considered the provision of exit options first because in the case of 
labour standards and relations it is more obvious what can be done to 
mitigate domination by providing such options. In general, provision of 
exit options is possible through the means outlined above: states can do 
more to ensure that they provide welfare, training and a range of 
employment opportunities for their citizens. The ILO can help ensure that 
they do these things. In the first instance, it can do so through various 
forms of technical assistance, although it may also be necessary to 
compel them. In the interests of preventing domination, other states, 
international institutions and corporations are also bound to act in ways 
that make it possible for states to provide a better range of exit options. 
Provision of adequate exit options means workers are less likely to be 
compelled to take jobs with dangerous working conditions and unfair pay 
in order to provide for their most basic interests. It may indirectly raise 
labour standards by giving workers a more effective bargaining position. 
However, there are situations in which it may be difficult or impossible to 
offer adequate exit options to workers. The most obvious examples are 
poor countries that have difficulty attracting foreign investment. These 
countries may be at an early stage of development and thus have limited
256 Sometimes this suggestion is implied in arguments that poor people in 
developing countries are at least relatively better off than they would 
otherwise be. See, for example, Wolf, 2004, chapter 9. I would 
emphasise the importance of meeting an absolute minimum standard for 
welfare.
infrastructure to provide training or a range of alternative sources of 
employment257. They may be reliant on a limited range of natural 
resources, meaning they tend to rely on a narrow range of industries for 
their income. In these cases, it is much more difficult for states to provide 
an adequate range of exit options. This makes workers more vulnerable 
to domination, since they are more likely to be reliant on a single source 
of income. Furthermore, even in wealthier countries, differences in wealth 
and resources may make some workers more vulnerable to domination 
than others. The situation of migrant workers in the US referred to in the 
previous chapter is one example of this. In these situations, it is 
necessary to focus on the way voice -  or participation -  can be used to 
mitigate domination. I want to look at several ways the ILO can work to 
improve the situation of workers who have limited exit options.
One of the core priorities of the ILO is the promotion and protection of 
freedom of association. As several authors point out, basic freedom of 
association is one of the more obvious tools workers need in order to 
draw attention to issues such as violation of labour standards or 
mistreatment by employers258. The most serious violations of freedom of 
association also amount to violations of more basic human rights or moral 
standards. The murders of trade union activists in Colombia259 and the 
violent attacks on strikers and union activists in Bangladesh260 are 
examples of this kind of case. In this situation, the ILO has a mandate
257 Moran refers to a range of different countries, from Madagascar, which 
comes fairly low on the UNDP’s Human Development Index rankings 
(143rd of 177) to mid-table countries such as the Philippines (90th of 
177). See UNDP,
http://hdrstats.undp.ora/countries/countrv fact sheets/ctv fs PHL.html. 
accessed January 5, 2009.
258 See for example Young, 2006, p. 108-9, Elliott and Freeman, 2003, 
chapter 5, and Bhagwati, 2004, p. 245-6.
259 According to Freedom House, 60 per cent of killings of trade union 
activists take place in Colombia. Until recently, there was a high rate of 
impunity for these killings, although pressure from the US and the ILO 
has led the Colombian government to be more active in seeking 
prosecutions. See Freedom House,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?paae=22&countrv=7373&vea
r=2008. accessed 6th January 2009.
260 See ILO, 2008, p. 59.
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and even moral duty to try to prevent these violations. These types of 
violation are of concern to other institutions from the UN and other states 
to activists in NGO groups. Up to now, the ILO has only used its 
enforcement powers against very obvious violations of its conventions 
against forced labour in Burma, and was not able to encourage other 
international institutions to co-operate in its enforcement (see Elliott and 
Freeman, 2003, p. 106). It did, however, indirectly encourage various 
clothing manufacturers to stop their operations in the country via a human 
rights campaign. In general, the lesson here is that it may be best to 
focus on the way some violations of specific aspects of freedom of 
association cross over into the moral concerns of other institutions and 
organisations. Even if the ILO itself is not powerful enough to enforce its 
conventions, it can pass on information about violations that cross over 
into broader moral concerns about the way states treat their citizens and 
employers treat their workers. The ILO could do more to publicise its 
findings when investigating cases such as the Bangladeshi strike, given 
that these are presumably of interest to institutions like the UN, as well as 
to groups such as Amnesty International.
This contrasts somewhat with the ILO’s current approach to promoting 
freedom of association, which, according to Elliott and Freeman has been 
focused on providing seminars on freedom of association and collective 
bargaining. Elliott and Freeman point out that he effectiveness of these 
seminars is hard to assess (Elliott and Freeman, 2003, p. 101). In 
contrast, a focus on specific violations of narrow rights might provide 
more obvious and tangible results, as well as providing cases for other 
international organisations and campaigners to latch onto.
The above discussion reflects a general concern with providing conditions 
in which workers in developing countries might have greater opportunity 
to advance their own concerns and interests. The standard criticism by 
globalisation enthusiasts of anti-globalisation movements is that they 
reflect the moral priorities and even the guilty consciences of wealthy 
westerners, rather than the genuine concerns of those in developing 
countries. These arguments tend to avoid the more difficult question of 
whether or how it is possible to provide more effective channels for the
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expression of the genuine concerns of developing country workers, 
however. I want to elaborate on two possible ways of doing this through 
the ILO.
The first is to provide a voucher based funding scheme for unions in 
developing countries. As defenders of unions often point out, many trade 
unions are both independent from states and business and internally 
democratic and answerable to their members. They often compare 
favourably with NGOs on these points (see, for example, Spooner, 2004, 
p. 8, although Spooner distinguishes between independent unions and 
state controlled ones such as the ACFTU). Part of the accountability of 
unions may result from the way these independent unions are funded 
through dues paid by their members. However, the poorest workers have 
limited funds to pay union dues, and in some of the lowest paid areas 
such as agriculture, unions are consequently poorly funded and 
organised (Spooner, 2004, p. 22). The aim of this proposal is to make 
unions in poorer countries more directly accountable to the poorest 
workers without requiring those workers to give up a substantial part of 
their wages, bearing in mind that many of the worst off workers already 
live at or below subsistence level. The basic proposal is that the poorest 
workers would be given vouchers that they could use to pay union dues, 
and the unions could then redeem these vouchers in the form of funding 
from the ILO. There are a number of qualifications and modifications that 
might be made to this basic scheme261, but it can be broadly defended 
along the following lines.
First, the explicit aim of the proposal is to provide a more effective voice 
for the poorest workers. These groups might be identified using the
261 The most obvious concern is that the scheme might result in client 
unions, as has been the case with unions in poorer Southern countries 
funded by wealthier Northern unions (Spooner, 2004, p. 6). This danger 
might be avoided in part by the ILO itself seeking a broad base of funding 
for the scheme. A second question is whether poor workers should have 
to spend the vouchers on unions -  it might be made possible for them to 
redeem them against other goods or services if they choose to. Third, 
there is a question about whether or how the funding could be gradually 
reduced if unions become more established and better able to support 
themselves. Fourth, there is a question about how to ensure that a range 
of possible unions is actually available for workers to choose between.
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criteria for domination already outlined, although other measures of 
deprivation could also be used. One frequent complaint in the literature 
on sweatshops and labour standards is that these groups rarely have an 
effective voice (see, for example, Elliott and Freeman, 2003, p. 69ff and 
Young, 2006, p. 128). Allowing workers themselves a greater opportunity 
to influence decisions about who represents them may alleviate this 
problem to some extent.
Second, the proposal insures that the decisions of the workers about who 
represents them have an impact on the funding of the unions in question. 
This gives those unions a stronger incentive to ensure that they 
demonstrate that they are effective in representing the interests of their 
constituents. It allows workers to discipline unions by withdrawing 
funding. It may also improve the standards of unions themselves if it 
encourages different unions in the same country to compete for funding. 
Third, the proposal is intended to establish unions that have a degree of 
independence from the state. One of the most frequent criticisms of the 
unions that do exist in developing and authoritarian countries is that they 
are state controlled and thus have limited scope to protest at the state’s 
actions. The most obvious example of this is the All China Federation of 
Trade Unions, which is accused of siding with the state and management 
in the most serious cases of worker complaints (see Elliott and Freeman, 
2003, p. 124, Spooner, 2004, p. 7). The proposal for funding by the ILO 
aims to get around this problem by providing unions with an independent 
source of support. It is worth noting that Larry Diamond advocates a 
similar approach in his discussion of broader concerns about promoting 
civil society in democratising countries: “My own view is that civil society 
organizations are likely to have more space to act independently and 
define their own agendas when their financial dependence is on foreign 
donors rather than their own government, especially when that 
international dependence is dispersed among a number of donors” 
(Diamond, 1999, p. 257)262.
262 Diamond also proposes matching of funds from local sources with 
funds from outside, so that for example each dollar raised locally by an 
NGO could be matched by ten dollars from international donors
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Fourthly, a frequent criticism of unions among both globalisation 
enthusiasts and authoritarian states is the concern that they will behave 
irresponsibly, promoting the interests of their narrow constituency at the 
expense of wider society (see for example, Wolf, 2004, p. 5, Bhagwati, 
2004, p. 176, Elliott and Freeman, 2003, p. 125)263. Basing funding of 
unions in the ILO provides a clear way to address these concerns. The 
ILO is a tripartite organisation, including representatives of states, 
employers and workers. As a result, there is scope for allowing state and 
employer representatives to bring complaints against unions that are felt 
to be acting irresponsibly. If these complaints are upheld, the ILO would 
be in a position to withhold funding from those unions. Despite this, the 
unions in question would still have a greater degree of independence 
from states than if they were directly state funded, as in the case of the 
ACFTU.
Fifthly, the proposal lends greater credibility to Bhagwati’s claims about 
setting domestic standards with the assistance of the ILO. If the ILO itself 
is able to encourage unions and civil society groups in developing 
countries, this may allow it to help set standards that are more directly 
representative of the interests of ordinary citizens, rather than of state 
delegates to the ILO.
This proposal is intended to demonstrate how it might be possible to use 
an existing institution like the ILO to provide a more effective voice for 
developing country workers. It is intended to give them a greater measure 
of control over the institutions that represent them, without requiring them
(Diamond, 1999, p. 258). This kind of scheme could be accommodated in 
the basic proposal set out here.
263 Maskus notes that some authoritarian governments worry that unions 
are a threat to their stability and their ability to benefit from rent-seeking 
and rent-sharing:
To governments in China, Myanmar, Indonesia and elsewhere, the 
spectre of the Solidarity Labour Movement in Poland in the early 
1980s still looms large. In this light, repression of labour rights is 
less about markets and productivity than it is about sustaining 
power in what might be considered, in a more open framework, 
illegitimate government institutions” (Maskus 2004, p. 499).
to directly bear the costs of setting up those institutions264. Despite the 
arguments that can be made in favour of this proposal, many 
authoritarian countries remain hostile to state independent unions. 
Furthermore, the proposal may be somewhat difficult and expensive to 
set up. It would probably be most likely to succeed through a process of 
experimentation with smaller countries in order to demonstrate its 
effectiveness to larger and more powerful states. These concerns 
suggest that we need a further intermediate way of promoting a more 
effective voice for developing country workers.
The ILO has a further possible role in this area, in that it could provide 
audits of both non-governmental systems for monitoring labour standards 
and of campaigns against sweatshops by NGOs. I will briefly examine 
these two possibilities.
Bhagwati places heavy emphasis on his argument that domestic labour 
standards in developing countries like India are at least partly subject to 
democratic determination (Bhagwati, 2004, pp 50-1). This argument 
neglects the fact that several countries with Export Processing Zones 
(where labour standards are generally lowered in order to attract outside 
investment) do not meet the Freedom House criteria for status as free, 
and in some cases are not even classed as electoral democracies265. 
There may be a case for developing democratic countries setting their 
own labour standards (and receiving technical assistance from the ILO to 
enforce and implement those standards when they are in place). This 
argument is much less plausible when applied to un-democratic and un- 
free countries, where workers are denied the right to organise and draw 
attention to the problems they face, though. Perhaps the best way in is to
264 It might also be added that most early trade unions and many unions 
today provide services such as health care and social security. If unions 
in developing countries are able to do this, it might again reduce 
domination by making workers less directly dependent on their 
employers.
265 Countries with export processing zones that are not electoral 
democracies include the UAE, which also prevents its workers from 
organizing, striking, or collectively bargaining. See 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template. cfm?paqe=22&vear=2008&countr 
v=7513. accessed 10th January 2009.
261
monitor and audit the non-governmental codes of conduct that outside 
investors sometimes bring to these countries. These investors probably 
have the most direct leverage over governments and employers in the 
countries in question, but are less directly threatening to the authority of 
those governments than anti-sweatshop campaigns. One example of the 
way this pressure can work in practice is a case where Reebok pressured 
Taiwanese owned factories to hold secret ballot elections of union 
representatives. Nevertheless, as O’Rourke and Elliott and Freeman 
emphasise, there is still a lack of credible monitoring of standards. This is 
where ILO audits are relevant. They could give more credibility to the 
better quality monitoring systems that some companies and employers 
use. At the same time, it can undermine the complacency of companies 
that deny problems simply because they use their own monitors. Because 
of the ILO’s tripartite structure, there is scope for union influence over the 
way these audits are carried out. The concerns about domination raised 
in the previous chapter suggest a framework for assessing the credibility 
of monitoring. It is important to consider carefully what workers have at 
stake if they raise problems and issues about standards in their 
workplace. Are they likely to be dismissed from employment if they raise 
issues with monitors? Is a negative monitoring report likely to result in a 
lost contract for an employer, leading to job losses for workers? Is there a 
threat that a rise in production costs will lower wages for workers? 
Considerations such as these arise from the vulnerability of workers who 
depend on their employment for the resources they need to vindicate 
their basic interests. Remedies might include providing anonymous help­
lines or websites for workers to report violations (Senser, 2002, refers to 
initiatives of this type that have been set up in China). Similarly, there 
may be a case for not making reports of violations of labour standards 
public immediately, since companies tend to react in knee-jerk fashion by 
cutting contracts with factories, rather than working to improve the 
situation. Perhaps a more effective strategy would be to use the threat of 
publicising the reports to pressure companies to improve standards. The 
point here is to look for ways of making worker participation possible 
without directly threatening other basic interests workers may have.
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Despite these possibilities, there are shortcomings to this approach. Most 
obviously, there is a concern that encouraging corporate codes of 
conduct and other non-governmental monitoring will crowd out more 
robust and effective labour standard enforcement, and act as a substitute 
for genuine freedom of association (Donfang, 2002, makes this point 
forcefully). Similarly, there is limited scope for workers themselves to set 
labour standards, or influence decisions about them. There is a worry that 
the standards offered reflect the priorities of employers and the influence 
of western consumers more than the interests of the workers themselves. 
Finally, it is observed that corporate codes have most influence on 
industries where outside investors play a major role. They tend to affect 
high profile, export oriented industries such as sporting goods 
manufacture, while leaving heavier industries untouched (see, for 
example, Elliott and Freeman, 2003, p. 131). For these reasons, it is 
important to emphasise that this proposal should be seen as a rather 
poor second best to the more robust suggestions about union funding 
made above. The aim of this weaker proposal is to find ways of ensuring 
that workers in authoritarian and un-democratic states are not left 
completely isolated.
A similar proposal could also be extended to global NGO campaigns 
against sweatshops. Here again, the ILO could monitor and audit 
campaigns to assess whether they include workers and ensure their 
basic interests are taken into account. The case of the Bangladeshi child 
labourers discussed at the end of the previous chapter could be an 
example of the kind of campaign that might get ILO approval, since the 
campaigners did make efforts to ensure that the children who lost their 
jobs had access to education and were not left destitute.266 The same 
concerns about “crowding out” of more robust and wide ranging attempts 
to improve labour standards still apply here, though. To some extent,
266 Elliott and Freeman suggest that the staid, bureaucratic image the ILO 
has may make it less threatening to authoritarian leaders and regimes. 
Although this may help the organization get a foothold in such regimes, 
the implementation of some of the suggestions here would involve an 
increase in the robustness and power of the ILO that could undermine 
this image in the long term.
these worries might be mitigated by the fact that unions and workers 
themselves do have some involvement in the ILO through its tripartite 
structure. They thus have at least some opportunity to identify campaigns 
that serve to suppress broader attempts to improve workers’ freedom of 
association and other rights. The auditing and monitoring process may 
also bring out common concerns between unions and campaigners and 
open the possibility for greater co-operation. Despite these points, it is still 
worth emphasising that these campaigns, and any ILO approval or 
support of them should be seen as a poor second to the more robust 
suggestions outlined above.
v) Summary
In conclusion, I have looked at a range of practical and policy proposals 
that are relevant to the ILO’s role in protecting workers. I have fitted these 
proposals into the framework for the analysis of domination that I set out 
in the previous chapter. Broadly speaking, the aim is to show how 
institutional arrangements can be structured to prevent or mitigate 
domination. In this case, providing workers with realistic and adequate 
exit options is one way to prevent their domination by employers. These 
exit options can be provided through welfare provision, training, and an 
open labour market. The ILO has a direct role to play in the first two 
options, providing technical assistance to countries so that they are better 
able to offer welfare and training to their citizens267. It has a less direct but 
important role in the third, by encouraging countries and the international
267 Bhagwati points out that funding for similar schemes ought to come 
from global economic institutions. As he puts it,
Poor countries typically can ill afford adjustment programs...So we 
need to think of institutional programs of adjustment assistance 
that can be domestically implemented but financed externally. The 
obvious candidate for this is the World Bank, which should put its 
money where its pro-globalization mouth is (Bhagwati, 2004,p. 
235).
Since the ILO has a stake in these programmes, there is a clear case for 
giving it some influence over the way they are implemented and 
assessed.
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economic institutions that influence them to adopt policies that ensure 
more open, diverse labour markets that can give workers more realistic 
exit options.
There is a range of situations in which the role of exit options is limited, 
though. Countries at lower levels of economic development are likely to 
lack the infrastructure to support diverse economies. Even in more 
developed countries, some workers are likely to find themselves in 
situations in which they rely on a single source of income, and are thus 
vulnerable to domination. In these cases, the most direct moral 
responsibility falls on employers, who are in a position to impose arbitrary 
reductions in people’s capacity to vindicate their basic interests. In the 
interests of preventing domination, employers are morally bound to show 
why changes in working conditions are not merely arbitrarily imposed. 
Workers have a claim to voice in the sense that they are entitled to 
demand that employers show that this is the case. I looked at some of the 
ways in which workers might actually be given more effective voice. First, 
attempts to prevent workers from organising often take the form of 
violations of other basic rights. In these cases, other agencies besides 
the ILO have relevant concerns and may have better capacity to 
intervene. The ILO has scope to work with other institutions such as the 
UN and human rights NGOs in cases of direct attacks on workers and 
strikers. These attacks constitute the most obvious violations of rights to 
organise and protest at violations of labour standards. Second, the ILO 
could take a more active role in helping to ensure that unions give voice 
to some of the worst off workers. The voucher scheme I outlined above is 
an attempt to show how this could be done. Finally, there are ways to 
ensure that monitoring and campaigns to improve labour standards pay 
more attention to workers’ interests. The ILO can monitor and audit these 
practices in order to make sure this is done. Even if such monitoring and 
campaigns do not always directly deliver improvements in labour 
standards in particular cases, there are ways to ensure that participation 
does not directly threaten workers’ jobs and incomes. Provision of 
anonymous procedures for reporting violations is one example of this.
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Another is to be more cautious about publicising violations when they are 
discovered.
The different circumstances of different countries mean that different 
parts of the proposals outlined above may be more or less appropriate in 
particular cases. Although some parts of the proposals are more robust 
and demanding than others, I have tried to show that smaller steps may 
be taken to try to alleviate domination even in the least promising cases.
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Introduction
In this final chapter, I have three main aims. First, I want to try to address 
some questions that may have been left open by the theoretical and 
practical discussions from the previous chapters. The aim is to try to bring 
together as neatly as possible the more abstract discussion from the first 
chapter and the more practical, policy-oriented discussion from the 
second one. I address five main issues here. First, I give a broad 
overview of the scheme into which the policy suggestions are supposed 
to fit. Second, I attempt to address the possible charge that my approach 
is not demanding enough. Third, I address the question of whether there 
needs to be a tighter fit between the claim that employers bear direct 
responsibility for their employees and the emphasis on the ILO as an 
institution charged with promoting better labour standards. Fourth, I 
address a worry from critics of republican political theory that preventing 
domination leads to excessive interference, particularly by states. Finally, 
I address the question of whether my approach is too narrowly focused 
on a specific example.
In the second section, I want to try to sum up the ways in which my 
approach improves on the arguments from the four main figures I looked 
at previously. Again, the aim is to try to bring these arguments together 
as neatly as possible. I restate my objections to Dryzek’s civil society 
approach, to Nagel’s statist approach, to Held’s cosmopolitan democracy 
and to Cohen and Sabel’s deliberative polyarchy. I also attempt to show 
how my arguments can answer the objections. Finally, I want to propose
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some avenues for further research. The aim here is to show that the 
various theoretical and practical suggestions made here could be 
developed as part of a broader research agenda. I look at the possible 
application of my practical suggestions to the problems faced by women 
workers. I suggest an extension of my argument about domination to 
issues of migration, asylum and citizenship. Finally, I provide a rough 
outline for empirical research that might be used to support my 
arguments about the role of local level civil society.
I) Answering some possible objections
In this first section, I will look at some issues that may have been left 
open from the previous chapters.
a) First, I have offered a rather fine grained set of proposals for a 
particular institution. It is also worth setting out the broader scheme that a 
focus on preventing domination as a priority of international justice would 
imply: to provide the woods to accompany the trees of the previous 
chapter. The first implication of my argument is that all states are required 
to be internally democratic and to create an environment in which it is 
possible for civil society organisations to function. A combination of 
competitive electoral democracy and civil society can be defended as 
ways of preventing domination by states. Electoral competition and active 
civil society help compel states to show that their policies do not impose 
arbitrary burdens on either their citizens as a whole or specific groups of 
citizens. Second, because state-citizen relationships are not the only 
morally significant relationships in which people stand, we also need to 
think carefully about how to mitigate or prevent domination in these other 
types of relationship. Taking our example, there are two main differences 
between state-citizen and employer employee relationships. First, in most 
cases employers do not face the same exit costs from the relationship as 
employees. As various commentators have argued268, wealthier 
employers (and shareholders) do not usually have basic interests at stake
268 See, for example, Barry, 2001, p. 146ff, and Shapiro, 2003, p. 44ff.
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when deciding whether to exit a particular business relationship. The 
situation is different for poor workers, particularly those in poor 
countries269. Second, employers are not usually bound by the same rules 
that apply to their employees. This contrasts with states in which, in 
principle at least, most laws apply to all citizens. These differences are 
intended to bring out the contrast between state-citizen and employer- 
employee relationships, and to emphasise the need for different 
approaches to mitigating domination in them. Third, even if states have 
greater capacity to set their own domestic policies and standards in many 
areas, international institutions can still hold states to account for their 
failure to live up to those domestic standards: Bhagwati’s example of the 
Indian government setting demanding labour standards it has no intention 
or capability of enforcing is an example of this. Furthermore, local level 
civil society groups are important in bringing these failures to light, and as 
I have argued, international institutions have an important role to play in 
supporting such groups. Internally independent civil society groups are an 
important ally for international institutions like the ILO, and I have 
attempted to show how the ILO could do more to support some of them.
In summary, the argument here is that even when states can legitimately 
set their own domestic standards in particular areas, there is a need for 
international institutions to ensure that they actually live up to those 
standards. They can do this by supporting local level civil society groups, 
including trade unions in the case of the ILO.
b) Second, this scheme may seem somewhat less demanding than the 
kind of cosmopolitan democratic institutions that Held and others 
demand. Cosmopolitans tend to criticise more limited approaches for 
being morally undemanding, particularly in the face of severe global 
poverty270. I want to answer this criticism by asking whether we need to
269 It is perhaps worth notiing that this difference between state-citizen 
and employer-employee relationships is a matter of degree. It is possible 
for the very wealthy to leave one state without great cost (see 
Sangiovanni, 2007, p. 12). However, the costs of emigration for most 
ordinary people are very high.
270 Simon Caney directs this charge at Miller (see Caney, 2002). He also 
directs the charge at Rawls (see Caney, 2001). John Tasioulas
distinguish between demandingness and appropriateness. Held’s 
cosmopolitan democracy is substantively demanding in terms of the 
goods it redistributes and in terms of the requirement that people actually 
participate on an equal footing in decisions that significantly affect them. 
However, we might respond to this by asking whether equal inclusion or 
participation is really appropriate when people have very different 
interests at stake. If a particular group of people are made especially 
worse off by the outcome of a particular decision, it is worth asking 
ourselves whether our objection to this outcome is because the people 
concerned were not given an equal chance to influence the decision or to 
participate, or whether they were given an adequate chance to participate 
in a way that allows them to protect their basic interests271. As I have 
argued, this question of whether people have had an adequate chance to 
participate requires careful attention to the circumstances that may make 
such participation costly or difficult, but I have also argued that the theory 
of domination I have described can provide a framework for assessing 
those circumstances.
c) Third, there may seem to be a gap between the agent bearing moral 
responsibility and the agent that is required to discharge that 
responsibility in the proposals I have described here. I have argued that 
the moral responsibilities that fall on employers are more demanding in 
the absence of other institutions -  particularly the state -  that are able to 
provide exit options. Employers face a more direct demand to provide 
voice to their workers in the sense of explaining why their decisions do
emphasises that principles of distributive justice such as Rawls’s duty of 
assistance are more demanding than current levels of redistribution in the 
form of international aid, but nevertheless asks whether the minimum 
Rawls sets is too low.
271 Beitz suggests a similar problem in a very brief paper called the 
“Problem of Global Democracy”. Beitz argues, “the question whether 
global governance processes should be made more democratic is ill- 
formed. We do better to begin with a view about the respects in which 
global governance processes can be unjust” (see Beitz, unpublished 
manuscript, accessed 22nd January 2009,
http://www.economvandsocietv.org/events/Beitz Cornell Precis.pdf).
Beitz does not address the question of whether participation plays a role 
in the conception of justice he has in mind.
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not arbitrarily reduce the workers’ capacities to vindicate their basic 
interests. The institutional proposals I outlined are not explicitly directed 
at employers, though; they are mainly directed at the ILO. This suggests 
that there is a rather puzzling gap between the agent bearing the moral 
responsibility (in this case, the employer) and the agent charged with 
actually carrying that responsibility out (in this case, the ILO). It is 
possible to close this gap by pointing out that the agent bearing a 
particular responsibility is not always best equipped to discharge that 
responsibility272. In the case of labour standards, it is often pointed out 
that the various schemes to monitor and raise labour standards that 
corporations set up tend to lack credibility. Even if we take the rather 
optimistic view that these schemes are a genuine attempt to monitor and 
improve labour standards, there are concerns that these schemes lack 
the independence and rigour needed to ensure that employers adhere to 
labour standards. If the various proposals described above amount to a 
more credible scheme for determining and monitoring labour standards, 
employers and firms would be under an indirect obligation to support 
such schemes. This might include, for example, contributing to the 
funding that the voucher scheme for unions would distribute, as an 
indirect way of ensuring that the ILO is able to monitor labour standards 
at the local level.
d) A fourth concern develops a common criticism of republicanism, and 
Pettit’s republicanism in particular. Several critics have pointed out that 
Pettit’s concern with potential domination can lead to an oppressive and 
overly interfering state, precisely the outcome that Pettit’s republican 
freedom seeks to avoid. The more fine-grained account of domination I 
have provided here provides us with the resources to answer this 
criticism. Because domination occurs in situations in which some people 
have limited exit options due to limited resources, the most obvious 
remedy for the threat of domination is to try to provide them with
272 As Robert Goodin points out, someone who causes an accident might 
not be well placed to help out, even if we would rightly see them as at 
fault: “When the wake from a passing speedboat capsizes my sailboat, it 
must be the responsibility of other nearby sailors rather than the long- 
gone speeder to pull me out of the water” (Goodin, 1985, p. 780).
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adequate exit options. This does not always require direct interference 
with the agent in the position to dominate. As we have seen, provision of 
exit options depends on adoption of policies that support a range of 
alternative sources of the resources people need to vindicate their basic 
interests. In the case of labour standards, the hope is that providing such 
a range of options to workers will give employers a greater incentive to 
offer better conditions in order to attract workers. The main burden of 
proof that would lie on employers would be to show that adequate exit 
options do exist for their employees, but this burden seems less onerous 
than more direct forms of interference. In the case of exit options, a 
concern with potential domination may be appropriate, given that the 
remedy itself does not necessarily involve excessive interference.
I have argued that participatory, deliberative processes are most 
appropriate when adequate exit options cannot be provided. However, it 
can be argued that participation itself can be very costly for some 
people273. Again, there is a worry that the remedy to domination here may 
turn out to be at least as costly as domination itself. The most obvious 
example is the difference in resources between employers and individual 
employees. The latter are not usually in a direct position to bring 
expensive litigation against employers who violate labour standards. 
There are a couple of points to be made in response. First, by focusing 
on exit options first, I have tried to limit the number of cases in which 
deliberation would be a strong moral requirement. Second, emphasising 
a basic requirement to protect basic interests means that the type of 
deliberation used should not itself become a source of domination. For 
example, the mechanisms employees should have to raise and remedy 
complaints against employers should not put them in a position in which 
they are likely to be dismissed or disciplined. Anonymous reporting of 
violations of labour standards is preferable to reporting in which 
managers can easily identify complainants, for example. Again, the 
general point is that participation needs to be designed with sensitivity to
273 See Miller, 2000a for discussion of some of the arguments about the 
burdens that political participation can impose.
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the possibility that certain forms of participation can themselves be 
excessively costly for those involved.
I have thus tried to steer a middle way between those who might 
advocate very strong intervention to prevent potential domination and 
those who would limit the definition of domination to actual or attempted 
arbitrary interference274. I have done so by arguing that the remedy does 
not always involve direct interference with those in a position to be 
potential dominators. Similarly, I have argued that participation can be 
designed in such a way that it does not itself threaten the basic interests 
of those who participate.
e) Finally, it may be objected that the proposals I have outlined are very 
fine grained and focused only on the response that specific institutions 
might make to specific forms of domination. In response, I believe that 
this may simply be the price we would have to pay for not directly 
pursuing a more robust form of global egalitarianism. If, as I have argued, 
inequalities of resources are a source of domination, then perhaps the 
simplest and most direct way to prevent domination is to pursue the kind 
of global egalitarianism that some contemporary cosmopolitans advocate. 
There is a range of possible objections to this, including various 
communitarian and libertarian concerns. My own main objection is the 
worry that any global institutions strong enough to pursue egalitarianism 
of this type are themselves likely to become sources of domination. My 
focus on exit options and participation is intended as a less substantively 
demanding alternative to cosmopolitan egalitarianism as a means of 
preventing domination. Although this proposal is intended to be less 
substantively demanding in terms of redistribution, it seems hard to avoid 
the conclusion that it will often be intellectually demanding. It will require 
the kind of careful attention that was shown by the activists in the case of
274 As Marilyn Friedman points out, “a state often controls behaviour by 
means of punishment or penalties. However, someone who does not 
exercise her capacity to interfere arbitrarily with others does not deserve 
to be punished or penalized by the state” (Friedman, 2008, p. 252). More 
broadly, John Ferejohn argues, “I think non-domination is a good thing, 
but, if pushed too far, it could end up intruding on so much of our Ives that 
what ordinary people call freedom (not what Pettit calls it) will be seriously 
compromised” (Ferejohn, 2001, p. 85).
the Bangladeshi sweatshops, for example, when they continued to pay 
attention to the further problems that resulted from their campaign and 
found ways to alleviate those problems by working with the people 
affected.
II) Comparing the alternatives
In this section, I want to sum up the various improvements that my 
approach offers over the various alternatives I criticised earlier in this 
thesis.
With regard to Dryzek, I want to focus on two of my main criticisms. First, 
Dryzek’s own criticisms of the state are not worked out sufficiently clearly. 
Second, he seems to take voluntary participation as a sufficient sign that 
protesting groups actually have significant interests at stake in particular 
cases. I will look at these in turn.
First, Dryzek assumes that the state is a source of oppression, but fails to 
acknowledge or address the possibility that the state might also serve to 
mitigate certain forms of oppression (or, in my terms, domination). As 
Shapiro and Young point out, this exclusive focus on the state repeats a 
basic mistake of liberal political theory. I have provided an account of 
some of the ways in which states might act to mitigate domination. In 
particular, I have focused on the way states can act to provide exit 
options to people who might otherwise be dependent on a single source 
of income. This is based on my argument that lack of exit options is one 
of the sources of domination. I have argued that the ILO as an 
international institution has a significant role to play in developing states’ 
capacities to provide such exit options, through welfare provision, 
training, and through encouragement of a diverse and open labour 
market. It is worth stressing the importance of providing a diverse range 
of possible alternative sources of income. This follows from my 
arguments about the role of limited exit options in domination. Broadly 
speaking, while states themselves have a role in trying to prevent or 
mitigate domination, they should also promote other agencies that offer
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alternative resources that people can use to vindicate their basic 
interests275.
Second, Dryzek’s claim that global civil society movements have more 
freedom to act than traditional actors neglects the moral responsibilities 
that may nevertheless fall on such agents276. As Young notes, it may be 
possible for wealthier western consumers to express their moral 
indignation at low labour standards by boycotting products, but these 
actions usually come at little personal cost to those consumers. As we 
have seen, the effect of such boycotts on workers can potentially be 
much more drastic. This suggests that the comparative freedom to act 
that the western consumers have is accompanied by a much greater 
degree of moral responsibility than Dryzek acknowledges. My 
suggestions about the role of the ILO in providing voice to developing 
country workers are partly motivated by this concern. For many such 
workers, the costs of protesting about their working conditions are 
extremely high. My proposals are aimed at making it easier and less 
costly for those workers who wish to protest about their situation to do so. 
For example, the proposal for a voucher scheme for union membership is 
intended to make it possible for the very poorest workers to join unions 
without having to bear the costs of doing so directly.
As a final point, I want to stress that I do not wish to dismiss the 
achievements of the more effective civil society campaigns, as many of 
the defenders of economic globalization tend to. The Bangladeshi child 
labour campaign referred to above is a case in which those involved did 
take considerable care to establish who might be affected by the 
campaign and ensure that those people were not harmed by the closure 
of their factories. Nevertheless, this case demonstrates the importance of 
responsibility in such campaigns. The substantive moral demands that 
the campaigners accepted in this case are much more stringent than 
Dryzek’s approach to civil society acknowledges. I argued that the theory
275 Michael Walzer makes some similar arguments in Spheres of Jusitice 
and more directly with regard to controlling state power in his essay on 
civil society. See Walzer (1983,1995).
276 As we saw above, Miller presses this point forcefully against 
advocates of global civil society. See Miller, 2000.
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of domination outlined above can be used to help identify vulnerable 
people in such cases.
Nagel’s statist objection to global justice insists that there are no moral 
demands outside the state, beyond minimal humanitarianism. The only 
institutional morality that matters is the egalitarian justice that holds 
between fellow citizens. Nagel seems to take the ideal type of a well- 
functioning state and use it as a baseline for their approach to global 
justice, yet this neglects the reality of international politics in some rather 
obvious ways. I have argued that this position misses two large points 
with regard to the differing capacities of states.
First, where states are weak or incapable, other actors may find 
themselves in a position of primary responsibility for providing people with 
basic resources. A sweatshop employer in a country with limited social 
security provision is an example of this. Nagel’s argument implies that the 
employer has no moral responsibilities beyond minimal humanitarianism.
I would argue that precisely the opposite is true. Because in this case the 
state does not provide the kinds of exit options that the sweatshop 
workers would need to avoid domination, the employer faces more 
onerous moral demands than otherwise. If the employer is not able to 
show that the workers have realistic exit options (in the form of social 
security or alternative employment), he is under a direct obligation to 
show that his decisions do not subject his employees to arbitrary 
reductions in their capacity to vindicate their basic interests. At his most 
sceptical, Nagel argues that it is not possible even to give a coherent 
account of these kinds of moral obligation. I hope to have shown that 
institutionally and morally significant relationships can exist outside the 
state. While a combination of coercion and legal authority might be shown 
to raise the distinctively egalitarian moral demands of justice, other 
significant relationships are possible. The work relationship is one 
example. It is morally significant because, for most people, work is their 
main source of the resources they need to vindicate their basic interests.
As a result, employers - particularly employers in states with weak social 
security and limited job markets - are in a position where they have the 
capacity to dominate their employees.
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Second, Nagel’s argument about the responsibilities of international 
institutions ignores large parts of the reality of what those institutions 
actually do. Part of the mandate of the ILO, for example, is to support and 
develop domestic, state-level capacities in a number of areas, from 
drafting and enforcement of labour laws to creation of employment 
opportunities. This reflects the fact that state capacities are unevenly 
distributed, but it may also reflect some awareness or acceptance of a 
moral responsibility to develop those capacities when they are weak. 
Even if we accept Nagel’s claim that states are the primary institutions of 
justice, the fact that state capacities to actually fulfil the responsibility to 
promote justice are unevenly distributed suggests a need for some sort of 
institutional cooperation to address this problem.
In general, the problem with Nagel’s account is that it does not go deeply 
enough into what states are actually for. Nagel is concerned with coercion 
and legal authority, but the moral significance of these aspects of the 
state is the role they play in enabling people to pursue other goods. It is 
possible to improve on Nagel’s argument by stressing the importance of 
states in providing the basic goods that people need to pursue their 
projects or live decent lives. However, once this move is made, it 
becomes clearer that there is a number of ways in which people can 
provide those goods. These include working relationships and various 
forms of civil society activity. One of my main points in this thesis has 
been to stress the importance of providing a range of attainable 
alternative ways of providing these resources as a way to prevent 
domination. This leads, for example, to the stress on encouraging an 
open employment market as one priority for the ILO.
As a separate point, Nagel’s focus on the state as the primary, or even 
only, site of justice neglects the role that non-state relationships also play 
in preventing domination by states. This returns us to the point about 
states promoting a diversity of institutions that was just made in the 
discussion of Dryzek above. Nagel’s suggestion that the state should 
provide a background of equality against which all other interactions can 
legitimately be seen as voluntary may lead to a very interventionist form 
of state authority. My approach is instead to focus on the provision of
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adequate exit options by a range of agencies as a means of preventing 
domination. Again, in the case of labour, the provision of an open labour 
market and an effective social security system seem to be the most 
obvious way to do this. Participation becomes particularly important when 
it is not possible to offer such options.
Held’s most recent formulations of his cosmopolitan principles place 
emphasis on a concern with the moral agency of individuals. A concern 
with domination is compatible with these cosmopolitan concerns because 
domination -  understood as interference without regard to the legitimate 
interests of those interfered with -  is itself a significant threat to moral 
agency277. However, it is notable that Held’s later work does not give any 
explicit account of whether or how democracy or political participation 
might work to prevent or mitigate arbitrary actions by states. I argued that 
the republican thinkers I have looked at can be used to generate an 
appropriate account of how the state works to do this. This extends in two 
broad directions. From Pettit (and Bellamy) we can draw an account of 
how electoral competition works to prevent arbitrary use of power by the 
state. The effectiveness of these mechanisms is limited by the scale of 
competition and by factors such as linguistic diversity, though. From 
Shapiro, we can draw an account of how the state can work to provide 
exit options from relationships that might otherwise result in domination. 
Drawing these accounts together, we can argue that if the state itself is 
subject to democratic control, it is less likely to dominate those individuals 
to whom it provides exit options.
These points can be related to Held in the following ways. First, as Held’s 
concerns about subsidiarity themselves acknowledge, we want 
democratic institutions to actually be effective. On the arguments just 
given, this points to reinforcing domestic democracy at the state level as
277 The point is to some extent acknowledged in Held’s discussions of the 
modern state and its role in facilitating autonomy: “The equal treatment of 
all before the law, and the protection of subjects from the arbitrary use of 
political authority and coercive power are sine qua non” (Held, 1995, p. 
145).
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the most likely site for effective democratic competition278. Furthermore, 
as Pettit argues, governments that are subject to domestic democratic 
control are also constrained to protect the interests of their citizens at the 
inter- and supra-national level. On this view, some of the problems faced 
by the worst off may be as much due to lack of domestic, state level 
democracy as to lack of cosmopolitan democracy. This pushes us to 
reformulate Held’s project in three ways. First, one of the main priorities 
should be the reinforcement of domestic level democracy. Second, the 
fact that not all states are well-functioning democracies means that 
citizens of such states are particularly vulnerable to actions that disregard 
their interests. Third, a concern with the interests of such citizens does 
not necessarily manifest itself in equal treatment or equal capacity to 
influence political processes. This is in part because they lack the 
background of secure welfare and institutions that would otherwise make 
such equality justifiable. Here, some version of Held’s principle of urgent 
need and avoidance of serious harm is appropriate, although I would 
modify it by emphasising that even in these cases, some form of 
participation is appropriate.
Because it places less emphasis on strong cosmopolitan institutions, this 
outline scheme is less demanding in the long run than Held’s proposals. 
Ultimately, the plausibility of my own approach depends on whether the 
arguments I have made do result in a less institutionally demanding 
programme than Held’s, and on whether the institutions I defend can be 
shown to prevent domination. The beginnings of such a case can be 
made by looking at the proposals for the ILO that I have already outlined. 
My overall preference is for a world of states that are internally 
democratic and promote a range of non-state institutions that provide 
their citizens with adequate resources and exit options. International 
institutions are needed to ensure states are willing and able to provide 
this range of institutions. This rough scheme is less demanding on
278 On this point, see also David Miller, who in an early article argued that 
electoral competition should be carried out at the state level, while local 
forms of participation should be encouraged to secure the intrinsic 
benefits of democratic participation (Miller, 1983).
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international institutions than Held’s cosmopolitanism. This is because the 
international institutions in question would mainly be charged with 
promoting and protecting individual states’ capacity to provide a range of 
resources and exit options for their citizens. They would not be as 
directly responsible for the egalitarian redistribution of resources or 
enforcement of rights as they would under Held’s scheme. I believe my 
less demanding scheme fits more closely with the ILO’s current mandate, 
in that this particular institution remains primarily concerned with states’ 
capacities to provide welfare, social security, a safe working environment 
and other work-related goods for their citizens. This is not to take an 
uncritical view of the ILO: the practical proposals I outlined would require 
the organisation to be better funded and have greater powers than it has 
at present. The proposals about providing voice for the worst off workers 
are substantively less demanding than Held’s proposals, although they 
are likely to present significant intellectual challenges in practice. The 
challenges are posed by the difficulties of deciding how much needs to be 
done to make it possible for workers to report issues such as violations of 
labour standards in particular cases. I do not think these challenges are 
insurmountable: there is already a range of possible solutions to this 
problem that ingenious defenders of labour standards and workers’ rights 
have developed. However, the fact that the circumstances that make 
participation and protest difficult for workers vary between particular 
cases is the main source of the challenges.
I have argued that the approach to domination and international 
institutions that I have defended is somewhat less demanding than Held’s 
institutional cosmopolitanism. However, it is also possible to hedge my 
bets by pointing out that even if some form of institutional
cosmopolitanism is the most plausible and attractive theory of global
justice, we would still need to think about how to construct the kind of 
institutions Held advocates in as fair and legitimate a fashion as possible. 
Given that the world is not as egalitarian as cosmopolitans would like, it is 
likely that the burdens of constructing cosmopolitan institutions are likely 
to fall unevenly on different groups. As a result, if we are interested in
constructing those institutions fairly and legitimately, we would need
some kind of principles and institutional structures to make sure that 
particular groups do not have to bear excessive or illegitimate burdens. 
Because the theory of domination I have described here is designed to 
identify those with the most urgent stakes in particular decisions, it is 
better suited to the task than the substantively egalitarian democracy that 
Held advocates.
Turning finally to Cohen and Sabel, there are two points I want to 
emphasise in order to draw a sharper contrast between my arguments 
and theirs. First, I criticised them for lack of attention to the need for 
incentives to ensure that those with urgent interests have a greater 
chance to influence decisions that affect them. The voucher scheme I 
outlined can be said to address this problem in two ways. First, it gives 
unions themselves greater incentive to pay attention to the interests of 
the worst off people in particular societies, since the scheme would 
(indirectly) provide funding or other support to unions that are attentive to 
the interests of those groups. Second, it could provide those workers with 
greater access to the influence that unions have over governments, 
employers and policy making. The scheme could thus increase the voice 
of workers both within the unions themselves and in society more 
generally.
Second, I have argued that there are good reasons for workers to play a 
greater participatory role in setting and monitoring labour standards, but 
that this requires careful attention to the specific problems of workers in 
countries that do not respect rights such as freedom of association, and 
in which workers are particularly vulnerable to employers. There is thus 
room for a high degree of contextual difference in the nature of the 
problems in particular cases, and I have argued that the ILO may be one 
of the better equipped international organisations to deal with these 
problems. Despite this contextual variation, the theory of domination 
provided here is intended as a framework for assessing particular cases. 
This approach contrasts with Cohen and Sahel's focus on inclusion, 
which, as I stressed above, does not necessarily mean participation.
Despite these objections, Cohen and Sahel's more pragmatic approach 
does have some attractions. In particular, the fact that a particular agent
281
is in a position to help in a particular case is often the result of a series of 
accidents or contingencies, but their situation nevertheless generates a 
moral obligation279. The Bangladeshi child labour case may be an 
example: the consumers’ and activists’ ability to influence the factory 
owners may be an accident of this type. In these cases, the most morally 
appropriate thing to do may be to worry how these people exercise their 
capacity to act in these particular cases, rather than to worry about how 
they people came by their capacity to act (who elected them?). Elliott and 
Freeman’s analysis of this particular case shows how it was possible for 
the activists to do more to listen to the people most directly and seriously 
affected by their campaign. Again, the theory of domination I have 
described is intended as a framework for critical analysis of these cases.
Ill) Suggestions for further research
Finally, I want to look at some areas for further research that might follow 
from the arguments developed here.
With specific reference to the labour standards issue, one broad area of 
concern and debate has been the effect of the spread of export oriented 
industries on women. Although these industries form only a fairly small 
proportion of world exports, it has been observed that the number of 
women employed in them is disproportionately high. For example, 
Bhagwati points out that in 1995, 90 per cent of the 1.2 million workers in 
the Bangladeshi garment factories were female (Bhagwati, 1995, p. 
85280). This issue is of interest for at least two reasons. First, there is a 
debate about whether the opportunity for such employment improves the 
situation of women or subjects them to harassment and dangerous 
working conditions. Defenders of these industries argue that they offer 
significant improvements over the alternatives available in the societies in
279 Jacob Levy makes this point in a recent discussion of David Miller’s 
arguments about national responsibility (see Levy, 2008).
280 Young claims that many of the workers in these factories are also 
young, from thirteen to fourteen years. See Young, 2006, p. 108.
question, and serve to increase the status and power of women281. It has 
been argued that women often choose to work in factories, even those 
with sweatshop conditions, because they provide flexible employment 
opportunities. Critics point out that women are vulnerable to sexual 
harassment and abuse at work. Some of the working conditions are 
intolerable from any moral or ethical perspective. It could also be argued 
that it is somewhat complacent to focus on relative improvements in 
women’s living conditions when the alternatives are often desperately 
bad.
The theory of domination I have described is relevant to these issues. 
The definition of basic interests I outlined above includes a minimal 
requirement for the resources necessary to function as an independent 
moral agent, because this agency is necessary to adapt one’s conception 
of a reasonably successful life according to circumstances. Although this 
conception of basic interests is sensitive to context, it still includes a 
minimal standard. It thus contrasts with the relative comparisons between 
the conditions of sweatshop workers and non-sweatshop workers that 
Wolf and Bhagwati draw. The point would not be to simply draw 
comparisons between the alternatives the workers have in their current 
society, but between the possible availability of options that would provide 
the conditions for some form of independent moral agency. This is the 
point of the stress on adequate exit options. To make the point more 
concrete, it is more plausible to argue that women will have chosen low 
paid, temporary jobs out of considerations of convenience or flexibility if 
they are in a situation where adequate alternatives are actually available 
to them.
Second, there is concern that women are generally under-represented in 
the trade union movement282. I have argued that -  at a minimum - trade 
unions are an important source of information for international institutions 
that might seek to hold states accountable to the labour standards that 
they set for themselves. Trade unions are also a source of internal 
pressure on states to set decent and realistic internal standards. It seems
281 See, for example Wolf, 2004, p. 239.
282 Spooner, 2004, discusses this problem.
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plausible to argue that these standards are more likely to reflect the broad 
needs of society -  women included -  if the unions themselves are more 
responsible and accountable to a broader cross-section of society. The 
voucher scheme for union membership that was discussed above may 
thus be relevant to the problem of including women. There is room for 
discussion about a range of adaptations that could be made to the basic 
scheme that has been outlined. Perhaps the failure of unions in some 
countries to include and represent women might be used to justify 
providing vouchers to women regardless of whether they are subject to 
domination. Alternatively, the fact that most women do seem to work in 
sectors where the violation of labour standards and other basic rights is 
particularly widespread might mean that a voucher scheme directed at 
the most vulnerable would increase the representation of women anyway. 
It has been observed that some non-union NGOs have been set up in 
response to women’s dissatisfaction at the failure of conventional trade 
unions to represent their interests. Examples of these groups include 
Women Working Worldwide and the International Gender and Trade 
Network283. It might be possible to adapt the voucher scheme to include 
these NGOs: if women feel that these kinds of organisation are likely to 
do a better job of representing them, they could have the opportunity of 
using their vouchers to support them. Alternatively, more work could be 
done to encourage the formation of unions in industries that employ 
disproportionate numbers of women. The affiliation into the International 
Trade Union Confederation of the Indian Self-Employed Women’s 
Association (SEWA) in 2006 is a relevant case study here. The ILO could 
investigate ways to encourage these developments.
There are thus two directions in which concern about the specific 
problems of women in relation to labour standards might be developed. 
First, more detailed consideration might be given to the specific problem 
of ensuring that women have adequate exit options and resources 
necessary to vindicate their basic interests. Second, the use of a voucher
283 Research into these groups is currently being carried out by Women in 
Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO). See 
http://www.wieao.org/index.Dhp (accessed 16th June 2009).
scheme to increase the voice of the most vulnerable workers in poorer 
societies could be adapted to address the specific problem of the under­
representation of women in trade union movements.
The previous section suggested some avenues for further research within 
the scope of the issue of labour standards and workers’ rights that has 
formed the central focus of this thesis. In this section, I want to broaden 
out the possibilities for further research into two other areas beyond this 
central focus. First, I want to look at the relevance of the arguments made 
here for a question regarding the status of migrants and asylum seekers. 
Second, I want to look at a possibility for broader empirical research into 
the role of local level civil society in protecting rights within states.
The first question is motivated by a question that Cohen and Sabel direct 
at Nagel. As Cohen and Sabel point out, the basic argument behind 
Nagel’s justification for limiting egalitarianism to states runs as follows: “In 
short, egalitarian justice is the internal morality of the association of 
equals that is formed by a legal order in which the subjects of the law are 
represented as its authors” (Cohen and Sabel, 2006b, p. 161). However, 
this raises the following practical question: “what happens when the state 
is populated by resident non-citizens?” (Cohen and Sabel, 2006, p. 
161n25). This question is clearly relevant to the broader issue of 
migration and asylum. There are complex moral issues at stake here, and 
a growing literature addressing the questions of the rights of migrants and 
asylum seekers to citizenship status. Clearly, this is not the place to 
address these issues in detail: I can only give an outline of how the 
theoretical approach I have described here might deal with this question.
To begin with, it is worth outlining what I think our moral intuitions would 
be with regard to the question of resident non-citizens. We expect non­
citizens such as tourists, migrants, visiting students and asylum seekers 
to obey national laws. The laws these groups are subject to are often 
coercively applied. We might also assume that they are enforced in part 
in the broad interests of those groups: they might be justified in terms of 
the way they ensure basic security and safety of such groups. Failing this, 
we might expect that compliance should not impose excessively heavy
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burdens on them. Yet Nagel’s argument seems to run into difficulties 
here. We do not generally give all these groups a right to participate in 
determining the laws -  tourists do not have the right to vote in our 
elections. Neither do they have a full claim to the benefits of our social 
security system. Yet a strong reading of Nagel’s argument suggests that 
this is what moral consistency would require. Tourists are subject to at 
least some of our laws, and thus would appear to have a reasonable 
claim to participate in determining them. Similarly, if they comply with 
those laws, they might have a reasonable claim on our social security 
system, if subjection to the law is the basis of Nagel’s rather broad 
conception of equal treatment. As far as I can tell, Nagel’s only response 
to this would be to emphasise the practical problems of, for example, 
letting tourists take part in national level politics. There does not seem to 
be any morally consistent objection to this point, despite the fact it runs 
quite sharply against our moral intuitions. Furthermore, most people 
would probably want to draw some distinction between asylum seekers 
and tourists. We set up procedures to assess the claims of asylum 
seekers and successful ones are entitled to at least some sort of claims 
on our social services, rights to work and even citizenship rights, as well 
as a reasonable assurance that their initial claims will be handled in a fair 
manner. Again, this distinction seems to fit with our moral intuitions but it 
is hard to see how it fits into Nagel’s argument.
The argument about domination would handle this problem in roughly the 
following way. The moral significance of states and other institutions is 
the role they play in ensuring people have a chance to fulfil their basic 
interests without being subject to domination. Where people have limited 
exit options, they are entitled to a form of participation that gives them the 
opportunity to be shown that these basic interests are protected. Our 
intuitive distinction between tourists and asylum seekers reflects this 
point. Tourists presumably do have exit options and are not in the country 
because they rely on its various institutions to provide for their basic 
needs. Their observance of our laws might broadly be construed in terms 
of a duty not to undermine the institutional scheme that does protect 
basic interests for citizens. Asylum seekers are presumed to be in a very
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different situation. The reason for their claim usually depends on the fact 
that they are at serious risk in their own countries and cannot expect that 
their basic interests would be adequately protected there. If the country in 
which they seek asylum is the only safe place for them, or they cannot 
afford to move between countries, it can be argued that they have limited 
exit options. This generates a claim to the kind of participation referred to: 
they have a reasonable claim to demand a form of participation that 
enables them to protect their basic interests.
This brief argument suggests that my institutional approach to domination 
and participation may be better equipped to handle the objection Cohen 
and Sabel level at Nagel. Clearly, there is much more that can be said 
here. There is a range of alternative approaches to the question of 
immigration and citizenship that could be used to criticise this basic 
argument. There are questions about the other groups I referred to -  
particularly economic migrants. There are also questions about the 
institutional requirements that this approach generates: just what sort of 
participation would give vulnerable groups a realistic chance of protecting 
their basic interests? Nevertheless, I hope to have given at least a rough 
idea of how the theoretical work done in this part of the thesis might be 
expanded beyond the example of labour standards that I looked at in 
detail here.
A different, more directly empirical avenue for research relates to the 
arguments about local level civil society made above. The general 
argument was that it is important to promote local level civil society as 
well as state level democracy wherever possible. This fits into a scheme 
in which states have greater opportunity to set domestic rules but are also 
held accountable for enforcing those rules. Local level civil society is 
important for those international institutions that monitor states’ efforts to 
live up to their own domestic standards. Again, promoting local level civil 
society in non-democratic states may be the best alternative we have in 
some cases, However, I would stress that it is a poor second best to a
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broader emphasis on promoting democracy at a range of levels, including 
both local level civil society and states284.
The basic claim behind this approach is that societies with both effective 
state level institutions and a robust and active civil society ought to 
perform better in terms of protecting citizens’ basic interests. The 
justification for this claim is that, especially in an unequal world, certain 
groups are particularly likely to have urgent interests at stake and need 
effective means to publicise those interests and demand that they are 
protected. Civil society groups are one of the most important institutional 
means for doing so285. In order to test this claim, it would be worth trying 
to group states according to whether they are democracies and whether 
they have robust civil societies, and then assess their performance with 
reference to protecting basic interests. Using the Freedom House survey 
as a rough guide might produce the following comparisons:
Country Electoral
Democracy?
Civil Society?
Vietnam No No
Cambodia No Yes
Indonesia Yes No
Taiwan Yes Yes
284 The approach I favour is thus broadly similar to the wide ranging 
approach to democracy promotion that Larry Diamond advocates in his 
book Developing Democracy (see Diamond, 1999).
285 This basic argument bears a broad resemblance to Philip Pettit’s 
arguments for a two-dimensional model of democracy. Pettit’s basic 
argument is that elections partly serve to protect broad general interests, 
but that non-electoral mechanisms are also needed to protect more 
specific interests in particular cases. The main difference between my 
approach and Pettit’s approach is that the two dimensional approach 
focuses on constitutional measures to protect specific interests as the 
second, non-electoral dimension. In my view, civil society groups are 
more important, although I think they need to be assessed more 
rigorously in terms of their claims to represent specific interests (see 
Pettit, 1999, 2000, 2005).
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This is a crude scheme that is intended to draw a contrast between 
countries that allow some forms of active civil society but are not electoral 
democracies, countries that are electoral democracies but have various 
restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly that restrict the 
effectiveness of civil society, and countries that allow for both elections 
and a robust and active civil society. If a study of this kind is to support 
the theoretical arguments made above, we might hope to find that 
countries with both elections and active civil society would do significantly 
better in terms of measures of protection of basic interests. Of course, a 
lot more needs to be said about the detail of how such a study might be 
carried out, and about the way it could be shown to support the 
arguments made here. However, if the outcome was that countries with 
both electoral democracy and civil society perform better in terms of 
protecting basic interests, this might be taken as support for the general 
arguments outlined here. It might be used to support a general advocacy 
for developing both electoral democracy and local level civil society that 
could be used to influence democracy promotion efforts by states and 
international institutions.
I have thus outlined three possible directions for further research. The 
first develops some implications and suggestions for a specific aspect of 
the example of labour standards. It suggests ways in which the 
theoretical arguments and practical suggestions made above might be 
applied to the specific problems faced by women workers in developing 
countries. In particular, it attempts to address the issue of the under­
representation of women in some trade union movements, even though 
women often make up a large majority of the workforce in sectors such as 
garment manufacturing. The second proposal suggests a way in which 
the theoretical arguments about domination made above might be applied 
to the question about citizenship that Cohen and Sabel direct at Nagel. It 
suggests that the theory of domination outlined here provides a more fine 
grained set of criteria for deciding which groups have a legitimate claim to 
participation in state-level decision making procedures. The third proposal 
suggests a wide ranging study that could be used to give support for the 
general argument about the role of civil society in protecting basic
interests. It takes up the suggestion that a combination of local level civil 
society and electoral democracy is the best way to protect such interests, 
and suggests a way in which this thesis might be given empirical support.
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Conclusion
By way of conclusion to this thesis, I want to set out in a basic and 
abstract form some of the key claims that were made. The aim of this is 
to demonstrate how the claims fit together, and to clarify the role of the 
main components of republicanism that, it is claimed, can contribute to 
debates about global justice. I will do this by setting out the claims a fairly 
formal way. The claims are made in several stages, each of which is 
made up of a number of steps.
Stage I: Universal Moral Concern
i) Individual human beings are objects of equal, general and
ultimate moral concern.
This is the basic statement of moral cosmopolitanism.
II) Stage II: The State and Basic Interests
i) All human beings require the fulfilment of a set of basic
interests in order to live a decent and successful life,
compatible with a similar life for all other human beings.
ii) Fulfilment of some basic interests requires institutional 
relationships.
iii) Institutional relationships involve control over resources and 
capacities needed to fulfil basic interests.
iv) Control over resources needed to fulfil basic interests puts 
some people in a position to act in ways that reduce other 
people’s capacity to fulfil the full set of basic interests.
v) Institutional relationships pose a potential threat to people’s 
capacity to fulfil their basic interests.
vi) The state is an institutional relationship that controls resources 
that are necessary for people to fulfil their basic interests.
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vii) States can provide resources directly or indirectly, by allowing 
and enabling other institutional relationships.
viii) States can be made to act in ways that take account of the 
interests of their citizens through democratic, electoral 
competition.
ix) The mechanisms that make democratic, electoral competition 
effective in controlling the state are limited in scale.
x) Democratic states are institutional relationships that can 
provide for the basic interests of their citizens without posing a 
threat to their ability to fulfil those basic interests.
This argument brings in the main republican points in the following two 
ways. First, steps iii, iv and v in particular bring in Shapiro’s concerns 
about the way institutional relationships involve control over important 
resources that people need in order to live a decent or worthwhile life. 
Step iv also brings in Pettit’s concern with domination, in that domination 
involves actions that do not take regard of people’s interests. Second, 
step vii brings in Pettit’s concern with mechanisms that are designed to 
ensure that institutions effectively track the interests of those affected by 
the institutional relationship.
The steps in this argument thus aim to explain how democratic control of 
the state works to enable people to access resources necessary to fulfil 
their basic interests while preventing the state from acting in ways that 
threaten those basic interests. They yield the main claim of this stage of 
the argument: democratic states are a reasonably effective means for 
enabling their citizens to fulfil their basic interests, but the mechanisms 
that prevent such states from acting in dominating or arbitrary ways are 
limited in scope.
Ill) Stage III: Democratic States and Other Societies
The second stage of the argument makes a claim about the role of states 
in their interactions with other states.
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i) States that are subject to internal democratic control will pursue 
the interests of their citizens in their interactions with other 
societies.
ii) States that are subject to internal democratic control will aim to 
prevent other states from acting in ways that are contrary to the 
interests of their own citizens.
iii) A world in which all states are democratic would prevent 
actions by states that are against the interests of individual 
citizens.
iv) A world in which all states are democratic is compatible with 
cosmopolitan concern for the basic interests of all individuals.
Stages I and II set out in a formal way a basic claim to the effect that a 
world in which all states were domestically democratic would be 
reasonably effective in fulfilling a general cosmopolitan concern with the 
interests of all individuals.
IV) Stage IV: Differences Between States
The next stage makes a basic claim about the capacities of different 
states.
i) Not all states are effective, internally well functioning 
democracies
ii) Not all states are institutional relationships that can provide for 
the basic interests of their citizens without posing a threat to 
their ability to fulfil those basic interests.
V) Stage V: Non-state Institutional Relationships
This stage makes a claim about the possibility of institutional relationships 
within states that are not internally well functioning democracies.
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i) States that are not effective, internally well-functioning
democracies can still allow and enable institutional 
relationships that involve control over resources that are 
necessary for citizens to fulfil their basic interests.
ii) States that are not effective, internally well-functioning
democracies are not always able to prevent those who control 
those relationships from acting in ways that undermine people’s 
ability to fulfil their basic interests.
The basic claims made in the four stages above can be combined to give 
us a rough outline of the main institutional -  and, from the republican 
perspective outlined here, moral -  problem that this thesis has attempted 
to address. The problem is as follows:
In the absence of effective democratic states, people stand in 
institutional relationships upon which they depend for resources 
and capabilities necessary to fulfil their basic interests, but which 
are not subject to effective controls that prevent domination.
This basic problem motivates both the criticisms developed in the 
chapters on Dryzek’s version of the global civil society approach, on 
Nagel’s version of statism, on Held’s version of cosmopolitanism and on 
Cohen and Sabel’s deliberative polyarchy. To summarise the main points:
Chapter Summaries
Dryzek
My main objection to Dryzek’s position is that his account of global 
discursive democracy focuses on the effectiveness of democratic 
movements without acknowledging their considerable capacity to act 
without regard for the interests of those they affect. This is a fairly 
straightforward case of dominium in Pettit’s terms. The main weakness of
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Dryzek’s case is that he neglects the role of states that are themselves 
subject to democratic control in preventing or mitigating this type of 
domination. So, to illustrate again, the sweatshop example emphasised 
the worry about the effects of boycotts and campaigns when those 
campaigns lead to the closure of factories upon which workers depend for 
fulfilment of their basic interests.
The discussion of Dryzek raises the issue of how we decide when actions 
impact on people. Dryzek’s claims about participatory democracy make 
more sense against the background of a state that can work to protect 
people and ensure that they are not vulnerable to the kind of dominium 
that was identified in the chapter. However, the absence of such a state 
for many people at the global level is the relevant disanalogy between the 
domestic and global levels of politics.
Nagel
Nagel argues that subjection to coercive laws that are collectively 
authorised is the source of claims of justice, and of egalitarian justice in 
particular. My main objection to this argument is that it focuses too 
narrowly on these institutional features of states without asking what the 
broader moral function of states is.
The second part of the chapter set out a concern about the claim that 
institutions states set up are legitimate because of their connection to 
internally legitimate or just states. This argument might be appropriate in 
a normative sense, but Nagel also applies it to existing international 
politics. The argument above about the possibility of institutions people 
depend on for provision of basic interests existing outside the state 
(Stage IV) indicates why this is an unconvincing move: there are 
relationships outside the state upon which people depend for provision of 
basic interests, and this is the source of the moral significance of those 
relationships.
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Held
Held’s recent work has affirmed versions of the cosmopolitan principles 
that are central to many other contemporary accounts of 
cosmopolitanism. These principles were also endorsed at the beginning 
of this thesis. The endorsement, coupled with Held’s focus on democratic 
participation, may make it harder to distinguish the approach taken here 
from Held’s cosmopolitanism. The key difference is in the way Held 
moves between his moral and his political principles. Although Held does 
sometimes refer to interests, I argued that a substantive conception of 
interests is much more important in moving from the moral to the 
institutional claim. More specifically, an understanding of how different 
institutional relationships affect people’s ability to vindicate their basic 
interests helps understand the relevance of political principles like 
democratic equality in preventing and mitigating domination in those 
relationships. I argued that Held is not sufficiently sensitive to this issue. 
He continues to endorse a principle of equal influence over decisions that 
is not appropriate in situations in which people have very different 
interests at stake. I argued that the absence of effective democratic 
states at the global level makes this situation a likely one. This also 
makes Held’s principle of urgent need and avoidance of serious harm 
more pertinent at the global level, but it is not clear what Held’s position 
on participation in these cases is. I argued that participation in such cases 
may be appropriate, but needs careful attention to the basic interests that 
are at stake in these cases.
Cohen and Sabel
Cohen and Sabel’s approach to the issue of global democracy uses the 
European Union as a model for the institutional approach they advocate. 
As a union of reasonably well functioning democratic states, the EU is 
potentially an empirical model and even test case for the claim made in 
stage III. However, Cohen and Sabel’s application of the EU model to the
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global level Is inappropriate for several reasons. First, it is not clear that 
their claims about deliberative polyarchy as a source of legitimacy would 
hold in a society in which decision makers are not at least at some point 
held accountable to elected officials or through electoral processes. Yet 
they nevertheless attempt to generalise their argument to cases where no 
such accountability exists, for example, to authoritarian states. Second, 
they do not acknowledge the role of electoral competition in democracies 
as a source of control that helps ensure that decision makers track the 
interests of affected people. This has been an important theme in recent 
republican discussions of democracy. While it was argued here that 
electoral competition is unlikely to work at the global level, other 
institutional forms of competition might be used to ensure decision 
makers have an incentive to track the interests of those they affect. Third, 
Cohen and Sabel generalise from the EU by using claims about the 
absence of a state that are unclear and sometimes confused. While the 
absence of a state may refer to areas that are legitimately free from direct 
state interference, it may also refer to areas in which states either fail to 
fulfil their responsibilities or have broken down altogether. The latter is the 
situation that seems to generate more obvious cause for moral concern, 
since the state is not providing for basic interests in these cases and 
citizens are thus left in a position of vulnerability.
The common thread linking these different arguments is a concern about 
the absence of the state. States are institutional relationships that can 
provide either the resources or the conditions for providing the resources 
that people need to fulfil their basic interests. Furthermore, the arguments 
about competitive electoral democracy are the basis for demonstrating 
how the states’ potential for arbitrary use of its power can be brought 
under some control. This is the point of the last four stages set out above.
I have argued that none of the approaches addressed above deal 
adequately with institutional relationships in which the state as an 
adequate and effective background is absent. However, the labour 
standards example provides examples of the kinds of vulnerability that 
people in such institutional relationships face.
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The constructive parts of this thesis set out an account of the substantive 
principles that provide a link from a cosmopolitan claim about individual 
humans as objects of moral concern to institutional principles that help fill 
out what it might mean to actually treat people as objects of such 
concern.
The basic argument was that cosmopolitan concern with the well being of 
all people requires individual moral agency. People should be able to 
pursue projects that contribute to their own well being and that of those 
around them in responsible ways, where responsibility requires attention 
to the basic needs of others. Individual well being is thus at the basis of 
this attempt to fill out the substantive content of a cosmopolitan position, 
and moral agency follows from there. It would be possible at this point to 
give a further account of the resources, goods or capabilities that 
contribute to individual moral agency. However, I argued that one reason 
for not doing so too explicitly is that we should compel decision makers to 
give an account of how their decisions affect individuals, and leaving the 
substantive content of the idea of individual moral agency fairly open is 
one way to do this. This is the point of the substantive minimalism 
referred to in the chapter above. Substantive minimalism thus gives 
expression to the republican idea of forcing institutions to track the 
interests of those they affect by forcing them to give an account of how 
their decisions and actions take account of the basic interests of those 
affected.
The institutional proposals set out in the second constructive chapter on 
domination above are intended to address a world in which the claims 
made in stage IV and V of my outline are true. That is, they are intended 
to address problems that occur in a world in which not all states are able 
or willing to provide for or to protect their citizens’ basic interests. If it is 
possible for citizens of such states to stand in other relationships upon 
which they depend to vindicate their basic interests, those relationships 
are of direct and often urgent moral concern. Looking at the literature on 
labour standards and sweatshops demonstrates how such relationships
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are possible. Many states that are too poor or weak to provide adequate 
social security for their citizens are nevertheless able to guarantee 
sufficient stability for companies to set up operations on their territory. 
Many states that are too undemocratic or unjust to make such provision 
are able to do the same. The citizens of such states often find themselves 
in employee-employer relationships upon which they depend for a range 
of resources necessary to provide for their basic interests. In the terms of 
this thesis, these people are vulnerable to domination. They are in a 
position in which they have limited exit options, and control of resources 
necessary for the vindication of some basic interests is used to reduce 
their capacity to vindicate a full set of basic interests. This is a matter of 
cosmopolitan concern, even when the employers are not the multi­
national corporations often referred to in discussions of globalization.
The second chapter on domination canvassed some possible remedies to 
the situation of the workers. These fell into two groups: those designed to 
provide exit, and those designed to provide voice. The former focused on 
ways of providing alternative ways of vindicating basic interests so that 
employees are not dependent on a single source. The latter focused on 
giving workers greater capacity to demand that decision makers show 
that decisions affecting them are not arbitrary and actually do take 
account of their basic interests. Provision of exit options is preferable in 
some circumstances, for a number of reasons. It can generate 
opportunities for those who wish to use voice to do so through bargaining. 
It also takes account of the fact that protest and use of voice often have 
costs for the people involved and that it may be better not to impose such 
costs given the context. However, in some cases it is not possible for 
affected people to be given adequate exit options. In this case, forms of 
voice are required. The rationale for this is to try to ensure that different 
options are at least explored and brought to light. As was stressed 
already, such forms of voice need to be sensitive to the fact that 
participation involves significant costs for the people involved, and to find 
ways to minimalize or redistribute such costs.
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I focused on the ILO as the main institution that is appropriate to deal with 
the reforms I proposed as means to deal with domination in the domain of 
work relations. Improvements in labour standards, poverty reduction, 
improved social security provision and improved participation by workers 
in decisions that affect them were all advocated as means to provide 
workers with a combination of exit options and voice. The reasons for 
focusing on the ILO had little directly to do with domination. The main 
reasons for focusing on that institution related to the fact its mandate and 
current practices mean that it has relevant concerns in this area and 
because some of the tools it has at its disposal -  technical assistance in a 
number of areas, moral suasion and in some cases sanctions -  make it 
one of the most appropriate international institutions to deal with the 
problems identified.
In the final chapter on domination, I examined some further criticisms of 
my basic argument, looked again at my arguments in relation to the other 
positions looked at in the body of the thesis, and finally set out some 
avenues for further research.
The five main objections I looked at were addressed in the following way. 
My concern throughout the thesis has been with what Pettit might call a 
form of dominium: domination that occurs in non-state relationships. In 
this case, the dominium examined occurs between individuals and groups 
when states are weak, absent, or otherwise unable to fulfil their normal 
duties. I argued that some forms of participation are appropriate, but a 
strong democratic form of participation on an equal footing is unlikely to 
be. Second, failure to include people in participatory processes can itself 
be seen as a failure to treat them as independent moral agents -  and is 
thus a violation of their basic interests. Beyond this, failure to include 
them makes it less likely that their interests will be taken into account. 
Again, I would stress that the aim here is not to make participation 
conditional on the likelihood that it will protect basic interests. Rather, 
because the failure to enable people to participate means decisions are 
less likely to track their basic interests, we need to find ways to ensure 
participation is possible even for the most vulnerable, and to ensure that
such participation is not itself excessively onerous. In practice, this may 
involve designing institutions in such a way that representatives have 
more effective incentives to defend the basic interests of those they 
represent. The voucher scheme outlined is an example of this. Third, a 
concern with preventing domination requires institutions that are 
appropriately situated to deal with specific problems. While employers 
bear responsibility for their workers, it is not always clear that they are 
well placed to discharge that responsibility. In such cases, other 
institutions, such as the ILO in my example, may be more appropriate. 
Fourth, the institutional design challenge is to find ways of alleviating 
domination that do not themselves make it difficult for people to vindicate 
their basic interests. This is partly expressed, for example, in Shapiro’s 
conception of democracy as a subordinate foundational good. The 
challenge for institutional design is to find ways of preventing domination 
that enable people to vindicate their basic interests. Fifth, I argued that 
the fine-grained approach taken here is appropriate if we do not advocate 
a strong form of institutional global egalitarianism. Again, the argument is 
that limits to such a strong institutional scheme are set by the limits of 
electoral democracy to control state institutions.
The arguments offered in the final three chapters of the thesis also 
constitute a more positive response to the positions criticised earlier. In 
response to Dryzek, I would argue that a concern with the kind of 
domination outlined provides more robust criteria for assessing the 
effects of global civil society campaigns. It provides outline criteria by 
which to judge the vulnerability of those likely to be affected by such 
campaigns. As a result, it provides a starting point for understanding how 
to pursue those campaigns more responsibly. It also, it should be 
stressed, helps us distinguish between existing campaigns in terms of the 
way they take basic interests into account. This was illustrated using the 
Bangladeshi sweatshop campaign.
In regard to Nagel, my approach emphasises more strongly the role of 
international institutions in ensuring that states are able to fulfil their basic 
responsibility to protect basic interests. Again, the ILO’s focus on
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technical assistance to states reflects this priority, although I also 
stressed the importance of building the capacity of civil society actors as 
a component of functioning domestic democracies.
Against Held, my argument was that his project needs to be recast in 
terms of developing state level democratic capacities. This point is 
acknowledged in his more recent work on globalization. However, the 
existing unevenness of the distribution of state capacities leaves some 
people more vulnerable than others. This leads to a greater need to focus 
on criteria such as Held’s seventh principle, relating to serious harm and 
urgent need. I argued that institutions like the ILO have a number of 
policy options that could be used to ensure that workers in states that do 
not do enough to protect their basic interests have at least some exit 
options and voice. Taking account of the situation of such people is a 
necessary part of Held’s cosmopolitan argument, since Held’s 
cosmopolitan principle requires moral concern with all individuals.
Finally, Cohen and Sabel’s account was criticised for not taking account 
of differences in state capacity, and for not being sufficiently attentive to 
the situation of groups with urgent interests at stake. My proposals are 
broadly directed at addressing these issues. Again, the ILO has policy 
options and a mandate to address state capacities in the relevant areas 
discussed here, as well as to act in ways that might give exit options and 
voice to some of the most vulnerable workers.
My last task in the final chapter was to set out some avenues for further 
research. The first of these related to the position of women in the global 
economy. Improvements in economic prosperity and employment 
prospects can be argued to make a significant contribution to women’s 
well being. However, it is also argued that women tend to be 
disproportionately represented in types of employment that make them 
vulnerable to exploitation and to the types of domination outlined here. 
This includes work in the informal sector in particular. It can also be 
added that these sectors are weaker in terms of union representation. As 
a result, there is an argument for adjusting the institutional proposals 
outlined in order to take better account of these problems.
A second avenue for research would be to apply the arguments made 
here to issues of asylum and immigration. A rationale for the limited size 
of states was provided here, but this argument was made in terms of a 
more general cosmopolitan concern for all individuals. When not all states 
can or do fulfil their responsibilities to individuals, it can be argued that 
some individuals find themselves subject to a form of domination. They 
have basic interests at stake and limited options for fulfilling those 
interests. This policy area thus raises questions that are relevant for the 
theory of domination outlined here.
Thirdly, empirical research on the role of civil society in preventing 
domination could be extended. The main arguments in this summary and 
the thesis as a whole have been directed towards situations in which 
states are generally weak or incapable, and the role of non-state actors in 
such cases. However, it is also argued that civil society plays a central 
role in functioning democracies. An argument that developed the 
theoretical perspectives defended in this thesis would look more closely 
at the role of civil society in preventing domination. It might, for example, 
ask how civil society works to protect basic interests in cases where 
otherwise well-functioning democratic institutions fail individual citizens or 
groups.
Some Key Concerns
Having summarised the main arguments made in this thesis, I now want 
to turn back to the schematic outline of the claims provided at the 
beginning of this conclusion. Although that scheme did not provide a full 
account of all the details of the arguments made in the thesis as a whole, 
setting out these arguments in a schematic way does have the advantage 
of drawing out some of the more controversial claims made in the thesis. I 
would identify the claims made in stage II, steps viii, ix and x and stage 
III, i, ii, iii, and iv as the most controversial. I want to turn to these claims 
again to look at ways to reinforce them.
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Stage II
xi) States can be made to act in ways that take account of the
interests of their citizens through democratic, electoral
competition.
xii) The mechanisms that make democratic, electoral competition
effective in controlling the state are limited in scale.
xiii) Democratic states are institutional relationships that can 
provide for the basic interests of their citizens without posing a 
threat to their ability to fulfil those basic interests.
This set of claims was defended on the basis of republican claims about 
the role of electoral competition in protecting people’s interests (Pettit, 
1999, 2000, Bellamy, 2008, Shapiro, 2003). They were used to draw a 
distinction between moral and political equality, but also to develop an 
argument about the limited scale of democratic competition. I picked out 
these two examples because they seem most plausible claims about the 
limits of effective democracy. There are three strategies for strengthening 
the basic claims here. First, they could be related back to the more 
general political science literature on democratic competition. Relevant 
theoretical and empirical studies here would include Schumpeter (1942), 
Miller (1983), Powell (2000), Medearis (2001), Mackie (2003). Developing 
the claims about linguistic diversity would take us into different literature: 
as noted in the chapter on Held below, this could include Kymlicka (1999) 
Carothers (2007) and Van Parijs (2007) as starting points. It would at the 
very least have to address some of the more obvious counter-examples, 
such as Switzerland, Belgium and Canada. One way to do this would be 
to emphasise the strength of democracy within the separate linguistic 
communities that make up these states, and to ask about how far 
democracy really works across their boundaries.
A second strategy if we wanted to develop the argument about the limited 
scale of democratic communities would make use of the literature that 
claims that a common culture is a necessary background to an effective, 
functioning democracy. This includes work by Miller (1995, 2008), Taylor
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(1996) and Barry (1999). Critical responses include Stepan (1998), 
Mason (2000) and Abidezah (2002). There are two comments worth 
making about this strategy, though. First, it again has to face familiar 
counter-examples such as Belgium, Canada and India. The argument is 
perhaps somewhat harder than in the language case though, since 
countries like Britain are made up of different national cultures that share 
the same language. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it is not 
necessarily incompatible with a broadly cosmopolitan moral outlook. A 
cosmopolitan could argue that it is a matter of moral concern about each 
individual that he or she be a member of a political community that is 
subject to adequate democratic control. The national identity claim is then 
largely instrumental to this purpose, and nationality is of less direct moral 
significance.
I have set out some strategies for reinforcing my argument about the role 
of democratic states in a broadly cosmopolitan moral order. Individual 
humans are objects of general, equal and ultimate moral concern, but 
states are means to make good on that concern. Again, I have presented 
arguments derived from republicanism about why this is so, and looked at 
some strategies for reinforcing those arguments. A third, more radical, 
approach might abandon these republican claims about the limits of 
democracy but retain the concern about domination. On this view, the 
main contribution of republicanism would be the observation that 
individuals are subject to relationships in which control of resources 
needed to vindicate certain basic interests leads to a reduction in the 
capacity to vindicate the full set of basic interests. On this view, absence 
of genuinely cosmopolitan institutions would be identified as the problem 
that such individuals face, and we would need to proceed more directly to 
the construction of such institutions. There are a couple of major 
problems with this approach, though. First, it would still need to give an 
account of how to bring the cosmopolitan institutions themselves under 
some sort of control. It might argue for some sort of direct or 
representative democratic control of such institutions. The second 
problem is that the more radical proposal runs counter to the positions of 
a wide range of contemporary cosmopolitans. Many such cosmopolitans
accept Kant’s worries about the prospect of a world government 
degenerating into a soulless despotism and are thus suspicious of strong 
global institutions along the lines of a world state. Other cosmopolitans 
have come up with a range of moral justifications of various limited forms 
of state sovereignty and provided ways to accommodate basic 
cosmopolitan concerns with sovereign states. It should be noted that 
these arguments have not generally addressed the issue of whether 
states have a role to play in controlling supra-national institutions. 
Nevertheless, these arguments suggest that this third version of the 
argument is too radical. Concern with the form of domination Pettit calls 
imperium requires institutional structures that can be brought under some 
sort of control, and arguments about how to bring a world government 
under control must address the concerns about scale and linguistic 
diversity set out here.
Stage III
i) States that are subject to internal democratic control will pursue 
the interests of their citizens in their interactions with other 
societies.
ii) States that are subject to internal democratic control will aim to 
prevent other states from acting in ways that are contrary to the 
interests of their own citizens.
iii) A world in which all states are democratic would prevent 
actions by states that are against the interests of individual 
citizens.
iv) A world in which all states are democratic is compatible with 
cosmopolitan concern for the basic interests of all individuals.
The steps made in this claim are perhaps more likely to draw direct 
criticism from cosmopolitans. The argument holds that the long term way 
to deal with the democratic problems of inter- and supra-national 
institutions is to make them more directly accountable to citizens of 
states. This argument would require that delegates to inter- and supra-
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national institutions should be more directly accountable to elected 
officials, or that elected officials should themselves be delegates to such 
institutions. Luis Cabrera has recently advanced a version of this 
proposal, arguing for more direct representation by parliamentarians in 
the WTO (Cabrera, 2007). In similar vein to Held, Cabrera argues for 
direct elections of representatives to the WTO in the long term, but his 
short term proposal is consistent with the approach outlined here. The 
question is whether the short term version of Cabrera’s proposal could 
work. Cabrera cites an episode in which the Clinton administration 
embarked on a vigorous campaign to counter public opposition to 
NAFTA, eventually resulting in a shift in favour of the proposal to join the 
association. Cabrera states,
The episode helps to demonstrate that rather than viewing a 
retreat to supra-state elite policy formation as the only feasible 
response to potential collective economic irrationality induced by a 
narrow protectionism, elites can respond by providing public 
outreach and education in efforts to actually persuade the potential 
beneficiaries of liberalization (Cabrera, 2007, p. 226).
This example raises two questions about how to reinforce the basic stage 
III claims. First, what other kinds of examples would provide similar 
empirical evidence in relation to this claim? The obvious place to start 
looking would be the large literature on the democratic legitimacy or 
deficit of the EU and other international institutions (for a starting points, 
see Grimm, 1995, Bellamy and Castiglione, 2000, Greven and Pauly, 
2000, Moravcsik, 2004). A comparative study might look at the extent to 
which elites in different institutions actually do work to try to change public 
opinion. Second, what kinds of institutional reforms might be necessary to 
ensure that domestic democratic representatives actually work to 
represent the interests of their constituents in international institutions? 
One possibility would be to select delegates from groups of local 
parliamentarians, so that in Britain, for example, Welsh, Scottish and 
English MPs might be sent as delegates to international institutions.
These arguments suggest ways in which the stage III argument could be 
reinforced and defended. Support for them would reinforce the claim that
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the long term aim should primarily be domestic democratization of states 
as a step to democratization of international institutions, rather than more 
direct democratization of such institutions.
Drawing out this step III claim is also relevant to the claim about the less 
ideal cases of societies that are not already democratic, which was the 
central focus of the practical proposals about the ILO discussed in the 
final chapters below. It suggests that a criterion for deciding which NGOs 
or unions to support would be their degree of support for eventual state 
level democratization. This reflects an approach found in Thomas 
Carothers’ work on democracy promotion strategies, with regard to civil 
society: “The basic idea is that where a democratic transition is seriously 
faltering due to disinterest or resistance from the power structure, the 
most likely source of pro-democratic values or initiatives is likely to be 
civil society” (Carothers, 1997, p. 21). Carothers cites a democracy- 
promotion programme in Kenya as an example. The general aim is to 
keep popular support of democracy alive even in the face of official 
intransigence or opposition by supporting pro-democracy elements in civil 
society.
The general point of this example is that a clearer idea of where we are 
ultimately going (which I drew here from my stage III claim) would give us 
a somewhat clearer set of criteria for distinguishing between different 
NGOs and unions, based on their degree of support for domestic level 
democratization.
I have summarised the arguments made in the individual chapters and 
provided a general overview of the argument made in the thesis as whole 
in this conclusion. Providing a schematic overview of the general 
argument has helped to draw out areas that could be given further 
support through theoretical analysis or empirical evidence. This provides 
scope for further work. However, drawing together this argument should 
also have made clear that the main focus of this thesis has been on the 
situation of people in non-democratic societies and on the possibility that 
they might be more vulnerable to others to the kind of domination outlined
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here. I have tried to argue throughout that attention to their situation is a 
matter of moral concern during a transition to a more just cosmopolitan 
order. Even if it is not possible to offer them the full benefits of such an 
order, it is a matter of moral concern that a transition to such an order 
takes as much account as possible of their interests, and of their basic 
interests in particular. I have tried to argue that this is morally required 
from the perspective of cosmopolitanism, and to suggest some ways of 
doing so.
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APPENDIX ONE: The History, Structure and 
Powers of the ILO286
I) History
The ILO was created in 1919 in the aftermath of the First World War. The 
organisation’s constitution was based on ideas tested in the International 
Association for Labour Legislation, and the constitution was adopted by 
the post war Peace Conference, becoming Part XIII of the Treaty of 
Versailles.
There were three motives for founding the ILO. The first was a 
humanitarian concern about the conditions of workers. Second, a political 
motivation was a worry that the poor conditions of workers could lead to 
social unrest. Third, the possible effect of social reform on production 
costs led to an economic concern that countries failing to improve labour 
standards would have an unfair advantage over their competitors and 
thus generate incentives to keep standards low.
The ILO was the only former League of Nations institution to survive 
World War II. In 1946, it became a specialized agency of the UN. It was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1969. Its current Director General, 
Juan Somavia, is the ninth person to hold the office.
II) Structure
The ILO’s tripartite structure makes it unique among UN agencies. Rather 
than being purely intergovernmental, its governing body consists of 
representatives of governments, employers and workers’ organizations. 
In 2003, there were 175 member states and 700 delegates. Each state 
has two government representatives, one employer representative and 
one worker representative.
286 This summary is drawn from the outlines of the ILO in Elliott and 
Freeman (2003, chapter 5 ), and from the ILO website, 
http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/Origins_and_history/lang~ 
en/index.htm, accessed 05 June 2009).
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There are 28 government members in the ILO’s executive Governing 
Body. Of these, 10 are permanently held by states considered to be of 
chief industrial importance. At present, these 10 states are Brazil, China, 
France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK and the USA. The 
remaining members of the governing body are elected every three years. 
There are 14 employer and 14 worker members of the Governing Body, 
elected respectively by the employer and worker delegates.
The International Labour Conference is held annually in Geneva. At the 
conference, conventions and recommendations are adopted. Decisions 
about general policy, work programme and budgets are also made. Each 
country’s four delegates has an equally weighted individual vote.
The International Labour Office is the ILO secretariat and provides 
advisory services, research and technical co-operation.
The Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations (CEACR) reviews and comments on the application 
and ratification of ILO conventions. Its reports also comment on other 
areas of law and practice that are relevant to the application of 
conventions in member states.
The Conference Committee on the Application of Standards identifies 
problem cases from the CEACR and invites delegates from the countries 
involved to address these problems in the open session of the 
International Labour Conference.
The Committee on Freedom of Association has the power to deal with 
complaints about this fundamental right, observation of which is a 
constitutional obligation. Any member state can be subjected to a 
complaint regarding this right, regardless of whether it has ratified the 
convention on freedom of association.
Ill) Powers
i) Standards and Conventions
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The ILO sets labour standards by adopting conventions that form the 
International Labour Code. Adopted conventions are considered 
international labour standards. Governments are not obliged to ratify 
conventions, and are thus only legally bound by the conventions they 
have voluntarily ratified. However, when a set number of governments do 
ratify a convention, they become treaties in international law.
Although the ILO’s International Labour Code covers a wide range of 
issues, in 1998 the International Labour Conference adopted a 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. This 
declaration four core labour standards that all members are obliged to 
respect, and eight conventions associated with realising them. The four 
standards relate to freedom of association and collective bargaining, 
discrimination, forced labour and child labour. The majority of states have 
now ratified the conventions relating to these core labour standards.
After taking office in 1999, Juan Somavia set up a “Decent Work” 
strategy. This programme promotes the four core labour standards and 
job creation; supports the development of social security; calls for 
dialogue between management, workers and government and expands 
the ILO’s International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour 
(IPEC).
ii) Supervision and Publicity
ILO conventions require members to report annually on ratified 
conventions and to report on failures to ratify conventions. Since the 1998 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles, the ILO also requires countries 
that have not ratified the conventions associated with the core labour 
standards to report on their efforts to promote them, and encourages 
employers and workers representatives to comment on these reports.
The main direct purpose of the reports is to expose violations of labour 
standards. However, other organizations such as the OECD and the 
International Confederation of Free Trades Unions also use ILO reports 
to identify violations of labour standards and human rights.
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iii) Technical Assistance
ILO technical co-operation aims to implement the Decent Work agenda 
introduced by Somavia. The aim is to implement the agenda at national 
level by assisting in the design and application of development 
programmes. More than half of the ILO’s resources are devoted to 
technical co-operation and more than 1,000 programmes are conducted 
in 80 countries. Support and funding comes from around 60 donor 
institutions, including the EU, UN, World Bank, regional development 
banks and employers’ and workers’ associations.
Technical assistance has been decentralised to local level offices. There 
are four main categories of co-operation: labour law reform; labour 
administration and dispute settlement; organization and collective 
bargaining for workers’ and employers’ associations and awareness 
raising. In the late 1990’s, contributions from donor nations to the ILO 
increased. Much of this money went to the IPEC programme on child 
labour.
iv) Enforcement
Although the ILO is frequently criticised for lacking enforcement powers, 
Article 33 of its Constitution allows it to take any action it deems suitable 
to ensure compliance with ratified conventions or with the conventions 
relating to freedom of association (which are binding regardless of 
ratification). In practice, this means the ILO can authorise governments to 
impose sanctions -  only the UN Security Council can require that 
sanctions be imposed by member governments. Further articles (24 and 
26) allow worker or employer organizations and official delegates to bring 
complaints against governments for failures to comply. The Governing 
Body will try to resolve such complaints informally, but Article 33 authority 
provides authority for sanctions if no resolution is found through informal 
processes. Although the wording of Article 33 was altered in 1946, this 
change did not rule out the possibility of economic or other sanctions 
against members.
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It is argued that the main reason the ILO does not use its sanctioning 
powers against members is that it is not believed that sanctions will be 
effective against members that lack genuine commitment to domestic 
change. The ILO’s first ever invocation of Article 33 was in 2000 against 
Burma, over forced labour. Discussions of the effectiveness of this 
invocation can be found in Howse, Langille and Burda (2006) and Elliott 
and Freeman (2003).
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APPENDIX TWO: Gathering Empirical Data on 
Violations of Labour Standards
This table is a summary of some of the available data on violations of 
trade union rights and labour standards among ILO member states. It is 
by no means intended as an exhaustive study, or as an attempt to 
establish correlations between different factors such as democracy or 
level of development and violations of rights and standards. Rather, it has 
three purposes. First, it aims to give a very rough empirical overview of 
the extent of violations, based on some of the available measures. 
Second, it aims to indicate some of the ways in which trade union rights 
and labour standards have been measured and give an overview of some 
of the observed problems with such measurements. Third, the table 
indicates some possible avenues for research into correlations between 
different factors.
Column B categorises countries according to their status on Freedom 
House’s annual Freedom in the World survey for 2008. Freedom House 
rates countries as Free (F), Partly Free (PF) or Not Free (NF). These 
categories are based on a combined average of scores for ratings in two 
categories: political rights and civil liberties. These scores are obtained by 
rating each country on ten political rights and fifteen civil liberties 
questions. Each question is marked from one to four, and the totals are 
used to determine a county’s rating. Qualitative information for the ratings 
is drawn from a variety of sources referred to in the survey, although 
Freedom House does not use ILO data on issues such as child labour or 
freedom of association. Ratings such as these may be useful in 
determining whether there is a connection between domestic democracy 
and compliance with labour standards.
Column C covers the Freedom House scores for the three questions on 
Associational and Organizational Rights. Each question is given a score 
out of four, with zero representing the lowest and four the highest degree 
of protection of rights. These scores are relevant to the union rights and 
labour standards issue because the Associational and Organizational 
Rights questions explicitly include questions about the presence of free
trade unions and effective collective bargaining. Kucera (2004b) suggests 
using the more general Civil Liberties score for countries, because the 
Civil Liberties questions include references to other issues relevant to 
concerns about labour standards, such as exploitation of workers and the 
economic rights of women. The advantage of the narrower focus is that it 
allows for the possibility of establishing a link between freedom of 
association and organization and other rights. A broader focus could, 
however, provide background information for an examination of union 
rights in particular.
Column D provides rankings from the UN’s Human Development Index 
for 2008. The index is itself a rough guide to development levels that 
combines measures of life expectancy, literacy, educational attainment 
and GDP per capita. Use of an index like this could establish links 
between levels of development and observation of labour standards. 
Kucera includes GDP per capita in his study for similar reasons.
Column E collects the weighted scores for Kucera’s trade union rights 
index. Data was collected for the period from 1993-1997. 37 criteria were 
used to classify types of violation of rights to freedom of association and 
collective bargaining. Weightings were used to indicate severity of 
violations. Scores are from one to ten, with lower scores indicating higher 
degrees of violation of trade union rights. Data is drawn from the ILO’s 
reports from the Committee on Freedom of Association, from the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions Annuai Survey of 
Violations of Trade Union Rights and from the U.S. State Department’s 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.
These scores are relevant to the labour standards issue, since they cover 
issues such as intimidation, murder, harassment and dismissal of trade 
union members and officials. However, as Kucera notes, high numbers of 
violations of union rights may indicate vibrant and effective unions that 
authoritarian states wish to suppress, while low scores may indicate that 
unions are weak and effectively suppressed.
Column F indicates whether countries have ratified all of the conventions 
relevant to the ILO’s four Core Labour Standards. Rodrik (1996) used 
ratification of these core standards, although both Rodrik himself and
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Block (2005) acknowledge that ratification of the core standards is a poor 
measure of observance of those standards, since many countries that 
have ratified the conventions are unwilling or unable to enforce them. 
Columns G, H, I and J gather data from an attempt to provide quantitative 
measures of countries’ de facto performance in implementing the four 
core labour standards (Cuyvers and Van Den Bulcke, 2005). This is an 
experimental study that gathers data from a previous analysis (Cuyvers, 
Van Den Bulcke and Wijaya, 2001). The authors focus on the ILO’s four 
core labour standards, freedom of association (G), freedom from child 
labour (H), freedom from gender discrimination (I) and freedom from 
forced labour (J). Scores are from 0 (low level of compliance) to 1 (high 
level of compliance). These scores are composed of weighted averages 
of two distinct scores. The first measures “formal” compliance, drawn 
from documents on ratification and reporting on the ILO conventions. The 
second measures “real” compliance. Information on such compliance is 
drawn from ILO reports, U.S. State Department Reports and ICTFU 
reports. 79 countries are covered.
This study provides a more fine-grained analysis of violations of specific 
rights. As the authors note, some surprising results, such as the fact 
Myanmar was not rated as the worst violator in terms of forced labour, 
were found. However, the authors stress that their measurements of 
violations were based on rules of thumb for interpreting written sources, 
and emphasise the difficulty of providing quantitative data. The study is in 
part an experiment in designing a social development index rather than 
an exhaustive survey of the most recent data on labour standards 
violations. Compared to the other studies, the range of countries covered 
is quite small.
Overall, the empirical sources examined here should be treated with 
caution. They are not exhaustive or detailed surveys. Several of the 
authors refer to both a lack of sufficient data and a lack of established 
methods of analysis. This is presumably compounded by the fact that 
many authoritarian countries repress or inhibit the very organizations that 
might gather data on standards. Nevertheless, some of the surveys 
produce surprising results about violations and compliance in specific
countries. They indicate that violations of labour standards and union 
rights are persistent problems. They also indicate possible patterns of 
factors that might be studied in further detail. Finally, they provide 
pointers to more specific violations that could be studied in relation to the 
context of the country in question.
A B C D E F G H I J
Afghanistan PF 4 N/A 0 N
Albania PF 8 H /0 .8 0 7 5 .49 Y
Algeria NF 6 M /0 .7 4 8 5 .79 Y
Angola NF 6 L /0 .4 8 4 6 .69 Y
Antigua F 12 H /0 .8 3 0 Y
Argentina F 11 H /0 .8 6 0 2 .56 Y
Arm enia PF 5 M /0 .7 7 7 Y
Australia F 12 H /0 .9 6 5 7 .4 4 N 0 .7 9 0 .84 0 .9 0 .89
Austria F 12 H /0 .9 5 1 10 Y
Azerbaijan NF 3 M /0 .7 5 8 9 .1 Y
Bahamas F 12 H /0 .8 5 4 8 .95 Y 0 .79 0 .9 6 0 .77 N/A
Bahrain PF 3 H /0 .9 0 2 7 .14 N 0.7 0 .93 0 .63 0 .84
Bangladesh PF 6 M /0 .5 2 4 1.73 N
Barbados F 12 H /0 .8 8 9 8 .65 Y
Belarus NF 0 H /0 .8 1 7 3 .98 Y
Belgium F 12 H /0 .9 4 8 9.1 Y
Belize F 11 M /0 .77 1 4 .5 9 Y
Benin F 12 L /0 .45 9 8 .2 Y
Bolivia PF 10 M /0 .7 2 3 1.43 Y
Bosnia PF 8 H /0 .8 0 2 Y
Botswana F 10 M /0 .6 6 4 7 .44 Y
Brazil F 10 H /0 .8 0 7 3 .83 N 0 .79 0 .87 0 .84 0 .78
Brunei NF 3 H /0 .9 1 9 N
Bulgaria F 11 H /0 .8 3 4 6 .24 Y
Burkina Faso PF 9 L /0 .37 2 8 .5 Y
Burundi PF 5 L /0 .38 2 7 .44 Y
Cambodia NF 6 M /0 .5 7 5 5 .94 Y 0 .78 0 .76 0 .6 2 0 .92
Cameroon NF 3 M /0 .5 1 4 3 .08 Y
Canada F 12 H /0 .9 6 7 8 .65 N 0 .85 0 .94 0 .7 8 0 .73
Cape Verde F 11 M /0 .70 5 7 .44 N
CAR PF 6 L /0 .35 2 6 .69 Y
Chad NF 4 L /0 .38 9 3 .23 Y
Chile F 12 H /0 .8 7 4 5 .86 Y
China NF 2 M /0 .7 6 2 0 N
Colombia PF 6 M /0 .7 8 7 0 Y 0 .4 0 .76 0 .87 0 .86
Comoros PF 6 M /0 .5 7 2 6 .84 Y
Congo NF 7 M /0 .6 1 9 6 .24 Y
DRC NF 5 L /0 .361 2 .93 Y
Costa Rica F 11 H /0 .8 4 7 2 .56 Y 0 .7 6 0 .78 0 .78 0 .94
Cote D 'Ivoire NF 4 L /0 .431 5 .34 Y
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Croatia F 12 H /0 .8 6 2 6 .77 Y 0 .77 0 .97 0 .87 0 .94
Cuba NF 1 H /0 .8 5 5 0 N
Cyprus F 12 M /0 .9 1 2 8 .65 Y
Czech Rep F 12 M /0 .8 9 7 7 .29 Y
Denm ark F 12 H /0 .9 5 2 8 .2 Y
Djibouti PF 5 M /0 .5 1 3 Y
Dominica F 12 M /0 .7 9 7 Y
Dominican
Rep F 11 M /0 .7 6 8 4 .2 9 Y
Ecuador PF 11 H /0 .8 0 7 2 .78 Y
Egypt NF 2 M /0 .7 1 6 4 .5 9 Y
El Salvador F 8 M /0 .7 4 7 2 .78 Y 0 .67 0 .9 0 .78 0 .94
Equatorial
Guinea NF 0 M /0 .7 1 7 0 Y
Eritrea NF 0 L /0 .44 2 9 .55 Y
Estonia F 12 H /0 .8 7 1 8 .05 Y
Ethiopia PF 3 L /0 .38 9 2 .33 Y 0 .76 0 .43 0 .5 8 N /A
Fiji PF 4 M /0 .7 4 3 5 .19 Y
Finland F 12 H /0 .9 5 4 9 .55 Y 0 .79 1 0 .9 4 0 .9 4
France F 12 H /0 .9 5 5 8 .95 Y
Gabon PF 6 M /0 .7 2 9 9 .1 N
Gambia PF 6 L /0 .47 1 8 .2 Y
Georgia PF 7 M /0 .7 6 3 9 .55 Y 0 .71 0 .79 0 .72 0 .93
G erm any F 12 H /0 .9 4 0 9 .47 Y
Ghana F 11 M /0 .5 3 3 7 .89 N
Greece F 11 H /0 .9 4 7 9 .1 Y 0 .79 0 .85 0 .81 0 .8 7
Grenada F 9 M /0 .7 7 4 Y
Guatem ala PF 8 M /0 .6 9 6 2 .48 Y 0.8 0 .66 0 .55 0 .8
Guinea-Bissau PF 8 L /0 .38 3 8 .35 N
Guinea NF 5 L /0 .42 3 6 .99 Y
Guyana F 10 M /0 .7 2 5 8 .65 Y
Haiti PF 6 M /0 .52 1 6 .24 N
Honduras PF 8 M /0 .7 1 4 3 .08 Y 0 .85 0 .65 0 .7 0 .88
Hungary F 12 H /0 .8 7 7 6 .8 4 Y
Iceland F 12 H /0 .9 6 8 9 .1 Y
India F 10 M /0 .6 0 9 5 .34 N
Indonesia F 9 M /0 .7 2 6 0 .98 Y 0 .67 0 .92 0 .59 0 .7 6
Iran NF 2 M /0 .7 7 7 0 N 0 .69 0 .76 0 .5 4 0 .95
Iraq NF 3 N/A 0 N
Ireland F 12 H /0 .9 6 0 10 Y 0 .79 1 0 .8 4 0 .9 5
Israel F 12 H /0 .9 3 0 6 .69 Y
Ita ly F 12 H /0 .9 4 5 9 .55 Y 0 .79 0 .97 0 .83 0 .93
Jamaica F 9 M /0 .7 7 1 8 .5 Y
Japan F 10 H /0 .9 5 6 6 .39 N
Jordan PF 5 M /0 .7 6 9 6 .69 N
Kazakhstan NF 4 H /0 .8 0 7 6 .24 Y 0 .79 0 .82 0 .8 7 0 .9 2
Kenya PF 9 M /0 .5 3 2 4 .4 4 N
Kiribati F 12 N /A N
Republic of
Korea F 11 H /0 .9 2 8 2 .93 N 0 .58 0 .97 0 .74 0 .63
Kuwait PF 6 H /0 .9 1 2 3 .53 N
Kyrgyzstan PF 7 M /0 .6 9 4 Y
Lao PDR NF 1 M /0 .6 0 8 0 N
Latvia F 12 H /0 .8 6 3 9 .1 Y
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Lebanon PF 8 M /0 .7 9 6 5 .34 N
Lesotho F 7 L /0 .4 9 6 5 .19 Y
Liberia PF 8 L /0 .3 6 4 0 N
Libya NF 0 H /0 .8 4 0 0 Y
Lithuania F 11 H /0 .8 6 9 6 .8 4 Y 0 .79
Luxembourg F 12 H /0 .9 5 6 9 .5 5 Y
Macedonia PF 7 H /0 .8 0 8 Y 0 .79
Madagascar PF 8 M /0 .5 3 3 8 .35 Y
Malawi PF 8 L /0 .45 7 5 .04 Y
Malaysia PF 5 H /0 .8 2 9 2 .18 N *
Marshall
Islands F 11 N/A N
Mali F 9 L70.391 7 .59 Y
Malta F 12 H /0 .8 9 4 9 .55 Y 0 .69
Mauritania PF 8 M /0 .5 5 7 5 .34 Y
Mauritius F 12 H /0 .8 0 2 6 .39 Y
Mexico F 9 H /0 .8 4 2 2 .63 N 0 .82
Moldova PF 6 M /0 .7 1 9 Y
Mongolia F 10 M /0 .7 2 0 7 .14 Y
Montenegro PF 10 H /0 .8 2 2 Y
Morocco PF 6 M /0 .6 4 6 3 .68 N 0 .47
Mozambique PF 7 L /0 .3 6 6 Y
M yanm ar NF 0 M /0 .5 8 5 0 N
Namibia F 12 M /0 .6 3 4 7 .59 N
Nepal PF 6 M /0 .5 3 0 6 .39 N
Netherlands F 12 H /0 .9 5 8 9 .55 Y
New Zealand F 11 H /0 .9 4 4 9 .1 N 0 .67
Nicaragua PF 7 M /0 .6 9 9 6 .09 Y 0 .88
Niger PF 8 L /0 .37 0 6 .99 Y
Nigeria PF 8 L /0 .49 9 2 .03 Y
Norway F 12 H /0 .9 6 8 8 .65 Y
Oman NF 3 H /0 .8 3 9 7 .89 N
Pakistan NF 4 M /0 .5 6 2 2 .78 Y
Panama F 11 H /0 .8 3 2 5 .19 Y
Papua New
Guinea PF 9 M /0 .5 1 6 8 .65 Y
Paraguay PF 8 M /0 .7 5 2 2 .33 Y
Peru F 8 M /0 .7 8 8 2 .03 Y 0 .87
Philippines PF 8 M /0 .7 4 5 1.95 Y 0 .69
Poland F 12 H /0 .8 7 5 8 .2 Y
Portugal F 12 H /0 .9 0 0 10 Y
Q atar NF 2 H /0 .9 0 6 0 N
Romania F 11 H /0 .8 2 5 4 .2 9 Y
Russia NF 4 H /0 .8 0 6 3 .98 Y
Rwanda NF 3 L /0 .43 5 0 Y
St Kitts and
Nevis F 12 H /0 .8 3 0 Y
Saint Lucia F 12 H /0 .8 2 1 N
Saint Vincent
and the
Grenadines F 11 M /0 .7 6 6 Y
Samoa F 10 M /0 .7 6 0 Y
San Marino F 12 N/A Y
Sao Tom e and F 10 M /0 .6 4 3 Y
0 .79  0 .92  
0 .8 2  0 .79
1 0 .71
0 .85  0 .7 6
0 .8 7  0 .54
0 .97  0 .91  
0 .88  0 .61
0 .7 6  0 .71  
0 .91  0 .92
0 .9 2
0 .78
N/A
0 .85
0 .87
0.88
0 .85
0 .8 4
0.73
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Principe
Saudi Arabia NF 0 H /0 .8 3 5 0 N
Senegal F 10 M /0 .5 0 2 5 .94 Y
Serbia F 11 H /0 .8 2 1 Y
Seychelles PF 9 H /0 .8 3 6 Y
Sierra Leone PF 8 L /0 .32 9 7 .59 N
Singapore PF 3 8 .2 N *
Slovakia F 12 H /0 .8 7 2 8 .2 Y
Slovenia F 12 8 .05 Y 0 .6 4 0 .82 0 .92
Solomon
Islands PF 9 M /0 .59 1 7 .44 N
Somalia NF 0 N/A 0 N
South Africa F 12 M /0 .6 7 0 5 .49 Y
Spain F 12 H /0 .9 4 9 8 .05 Y 0 .79 1 0 .82
Sri Lanka PF 8 M /0 .7 4 2 6 .09 Y 0 .85 0 .98 0 .92
Sudan NF 3 M /0 .5 2 6 0 N
Surinam e F 11 M /0 .7 7 0 9 .55 N
Swaziland NF 3 M /0 .5 4 2 3 .23 Y
Sweden F 12 H /0 .9 5 8 9 .55 Y 0 .79 0 .97 0 .93
Sw itzerland F 12 H /0 .9 5 5 9 .55 Y 0 .9 4 1 0 .76
Syria NF 0 M /0 .7 3 6 0 Y
Tajikistan NF 4 M /0 .6 8 4 Y
Tanzania PF 7 M /0 .5 0 3 6 .69 Y
Thailand NF 5 M /0 .7 8 6 5 .04 N 0 .45 0 .85 0 .61
Tim or-Leste PF 7 L /0 .48 3 N
Togo NF 6 L /0 .47 9 5 .49 Y 0 .78 N/A 0 .52
Trinidad and
Tobago F 11 H /0 .8 3 3 Y
Tunisia NF 2 M /0 .7 6 6 6 .54 Y
Turkey PF 7 M /0 .7 9 8 0 .68 Y 0 .81 0 .73 0 .64
Turkm enistan NF 0 M /0 .7 2 8 N
Tuvalu F 12 N/A N
Uganda PF 6 L /0 .49 3 6 .09 Y
Ukraine F 10 M /0 .7 8 6 5 .04 Y
UAE NF 3 H /0 .9 1 0 0 N
UK F 12 H /0 .9 4 2 4 .1 4 Y
USA F 11 H /0 .9 5 0 4 .7 4 N 0 .67 0 .97 0 .64
Uruguay F 12 H /0 .8 5 9 8 .65 Y
Uzbekistan NF 0 M /0 .70 1 9 .1 N
Vanuatu F 11 M /0 .6 8 6 N
Venezuela PF 6 H /0 .8 2 6 6 .92 Y
Vietnam NF 2 M /0 .7 1 8 0 N
Yemen PF 4 M /0 .5 6 7 5 .04 Y
Zam bia PF 8 L /0 .45 3 2 .48 Y
Zim babw e NF 2 N/A 4 .4 4 Y
0 .94
0.88
0 .72
0 .94
0 .94
0 .87
0 .76
0 .93
0.73
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